Chapter 61
Hellenistic Pseudo-Caesar LatinMarcellus was much stronger in infantry forces; for the legions he had were veteran ones, tested in many campaigns. Cassius relied on the loyalty rather than the valour of his legions. Consequently when the two camps had been pitched over against one another and Marcellus had selected a position suitable for a stronghold which might enable him to prevent the enemy troops from getting water, Longinus was afraid of being shut up by a virtual blockade in territory controlled by others and hostile to himself; and so he silently set out from his camp by night and marched swiftly to Ulia, a town which he believed to be loyal to himself. There he pitched his camp so close to the walls of the town that not only its natural position—for Ulia is situated on a lofty mountain—but also the actual fortification of the city made him safe on all sides from assault. Marcellus pursued him and pitched his camp over against the enemy camp as close to Ulia as he could. When he had appreciated the nature of the ground, he had inevitably to resort to the very tactics to which above all he wanted to resort, namely refraining from an engagement—and had there been an opportunity for engaging he could not have held in check his excited troops—and at the same time not allowing Cassius to roam too far afield, to prevent more communities from suffering the fate of the inhabitants of Corduba. By siting strongholds at suitable points and carrying his field-works in a continuous ring round the town, he hemmed in Ulia and Cassius with entrenchments. But before these could be completed, Longinus sent out his entire cavalry force, in the belief that it would stand him in very good stead if it stopped Marcellus from collecting fodder and corn, whereas it would prove a great handicap if, shut up by blockade and rendered useless, it used up precious corn.