Book 8

WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for a long time they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers, who had escaped from the very scene of action, and gave them a correct account of it; not crediting that their forces could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced of it, they were angry with those of the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition; (as though they had not voted for it themselves;) and were enraged with the soothsayers and reciters of oracles, and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had put them on hoping that they should subdue Sicily.

Every thing, indeed, on every side distressed them; and after what had happened, fear and the greatest consternation overwhelmed them. For they were at once weighed down by the loss which every man individually, as well as the whole state at large, had experienced, by the destruction of so many heavy-armed, and horsemen, and troops in the flower of their youth, like which they saw they had none left; and at the same time being aware that they had no competent number of ships in the docks, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for their vessels, they were at present without hope of saving themselves. They thought, too, that they should have their enemies in Sicily directly sailing with their fleet against the Piraeus, especially after they had gained such a victory; and that their foes at home, then doubly equipped on all points, would surely now press them with all their might, both by land and by sea, and their own allies with them in revolt.

But nevertheless it was determined, that, as far as their present resources allowed, they ought not to submit, but to equip a fleet, by whatever means they could, providing by contribution both timber and money; and to put matters on a secure footing amongst the allies, especially in Euboea: and, moreover, to reform every thing in the city, with a view to greater economy, and elect a council of elders, who should deliberate beforehand on their present measures, as there might be occasion.

And through their excessive fear at the moment they were ready, (as is the people's fashion,) to be orderly in every thing. Having thus determined, they acted accordingly, and so the summer ended.

The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even f no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected, severally, that they might have attacked them also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labours.

But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer.

The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to their resources, would in all probability be with them in great force with the spring.

And thus being on every account full of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they would both be released in future from all dangers, like that which would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if they had won Sicily in addition to their other dominion; and that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy n safety the supremacy over the whole of Greece.

Agis, their king, set out therefore immediately, during his winter, with some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for their fleet; and having turned in the direction of the Malian gulf, and carried off, on the ground of their long-standing enmity, the greater part of the exposed property of the Oetaeans, he exacted money for the ransom of it; and also compelled the Achaeans of Pthiotis, and the other subjects of the Thessalians thereabouts, (though the Thessalians remonstrated with him, and objected to it,) to give both hostages and money; the former of which he deposited at Corinth, and endeavoured to bring their countrymen over to the confederacy.

The Lacedaemonians also issued to the states a requisition for building a hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Boeotians at five and twenty each; that of the Phocians and Locrians together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians, at ten; and that of the Megareans, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians at ten. They were also making all other preparations, with the intention of proceeding immediately to war at the very commencement of spring.

The Athenians too, as they had determined, were preparing during this same winter for building ships; having contributed towards the supply of timbers, and fortified Sunium, that their corn-ships might have a safe passage round; while they also evacuated the fort in Laconia, which they had built in that country when they were sailing by it for Sicily; and with a view to economy retrenched all their other expenses, whatever any where appeared to be useless expenditure; and, above all, kept their eye on the allies, to prevent their revolting from them.

While both parties were carrying out these measures, and engaged in preparation for the war, just as when they were commencing it, the Euboeans, first of all, sent during this winter an embassy to Agis, to treat of their revolting from the Athenians. He acceded to their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthus, to come from Sparta and take the command in Euboea. Accordingly they came with about three hundred of the Neodamodes, and he began to prepare for their crossing over.

But in the mean time some Lesbians also came to him; for they, too, wished to revolt. And as the Boeotians supported their application, Agis was persuaded to defer acting in the cause of Euboea, and made preparations for the revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes as a commander, who was to sail to Euboea; while the Boeotians promised them ten ships, and Agis the same number.

These measures were undertaken without the authority of the Lacedaemonian state; for as long as Agis was at Decelea, and his forces with him, he had power both to send troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy soldiers and money. And at this time the allies obeyed him, one might say, much more than the Lacedaemonians in the city: for he was feared, because he went every where in person with a force at his command. He, then, furthered the views of the Lesbians. The Chians and Erythraeans, on the other hand, who were also ready to revolt, made their application, not to Agis, but at Sparta.

There went with them also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was governor of the sea-coast under king Darius, son of Artaxerxes. For Tissaphernes also was inviting the Lacedaemonians to co-operate with him, and promised to furnish them with supplies.

For he had lately been called on by the king for the tribute due from his government, for which he was in arrears, as he could not raise it from the Greek cities because of the Athenians. He thought, therefore, that he should both get in his tribute more effectually, if he reduced the power of the Athenians; and at the same time should gain for the king the alliance of the Lacedaemonians; and either take alive, or put to death, as the king had commanded him to do, Amorges, the natural son of Pisuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of Caria. The Chians and Tissaphernes, then, were negotiating this business in concert.

About the same time Calligitus son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from their country, and living at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedaemon, being sent by Pharnabazus to bring a fleet despatched to the Hellespont; and that he himself, if possible, might, for the sake of the tribute, cause the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians—the same object as Tissaphernes had in view—and gain for the king, by his own agency, the alliance of the Lacedaemonians.

While these negotiations were severally carried on by each party, by the emissaries both of Pharnabazus and of Tissaphernes, there was great competition between them at Lacedaemon, the one striving to prevail on them to send a navy and army to Ionia and Chios first, the other, to the Hellespont.

The Lacedaemonians, however, acceded with a very decided preference to the application of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades was also co-operating with them, being the hereditary and very intimate friend of Endius, one of the ephors; for which reason also his family had a Lacedaemonian name, in consequence of this friendship;

for Endius was called the son of Alcibiades.

However, the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to ascertain whether they had as many ships as they said, and whether their city corresponded with the representations of its high character: and when he brought them word back that what they heard was true, they straightway took the Chians and Erythraeans into alliance, and resolved to send them forty ships, as there were already there (according to the statement of the Chians) not less than sixty.

Of these they themselves at first intended to send ten, with Melancridas, who was their high admiral; but afterwards, an earthquake having occurred, instead of Melancridas they determined to send Chalcideus, and instead of the ten ships to equip but five in Laconia. And thus the winter ended, and the nineteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

The following summer, when the Chians straightway urged them to despatch the fleet, and were afraid that the Athenians might get intelligence of their measures, (for all parties sent their embassies without their knowledge,) the Lacedaemonians sent three Spartans to Corinth, to haul the ships as quickly as possible across the isthmus, from the opposite sea to that on the side of Athens, and to give orders for them all to sail to Chios, both those which Agis was preparing for Lesbos, and the rest. Now the total number of the ships belonging to the allied states that were there was thirty-nine.

Calligitus, then, and Timagoras, acting in behalf of Pharnabazus, did not join the rest in the expedition to Chios, or give, to forward the despatch of the fleet, the money which they had brought with them, namely, five and twenty talents; but they intended to sail afterwards by themselves with a fresh armament.

Agis, on the contrary, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were determined to send to Chios first, did not himself maintain any different view; but the allies assembled at Corinth, and held a council, when they resolved to sail first to Chios, with Chalcideus as commander, who was equipping the five vessels in Laconia; then to Lesbos, with Alcamenes in command, (the same person as Agis intended to appoint;) and, lastly, to go to the Hellespont, where Clearchus, son of Ramphias, was appointed to the command.

But they determined to take only half the ships across the isthmus first, and let these sail off immediately; that the Athenians might not attend to those which were setting out, so much as to those which were being conveyed across after them.

For in this case they were making their expedition openly, as they imputed to the Athenians a want of power to oppose them, because no numerous fleet belonging to them was yet visible. And so, according to their resolution, they immediately took across one and twenty ships.

But when they were urgent for setting sail, the Corinthians were not disposed to accompany them before they had kept the Isthmian festival, for which that was the time. Agis expressed to them his willingness that they (according to what they urged) should not break the Isthmian truce, but that he should make the expedition on his own responsibility.

When, however, the Corinthians did not agree to this, but a delay was caused in the matter, the Athenians the more easily gained intelligence of the designs of the Chians; and sending Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them with the fact, and on their denying it, commanded them to send with them some ships, as a pledge of good faith in their alliance.

Accordingly they sent seven. The reason of the ships being sent was, that the majority of the Chians were ignorant of the negotiations; while the few who were privy to them were both unwilling at present to incur the hostility of their commons, before they had gained some strength, and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to come, since they had so long delayed.

In the mean time the Isthmian games were being celebrated, and the Athenians (the sacred truce having been proclaimed) went to attend them; and thus the designs of the Chians became more evident to them. When they returned, they immediately took measures that the fleet might not put out from Cenchrea unobserved by them.

After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with one and twenty ships under the command of Alcamenes; and the Athenians, having at first advanced against them with an equal number, then began to retreat towards the open sea. When the enemy did not follow them far, but drew back, the Athenians likewise returned; for they had the seven Chian vessels in the number of those with them, and did not consider them trustworthy.

Afterwards, having manned others, so as to make in all thirty-seven, while the enemy were coasting along, they chased them into Piraeus, in the Corinthian territory. This is a desert port, on the extreme borders of Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but collected the rest, and brought them to anchor.

And now, when the Athenians both attacked them by sea with their ships, and had landed on the shore, there was a great disorder and confusion; and the Athenians severely damaged most of their ships on the beach, and killed Alcamenes their commander; whilst some also fell on their own side.

After parting, they posted a sufficient number of ships to keep watch over those of the enemy, and with the rest came to anchor at the small island

[opposite the mouth of the harbour]; on which, as it was not far off, they proceeded to encamp, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement.

For the Corinthians, too, had joined the Peloponnesians on the day after the battle, coming to the succour of the ships; and not long after, the rest of the people in the neighbourhood also. But when they saw that to keep guard over them in so desert a spot was a difficult service, they were at a loss what to do, and thought of burning the ships; but afterwards they determined to draw them up on shore, and station themselves by them with their land forces, and keep guard until some favourable opportunity of escape presented itself.

Agis also, on receiving intelligence of this, sent to them a Spartan, namely Thermon. Now news had first been taken to the Lacedaemonians that their ships had put to sea from the isthmus, (for Alcamenes had been told by the ephors to send a horseman when that took place,) and they immediately wished to despatch their five ships, with Chalcideus in command, and Alcibiades with him. Afterwards, when they had resolved on this, the news of their fleet taking refuge in Piraeus reached them; and being disheartened, because they had failed in their first operations in the Ionian war, they no longer thought of sending the ships from their own country, but even of recalling some that had previously put out to sea.

When Alcibiades knew this, he again persuaded Endius and the rest of the ephors not to shrink from the expedition; telling them that they would have made their voyage before the Chians heard of the disaster which had befallen their fleet; and that he himself, when he had once reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt, by acquainting them both with the weakness of the Athenians and the forwardness of the Lacedaemonians; for he should be thought more credible than others.

To Endius himself he also represented in private, that it would be a glorious thing to have caused by his own agency the revolt of Ionia, and to have brought the king into alliance with the Lacedaemonians, instead of that honour being earned by Agis; (for with him he happened to be at variance.)

He, then, having prevailed on the rest of the ephors, as well as Endius, put out to sea with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and they proceeded on their voyage with all speed.

About this same time also, the sixteen Peloponnesian vessels in Sicily which with Gylippus had assisted in bringing the war to a conclusion, were on their return; and after being intercepted near Leucadia, and roughly handled by the seven and twenty Athenian ships which Hippocles son of Menippus commanded, on the look-out for the ships from Sicily, the rest of them, with the exception of one, escaped from the Athenians, and sailed into harbour at Corinth.

With regard to Chalcideus and Alcibiades, while they were on their voyage, they seized all they met with, to prevent any tidings of their approach being carried; and after first touching at Corycus, and leaving them there, they themselves having previously had an interview with some of the Chians who were in co-operation with them, and being urged by them to sail up to the city without sending any notice beforehand, they thus came upon the Chians unexpectedly.

Accordingly the greater part of them were astonished and dismayed; while it had been arranged by the few, that the council should be assembled just at the time. And when speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, telling them that many more vessels were sailing up, and not acquainting them with the fact respecting their fleet being blockaded in Piraeus, the Chians revolted from the Athenians, and immediately after them the Erythraeans.

After this they sailed with three vessels and induced Clazomenae to revolt also. The Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the continent, and began to fortify

Polichna, in case they might want it as a place to retreat to from the island on which they lived. They, then, having revolted, were all engaged in raising fortifications and preparing for the war.

News of the revolt of Chios quickly reached Athens, and considering that the danger which had now encompassed them was great and evident, and that the rest of the allies would not remain quiet when the most important state had changed sides; with regard to the thousand talents which throughout the whole war they had earnestly desired not to meddle with, they immediately rescinded, in consequence of their dismay, the penalties attaching to any one who proposed to use them, or put such a proposal to the vote; and passed a decree for taking them, and manning a large number of ships; while of those that were keeping watch at Piraeus they at once sent off the eight which had left the blockade, and after pursuing those with Chalcideus and not overtaking them, had returned, (their commander was Strombichides son of Diotimus,) and resolved that twelve more, under Thrasycles, should also leave the post of observation, and reinforce them shortly afterwards.

They also removed the seven Chian vessels, which joined them in the blockade of Piraeus; and liberated the slaves who were on board of them, while the freemen they put in bonds. In the place of all the ships that had departed they speedily manned others, and sent them to observe the Peloponnesians, resolving at the same time to man thirty more. So great was their ardour; and no trivial measure was undertaken with regard to the forces they sent to Chios.

In the mean time Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and having added one Samian vessel to his squadron, he sailed to Teos, and begged them to remain quiet. Chalcideus also was advancing with three and twenty ships from Chios to Teos; while at the same time the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans moved along the shore. Strombichides, on receiving prior intelligence of this, weighed anchor beforehand;

but when out in the open sea, on observing that the ships coming from Chios were so numerous, he fled towards Samos, while they pursued him.

With regard to the land forces, although the Teians were not at first disposed to admit them, yet when the Athenians had fled, they received them into the city. The troops then waited for some time, expecting Chalcideus also to return from the pursuit: but when he was long in coming, they began themselves to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the Teians; while a small body of the barbarians also, who had joined them under the command of Stages, lieutenant of Tissaphernes, assisted them in the demolition of it.

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into Samos, armed the seamen on board the vessels from the Peloponnese, and left them at Chios; and having manned these with substitutes from Chios, and twenty besides, they sailed to Miletus to effect its revolt.

For Alcibiades, being on intimate terms with the leading men of the Milesians, wished to anticipate the ships from the Peloponnese by winning them over, and so to secure that honour, as he had promised, to the Chians, himself, Chalcideus, and Endius who had sent them out, by causing the revolt of as many cities as possible in concert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus.

Having made therefore the chief part of their passage unobserved, and having arrived a little before Strombichides and Thrasycles, who had just come from Athens with twelve ships, and joined in the pursuit of them, they prevailed on Miletus to revolt. The Athenians sailed up close after them with nineteen ships, and on the Milesians not admitting them, came to anchor at the adjacent island of Lade.

And now the first alliance made between the king and the Lacedaemonians was concluded by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, immediately after the revolt of the Milesians, to the following effect:

The following are the terms on which the Lacedaemonians and their confederates concluded an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes. All the country and cities which the king holds, or the forefathers of the king held, shall belong to the king: and from these cities whatever money, or any thing else, came in to the Athenians, shall be stopped by the king, the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, in common; so that the Athenians may receive neither money nor any thing else.

—Moreover, the war with the Athenians shall be carried on in common by the king, the Lacedaemonians, and their confederates; and it shall not be lawful to bring the war with the Athenians to a conclusion, except both parties shall agree to it, the king, and the Lacedaemonians with their confederates.

—Should any revolt from the king, they shall be considered as enemies to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates; and if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, they shall be considered as enemies to the king, in like manner.

This, then, was the alliance that was concluded; immediately after which the Chians manned ten more ships, and sailed to Anaea, wishing both to get intelligence of those in Miletus, and at the same time to urge the cities to revolt.

But a message having reached them from Chalcideus, that they were to sail back again, and that Amorges would be upon them with an army on shore, they sailed to the temple of Jupiter, and then descried sixteen ships, with which Diomedon again, subsequently to the arrival of Thrasicles, was sailing up from Athens.

On seeing them they fled with one ship to Ephesus, while the rest proceeded towards Teos. The Athenians, then, took four of their ships empty, the men having escaped to shore beforehand; but the rest took refuge in the city of the Teians.

And now the Athenians sailed away from Samos; while the Chians put out with their remaining vessels, and their land forces with them, and procured the re volt of Lebedos, and then again of Erae. After this they returned to their respective homes, both the land and the sea forces.

About the same time, the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians that were in Piraeus, which had been chased to land at the time we last mentioned them, and were blockaded by the Athenians with an equal number, having made a sudden sally against the Athenian squadron, and defeated it in an engagement, took four of the ships, and after sailing back to Cenchrea, proceeded to prepare again for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also joined them from Lacedaemon, as high admiral, to whom now belonged the command of all the naval forces.

Meanwhile, after the troops had returned from Teos, Tissaphernes himself also repaired thither with an army, and further demolished the fort at Teos, whatever had been left of it, and then returned. Not long after his departure, Diomedon, having arrived with ten Athenian ships, concluded a treaty with the Teians for admitting his force, as they did the enemy's. And after coasting along to Erae, and assaulting the city without taking it, he sailed away.

About the same time, too, occurred at Samos the insurrection of the commons against the nobles, in conjunction with some Athenians who happened to be there on board three vessels. The popular party of the Samians, then, put to death some two hundred of the nobles, in all, and condemned four hundred to banishment; and having themselves taken possession of their land and houses, (the Athenians, moreover, having after this passed a decree for their independence, considering them now as trusty allies,) they governed the city henceforth, and neither admitted the landowners to any other privilege, nor allowed any of the commons in future to give his daughter in marriage to them, nor to take a wife from them.

After these things, in the course of the same summer, the Chians went on as they had begun, without any falling off in their zeal; and as they found themselves, even independently of the Lacedaemonians, with a large force for bringing over the states, and at the same time were desirous that as many as possible should share the danger with them, they made an expedition by themselves with thirteen ships to Lesbos, according to the arrangement of the Lacedaemonians to go to that island in the second place, and thence to the Hellespont, while at the same time the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were there, and of the allies from the country itself, moved along shore towards Clazomenae and Cuma; the commander of the troops being Evalas, a Spartan, and of the ships, Diniadas, one of the Perioeci.

The fleet having sailed first to Methymna, effected the revolt of the place, and four vessels were left there; while the remainder, again, effected that of Mytilene also.

Now Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail, as he had intended, with four ships from Cenchrea, and arrived at Chios On the third day after his coming there, the Athenian ships, five and twenty in number, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had subsequently brought a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens.

The same day, at a late hour, Astyochus also put out, and taking one Chian vessel in addition to his own, sailed to Lesbos, to render it whatever assistance he could. Accordingly he came to Pyrrha, and thence the next day to Eresus, where he heard that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians on the first assault.

For the Athenians, immediately on sailing to the place, unexpectedly put into the harbour, and defeated the Chian ships; and having landed, and conquered in a battle those who opposed them, they took possession of the city.

Receiving this intelligence, both from the Eresians and from the Chian ships coming from Methymna with Eubulus, three of which fell in with him, (for one had been taken by the Athenians,) after being left behind at the time, and so escaping when Mitylene was taken, Astyochus no longer advanced to Mitylene, but having persuaded Eresus to revolt, and supplied it with arms, he both sent the heavy-armed from on board his own ships to Antissa and Methymna, having appointed Eteonicus to the command, and himself coasted along thither with his own ships and the three Chians; hoping that the Methymnaeans would be encouraged by the sight of them, and persevere in their revolt.

But when every thing at Lesbos went against him, he took his own force on board, and sailed back to Chios; while the land forces also that had been disembarked from the vessels, and were to have proceeded to the Hellespont, returned again to their several cities. After this, six of the allied ships from the Peloponnese that were at Cenchrea came to them at Chios.

The Athenians, on the other hand, arranged matters again at Lesbos, and sailing thence, took Polichna, belonging to the Clazornenians, which was being fortified on the mainland, and carried them over again to their city on the island, excepting the authors of the revolt, who had departed to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenae came over again to the Athenians.

The same summer the Athenians, who were with their twenty ships at Lade for the observation of Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, slew Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come against them with a few men, and sailing across three days after, erected a trophy; which, as it had been raised without their having command of the country, the Milesians threw down.

And now Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, advancing from the Oenussae, the islands off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which they held in the Erythraean country, as well as from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from their ships, having as epibatae, some of the heavy-armed from the muster-roll, who had been pressed into the service.

Having landed at Cardamyle and Bolissus, after defeating in battle those of the Chians who had come out against them, and killing many of them, they desolated the places in that neighbourhood. They defeated them again in another battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium, after which the Chians no longer went out to meet them; while they ravaged their country, which was finely stocked, and had continued unhurt from the Median wars down to that time.

For the Chians are the only people that I am acquainted with, after the Lacedaemonians, who were at once prosperous and prudent; and the more their city increased in greatness, the more secure were their arrangements.

And even their present revolt, if any think that they executed this without regard for the safer course, they did not venture to make, before they were likely to run the risk in concert with many brave allies, and perceived that even the Athenians themselves no longer denied, after their disaster in Sicily, that without doubt their circumstances were utterly bad. But if they were somewhat disappointed by the unexpected results that occur in the life of man, they found out their mistake in company with many others, who had in the same way imagined that the power of the Athenians would be quickly destroyed.

When therefore they were excluded from the sea, and were being ravaged by land, a party of them endeavoured to bring over the city to the Athenians. Though the magistrates detected them, they remained quiet themselves, and having brought Astyochus the admiral from Erythrae with four ships, which he had with him, considered how they might stop the conspiracy by the mildest measures, whether by taking hostages, or in any other way. They, then, were engaged with this business.

At the close of the same summer, there sailed from Athens a thousand Athenian heavy-armed, fifteen hundred of the Argives, (for five hundred of the Argives who were lightarmed, were provided with full armour by the Athenians,) and a thousand of the allies, in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides: these sailed into port at Samos, and after crossing over to Miletus, formed their camp there.

The Milesians marched out, themselves to the number of eight hundred heavy-armed, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of foreign mercenaries with Tissaphernes himself, who was present with his cavalry, and gave battle to the Athenians and their allies.

The Argives, advancing from the line with their own wing, and despising the enemy, while they pushed forward in some disorder, as against Ionians and men who would not receive their charge, were defeated by the Milesians, and not less than three hundred of them slain.

But the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians first, then beat back the barbarians and the rest of the multitude, and without engaging the Milesians, (for they retreated into their city after their rout of the Argives, on seeing the rest of their army worsted,) they pitched their camp, as being now victorious, close to the very city of Miletus.

And it so happened, that in this battle the Ionians on both sides were superior to the Dorians; for the Athenians conquered the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Argives. After erecting a trophy, the Athenians prepared to invest the place, (which stood on an isthmus,) thinking that if they could win Miletus, the other towns would easily come over to them.

In the mean time, when it was now about dusk in the evening, intelligence reached them that the five and fifty ships from the Peloponnese and from Sicily were all but there. For from the Siceliots, who were chiefly urged by Hermo crates the Syracusan to take part in what remained for the destruction of the Athenians, there came twenty ships of the Syracusans, and two of the Selinuntines; and those from the Peloponnese, which they were preparing, [when we last mentioned them,] were now ready: and both squadrons being committed to Theramenes the Lacedaemonian to take to Astyochus the admiral, put in to Lerus first, the island before Miletus.

Then, on finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed thence into the Iasic gulf in the first place, wishing to know the state of affairs with regard to Miletus.

When Alcibiades therefore had gone on horseback to Tichiussa, in the Milesian territory, to which part of the gulf they had sailed and brought to for the night, they heard the particulars of the battle. For Alcibiades was present at it, taking part with the Milesians and Tissaphernes; and he now advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and the whole cause, to go as quickly as possible to the relief of Miletus, and not permit it to be invested.

They, then, intended to relieve it in the morning. Phrynichus, the commander of the Athenians, on the other hand, when he had heard from Lerus a correct account of their fleet, and when his colleagues wished to await its arrival and give it battle, said that he would neither do so himself, nor, to the best of his power, allow them or any one else to do it.

For when they might meet them hereafter with an accurate knowledge of the number of ships on the enemy's side, and with how many of their own opposed to them they would, after adequate and calm preparations, be able to give them battle, he would never run an unreasonable hazard through yielding to the disgrace of reproach.

For it was no disgrace for the Athenians to retreat with a navy at a proper time; but in any way whatever, the result would be more disgraceful should they be defeated, and for the state to incur not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger. For after its late misfortunes, it was hardly expedient voluntarily for it to act on the offensive in any quarter, even with a force that could be relied upon, or even in a case of absolute necessity:

how then could it without any such compulsion rush into self-chosen dangers? He ordered them therefore as quickly as possible to take up their wounded, and their land forces, with such stores as they had brought with them; but to leave behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, that their ships might be the lighter, and to sail away to Samos, and thence, when they had Collected all their ships, to make their attacks upon them, whenever they had an opportunity.

Having given this advice, he acted accordingly; and so Phrynichus, not on that immediate occasion more than on subsequent ones, nor in that business only, but in all that he had any thing to do with. proved himself to be a man of sound judgment.

In this way, with an incomplete victory, the Athenians immediately broke up their camp, and retired from Miletus; and the Argives, in mortification at their defeat, sailed off home from Samos as quickly as they could.

As soon as it was morning, the Peloponnesians weighed anchor from Tichiussa, and put into Miletus after the enemy's departure; and after remaining one day, they took with them on the next the Chian vessels which had, in the first instance been chased in company with Chalcideus, and were disposed to sail back again for the stores which they had taken out of their vessels at Tichiussa.

On their arrival, Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces, and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which Amorges their enemy maintained himself. Accordingly, having assaulted Iasus on a sudden, and while the inhabitants thought nothing but that the ships belonged to the Athenians, they took it;

and the Syracusans were most distinguished in the action. Amorges, who was a natural son of Pissuthnes, and had revolted from the king, the Peloponnesians took prisoner, and delivered him up to Tissaphernes to lead away to the king, if he pleased, according to his orders. They then sacked Iasus; and the army got very large treasures, for the place was one of ancient wealth.

The mercenaries serving with Amorges they took to themselves, and added to their ranks, without doing them any harm, as most of them were from the Peloponnese: while they delivered to Tissaphernes the town and all the captives, both bond and free, for each one of whom they stipulated to receive from him a Daric stater; after which they returned to Miletus.

Pedaritus the son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to take the command at Chios, they despatched by land to Erythrae, with the mercenary force taken from Amorges, and appointed Philippus to remain on the spot, as governor of Miletus. And so the summer ended.

The following winter, when Tissaphernes had put Iasus into a state of defence, he passed on to Miletus, and distributed amongst all the ships a month's pay, as he had undertaken at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an Attic drachma a man per day, but wished in future to give but three oboli, until he had consulted the king; should he, however, command it, he said he would give them the full drachma.

When Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, objected to this, (for Theramenes, inasmuch as he was not admiral, but only sailing with them to deliver up the fleet to Astyochus, was easy on the subject of pay,) there was fixed, notwithstanding, a sum [for the whole fleet] larger by five ships than three oboli a man per day. For he gave three talents a month for five ships, and to the rest, according as they had vessels beyond this number, was given in the same proportion.

The same winter, more ships, to the number of thirty-five, having come from home to join the Athenians at Samos, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon in command, after collecting those from Chios and all the rest, they determined, having drawn lots for their respective services, to blockade Miletus with their naval force, and to send against Chios both a fleet and army.

And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, having with them thirty ships, and taking in transports a part of the thousand heavy-armed that had come to Miletus, sailed, according to their lot, against Chios, while the rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, secured the command of the sea, and advanced upon Miletus.

Astyochus, happening at that time to be collecting at Chios the hostages taken in consequence of the conspiracy, ceased from that, when he found that the ships with Theramenes were come, and that the affairs of the confederacy were more prosperous.

And taking a squadron consisting of ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian ships, he put out to sea, and after attacking Pteleum without taking it, coasted along to Clazomenae, and commanded those of them who favoured the Athenian cause to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join their party. Tamos also, who was lieutenant-governor of Ionia, united in this command.

When they did not listen to it, he made an attack on the town, which was unwalled, and not being able to take it, sailed away before a strong gale himself to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put into the islands adjacent to Clazomenae, namely, Marathussa Pele, and Drymussa.

Having staid there on account of the winds eight days, all the property of the Clazomenians that had been secretly stowed away there, they partly ravaged and consumed, and partly put on board their ships; and then sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma, to join Astyochus.

While he was there, ambassadors from the Lesbians came to him, wishing to revolt again. And as far as he was concerned, they gained his assent; but when the Corinthians and other allies were not zealous for it, in consequence of their former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios; at which place, after his ships had been dispersed in a storm, they arrived from different directions.

After this, Pedaritus, who when we last mentioned him was moving along the coast by land from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and then passed over, himself and his forces, to Chios; where he had also about five hundred soldiers who had been left by Chalcideus from the five ships, with their arms.

And when certain Lesbians made offers of revolt, Astyochus urged to Pedaritus and the Chians, that they ought to go with their ships, and effect the revolt of Lesbos; for so they would either themselves gain an addition to the number of their allies, or, in case of failure, would still do the Athenians mischief. They, however, did not listen to them, and Pedaritus refused to give up to him the ships of the Chians.

He, therefore, taking the five of the Corinthians, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and those of the Lacedaemonians which he had come with, sailed for Miletus, to take the command as admiral, after many threats to the Chians that assuredly he would not come to their aid, should they be in any need of it.

Having touched at Corycus, in the Erythraean country, he staid there the night. The Athenians also, on their passage from Samos to Chios with their troops, were only parted from them by being on the other side of a hill; and so they brought to for the night, and escaped each other's notice.

On the arrival of a letter from Pedaritus in the night, to say that some Erythraean prisoners, after being set at liberty, had come from Samos to Erythraea for the purpose of betraying it, Astyochus immediately weighed anchor again for Erythraea: within so little was he of falling in with the Athenians.

Pedaritus also sailed across to join him; and having investigated the case of the men who were thought to be traitors, when they found that the whole story had been made up in order to effect the escape of the men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, one to Chios, the other to Miletus, as he had intended.

In the mean time also the army of the Athenians, while sailing round with the ships from Corycus, met with three Chian vessels of war off Arginus, and on seeing them gave them chase; when a violent storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty took refuge in the harbour. Of the Athenians, the three which had pursued most vigorously were wrecked, and thrown up near the city of Chios, the men being either taken prisoners or slain; while the remainder took refuge in the harbour under Mount Mimas, called Phoenicus, from whence they afterwards came to anchor in the port of Lesbos, and made preparations for the work of fortification.

The same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian, having sailed from the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan, sailed into port at Cnidus, which had now revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes.

When those at Miletus received intelligence of them, they gave orders for half of the vessels to keep guard at Cnidus, and the other half to cruise around Triopium, and seize the merchantmen that were approaching from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory running out from the Cnidian territory, and is consecrated to Apollo.

But the Athenians, having had notice of it, and having sailed out from Samos, seized the six ships that were keeping guard at Triopium, though the crews escaped from them. After this they put in at Cnidus, and having assaulted the city, which was unfortifled, were within a little of taking it. The next day they made a second assault on it;

but as they did not now do it so much damage, since the inhabitants had provided better defences during the night, and the crews which had escaped from the ships at Triopium had gone in to join them, they withdrew, and after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to Samos.

Astyochus having come about the same time to the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abundantly supplied with every thing in their camp. For pay was given them to a sufficiently large amount, and the great sum of money which had been raised from the plunder of Iasus was still at the command of the soldiers, and the Milesians carried on the war with spirit.

Nevertheless the Peloponnesians considered that the first convention with Tissaphernes, which had been concluded by Chalcideus, was defective, and not so much for their advantage [as for his]; and, consequently, while Theramenes was yet there, they concluded another, which was to the following effect:

The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius, the sons of the king, and Tissaphernes, that there should be a treaty and friendship between them on these terms:

Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or did belong to his father, or his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians shall be permitted to proceed for the purpose of war, or for any harm: neither shall the Lacedaemonians, nor their confederates, exact tribute from these cities. Neither shall King Darius, or any states in the king's dominions, be allowed to proceed against the Lacedaemonians, or their allies, for the purpose of war or other injury.——Should the Lacedaemonians, or their allies, require any assistance from the king, or the king stand in need of any from the Lacedaemonians, or their allies;

to whatever they may gain each other's assent, that shall be right for them to do.——Both parties shall carry on in common the war against the Athenians and their allies;

and should they come to terms of peace, they shall both do so in common.

——Whatever troops shall be in the king's country in consequence of the king's having sent for them, the king shall pay their expenses.——Should any of the states which have concluded this convention with the king proceed against the king's country, the rest shall prevent it, and assist the king to the utmost of their power. And should any of those in the king's country, or in all his dominions, proceed against the country of the Lacedaemonians, or of their allies, the king shall prevent it, and assist them to the utmost of his power.

After this convention Theramenes gave up the fleet to Astyochus, and sailing away in a small boat was lost at sea.

The Athenians, having now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios with their army, and commanding both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place that was both naturally strong on the land side, contained several harbours, and was not far from the city of Chios.

Now the Chians having been beaten in several previous engagements, and not being on very good terms amongst themselves, but regarding each other with suspicion, because Tydeus, son of Ion, and his party had already been executed by Pedaritus on the charge of Atticism, and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to an oligarchy; in consequence of these things they kept quiet, and thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries under Pedaritus to be a match for the enemy.

They sent, however, to Miletus, urging Astyochus to come to their aid: and when he did not listen to them, Pedaritus sent a letter to Lacedaemon, representing him as being guilty of a misdemeanor.

On this footing stood the affairs of the Athenians at Chios: while from Samos their ships kept sailing out against those at Miletus, and when they did not advance to meet them, they returned again to Samos, and remained quiet.

The same winter, the seven and thirty ships which had been equipped by the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus, through the instrumentality of Calligitus the Megarean and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out from the Peloponnese, and sailed for Ionia, about the period of the solstice, Antisthenes a Spartan being on board in command of them.

The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as assistant counsellors for Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. They were instructed on their arrival at Miletus to co-operate in the arrangement of all other affairs, as should be best, and to despatch these vessels—either just the number, more, or fewer—to the Hellespont to join Pharnabazus, should they think proper, appointing to the command of them Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who sailed out with them; and also, if the eleven commissioners deemed fit, to depose Astyochus from the office of admiral, and appoint Antisthenes; for they were suspicious of him in consequence of the letters from Pedaritus.

Sailing therefore from Malea across the open sea the squadron touched at Melos, and there falling in with ten Athenian ships took three of them empty, and burnt them. After this, being afraid that those of the Athenian vessels which had escaped from Melos might (as was the case) give information of their approach to those at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having made their voyage longer by taking this precaution, they made the land at Caunus, in Asia;

from which place, considering themselves to be now in safety, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus, in order to be convoyed by them along the coast.

At this same time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messengers to Astyochus, notwithstanding his holding back, and begged him to succour them in their siege with all his fleet, and not to permit the largest of the allied cities in Ionia to be both excluded from the use of the sea, and wasted by forays on the land.

For the slaves of the Chians being numerous, and indeed forming the largest body there was in any one city, except that of the Lacedaemonians, and at the same time being, in consequence of their great numbers, punished more severely than usual in cases of offence, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly established, with the advantage of a fortified position, the greater part deserted to them; and these did the most mischief to the country, through their acquaintance with it.

The Chians therefore represented, that while there was still a hope and possibility of stopping them, while Delphinium was still being fortified, and not yet completed, and a higher wall was being erected round their camp and the ships, it was incumbent on him to assist them. And although Astyochus, because of his threat on the occasion already mentioned, had not intended to do it, when he saw that the allies also were anxious for their relief, he set out to succour them.

In the mean time tidings came from Caunus that the seven and twenty ships, with the Lacedaemonian counsellors. were come. And thinking every thing else of secondary importance, compared with his convoying so large a number of ships, in order that they might more entirely command the sea, and with the safe passage of the Lacedaemonians who had come to observe his conduct, he immediately gave up going to the relief of Chios, and sailed to Caunus.

Having landed, as he coasted along, at

Cos Meropis, which was unfortified, and in ruins in consequence of an earthquake which they had experienced—the most violent one which I ever remember—he sacked the town, the men having fled to the mountains, and by incursions made spoil of the country, excepting the free population, whom he released.

Having come from Cos to Cnidus by night, he was constrained by the advice of the Cnidians not to land his seamen, but to sail, just as he was, straightway against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals at Samos, was on the look-out for those seven and twenty ships that were approaching from the Peloponnese, and to join which Astyochus also was coasting along.

For those at Samos had heard from Melcs of their approach, and Charminus was watching for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia; as by this time he was aware of their being at Caunus.

Astyochus therefore sailed immediately to Syme, before he was heard of, on the chance of finding the ships some where out at sea. But the rain and the cloudy state of the atmosphere which he encountered caused the dispersion of his ships during the dark, and threw them into confusion.

In the morning, when his fleet had been separated, and the left wing was now in sight of the Athenians, while the rest of it was still dispersed around the island, Charminus and the Athenians put out against it with all speed, with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the vessels they were watching for, namely, those from Caunus.

Having attacked them therefore immediately, they sank three, and severely damaged some others, and had the advantage in the action, until the larger division of the fleet unexpectedly came in sight, and they were surrounded on every side.

Then they took to flight, and having lost six ships, fled for refuge with the rest to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put into Cnidus, and the seven and twenty ships from Caunus having effected a junction with them, they sailed with the whole number, and erected a trophy on Syme, and then came to anchor again at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on hearing the particulars of the engagement, having sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme, made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, or that on them, but took their naval stores, which were at Syme, and after touching at Lorymi on the continent, sailed back to Samos. And now all the Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were refitted, so far as they required it;

and the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes, (for he had come to meet them,) both respecting what had already been done, if there was aught that did not please them, and with reference to future hostilities, in what way they might be conducted most to the benefit and advantage of both parties.

Lichas, more especially, kept an eye on the transactions, and said, that neither of the two treaties was properly drawn up, Neither that of Chalcideus, nor that of Theramenes, but it was a shameful thing that the king should even now claim to be master of all the country over which he and his ancestors had formerly had dominion. For in that was involved the re-subjugation of all the islands, with Thessaly, Locris, and as far as Boeotia; and so, instead of freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be putting the Median yoke on the Greeks. He told them therefore to conclude another and a better treaty, or at any rate they would not act according to this;

nor did they want any of his supplies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, being offended at this, went away from them in a rage, and without settling any thing.

They, in consequence of communications from some of the most powerful men there, were disposed to sail to Rhodes; hoping to bring over to their side an island which was strong both in its number of seamen and its land forces; and moreover thinking that they should themselves be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without asking Tissaphernes for money.

Having sailed therefore immediately, that same winter, from Cnidus, and having first put in with ninety-four ships to Camirus in the Rhodian territory, they frightened away most of the inhabitants, who were not aware of their intentions, and therefore fled, especially as the town was unfortified. Then, having assembled both these and the people from the two other towns, Lindus and Ialysus, the Lacedaemonians prevailed on the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians.

And so Rhodes joined the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Athenians, having got notice of it, sailed at this time with their ships from Samos, wishing to anticipate them, and came within sight of the island as they lay out at sea; but being a little too late, they sailed back in the first instance to Chalce, thence to Samos, and afterwards carried on the war against Rhodes by attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.

The Peloponnesians levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of two and thirty talents; but in other respects lay still for eighty days, having drawn up the ships on shore.

In the mean time, and at even a still earlier period, before they removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were being carried on. Alcibiades being suspected by the Peloponnesians after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, and instructions having been sent by them from Lacedaemon to Astyochus to put him to death, (for he was a personal enemy of Agis, and in other ways appeared to be unworthy of trust,) he first retired in alarm to the court of Tissaphernes, and then did the greatest harm he could to the cause of the Peloponnesians with him.

Being his adviser on all points, he cut down the pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma three oboli were given, and that not regularly; telling Tissaphernes to represent to them, that the Athenians, who for a longer time had had experience in naval matters, gave their men but three oboli; not so much from poverty, as that their seamen might not grow insolent from abundance, and either be less able-bodied, through spending money on such things as produce weakness, or desert their ships by means of leaving their arrears of pay as a security for them.

He also gave him such instructions, that by giving money he persuaded the trierarchs and generals of the different states to concede these points to him; excepting the Syracusans; but of these Hermocrates alone opposed him on behalf of the whole confederacy.

The states, too, which applied for money he dismissed with an answer from himself, on the part of Tissaphernes, alleging by way of refusal, that the Chians were shameless, who, though the wealthiest of the Greeks, and being protected as they were by the aid they were receiving, expected others to risk both their persons and their purses for their liberty.

With regard to the rest of the states, which used before their revolt to lavish their money on the Athenians, he said that they were wrong if they would not now also contribute as much, or even more, for their own interests.

He also represented that Tissaphernes was naturally sparing at present, inasmuch as he was carrying on the war with his own resources; but that if supplies should ever come down from the king, he would give them their full pay, and afford the states all proper relief.

He likewise advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; nor to be anxious, by either bringing the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or giving pay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer on the same party the command both of land and sea; but to let them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the power at all times to lead the one party or the other against those who were annoying him.

If, on the contrary, the command both by land and sea were united, he would be at a loss for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger; unless he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the contest with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a trifling share of the expense, and at the same time with security to himself.

And the Athenians, he said, were a more desirable people to share the empire with him; for they were less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war with both a profession and a practice most advantageous to him; as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as the sea was concerned, to themselves and to him all the Greeks who lived in the king's country; while the other party, on the contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor was it likely that the Lacedaemonians should at the present time be liberating the Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians;

unless they should ever fail in reducing the Athenians.

He urged them therefore to wear them both out at first, and after cutting off as much as possible from the power of the Athenians, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from his country.

Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far at least as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but by telling them that the Phoenician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigour of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in cooperating with them.

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, whilst he was with them, both because he thought it best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest.

And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted,] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals amongst them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them: but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.

This design therefore was first mooted in the camp, and thence spread to the city. Accordingly, certain individuals went over from Samos, and had an interview with Alcibiades; and when he held out that he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and then the king, in case they were not under a democratical government, (for so the king would place greater reliance on them,) the aristocratical party amongst the citizens, who also suffered most at present, entertained many hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well as of gaining the victory over the enemy.

Accordingly they went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favoured their views, openly representing to the people at large that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed by a democracy.

The multitude, though annoyed to a certain extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because of their abundant hopes of pay from the king; while those who were for establishing the oligarchy, after they had communicated their designs to the mass of the people, again considered the proposals of Alcibiades amongst themselves and the greater part of their associates. To the rest, then, they appeared advantageous and worthy of their confidence;

but Phrynichus, who was still general, was not at all pleased with them, but thought that Alcibiades (as was really the case) had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, or considered any thing else but how, by bringing the state to change its present constitution, he might obtain his recall by the invitation of his associates.

What they themselves, however, should most especially look to, was, he said, to avoid being rent by factions. That it was not for the king's advantage, when the Peloponnesians were now on an equality at sea, and held none of the least cities in his dominion, to incur trouble by siding with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, when he might have made the Peloponnesians his friends, by whom he had never yet been injured.

As for the allied states, again, to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, he well knew that neither those which had revolted would any the more on that account come over to them, nor those that were left be more staunch to them; for they would not wish to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy, rather than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of govern ment they might obtain their liberty.

And with regard to the respectable classes, as they were called, they considered that the oligarchs would not cause them less trouble than the popular government, being as they were the authors and introducers of projects which were evil for the people, and from which they themselves derived most benefit. Indeed as far as depended on them, they would be put to death without trial, and even by measures of violence; whereas the commons were their refuge, and the moderators of the other party.

And as the states had learnt these things from positive facts, he well knew that such was their opinion on the subject. For himself, then, he was pleased with none of the schemes carried on by Alcibiades at present, as before.

But those members of the association who had assembled acceded to the present proposals, as they had at first determined, and prepared to send Pisander and some others on an embassy to Athens, to treat for the return of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in that city, and so to gain the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians.

But when Phrynichus saw that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would accede to it, being afraid, on considering the opposite tendency of what had been maintained by himself, that if he were restored he would do him some mischief, as one who had impeded his plans, he had recourse to the following device.

He sent to Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, with secret instructions that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by bringing Tissaphernes into friendship with the Athenians; expressly mentioning all the other matters also, and pleading that it was pardonable in him to devise evil against a man who was an enemy, even though it were to the detriment of the state.

Now Astyochus did not so much as think of punishing Alcibiades—especially as he no longer put himself in his power as he used to do—but having gone up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, at once told them the contents of the letter from Samos, acting as an informer to them, and for his own private gain devoting himself, as was said, to the interest of Tissaphernes both on these and on all other matters:

for which reason also he was the more gentle in remonstrating with him respecting the pay not being given in full.

Alcibiades immediately sent a letter to Samos giving information against Phrynichus to the authorities there, telling them what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus, being confounded and in the most extreme danger, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been duly kept secret, and telling him now that he was prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; describing the particulars of the way in which he could do it, as Samos was unfortified; and pleading that it was not now culpable in him, being, as he was, in danger of his life through them, to do this, or any thing else, rather than be destroyed by his bitterest enemies. Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.

Now when Phrynichus had discovered beforehand that he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades on the subject was on the point of arriving, he himself anticipated it by announcing to the army, that as Samos was unfortified, and all the ships were not stationed within the harbour, the enemy intended to attack the camp: that he had certain intelligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defence. Now he was himself general, and so had full authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for the work of fortification;

and owing to this Samos was the more quickly walled, though it would have been so under any circumstances. Not long after came the letters from Alcibiades, saying that the army was going to be betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were on the point of attacking them.

As, however, Alcibiades was not thought to be worthy of credit, but to have had a previous acquaintance with the plans of the enemy, and through personal dislike to have attributed them to Phrynichus, as though he were privy to them, he did him no harm, but rather bore witness to his statement by sending this intelligence.

After this, Alcibiades tried to bring over and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; and he, though afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with more ships than the Athenians, was still disposed to be convinced by him, if by any means he could; especially since he had observed the dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians which had been expressed at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, (for as at this time they were at Rhodes, it had already occurred,) in the course of which Lichas had verified the observation which had before been made by Alcibiades about the Lacedaemonians liberating all the states, when he said that it was an intolerable agreement that the king should be master of the cities over which, at any earlier period, either himself or his fathers had had dominion. Alcibiades then, inasmuch as he was struggling for a great object, was earnestly courting and soliciting Tissaphernes.

The Athenian ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been sent from Samos with Pisander, on their arrival at Athens, delivered an address before the people, giving a summary of many arguments, but most especially urging, that by recalling Alcibiades, and not being under a democratical government in the same manner as hitherto, they might both have the king for an ally, and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians.

When many others opposed them on the subject of the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades at the same time exclaimed, that it was a shameful thing if he were to return by doing violence to the laws; and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces adjured them with regard to the mysteries, for which he had been banished, and appealed to the gods against their restoring him; Pisander came forward in the face of much opposition and indignant protesting, and taking aside each one of his opponents, asked him whether he had any hope of preservation for the state, since the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than themselves opposed to them on the sea, and more cities in alliance with them, while the king and Tissaphernes supplied them with money; whereas they themselves had no longer any, unless some one should persuade the king to come over to their side.

When, on being thus questioned, they allowed that they had not, he then said to them plainly,

This advantage, then, cannot be attained by us, if we do not adopt a more temperate policy, and put the offices into the hands of a smaller number, that the king may place confidence in us— (and that we may not consult so much at present about a form of government as about the preservation of the state; for we shall have power to alter hereafter whatever may not please us)—and, moreover, if we do not restore Alcibiades, who is the only man at present that can effect this.

The people were at first very indignant on hearing mention made of the oligarchy; but when plainly informed by Pisander that there were no other means of preservation, being afraid, and at the same time having hopes of changing it again, they gave way.

Accordingly they resolved that Pisander and ten commissioners with him should sail and conclude, as they might think would be best, the negotiations both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.

At the same time, on Pisander's falsely accusing Phrynichus, the people deposed him from his command with his colleague Scironides, and sent Diomedon and Leon to the fleet as generals in their stead. For Pisander calumniated Phrynichus by saying that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, only because he did not think him favourable to the negotiations carried on with Alcibiades.

Pisander likewise visited all the clubs which had previously existed in the city for mutual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted them to unite together and by common counsels abolish the democracy; and after making all his other preparations to suit the present state of affairs, so that there might be no more delay, he himself with the ten commissioners proceeded on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

In the course of this winter Leon and Diomedon, having by this time reached the Athenian fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up; and having made a descent on the territory, and defeated in an engagement those of the Rhodians who went out against them, they withdrew to Chalce, and carried on the war from that place, rather than from Cos; for it was more convenient for their observing whether the fleet of the Peloponnesians put out in any direction.

Xenophantidas the Lacedaemonian also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, telling them that the wall of the Athenians was now completed, and unless they succoured them with all their ships, their cause would be ruined at Chios. Accordingly they determined to relieve them.

In the mean time Pedaritus, with his mercenaries and the Chians, made a general assault on the fortification round the Athenian ships, and took a part of it, and got possession of some vessels that had been drawn up on shore: but when the Athenians had come out to the rescue, and had routed the Chians first, the rest of the force, more immediately around Pedaritus, was defeated, he himself killed, with many of the Chians, and a great number of arms taken.

After these things the Chians were besieged still more closely than before, both by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. In the mean time, the Athenian ambassadors with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him respecting the convention.

But as Alcibiades could not depend on the views of Tissaphernes, who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and wished still (as he had been instructed by him) to wear both parties out, he had recourse to the following plan, in order that Tissaphernes, by demanding the greatest possible concessions from the Athenians, might avoid coming to terms with them. Tissaphernes also, in my opinion, wished the same result, being himself led to do so by fear:

but Alcibiades, when he saw that the satrap was not, under any circumstances, desirous of making an agreement, wished the Athenians to think that he was not incapable of persuading him, but that when Tissaphernes had been persuaded, and was willing to join them, the Athenians did not concede enough to him.

For Alcibiades, speaking in person in behalf of Tissaphernes, who was also present, made such excessive demands, that the refusal of the Athenians, although for a long time they conceded whatever he asked, was still the apparent cause of their failure. For they required the whole of Ionia to be given up, and then again the adjacent islands, with other things; and when the Athenians did not object to these demands, at last, in their third interview, being afraid that he would certainly be convicted of inability to keep his word, he demanded that they should permit the king to build ships, and sail along his own coast, wherever and with how many soever he might please. Upon that the Athenians complied no longer, but considering that the business was impracticable, and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage, and went to Samos.

Immediately after these things, in the very same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them driven to absolute hostilities with him; being afraid that if they were without supplies for many of their ships, they might either be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might without his assistance attain the object of their wishes. And again, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage the continent in search of supplies.

From calculating and forecasting all these things, in accordance with his wish to reduce the Greeks to a footing of equality with one another, he consequently sent for the Lacedaemonians, and gave them supplies, and concluded a third treaty with them, to the following effect:

In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded on the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, respecting the interests of the king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies.—That the king's country, so far as it lies in Asia, shall belong to the king still;

and that respecting his own territory, the king shall adopt such measures as he pleases.—

That the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade the king's territory, nor the king that of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, to do it any harm.— That if any of the Lacedaemonians invade the king's territory to do it harm, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it;

and that if any one from the king's country proceed against the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do them harm, the king shall prevent it.——

That Tissaphernes shall provide the pay for the ships now present. according to the contract, until the king's fleet has come;

but that when the king's fleet has come, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships, if they wish it. That if, however, they consent to receive supplies from Tissaphernes, he shall furnish them, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall refund to him, at the conclusion of the war, whatever sums of money they may have received.—

That after the king's ships have arrived, those of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and those of the king shall jointly carry on the war, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies may think fit. And if they wish to terminate hostilities with the Athenians, they shall be terminated on the same footing.

This was the treaty that was made. And after this, Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phoenician fleet, as had been agreed, and all other things which he had promised; or, at any rate, he wished to appear to be thus preparing.

When the winter was now closing, the Boeotians took Oropus by treachery, while an Athenian garrison was holding it. There co-operated with them, also, some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea. For as the place was just opposite to Eretria, so long as the Athenians held it, it could not fail to do much damage both to Eretria and the rest of Euboea.

Being now therefore in possession of Oropus, the Eretrians came to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians into Euboea. They, however, were more disposed to relieve Chios in its distress, and so put out and sailed from Rhodes with all their fleet.

When they were off Triopium, they descried that of the Athenians out at sea, sailing from Chalce: and as neither side advanced against the other, they arrived, the Athenians at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, finding that it was no longer possible to go to the relief of Chios without a sea-fight. And so the winter ended, and the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Immediately at the commencement of the spring of the following summer, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont, to effect the revolt of Abydus, which is a colony of the Milesians; and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how to succour them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to a naval engagement.

They happened, while Astyochus was still at Rhodes, to have received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out as a passenger with Antisthenes, and twelve ships which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were Thurian, four Syracusan, one Anaean, one Milesian, and one Leon's own ship When therefore the Chians had gone out against them in full force, and had occupied a strong position, while their ships at the same time to the number of six and thirty put out to meet the two and thirty of the Athenians, they engaged them by sea;

and an obstinate battle having been fought, the Chians and their allies, who had not the worst in the action, returned (for it was now late) into their city.

After this, immediately that Dercyllidas had proceeded thither by land from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, as also did Lampsacus two days later.

When Strombichides heard of this, he went to the rescue from Chios, as quickly as possible, with four and twenty Athenian ships, some of which also were transports carrying heavy-armed troops;

and when the Lampsacenes came out against him, having defeated them in battle, taken at the first assault their city, which was unfortified, and made spoil of implements and slaves, (though he restored the freemen to their dwellings,) he proceeded against Abydus When they did not capitulate, and he was unable to take the place by assault, he sailed away to the coast opposite Abydus, and appointed Sestus, a town of the Chersonese which the Medes had held at the time so well known, as a post for a garrison, and for the defence of the whole of the Hellespont.

In the mean time the Chians were masters of the sea more than they had been; and Astyochus with those at Miletus, on hearing the particulars of the naval engagement, and the departure of Strombichides with his squadron, took fresh courage.

And so having coasted along with two ships to Chios, he took the fleet from that place, and with all his force now united advanced against Samos. When the Athenians, in consequence of their being suspicious of one another, did not put out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus.

For about this time, or still earlier, democracy had been abolished at Athens. For when Pisander and the ambassadors came from Tissaphernes to Samos, they both secured still more strongly their interest in the army itself, and instigated the most powerful of the Samians also to try with them to set up an oligarchy among themselves, although they had been rising up against one another to avoid an oligarchical government.

At the same time those of the Athenians at Samos determined, after communicating with each other, to give up Alcibiades, since he would not join them, (for indeed he was not a proper person, they said, to become a member of an oligarchy,) but to consider amongst themselves, since they were now actually imperilled, by what means their cause might escape abandonment; and at the same time to persevere in their measures for the war, and themselves to contribute with alacrity from their own private resources, both money and whatever else might be required, since they were no longer bearing the burden for any but themselves.

Having thus exhorted one another, they then immediately sent back home Pisander and half the ambassadors, to manage matters there; with instructions also to establish oligarchy in such of the subject cities as they touched at: the other half they sent to the rest of the places subject to them, some in one direction and some in another.

They also dismissed to his government Diotrephes, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, but had been elected to take the command of the countries Thraceward. He, on his arrival at Thasos, abolished the democratical government;

but about two months after his departure the Thasians began to fortify their city, as wanting no more aristocracy in conjunction with the Athenians, but daily looking for liberty to be given them by the Lacedaemonians.

For indeed there was a party of them with the Peloponnesians which had been expelled by the Athenians, and which, in concert with their friends in the city, was exerting itself with all its might to bring a squadron, and effect the revolt of Thasos. They had the fortune, then, to find what they most wished, namely, the city brought to the right side without any danger, and the democratical party deposed, which had been likely to prove an obstacle.

Thus then in the case of Thasos, and, I imagine, in that of many other of the subjects, the result was the contrary of what was expected by those of the Athenians who were establishing oligarchy; for when the states had got a moderate government, and security of action, they went on to absolute liberty, and did not value the specious advantage of good laws which they received from the Athenians.

Pisander, then, and his companions, as they coasted along, abolished the popular governments in the cities, according to arrangement, and, moreover, took from some places heavy-armed troops as their allies, and so came to Athens. There they found most of the business already accomplished by their associates.

For some of the younger men, having conspired together, secretly assassinated one Androcles, the most prominent leaders of the commons, and who also had mainly procured the banishment of Alcibiades; and for both these reasons, on account of his being a popular leader, and because they thought they should gratify Alcibiades, who, they concluded, would be recalled, and would make Tissaphernes their friend, they were the more ready to kill him. There were some other obnoxious individuals also whom they secretly took off in the same manner.

A proposal too had already been openly set on foot by them, that no others should receive pay but such as served in the war; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government, and those such as were most competent to do the state service both with their property and their persons.

Now this was but a specious profession for the people at large, since the same men would really hold the government as would bring about the revolution. The people, however, and the council of five hundred still met notwithstanding, though they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, but both the speakers belonged to that party, and the points to be brought forward were previously discussed by them.

Indeed no one else any longer opposed them, through fear, and from seeing that the conspiracy was extensively spread; and if any one did speak against them, he immediately came to his end in some convenient way, and there was neither any search made for those who had perpetrated the deed, nor were they brought to justice if they were suspected; but the commons remained still, and in such consternation that every one thought himself fortunate who did not meet with some violent treatment, even though he held his tongue.

From supposing, too, that the conspiracy was much more general than it really was, they were the more faint-hearted, and were unable to ascertain its extent, being powerless in consequence of the size of the city, and their not knowing one another's views.

And on this same ground also it was impossible for a man to bemoan himself to another in his indignation, so as to repel one who was plotting against him; since he would either have found a person he did not know, to whom to speak his mind, or one whom he knew but could not trust.

For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, supposing every one to have a hand in what was going on. For there were amongst them some whom one would never have supposed likely to join an oligarchy; and it was these that produced the greatest distrust in the many, and that contributed most to the safety of the few, by confirming the people's want of confidence in each other.

Pisander and his colleagues therefore having come at this critical time, immediately addressed themselves to the remainder of the work. In the first place, having assembled the people, they moved a resolution for electing ten commissioners with absolute powers for compiling laws, and that after compiling them they should lay before the people, on an appointed day, their opinion as to the manner in which the state would be best governed.

Afterwards, when the day had arrived, they enclosed the assembly in the Colonus, (a temple of Neptune outside the city, at the distance of about ten stades,) and the compilers brought forward no other motion, but simply this, that any of the Athenians should be at liberty to express any opinion he might please; and if any one either prosecuted the speaker for illegality, or otherwise injured him, they imposed upon him severe penalties.

Upon that it was at length plainly declared, that no one should any longer either hold office, or receive pay, according to the present constitution; that they should elect five men as presidents, who, again, should elect a hundred, and each of the hundred three for himself, and that these, amounting to four hundred, should enter the council-chamber, and govern as they might think best, with full powers, and should elect the five thousand also, whenever they might please.

Now it was Pisander who moved this resolution, and in other respects was openly the most forward in assisting to put down the democracy. But the person who devised the whole business, and the means by which it was brought to this issue, and who for the longest time had given the subject great attention, was Antiphon, a man second to none of the Athenians of his day in point of virtue, and who had proved himself most able to devise measures, and to express his views; who also, though he did not come forward in the assembly of the people, nor by choice in any other scene of public debate, but was viewed with suspicion by the people through his reputation for cleverness, yet was most able for any one man to help those who were engaged in contest, whether in a court of justice, or before a popular assembly, whoever of them might consult him on any point.

And he himself, too, when the party of the Four Hundred had subsequently fallen, and was severely treated by the commons, appears to me to have made the best defence of all men up to my time, when tried for his life on the subject of this very government, on a charge of having assisted in setting it up.

Phrynichus, too, showed himself, beyond all others, most zealous for the oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades, and the certainty that he was acquainted with the intrigues he had carried on at Samos with Astyochus; for he thought that, in all probability, he would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And he showed himself, when once he had undertaken their business, by far the most capable of facing dangers.

Theramenes the son of Hagnon was also a leader amongst those who joined in abolishing the democracy, a man of no small power, either of language or intellect. So that, conducted as it was by so many clever men, it was not unnatural that the business should succeed, though an arduous one. For it was a difficult matter to deprive the Athenian people of its liberty, about a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, and when it had not only been subject to none, but accustomed also, for more than half of that period, to rule over others.

When the assembly had been dissolved, without contradiction from any one, and by its own ratificaion of the measure, then they afterwards introduced the Four Hundred into the council-chamber, in the following manner. All the Athenians, in consequence of the enemy established at Decelea, were constantly under arms, either on the walls or in the ranks.

On that day, then, they permitted those who were not privy to their design to go home, as usual; while to those who were in the conspiracy directions were given to wait about quietly, not just by the arms, but at some little distance; and if any one should oppose what was doing, to seize the arms and not suffer it.

Moreover, some Andrians and Tenians, and three hundred Carystians, with some of the Aeginetan colonists, whom the Athenians had sent to occupy that island, had come for this very purpose with their own arms; to whom directions had already been given on this subject.

When these things had been thus arranged, the Four Hundred, each with dagger concealed on his person, and the hundred and twenty Grecian youths, of whose services they availed themelves wherever any business required to be dispatched, came and presented themselves to the council of Five Hundred, who were in their chamber, and told them to take their pay and go out; themselves bringing it for thee whole of their remaining term of office, and giving it to them when they went out.

When in this way the council had withdrawn without speaking a word against it, and the rest of the citizens made no disturbance, but kept quiet, the Four Hundred then entered the council-chamber, and elected their prytanes by lot; and for what concerned the gods, offered prayers and sacrifices on installing themselves in their government. Afterwards, however, they departed widely from the popular administration, (except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades,) and in other respects ruled the city by force. Some men, who appeared desirable to be taken out of their way, they put to death, though not many;

others they put in prison, and others they banished. They also entered into communication with Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, who was at Decelea; telling him that they were desirous of making peace, and that it was but reasonable that, as he would treat with them, and no longer with the faithless multitude, he should more readily come to terms.

He, however, thought that the city was not in a settled state, and that the people would not so immediately give up their ancient liberty, nor remain quiet, if they should see a large force of Lacedaemonians; and not being quite sure at present that they were no longer in a disturbed condition, he made no conciliatory answer to those who had come from the Four Hundred, but sent for a large additional force from the Peloponnese, and not long after went down himself with the garrison from Decelea, in conjunction with the troops which had joined him, to the very walls of Athens; hoping that either the people there, being thrown into disorder, would submit on his own terms, or that in consequence of the confusion which would probably be created both within and without, he could not fail to carry the long walls on the first assault, owing to the absence of troops along them for their defence.

But when he approached near to the city, and the Athenians made not the slightest stir within, while they sent out their cavalry, with a division of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, and shot down some of the enemy in consequence of their near advance, and got possession of some arms and dead bodies, then indeed, finding this to be the case, he led his army back again.

He and his own troops still remained in their former position at Decelea, but the newly arrived forces he sent home, after they had staid in the country some few days. After this, the Four Hundred sent an embassy to Agis nevertheless; and when he now received them more favourably, and advised them to that effect, they sent envoys to Lacedaemon also to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of peace.

They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to reassure the troops, and to tell them that the oligarchy had not been established for the injury of the city and the citizens, but for the preservation of the whole state; moreover, that there were five thousand, and not four hundred only, who had a share in the government; though never yet, in consequence of their expeditions and their foreign occupations, had the Athenians come to consult on a business of such importance that five thousand of them assembled for the purpose.

They gave them, too, all other instructions as to what was suitable for them to say, and despatched them immediately after their own estabment in power, being afraid that a mob of sailors might (as was really the case) both themselves refuse to continue under the government of an oligarchy, and through the evil spreading from that quarter be the means of deposing them.

For at Samos the oligarchy was already made the subject of new measures, and the following events happened at the very time that the Four Hundred were conspiring.

Those of the Samians who had risen up against the aristocratical party, and constituted the commons, turning round again, and being prevailed upon by Pisander on his arrival, and by the Athenians who were in the conspiracy at Samos, both bound themselves by oaths to the number of three hundred, and were prepared to attack the rest, as forming the democratical party.

They also put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a base fellow, who had been ostracised, not from fear of his influence or rank, but for his villany, and for being a disgrace to the city; acting in the matter in concert with Charminus, one of the generals, and a party of Athenians who were with them, and to whom they had given pledges of faith. They likewise perpetrated other such deeds in conjunction with that party, and had determined to make an attack on the populace.

They, however, having notice of their design, revealed what was going to be done to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals, (for these submitted to the oligarchy against their will, from being honoured by the people,) and to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former serving as a trierarch, the latter in the heavy infantry, as well as some others who had always been thought to be most opposed to the conspirators; begging them not to stand still and permit them to be ruined, and Samos to be lost to the Athenians, through whose help alone their empire had held together up to this time.

On hearing this, they went to every one of the soldiers, and exhorted them not to put up with it, and especially the crew of the Paralus, as all on board of that vessel were Athenians and freemen, and had always been most bitter against an oligarchical government, even before there was one established. Leon and Diomedon also left them some ships for their protection, whenever they might themselves sail any where So that when the three hundred made an attack on them, by the aid of all these, and especially of the crew of the Paralus, the popular party of the Samians gained the upper hand.

Of the three hundred they put to death some thirty, and banished three who were the most guilty; while with the rest they entered into an amnesty, and lived together for the future under a democratical government.

The ship Paralus, and Chaereas son of Archestratus on board of it—an Athenian who had been forward in the revolution—were sent by the Samians and the soldiers with all speed to Athens, to carry the news of what had taken place; for they were not yet aware of the Four Hundred being in power.

On their sailing into harbour, the Four Hundred immediately threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and having taken their vessel from them, and removed them into another employed as a troop-ship, they set them to keep guard round Euboea. Chaereas, by some means or other, immediately secreted himself;

and when he saw the present state of things, he went back to Samos, and took the soldiers an exaggerated report of affairs at Athens, aggravating every thing, and telling them that they were punishing all with stripes, and it was impossible to speak a word against those who held the government; moreover, that their wives and children were outraged, and that they intended to seize and confine all the relatives of such as were in the army at Samos and not on their own side, in order that, if they would not submit to them, the prisoners might be put to death:

with many other false statements which he made beside.

On hearing this, they were at first strongly inclined to make an attack on those who had been the chief authors of the oligarchy, and such of the rest as had taken part in it. Afterwards, however, being prevented by the men of moderate views, and warned not to ruin their cause, while the enemy were lying so near them with their ships ready for action, they desisted from it.

After this, wishing openly now to change the government at Samos to a democracy, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasylus, (for these were the chief leaders in the revolution,) bound all the soldiers, and, most of all, the oligarchical party themselves, by the most solemn oaths, that they would assuredly be governed by a democracy, and live in concord; and also that they would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians. and would be foes to the Four Hundred, and hold no intercourse with them.

All the Samians too, who were of full age, took the same oath with them; and the soldiers communicated to the Samians all the circumstances, and the probable results of their dangers, thinking that neither for them nor for themselves was there any resource that could save them, but that if either the Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus should defeat them, they would be destroyed.

Thus they were engaged in contention at this time, the one party wishing to force the city to a democracy, the other to an oligarchy.

And the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals, and any of the trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others in their place, both trierarchs and generals; of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasylus were two. They also stood up and exhorted one another, both on other topics and on this;

that they ought not to be disheartened because the city had revolted from them; for it was but the smaller party which had separated from them who were the larger, and better provided in all respects.

For since they held the whole fleet at their command, they would compel the other cities under their dominion to give them money, just the same as though they were coming from Athens. For they had a city in Samos, and no weak one either, but such as, when at war with them, had been within a very little of taking away the command of the sea which the Athenians enjoyed. And as for the enemy, they were defending themselves against them from the same position as before. They, then, inasmuch as they had command of the ships, were more able to provide themselves with necessaries than those at home. Nay, it was through their being stationed in advance at Samos, that those at home had before commanded the entrance to the Piraeus;

and now also they would be brought to such a strait, should they not consent to give them back the government, that they themselves would be better able to exclude them from the sea than to be excluded from it by them.

Indeed it was but a trifling and inconsiderable degree in which the city was of use to them towards gaining the victory over the enemy; and they had lost nothing in losing those who had neither any more money to send them, (but the soldiers provided it themselves,) nor yet good counsel to give them, for the sake of which a state has authority over armaments. On the contrary, even on these points the other party had done wrong by abolishing the laws of their fathers; while they themselves maintained those laws, and would endeavour to make them do it also. So that neither had they the inferiority as regarded those who should give good counsel.

Alcibiades, too, would gladly secure them the alliance of the king, should they grant to him security of person and a restoration to his country. And what was most important, should they fail on all points, yet, having so large a fleet as they had, there were many places for them to retire to, in which they would find both cities and territory.

Having thus debated the matter together, and encouraged one another, they proceeded to make preparations for the war no less than before; and the ten ambassadors who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, hearing of this when they were now at Delos, remained quiet there.

About this time also the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were raising a clamour amongst themselves, about their cause being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. For Astyochus, they said, would neither fight before, while they themselves were still the stronger, and the Athenian fleet was small, nor would he now, when the enemy were said to be in a state of sedition, and their ships were not yet brought together; but they would run the risk of being worn out by delay, while waiting for the Phoenician fleet—an idle pretence, and not a reality. And Tissaphernes, on the other hand, did not bring up this fleet, and at the same time injured their own navy by not giving them supplies regularly, or to the full amount. They ought therefore to wait no longer, but to come to a decisive engagement at sea. It was the Syracusans that most especially urged this.

The confederates, and particularly Astyochus, hearing these murmurs, and having resolved in council to fight a decisive battle, since the disturbances at Samos were also reported to them, they weighed anchor with all their ships, amounting to a hundred and twelve, and having given orders for the Milesians to march by land towards Mycale, they sailed to the same place.

But the Athenians with their eighty-two ships which were lying at Glauce in the territory of Mycale, (Samos being but a short distance from the mainland at this point, opposite Mycale,) when they saw the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired to Samos, not thinking themselves sufficiently strong in numbers to risk a battle for their all.

Besides, as they had had notice from Miletus of the enemy's wish for an engagement, they were expecting Strombichides from the Hellespont, to reinforce them with the ships which had gone from Chios to Abydus; for a messenger had previously been sent to him. Thus they retired to Samos;

while the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and formed their encampment, with the land forces of the Milesians and the people in the neighbourhood.

The next day, when they were going to advance against Samos, tidings reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, and they immediately sailed back again to Miletus.

The Athenians, when their squadron had joined them, advanced themselves against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when no one came out to meet them, they sailed back again to Samos.

The same summer, and immediately after this, since the Peloponnesians had not with their whole united fleet offered battle to the enemy, not thinking themselves a match for them, they were at a loss from what quarter to get money for such a number of vessels, especially as Tissaphernes supplied it ill; and therefore they sent Clearchus the son of Ramphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, in accordance with the original orders from the Peloponnese.

For Pharnabazus invited them to his aid, and was prepared to furnish them with supplies; and at the same time intelligence reached them that Byzantium had revolted.

Accordingly, these ships of the Peloponnesians put out into the open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians during their voyage; but were overtaken by a storm, and the greater part of them put into Delos with Clearchus, and subsequently returned to Miletus, (Clearchus, however, afterwards went to the Hellespont by land, and entered on his command,) while the rest, to the number of ten, arrived safe at the Hellespont with Helixus the Megarean, and effected the revolt of Byzantium.

After this, when the commanders at Samos were aware of it, they sent some ships to the Hellespont to oppose them and keep guard against them; and a trifling battle was fought at sea before Byzantium, between eight vessels against eight.

Now the leading men at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, had all along retained the same purpose, ever since he had effected a change in the government, namely, to restore Alcibiades; and at length, in an assembly, he persuaded the greater part of the soldiers to the same; and when they had passed a decree for the return and security of Alcibiades, he sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, thinking that their only chance of preservation was his bringing Tissaphernes over from the Peloponnesians to them.

An assembly therefore having been convened, Alcibiades both complained of and deplored his own calamity in having been banished, and by speaking at great length on public matters raised them to no slight hopes for the future; and extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes, in order that both the members of the oligarchy at home might be afraid of him, and the clubs be the more quickly broken up; and also that those at Samos might hold him in the greater honour, and be more encouraged themselves; and that the enemy, moreover, might be as much as possible set against Tissaphernes, and cast down from their present hopes. Accordingly Alcibiades, in the most boastful strain, held out these promises to them;

that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to him, that if he could but trust the Athenians, assuredly they should not want for supplies, so long as any of his own property remained, even though he should have at last to sell his own bed; and that he would bring the Phoenician ships which were now at Aspendus to join the Athenians, instead of the Peloponnesians; but he could only place confidence in the Athenians, if Alcibiades himself were recalled to be his security for them.

On hearing these and many other representations, they immediately elected him general in company with the former ones, and committed to him the whole management of their affairs. And now for nothing would they have exchanged their several hopes at the moment, both of preservation and of vengeance on the Four Hundred. Nay, they were at once ready immediately to despise their enemies on the spot, on the strength of what had been said, and to sail to the Piraeus.

He, however, most positively forbad their sailing to the Piraeus, and leaving behind them their enemies who were so much closer at hand, though many were urgent for it, and told them that since he had been chosen their general, he would first of all sail to Tissaphernes, and arrange with him measures for the war.

And so, on leaving this assembly, he took his departure immediately, that he might be thought to communicate every thing to him; at the same time that he wished to be more honoured by him, and to show him that he was now elected general, and was able to do him either good or harm. And thus it was the good fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by means of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by means of them.

When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, though they were before distrustful of Tissaphernes, they were now far more disgusted with him than ever.

For the truth was, that in the case of the Athenians advancing against Miletus, when the Peloponnesians would not put out to meet them and give them battle, Tissaphernes became far more sick of giving them pay; and indeed that he had even before this made some progress in their dislike, on account of Alcibiades.

And so the soldiers, and some of the other men of consideration also, as well as the soldiery, clubbing together as before, began to reckon up their grievances; namely, that they had never yet received their full pay; that what was now given them was deficient in amount, and not even that paid regularly; that unless they either fought a decisive battle, or removed to some station where they might have supplies, the men would desert their ships; and that for all this Astyochus was to blame, through his humouring Tissaphernes for his own profit.

While they were thus reckoning up their grievances, the following disturbance also occurred about Astyochus.

The Syracusan and Thurian seamen, inasmuch as they were, generally speaking, most free, applied to him also with the greatest boldness, and demanded their pay. He answered them somewhat haughtily, and threatened them; and indeed against Dorieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, he even lifted up his baton. When the mass of the armament saw this, sailor-like, they rushed in a rage upon Astyochus to strike him;

but he saw them in time, and fled for refuge to an altar. Notwithstanding their rage, therefore, he was not struck, but they were parted again.

The Milesians also took the fort belonging to Tissaphernes which had been built in Miletus, having attacked it when unobserved, and drawn out of it the garrison that was in it. And the rest of the confederates also approved of these things, and especially the Syracusans.

Lichas, however, was displeased with them, and said that the Milesians and the rest of the states in the king's country ought to submit to Tissaphernes, in such things as were reasonable, and to pay him court, until they had brought the war to a happy conclusion. But the Milesians were offended with him for this, and other things of the same kind; and afterwards, when he had died of sickness, they would not allow them to bury him where those of the Lacedaemonians who were present wished to do.

When their affairs, then, were involved in these dissensions both with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command, while Astyochus sailed away. With him Tissaphernes also sent, as an ambassador, one of his courtiers named Gaulites, a Carian who spoke two languages;

both to lay an accusation against the Milesians on the subject of the fort, and at the same time to make an apology for himself; for he knew that the Milesians were going thither chiefly to raise a clamour against him, and Hermocrates along with them, who intended to represent Tissaphernes as ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians in concert with Alcibiades, and pursuing a double policy.

For he had always been at enmity with him about the payment of the money to the forces; and at last, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and some others of the Syracusans, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, had come to Miletus to take command of the Syracusan ships, Tissaphernes pressed far more severely than ever on Hermocrates, when he was now an exile; both laying other things to his charge, and especially, that having once asked him for money and not obtained it, he displayed his enmity to him in consequence.

Astyochus, then, with the Milesians and Hermocrates, sailed away to Lacedaemon; while Alcibiades had by this time crossed over again from Tissaphernes to Samos.

And now the ambassadors from the Four Hundred, whom they sent at the time we mentioned to appease and inform those at Samos, arrived from Delos, after Alcibiades had come; and when an assembly had been called, they attempted to make a speech.

But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out, that they should put to death those who were abolishing the democracy; afterwards, however, they were with difficulty calmed down, and gave them a hearing.

They, then, delivered to them this message;

that it was neither for the destruction of the state that the recent change had been made, but for its preservation; nor in order that it might be delivered up to the enemy, (for they might have done that when they invaded the country during their government:) that all in their turn should share the privileges of the Five Thousand; and that their relatives were neither being outraged, as Chaereas had slanderously reported to them, nor suffering any harm, but remained as they were, each in the enjoyment of his property.

Though they made this and many other statements besides, they listened none the more favourably, but were angry, and expressed different opinions, though most generally, that they should sail to the Piraeus. And on that occasion Alcibiades appeared to have benefited the state for the first time, and in a degree inferior to no one else. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent on sailing against their countrymen, in which case most certainly the enemy would have taken possession of Ionia and the Hellespont, he was the man who prevented them.

Indeed on that emergency no one else would have been able to restrain the multitude. He, however, both made them desist from the attack, and silenced with rebukes those individuals who were on their own account most angry with the ambassadors.

He then dismissed them with an answer from himself, that he did not object to the Five Thousand being in power, but ordered them to depose the Four Hundred, and to establish the council of Five Hundred as before. That if any retrenchment had been made with a view to economy, in order that those who were on service might be better provided with supplies, he entirely approved of it.

In other respects also he urged them to stand out, and not at all to submit to the enemy. For if only the state were preserved, there was great hope of their being reconciled to one another;

but if either of the two parties were once destroyed, either that at Samos, or that at home, there would no longer be any one for them to be reconciled to.

There came also ambassadors from the Argives, with offers of assistance to the popular party of the Athenians at Samos;

but Alcibiades thanked them, and desiring them to come when they should be called upon, thus dismissed them. Now the Argives came in company with the crew of the Paralus, who, when last mentioned, had been commanded by the Four Hundred to cruise in the troop-ship round Euboea; and who, while taking to Lacedaemon some Athenians that had been sent as ambassadors by the Four Hundred, namely, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, when off Argos in their passage, seized the ambassadors, and delivered them up to the Argives, as being some of those who had been most instrumental in abolishing the democracy; while they themselves did not go to Athens again, but taking the ambassadors from Argos to Samos arrived there with the trireme they were in.

The same summer, and at the very time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with Tissaphernes, both on other accounts, and especially because of the return of Alcibiades, thinking that he was now evidently Atticizing, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go to Aspendus for the Phoenician ships, and desired Lichas to accompany him; saying, that with regard to the armament, he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant, to furnish the supplies while he was himself absent. The same account, however, is not given by all;

nor is it easy to decide with what motive he went to Aspendus, and yet, after going. did not bring the fleet. For it is certain that the Phoencician ships, a hundred and forty seven in number, came as far as Aspendus;

but why they did not come on, is a subject of many conjectures. For some think it was, that by going away he might, in accordance with his plan, wear down the power of the Peloponnesians; (at any rate Tamos, who was intrusted with the charge, provided them with supplies no better, but even worse, than himself.) Others, that after bringing the Phoenicians to Aspendus, he might exact money from them for their discharge; (for under no circumstances did he intend to employ them on any service.) Others, that it was on account of the clamour against him, which had spread to Lacedaemon—to have it said that he was not wronging them, but was certainly gone for the ships, which were undoubtedly manned for service.

To me, however, it appears most evident that it was with a view to wear out the Greeks, and to keep them in suspense, that he did not bring the fleet; to weaken them, during all the time that he was going there and delaying; and to keep them balanced, in order that he might make neither party too strong by joining them. For had he wished to bring the war to a conclusion, it is surely evident that he might have done it without any doubt. For by bringing the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians; since even at present they maintained their opposition with their navy, on terms of equality rather than of inferiority.

But what most clearly convicts him is the excuse which he alleged for not bringing the ships. For he said that they were fewer in number than the king had commanded to be collected. But surely he would have gained still greater thanks by that, through not spending so much of the king's money, and yet effecting the same object at a less cost.

At any rate, with whatever intention it might have been, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and had an interview with the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians, by his desire, sent Philippus, a man of Lacedaemon, with two triremes to fetch the fleet.

Alcibiades, on finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, sailed thither himself also with thirteen ships, promising the forces at Samos a sure and great benefit; for that he would either himself bring the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at any rate prevent its going to the Peloponnesians. For in all probability he had long known the purpose of Tissaphernes, that he did not intend fetching them, and wished to prejudice him as much as possible with the Peloponnesians, on the ground of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be the more compelled to join the side of Athens. Accordingly he set sail and pursued his voyage upwards, straight for Phaselis and Caunus.

When the ambassadors sent from the Four Hundred arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered the message from Alcibiades, namely, that he begged them to hold out, and not submit at all to the enemy; and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army to those at home, and of getting the better of the Peloponnesians; they gave much more courage to the greater part of those implicated in the oligarchy, who had even before been discontented with it, and would gladly have been quit of the business by any safe means.

Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though amongst the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm;

and so they declared, not that they wished to escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis.

This, however, was but a public profession made by them in word; but it was from private ambition that most or them pursued that very method by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to be overturned. For all at once not only claim to be equal, but every one decidedly the first man. [And in such a case failure is intolerable:] whereas, when an election is made under a democracy, a man more easily submits to the result, as he does not think himself beaten on equal terms.

But what most evidently encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiades being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that the power of the oligarchy would be permanent. Each one therefore strove to be himself the first to take the lead of the commons.

But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a form of government, and who now took the lead, namely, Phrynichus, (who when general at Samos had quarrelled, as already mentioned, with Alcibiades;) and Aristarchus, a man in the highest degree and for the longest opposed to democracy; and Pisander, and Antiphon, and others who were most influential, had before—as soon as they were established in power, and afterwards, when the forces at Samos revolted from them for a democracy—sent members of their body as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and been very anxious for peace with them, and been engaged in building the fort in what is called

Eetionia. And far more than ever was this the case, after their ambassadors from Samos had arrived; seeing, as they did, that both the majority of the people, and those of their own members, who before appeared trustworthy, were now changing their views.

And so they despatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others with all speed, (for they were afraid of what was going on both at home and at Samos,) with instructions to make terms with the Lacedaemonians in any way whatever that was at all tolerable.

And they worked with still greater earnestness at the fort in Eetionia. Now the object of the fort, as Theramenes and his party maintained, was this; not that they might avoid admitting the army at Samos into the Piraeus, should they attempt to sail in by force; but rather that they might admit the enemy, whenever they pleased, both with ships and troops. For Eetionia is a mole of the Piraeus, and the entrance into the harbour is straight by it.

It was being fortified therefore in such a manner, in connexion with the wall previously existing on the land side, that, with only a few men posted in it, it would command the entrance. For in the very tower standing on one of the two sides, at the mouth of the harbour, which was narrow, was the termination both of the original wall on the land side, and of the new and inner one which was being built on the side of the sea.

They also built a portico, which was very large and in immediate connexion with this wall in the Piraeus; of which they themselves had the command, and in which they compelled all to deposit both what corn they had before and what was now brought in, and to take it out thence when they sold it.

On these subjects, then, Theramenes had long been murmuring; and ever since the ambassadors had returned from Lacedaemon without effecting any general arrangement for them, he did so still more, saying that there would be danger of this fort's proving the ruin of the city.

For some ships from the Peloponnese, whose aid the Euboeans had invited, to the number of two and forty, including some Italian and Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, also happened to be now lying off Las, in Laconia, and preparing for their passage to Euboea, under the command of Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartan. These Theramenes declared to be sailing, not so much to the aid of Euboea, as of those who were fortifying Eetionia; and that if they were not on their guard now, they would be lost before they were aware of it.

And there really was some plan of this kind entertained by those who were charged with it, and it was not merely a verbal misrepresentation. For it was the wish of that party, if possible, to retain their dominion over the allies with an oligarchical government; if not, to retain their independence, with the possession of their ships and walls; but if excluded from that also, at any rate not to perish themselves under the restored democracy before and above all others, but even to call in the enemy, and without walls and ships to make peace with them, and retain the government of the city on any terms whatever, if they had only security for their persons.

For this reason they were also diligently raising this fortification, with both posterns and entrances, and facilities for introducing the enemy, and were desirous to have it completed in time.

Now what was said of them was previously advanced in small parties only, and with greater secrecy; but when Phrynichus, on his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, had been designedly stabbed in the full market by a man who served in the peripoli, and after proceeding but a short distance from the council-chamber expired immediately, and the assassin escaped; while his accomplice, who was an Argive, though seized and tortured by the Four Hundred, mentioned no one's name as having instigated him to it, nor any thing else, but that he knew many men assembled in different houses, both that of the commander of the peripoli and others; then indeed, when no disturbance arose from this, Theramenes and Aristocrates and all the rest of the Four Hundred, as well as of those out of doors who held the same views, proceeded with greater confidence to the execution of their measures. For at this same time the ships had now sailed round from Las, and after coming to anchor at Epidaurus, had overrun Aegina;

and Theramenes remarked, that it was not probable that, while on their passage to Euboea, they should have run into the bay, and be lying again at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited, and come for the purposes with which he had all along been charging them; and therefore it was not possible any longer to remain quiet.

At length, after many more seditious speeches and suspicions had been uttered, they now proceeded to business in real earnest. For the heavy-armed who were in the Piraeus, building the wall in Eetionia, amongst whom also was Aristocrates a taxiarch, with his company, arrested Alexicles, who was a general on the side of the oligarchy, and very favourably inclined to the associates, and taking him into a house confined him there. There were others who assisted them in this, and particularly one Hermon, commander of the peripoli stationed in Munychia;

and, what was of most importance, the mass of the heavy-armed were in favour of these measures.

When this news reached the Four Hundred, (who happened to be sitting together in their council-chamber,) immediately, with the exception of such as did not approve of the present government, they were prepared forthwith to arm themselves, and threatened Theramenes and those with him. He, however, said in his defence that he was ready to go at once and assist in rescuing Alexicles; and taking with him one of the generals who held the same views with himself, he proceeded to the Piraeus; while Aristarchus and some young men of the cavalry went to the rescue. The tumult, then, was great and alarming:

for those in the city thought that the Piraeus was already taken, and the general under arrest put to death; while those in the Piraeus believed that the men in the city were all but attacking them. But when the elder men stopped those in the city who were running about, and rushing to the stands of arms;

while Thucydides the Pharsalian, the Proxenus of the state, was also present, and earnestly opposed the several parties, calling upon them not to destroy their country while the enemy were still waiting to attack them; they were with difficulty quieted and forbore from attacking one another. Now when Theramenes came into the Piraeus, (for he too was one of the generals,) as far as shouting went, he was angry with the soldiers;

but Aristarchus and those who were opposed to the popular party were in a violent rage. Most of the soldiers however joined in the work, without changing their purpose, and asked Theramenes, whether he thought that the wall was being built for any good, or would be better demolished.

He said, that if they thought right to demolish it, he also agreed with them. Upon that both the soldiers and many of the men in the Piraeus immediately mounted, and began to pull down the fortification. And the cry for the encouragement of the multitude was this;

that whoever wished the Five Thousand to rule instead of the Four Hundred, must go to help in the work.

For they continued, notwithstanding, to conceal their real views under the name of the Five Thousand, so that whoever wished the commons to hold the government did not expressly mention that word; fearing that the Five Thousand might really have been elected, and that so by saying something to one [who belonged to that body,] he might, through his ignorance of the fact, commit himself. And, indeed, for this reason the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to be elected, nor to have it known that they were not; thinking, on the one hand, that to instal so many partners with them would amount to a downright democracy; and, on the other hand, that uncertainty on the subject would strike them with fear of one another.

The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, assembled nevertheless in their council-chamber; while the soldiers in the Piraeus, after releasing Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolishing the fortification, came to the temple of Bacchus close to Munychia, and having piled their arms, held an assembly there out of the usual place; and in accordance with a resolution made by them, proceeded straightway to the city, and piled their arms in the Anaceum.

But when certain chosen deputies from the Four Hundred came to them, they conversed man with man, and such as they saw to be men of moderate views they persuaded both to remain quiet themselves, and to restrain the rest; telling them that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from these the Four Hundred should be elected in rotation, in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit: but, in the mean time, they begged them by no means to destroy the city, or drive it into the hands of the enemy.

So the whole body of the soldiers, when such addresses were made by many and to many, were more pacified than before, and most alarmed for the whole state; and they agreed to hold, on an appointed day, an assembly in the temple of Bacchus, with a view to restoring concord.

When the day for holding the assembly was come, and they had all but met, news were brought that the two and forty ships with Agesander were advancing from Megara along the coast of Salamis; and every one of the soldiers in general considered this to be the very thing which had so long been asserted by Theramenes and his party, namely, that it was to the fort that the ships were sailing; and it appeared to have been thrown down to good purpose.

And it might, perhaps, in some measure have been by appointment that Agesandridas lingered about Epidaurus and that neighbourhood; though it is also probable that he stayed there in consequence of the present sedition amongst the Athenians, in hope of coming up at the moment favourable for action.

But the Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving this intelligence, immediately ran down in full force to the Piraeus, considering that a war with the enemy, of greater importance than that amongst themselves, was threatening them at no great distance, but close to their harbour. Some of them therefore went on board the ships that were already afloat; others launched additional ones; and some others ran to the defence of the walls and the mouth of the harbour.

But the Peloponnesian ships, after sailing by and doubling Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae, and subsequently went to Oropus.

So the Athenians were compelled to go to sea in a hurry and with untrained crews, inasmuch as the city was in a state of sedition, and they were anxious with all speed to go to the rescue of what was their most important possession; (for since Attica had been closed against them, Euboea was every thing to them;) and accordingly they sent Thymochares in command of some ships to Eretria.

When they arrived there, they amounted, with those that were in Euboea before, to six and thirty; and they were immediately forced to an engagement. For Agesandridas, after his men had dined, put out from Oropus, which is distant from Eretria about sixty stades by sea.

When, then, he was advancing against them, the Athenians straightway prepared to man their ships, supposing that their men were near their vessels. They, however, were purchasing provisions for their dinner, not from the market-place, (for by an arrangement of the Eretrians there was nothing on sale there,) but from the houses in the outskirts of the town, in order that the enemy, while the Athenians were long in manning their ships, might attack them by surprise, and compel them to put out just as they might happen. Moreover, a signal had been raised at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus of the time when they should put to sea.

The Athenians then, having put out with such scanty preparations, and fought a battle off the harbour of Eretria, held out against them, notwithstanding, for some little time, and were then put to flight and pursued to the shore.

And now such of them as took refuge in the city of the Eretrians, as being friendly to them, fared worst of all, for they were butchered by them; but those who fled to the fort in the Eretrian territory, which the Athenians themselves occupied, were saved;

as also were all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, having taken two and twenty of the Athenian vessels, and either killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. And not long after they effected the revolt of the whole of Euboea, excepting Oreus, (which was held by the Athenians themselves,) and arranged all other matters thereabout.

When the news of what had happened at Euboea reached the Athenians, a greater consternation was felt by them than had ever been before. For neither had the disaster in Sicily, though it appeared a great one at the time, nor any other event, ever yet alarmed them so much.

For when, after their army at Samos had revolted from them, and they had no more ships nor men to go on board them, while they were in a state of sedition, and did not know when they might break out into conflict with one another; [when, I say, under such circumstances] so great a calamity had befallen them—one in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was most of all, Euboea, from which they derived more advantages than from Attica—how could their dejection be unnatural?

But what especially and most immediately alarmed them, was the thought that the enemy would venture, on the strength of their victory, to sail straightway to the attack of their port Piraeus, while it had no ships for its protection;

and they supposed that they were already all but there. And indeed, if they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by lying near it, or if they had remained and blockaded it, have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the whole city; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been theirs, with Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Euboea, in a word, the whole empire of Athens.

But it was not on this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedaemonians proved themselves most convenient people for the Athenians to be at war with. For by being very widely different in character—the one people being quick, and the other slow; the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous—they presented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval empire. A proof of this was given by the Syracusans; for they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most successful in carrying on war with them.

On receiving therefore this news, the Athenians, notwithstanding, manned twenty ships, and called an assembly; one immediately, which was summoned to meet on that occasion for the first time in what was called the Pnyx, (where they had been accustomed to meet in other days,) and in which they deposed the Four Hundred, and resolved that the government should be put into the hands of the Five Thousand; that in that body should be included all who furnished themselves with heavy armour, and that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office;

or if any one did, they declared him to be accursed. Many other assemblies were also held subsequently, in which they appointed persons to frame a code of laws, and every thing else requisite for the government. And during the first period of this constitution the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best polity they ever did, at least my time; for the blend into together of the few and the many was effected with moderation; and this was what raised the state up again after the disastrous occurrences which had taken place.

They also passed a decree for the recall of Alcibiades, and some brothers with him; and sending to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to attend diligently to their interests.

On this change being made, the party of Pisander and Alexicles, and all who were most devoted to the oligarchy, withdrew privily to Decelea; while Aristarchus alone of them, happening to be in office as general, took with all haste some of the most barbarous amongst the archers, and proceeded to Oenoe.

This was a fortress belonging to the Athenians on the borders of Boeotia, and in consequence of a blow that had been inflicted on them by the garrison, by cutting off a party of men on their return from Decelea, it was being besieged by the Corinthians, who had volunteered for the service, and had called the Boeotians also to their aid.

After communicating therefore with these, Aristarchus deceived those in Oenoe, by telling them that their countrymen in the city had made a general surrender to the Lacedmaeonians, and they must give up the place to the Boeotians; for that such were the terms of the capitulation. They therefore, believing him, inasmuch as he was one of the generals, and knowing nothing that had happened, in consequence of their being blockaded, evacuated the fort under truce.

It was in this manner that the Boeotians took and occupied Oenoe, and that the oligarchy and sedition at Athens came to an end.

About the same period of this summer the Peloponnesians at Miletus also executed the following measures. When none of those who were intrusted with the business by Tissaphernes, at the time that he went to Aspendus, afforded them supplies, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes made their appearance hitherto, but Philippus who had been sent with him, as well as another Spartan named Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus the admiral, that the ships would not join them, and that they were being wronged by Tissaphernes in every respect; and when again Pharnabazus was calling them to his aid, and was desirous to get the ships in his turn, like Tissaphernes, and cause the remaining cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby; under these circumstances, I say, Mindarus, with great regularity, and with orders suddenly given, to escape the observation of those at Samos, weighed anchor from Miletus with three and seventy ships, and sailed for the Hellespont. (Sixteen ships had at an earlier period of this same summer entered that sea, and overrun some parts of the Chersonese.) But being caught in a storm, and compelled to do so, he put in at Icarus, and after remaining there through stress of weather five or six days, arrived subsequently at Chios.

When Thrasylus heard of his having put out from Miletus, he himself also set sail straightway from Samos with five and fifty ships, hurrying on to prevent his sailing into the Hellespont before him.

But on finding that he was at Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts both in Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that in case of the ships stirring in any direction they might not do so unobserved; while he himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders for preparing meal and other necessaries, with a view of advancing from Lesbos to attack them at Chios, if any length of time should be spent there. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against and take it, if he could.

For some exiles of the Methymnaeans, and those the most influential, having carried over from Cuma about fifty heavy-armed men who had been associated with them, and hired others from the continent, with three hundred in all, of whom Alexander, a Theban, took the command on the strength of his connexion with them, made an attack on Methymna first; and when beaten off from the attempt by means of the Athenian garrison troops which had advanced from Mytilene, and again repulsed in an engagement outside of the town, made their way over the mountain, and procured the revolt of Eresus.

Thrasylus therefore sailed against it with all his ships, intending to assault it. Thrasybulus, too, had arrived there before him with five ships from Samos, on receiving tidings of the exiles thus crossing over; but being too late, he went to Eresus, and lay at anchor before it.

They were also joined by two vessels on their return home from the Hellespont, and by those of the Methymnaeans; and so there were present, in all, seven and sixty ships, with the troops of which they made their preparations for taking Eresus by storm, if they could, with the aid of engines, or in any way whatever.

In the mean time Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, after being victualled for two days, and receiving from the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the third day put out with all speed from the island, not into the open sea, to avoid falling in with the fleet at Eresus, but sailing to the continent with Lesbos on their left hand.

After touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocaean territory, and dining, they proceeded along the coast of Cuma, and supped at Argennusa on the mainland, over against Mytilene.

Thence they still coasted on, though it was late in the night, and arrived at Harmatus on the continent, just opposite Methymna, and after dinner passing quickly by Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnight to Rhoeteum, and so were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum, and other places in that neighbourhood.

Now the Athenians were at Sestos with eighteen ships; and when their friends gave them notice by fire signals, while they also observed the fires on the hostile shore suddenly appear numerous, they were aware that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont. Accordingly that same night, sailing as quickly as they could, and keeping close under the shore of the Chersonese, they coasted along towards Elaeus, wishing to escape from the enemy's fleet into the open sea.

And they eluded the observation of the sixteen ships at Abydus, although orders for keeping guard had been before given by their friends who went to them, that they might be on the alert against the Athenians in case they should sail out. But descrying those with Mindarus in the morning, and being immediately chased by them, they had not all time to escape, but the greater part of them did, to Imbros and Lemnus; while four of the ships, which were sailing last, were overtaken off Elaeus.

One of these, which was stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus, they took together with its crew, and two others without their crews; while the remaining one they burnt, after it had been deserted, close to Imbros.

After this, with the vessels which had joined them from Abydus and the rest, amounting in all to eighty-six, they besieged Elaeus that day, and when it did not surrender, sailed back to Abydus.

As for the Athenians, they had been deceived by their scouts, and did not imagine that the passage of the enemy's fleet could ever escape their vigilance, but were leisurely assaulting the walls of Eresus. When, how ever, they were aware of it, they immediately left Eresus, and proceeded with all haste to the defence of the Hellespont.

And they took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which having on that occasion put out into the open sea more boldly than the rest, fell in with them. The next day they arrived and cast anchor at Elaeus, and bringing in from Imbros such ships as had taken refuge there, they were five days making preparations for the battle.

After this they fought in the following manner. The Athenians, drawn up in column, were sailing close along shore towards Sestos; while the Peloponnesians, observing this from Abydus, put out on their side also to meet them.

When they found that they were on the eve of an engagement, they extended their flank, the Athenians along the Chersonese, from Idacus to Arrhiana, with seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, from Abydus to Dardanus, with eighty-six.

On the side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself and the fastest sailing vessels; on that of the Athenians, the left was held by Thrasylus, the right by Thrasybulus; while the other commanders took their position as might severally happen.

It being the object of the Peloponnesians to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenians' right with their own left to exclude them, if they could, from sailing out of the straits, as well as to drive their centre on to the shore, which was at no great distance; the Athenians, aware of this, extended their own wing also where the enemy wished to hem them in, and had the advantage over them in sailing;

while their left had by this time passed the headland called Cynossema. But in consequence of this, they had to form their centre with weak and scattered ships, especially as they had the smaller number at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a sharp and angular projection, so that what was doing on the other side of it was not visible.

The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their attack, having had a decided advantage in the action.

To assist their centre was neither in the power of Thrasybulu on the right, owing to the superior number of ships that were pressing on him, nor of Thrasylus on the left; for it was con cealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover. the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with no inferior numbers prevented his doing it: until the Peloponnesians, from pursuing, in the security of victory, different vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater disorder in one part of their force.

Thrasybulus therefore, observing this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to him; and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the enemy's line, handled them roughly in their scattered condition, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the victory to Thrasylus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when they saw the rest doing so likewise.

The rout having thus been effected, and the Peloponnesians having most of them taken refuge at the mouth of the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydus, though the Athenians took but few ships, (for the narrow breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of refuge at a little distance,) yet the victory which they gained in this sea-fight was most opportune for them.

For whereas they had before been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of losses in detail, as well as of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased to think disparagingly of themselves, and to consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea.

However, they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively; while they themselves lost fifteen.

After erecting a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring the enemy their slain under a truce, they then despatched a trireme to Athens with the news of their victory.

On the arrival of the vessel, and on hearing of their unexpected good fortune, after the disasters which had recently befallen them in Euboea, and through their own sedition, they were much encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly prevail, if they supported it with vigour.

On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians at Sestos having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. And descrying the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they attacked them, and took the vessels, after defeating in a battle those who came to help them on shore. On their arrival also at Cyzicus, which was unfortified, they got possession of it again, and levied a contribution from it.

In the mean time the Peloponnesians also sailed front Abydus to Elaeus, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound condition, (the rest having been burnt by the inhabitants,) and then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch the squadron that was there.

About this same time, too, Alcibiades returned to Samos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, bringing word that he had prevented the Phoenician ships from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes a more decided friend to the Athenians than before. Having then manned nine ships in addition to those he had already, he levied large sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos.

After executing these measures, and placing a governor in Cos, it being now towards autumn, he sailed back to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, when he heard that the Peloponnesian squadron had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he set out again from Aspendus, and proceeded to Ionia.

Now while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (of Aeolian extraction,) conveyed by land over Mount Ida some heavy-armed troops from Abydus, and introduced them into their city, in consequence of being ill-treated by Arsaces the Persian, Tissaphernes' lieutenant.

This same man, pretending to have a quarrel which he had not yet avowed, and offering service to the chief men amongst them, had induced the Delians, who had settled at Atramyttium, when driven from their homes by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying Delos, to go out as though on terms of friendship and alliance with him; and then, having watched when they were at dinner, had surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down.

Since therefore they were afraid, on account of this deed, that he might some time or other commit some outrage on themselves too, and since he also imposed upon them burdens which they could not bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

When Tissaphernes heard of this act also on the part of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus and that at Cnidus, (for there too his garrisons had been driven out,) considering that he must have incurred their violent displeasure, and fearing that they might do him still further mischief, and, moreover, being vexed to think that Pharnabazus, by receiving them, might in less time and at less expense be more successful in his measures against the Athenians, he determined to go to them at the Hellespont, that he might both complain of what had been done at Antandrus, and defend himself as plausibly as he could against their charges respecting the Phoenician fleet, and all other matters. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus, and offered sacrifice to Diana.

[When the winter following this summer shall have terminated, the twenty-first year will be completed.]