Book 1

When Caesar’s dispatch had been handed to the consuls, the tribunes, with difficulty and after much wrangling, gained their permission for it to be read in the senate, but they could not obtain consent for a motion to be brought before the senate on the subject of the dispatch. The consuls bring forward a motion on the state of public affairs. The consul L. Lentulus puts pressure on the senate, and promises that he will not fail the republic if the senators are willing to express their opinions with boldness and resolution; but if they pay regard to Caesar and try to win favour with him as they have done on previous occasions, he says that he will consider his own interests and will not obey their authority. I too, said he, can shelter myself under the favour and friendship of Caesar. Scipio expresses himself in similar terms—that Pompeius is inclined not to desert the republic if the senate follows him; but if it delays and acts remissly, it will in vain solicit his aid should it wish to do so in the future.

This speech of Scipio appeared to come from the mouth of Pompeius himself, since the senate was meeting in the city and Pompeius was close at hand. Some had expressed less rigorous views, such as M. Marcellus, who at first embarked on a speech to the effect that the question ought not to be referred to the senate till levies had been held throughout Italy and armies enrolled under whose protection the senate might venture to make such decrees as it wished safely and freely; such, too, as M. Calidius, who expressed the opinion that Pompeius should go to his own provinces in order that there might be no motive for hostilities: Caesar, he said, was afraid lest it should be thought that Pompeius, having extorted two legions from him, was holding them back and retaining them near Rome with a view to imperilling him; such also as M. Rufus, who with a few modifications followed the opinion of Calidius. All these speakers were assailed with vehement invective by the consul L. Lentulus. He absolutely refused to put the motion of Calidius, and Marcellus, alarmed by the invectives, abandoned his proposal. Thus most of the senators, compelled by the language of the consul, intimidated by the presence of the army and by the threats of the friends of Pompeius, against their will and yielding to pressure, adopt the proposal of Scipio that Caesar should disband his army before a fixed date, and that, if he failed to do so, he should be considered to be meditating treason against the republic. The tribunes M. Antonius and Q. Cassius intervene. The question of their intervention is immediately brought before the senate. Opinions of weighty import are expressed, and the more harsh and cruel the speech the more it is applauded by the personal enemies of Caesar.

When the senate was dismissed in the evening all the members of the order are summoned out of the city by Pompeius. He praises the zealous and encourages them for the future; the sluggish he reproves and stimulates. Everywhere a number of reserves from the old armies of Pompeius are called out to serve by the prospect of prizes and promotion; many are summoned from the two legions handed over by Caesar. The city and the comitium itself are filled with tribunes, centurions, reserves. All the friends of. the consuls, all the adherents of Pompeius and of those whose enmity to Caesar was of long standing, are compelled to attend the senate. By their clamorous throngs the weaker are terrified and the wavering are confirmed, while the majority are robbed of the privilege of free decision. The censor L. Piso promises to go to Caesar, also the praetor L. Roscius, to inform him of these matters. They demand a period of six days for the execution of their purpose. Some express the opinion that envoys should be sent to Caesar to set before him the feelings of the senate.

All these speakers encounter opposition and are confronted with speeches from the consul, from Scipio, and from Cato. Cato is goaded on by his old quarrels with Caesar and vexation at his defeat. Lentulus is moved by the greatness of his debts, by the prospect of a military command and a province, and by the lavish bribes of rulers claiming the title of king, and boasts among his friends that he will prove a second Sulla to whom shall fall the supreme command. Scipio is stimulated by the same hope of a province and of armies, which he thinks that kinship will entitle him to share with Pompeius; also by the dread of the law courts, by the flattery of certain powerful men who had then great influence in public affairs and in the law courts, and by his own and their ostentatious character. Pompeius, urged on by Caesar’s enemies and by his desire that no one should be on the same level of authority with himself, had completely withdrawn himself from Caesar’s friendship and become reconciled with their common enemies, most of whom he had himself imposed upon Caesar at the time of their connexion by marriage. Stirred, too, by the discredit attaching to his diversion of two legions from their route by Asia and Syria and his appropriation of them for his own power and supremacy, he was eager that the issue should be brought to the arbitrament of war.

For these reasons everything is done in hurry and confusion. Caesar’s friends are allowed no time to inform him, nor are the tribunes given any opportunity of protesting against the peril that threatened them, nor even of retaining, by the exercise of their veto, the most fundamental of their rights, which L. Sulla had left them, but within the limit of seven days they are compelled to take measures for their own safety, whereas the most turbulent of the tribunes in earlier times had been wont to regard with apprehension the conclusion of at least eight months of administration. Recourse is had to that extreme and ultimate decree of the senate which had never previously been resorted to except when the city was at the point of destruction and all despaired of safety through the audacity of malefactors: The consuls, the praetors, the tribunes, and all the proconsular who are near the city shall take measures that the state incur no harm. These resolutions are recorded by decree of the senate on January 7. So on the first five days on which a meeting of the senate could be held after the date on which Lentulus entered on his consulship, except two election days, decrees of the severest and harshest character are passed affecting Caesar’s imperial command and those highly important officials, the tribunes of the people. The tribunes at once flee from the city and betake themselves to Caesar. He was at that time at Ravenna and was awaiting a reply to his very lenient demands, in the hope that by some sense of equity a peaceable conclusion might be reached.

On the following days the senate meets outside the city. Pompeius carries out the policy which he had indicated by the mouth of Scipio. He commends the manly consistency of the senate, and sets forth the strength of his forces, showing that he has ten legions ready to hand, and, moreover, that he had ascertained for certain that the troops were ill-disposed to Caesar and could not be persuaded to defend or follow him. Other matters are at once referred to the senate—that a levy should be held throughout Italy, that Faustus Sulla should he at once sent into Mauritania, and that a grant of money should be made to Pompeius from the treasury. A motion is also proposed that King Juba should be styled Ally and Friend. But Marcellus refuses to allow this for the present. The tribune Philippus vetoes the motion about Faustus. On the other matters decrees of the senate are recorded in writing. The provinces, two consular, the rest praetorian, are decreed to private persons. Syria falls to Scipio, Gallia to L. Domitius; Philippus and Cotta are passed over by private arrangement, nor are their lots cast into the urn. To the rest of the provinces praetors are sent. Nor do they wait, as had been the habit in previous years, for a motion to be brought before the people about their imperial command; but, wearing the scarlet military cloak, they leave Rome after offering the usual vows. The consuls quit the city, a thing which had never previously happened, and private persons have lictors in the city and the Capitol, contrary to all the precedents of the past. Levies are held throughout Italy, arms are requisitioned, sums of money are exacted from the municipal towns and carried off from the temples, and all divine and human rights are thrown into confusion.

When this was known Caesar addresses his troops. He relates all the wrongs that his enemies had ever done him, and complains that Pompeius had been led astray and corrupted by them through jealousy and a desire to detract from his credit, though he had himself always supported and aided his honour and dignity. He complains that a new precedent had been introduced into the state whereby the right of tribunicial intervention, which in earlier years had been restored by arms, was now being branded with ignominy and crushed by arms. Sulla, he said, though stripping the tribunicial power of everything, had nevertheless left its right of intervention free, while Pompeius, who had the credit of having restored the privileges that were lost, had taken away even those that they had before. There had been no instance of the decree that the magistrates should take measures to prevent the state from suffering harm (the declaration and decision of the senate by which the Roman people are called to arms) except in the case of pernicious laws, tribunicial violence, a popular secession, or the seizure of temples and elevated positions: and he explains that these precedents of a former age had been expiated by the downfall of Saturninus and of the Gracchi. No event of this kind had occurred at the time in question or had even been thought of. He exhorts them to defend from his enemies the reputation and dignity of the commander under whose guidance they have administered the state with unfailing good fortune for nine years, fought many successful battles, and pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany. Thereupon the men of the Thirteenth Legion, which was present (he had called this out at the beginning of the disorder; the rest had not yet come together), exclaim that they are ready to repel the wrongs of their commander and of the tribunes.

Having thus learnt the disposition of the soldiery, he sets out for Ariminum with that legion, and there meets the tribunes who had fled to him. The rest of the legions he summons from their winter quarters and orders them to follow him. Thither comes the young L. Caesar whose father was one of Caesar’s legates. When their first greetings were over he explains—and this was the real reason of his coming —that he has a message from Pompeius to give him regarding a personal matter. He says that Pompeius wishes to be cleared of reproach in the eyes of Caesar, who should not construe as an affront to himself what he had done for the sake of the state. He had always placed the interests of the republic before private claims. Caesar, too, considering his high position, should give up for the benefit of the state his partisan zeal and passion, nor be so bitterly angry with his enemies as to injure the commonwealth in the hope that he is injuring them. He adds a few other remarks of this kind, at the same lime making excuses for Pompeius. The praetor Roscius lays substantially the same proposals before Caesar, and in the same language, and makes it clear that he received them from Pompeius.

Though these proceedings seemed to have no effect in lessening the sense of wrong, nevertheless now that he had found suitable persons to convey his wishes to Pompeius he makes a request of each of them that, as they had brought him the messages of Pompeius, they should not object to convey his demands in reply, in the hope that by a little trouble they might be able to put an end to serious disputes and free the whole of Italy from alarm. As for myself, he said, I have always reckoned the dignity of the republic of first importance and preferable to life. I was indignant that a benefit conferred on me by the Roman people was being insolently wrested from me by my enemies, and that, robbed of my six months’ command, I was being dragged back to the city, when the people had directed that I should be allowed to be a candidate in absence at the next election. Nevertheless, for the sake of the state I have borne with equanimity this infringement of my prerogative; when I sent a dispatch to the senate proposing that all should give up arms failed to obtain even this request. Levies are being held throughout Italy, two legions which had been filched from me under the pretence of a Parthian war are being held back, the state is in arms. To what does all this tend but to my own ruin? Still Lam_prepared to resort to anything, to submit to anything, for the sake of the commonwealth.. Let Pompeius go to his own provinces, let us disband our armies, let everyone in Italy lay down his arms, let fear be banished from the state, let free elections and the whole control of the republic be handed over to the senate and the Roman people. That this may be done more easily and on definite terms and be ratified by an oath, let Pompeius himself come nearer or allow me to approach him. In this way a conference will settle all disputes.

Having received his instructions, Roscius arrives at Capua with L. Caesar, and there finds the consuls and Pompeius, and delivers Caesar’s demands. After deliberation they reply and send him back by their hands written instructions, the main purport of which was that Caesar should return to Gaul, quit Ariminum and disband his forces; if he did this, Pompeius would go to the Spanish provinces. Meanwhile, until a pledge was given that Caesar would carry out his promise,the consuls and Pompeius would not interrupt their levies.

It was an unfair bargain to demand that Caesar should quit Ariminum and return to his province while he himself retained his provinces and legions that were not his own: to wish that Caesar’s army should be disbanded while he himself continued his levies: to promise that he would go to his province and not to fix a limit of time for his departure, so that if he had not gone when Caesar’s consulship was over he would nevertheless be held guiltless of breaking his word: finally, his refusal to give an opportunity for a conference and to promise that he would approach Caesar tended to produce a profound despair of peace. And so he sends M. Antonius with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium, and himself stops at Ariminum with two cohorts and arranges to hold a levy there; he occupies Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, each with one cohort.

Meanwhile, having been told that the praetor Thermus was holding Iguvium with five cohorts and fortifying the town, and that all the inhabitants of Iguvium were extremely well disposed towards himself, he sends Curio thither with the three cohorts which he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum. Learning of his approach,Thermus, mistrusting the goodwill of the community, withdraws his cohorts from the town and flies. His troops desert him on the way and return home. Curio with the utmost goodwill of everyone recovers Iguvium. Hearing of this, Caesar, relying on the goodwill of the townsfolk, removes the cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion from the garrisons and proceeds to Auximum. This town Attius was holding with cohorts that he had introduced into it, and, sending round senators, was levying troops throughout Picenum.

Learning of Caesar’s approach, the decurions of Auximum throng to meet Attius Varus and explain that they are not free to act at their discretion; that neither they nor the rest of their fellow-townsmen can endure that G. Caesar, holding imperial command, having deserved so well of the state and after performing such exploits, should be prevented from entering the walls of the town: so let Varus have regard to the future and his own peril. Stirred by their words, he withdraws from the town the garrison that he had brought in and takes to flight. A few of Caesar’s men of the first century followed him and compelled him to halt. An engagement is fought and Varus is deserted by his followers; some of his men retire to their homes, the rest make their way to Caesar; and among them L. Pupius, a centurion of the first company who had previously held the same rank in the army of Gn. Pompeius, is arrested with them and brought before him. Caesar, however, commends the men of Attius’ detachment, sends Pupius away, and thanks the inhabitants of Auximum, promising to remember their action.

When these events were announced at Rome such consternation seized at once on the inhabitants that when the consul Lentulus had come to open the treasury for the purpose of providing a sum of money for Pompeius in. accordance with a decree of the senate, as soon as ever he had opened the inner treasury he fled from the city; for news was falsely brought that Caesar was on the very point of arriving and that his cavalry had already come. Lentulus was followed by his colleague Marcellus and by most of the magistrates. Gn. Pompeius had left the city the day before and was on his way to the legions which he had taken from Caesar and distributed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levying of troops round the city is broken off; no one thinks there is any safety this side of Capua. It was at Capua that they first rally with renewed courage and begin to raise a levy among the colonists who had been planted there under the Julian law, while Lentulus brings the gladiators, whom Caesar kept in a training school there, into the forum and encourages them by the prospect of liberty, gives them horses, and orders them to follow him; y but afterwards, on the admonition of his followers, because such a proceeding was censured by the general judgment, he distributes them for safe keeping among his friends in the burgess-body at Capua.

Caesar, starting from Auximum, traverses the whole of the Picene territory. All the prefectures of those parts receive him with the utmost gladness and assist his army with supplies of every kind. Even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had founded and built at his own expense, envoys come to him and promise to do his bidding with the utmost eagerness. He requisitions soldiers; they send them. Meanwhile the Twelfth Legion overtakes Caesar. With these two legions he goes to Asculum in Picenum. Lentulus Spinther, who was holding that town with ten cohorts, as soon as he hears of Caesar’s approach, flies from the town, and while endeavouring to take his cohorts away with him is deserted by a great part of his men. Abandoned on the march with a few followers, he falls in with Vibullius Rufus, who had been sent by Pompeius into the Picene district to confirm the loyalty of the inhabitants. Vibullius, on learning from him of what was going on in Picenum, takes over his soldiers and lets him go free. He also collects from the neighbouring districts what cohorts he can from the Pompeian levies; among them he captures Lucilius Hirrus, flying from Camerinum with six cohorts which he had there in garrison. By gathering all these together he makes up thirteen cohorts. With them he makes his way by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium and reports the arrival of Caesar with two legions. Domitius by himself had collected and brought from Alba about twenty cohorts, consisting of Marsi and Peligni, drawn from the neighbouring districts.

On the recovery of Firmum and the expulsion of Lentulus, Caesar gives orders that the men who had deserted Lentulus should be sought for and a levy instituted. He stays there himself one day for foraging purposes and then hastens to Corfinium. On his arrival there five cohorts dispatched from the town by Domitius were breaking down the bridge over the river, distant about three miles from the town. A conflict taking place there with Caesar’s skirmishers, the Domitian troops were quickly driven from the bridge and withdrew into the town. Caesar, leading his troops across, halted outside the town and pitched camp close to the wall.

Learning what had occurred, Domitius offers a large reward to some men acquainted with the district, and sends them with dispatches to Pompeius in Apulia to beg and beseech him to come to his assistance, pointing out that Caesar could easily be cut off by two armies operating in the narrow passes and so be prevented from foraging. If Pompeius does not do this, Domitius says that he himself and more than thirty cohorts and a great number of senators and Roman knights will be imperilled. Meanwhile, having exhorted his men, he places engines on the walls and assigns each man a definite duty for the protection of the town. In a speech he promises the troops lands out of his own possessions, four acres apiece, and in like proportion to the centurions and reserves.

Meanwhile word is brought to Caesar that the inhabitants of Sulmo, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, are ready to carry out his wishes, but are prevented by the senator Q. Lucretius and by Attius the Pelignian, who were in occupation of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sends M. Antonius thither with five cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion. The people of Sulmo as soon as they saw our standards opened the gates and sallied forth in a body, townsmen and soldiers, to meet and congratulate Antonius. Lucretius and Attius flung themselves from the wall. Attius is brought to Antonius and begs to be sent to Caesar. Antonius returns with the cohorts and Attius the same day on which he started. Caesar united these cohorts with his own army and let Attius go free. He determined during the first few days to strengthen his camp with extensive works, to bring in supplies of corn from the neighbouring towns, and to wait for the rest of his forces. Three days after, the Eighth Legion joins him and twenty-two cohorts from the new levies in Gaul and about three hundred horsemen from the Noric lung. On their arrival he pitches a second camp the other side of the town, and puts Curio in charge of it. On the subsequent days he set himself to surround the town with an earthwork and redoubts. The main part of this work having been carried out, about the same time the messengers sent by Pompeius return.

When the dispatch was read Domitius, concealing the facts, asserts in a public meeting that Pompeius would quickly come to their aid, and exhorts them not to lose heart, but to prepare whatever was required for the defence of the town. Privately he confers with a few of his friends and determines to adopt the plan of flight. As his looks belied his words, and all his actions were marked by more haste and timidity than he had usually shown on the previous days, while, contrary to his custom, he conversed much in secret with his own friends by way of taking counsel, and shunned general deliberations and gatherings, concealment and dissimulation were no longer possible. For Pompeius had sent back word that he would not utterly imperil the whole situation, and that it was not by his advice or consent that Domitius had betaken himself into the town of Corfinium, and bade him therefore come to him with all his forces if there should be any opportunity of doing so. This, however, was being rendered impossible by the blockade and investment of the town.

When the intentions of Domitius had been divulged, the troops who were at Corfinium draw apart in the early evening and hold a conference among themselves by means of the military tribunes, centurions, and the most respectable men of their own class. They say that they are being invested by Caesar; that his siege works and fortifications are almost completed; that their leader Domitius, in confidence and reliance on whom they have remained steadfast, has abandoned them all and is meditating flight; that they are bound to consider their own safety. The Marsi at first disagree with them and occupy that part of the town which seemed the most strongly fortified; and so great a dissension arises among them that they attempt to engage in hostilities and to fight out the issue, but soon after, messengers having been sent to and fro, they learn the facts, of which they were unaware, about the proposed flight of L. Domitius. And so all unanimously surround Domitius, who had been brought out before them, and guard him, and send envoys out of their number to Caesar, saying that they are ready to open the gates, to do his bidding, and to give up L. Domitius alive into his hands.

When these things were known, although Caesar thought it of great importance to get possession of the town at once and to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change of feeling should be effected by lavish gifts or by a strengthening of their courage or by false news, since, as he reflected, great crises often occurred in war through slight Influences; nevertheless, fearing lest the town should be plundered by the entry of the troops and the licence of night, he commends those who had come to him and dismisses them into the town and orders the gates and walls to be carefully guarded. He personally distributes his men over the earthworks which he had set himself to construct, not leaving fixed intervals, as had been the custom on previous days, but in an unbroken line of sentries and outposts, so that they may touch one another and fill up the whole line of investment; he sends round the tribunes and prefects, exhorting them not merely to be on their guard against sallies, but also to watch for the secret exit of individuals. And, in fact, no one among them all was so remiss and languid in’spirit as to take rest that night. So keenly did they await the ultimate issue that their hearts and minds were drawn in different directions as they asked what was happening to the Corfinians themselves, what to Domitius, what to Lentulus and to the rest, and what chances were befalling each side.

About the fourth watch Lentulus Spinther confers with our outposts and sentries from the wall, saying that he would like to have an interview with Caesar if the opportunity were granted him. Permission being given, he is escorted from the town, nor do the Domitian soldiers leave him till he is brought into the presence of Caesar. He pleads with him for his own safety, begs and beseeches that he will spare him, reminds him of their old-standing friendship, and sets forth the benefits that Caesar had conferred on him —and they were very great, for through his means he had been admitted to the College of the Pontifices, had held the province of Spain after his prae- torship, and had been assisted in his candidature for the consulship. Caesar interrupts his speech, observing that he had not quitted his province with any evil intent, but to defend himself from the insults of his foes, to restore to their position the tribunes of the people who at that conjuncture had been expelled from the state, to assert the freedom of himself and the Roman people who had been oppressed by a small faction. Lentulus, encouraged, by his speech, begs permission to return to the town, saying that the fact that he had gained his point about his own safety would comfort the rest in their hope for theirs; some of them, he added, are so terrified that they are being forced to adopt harsh measures against their own life. Receiving permission, he departs.

As soon as day dawned Caesar orders all senators and their sons, military tribunes, and Roman knights to be brought before him. There were fifty of them: of the senatorial order, L Domitius, P Lentulus Spinther, L. Caecilius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus the quaestor, L. Rubrius; also the son of Domitius with many other youths, and a large number of Roman knights and decurions whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal towns. All these when brought before him he protects from the clamorous insolence of the troops: he addresses them in a few words, complaining that no gratitude had been shown him on their part for his signal acts of kindness, and dismisses them all unharmed. The sum of 6,000,000 sesterces which had been taken by Domitius to Corfinium and placed in the public treasury, and then handed over to him by the four magistrates of Corfinium, he restores to Domitius, in order that he may not be thought more self-eon-trolled in dealing with men’s lives than with their property, although there was no doubt that this money belonged to the state and had been assigned by Pompeius for military pay. The soldiers of Domitius he orders to take the oath of allegiance to himself, and on that day moves camp and completes a full day’s march, having stopped at Corfinium for seven days in all, and, passing through the borders of the Marrucni, Frentani, and Larinates, arrives in Apulia.

Pompeius, learning of the events that had happened at Corfinium, goes from Luceria to Canusium and thence to Brundisium. He orders that all the forces drawn from the new levies should be brought to him from every quarter; he arms the slaves and husbandmen and furnishes them with horses, making out of them about three hundred horsemen. L. Manlius the praetor flies from Alba with six cohorts, Rutilius Lupus the praetor from Tarracina with three. These, catching sight of Caesar’s cavalry under the command of Vibius Curius, desert their praetor, transfer their colours to Curius, and go over to his side. So, too, on subsequent marches several cohorts fall in with Caesar’s main body and others with the horse. N. Magius of Cremona, Pompeius’ chief engineer, is captured on the route and brought back to Caesar, who sends him back to Pompeius with instructions to the effect that, since up to the present no opportunity of a conference has been allowed and he himself is on the way to Brundisium, it is to the interest of the state and the common welfare that he should have a conference with Pompeius; that when they are separated by long distance and terms of agreement are conveyed by others, the same results are not gained as would be secured if they were to discuss all the conditions face to face.

Having given these instructions, he arrives at Brundisium with six legions, three veteran, and the rest consisting of those which he had formed from a new levy and raised to their full complement on his march, for he had sent the Domitian cohorts straight off from Corfinium to Sicily. He finds out that the consuls had gone to Dyrrachium with a great part of the army, and that Pompeius was remaining at Brundisium with twenty cohorts, nor could it be ascertained for certain whether he had remained there for the sake of holding Brundisium, in order that he might more easily control the whole Adriatic from the extremities of Italy and the shores of Greece and so carry on war from either side, or whether he had halted there from lack of ships; and fearing lest Pompeius should think that he ought not to abandon Italy, he determined to block the exits and stop the working of the harbour of Brundisium. The following was the method of his operations. Where the mouth of the harbour was narrowest he threw out piers and a dam from the shore on each side because the sea was shallow there. As he proceeded further out, since the mole could not hold together where the water was deeper, he placed two rafts thirty feet square over against the end of the breakwater. He fastened these by four anchors, one at each of the four angles, to prevent them being shifted by the waves. When they were finished and placed in position he attached in order other rafts of a like size. These he covered with soil and a raised causeway that there might be no obstacle in the way of approach or ingress for the purpose of defence. In front and on each side he protected them with fascines and screens; on every fourth raft he ran up towers of two stories that he might thus more conveniently defend them from an attack by ships and from fire.

To meet this Pompeius fitted out some large merchant-ships which he had seized in the port of Brundisium. On them he erected towers of three stories each, and when they were equipped with a number of engines and weapons of every kind he brought them up close to Caesar’s works so as to breakthrough the rafts and destroy the works. Thus fighting went on every day, each side discharging slings, arrows, and other missiles. But Caesar, while carrying on these operations, did not think that negotiations for peace ought to be dropped; and though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom he had commissioned to carry instructions to Pompeius, was not sent back to him, and though his frequent attempts at an understanding were hindering energetic action and policy, yet on all accounts he thought it right to persevere therein. And so he sends to Scribonius Libo his legate Caninius Rebilus, one of Libo’s intimate friends, to confer on the subject. He instructs him to exhort Libo to effect a reconcilement; his chief demand is that he should himself have an interview with Pompeius. He explains that if he is allowed this opportunity he has great confidence that it will result in their laying down arms on equal terms; and that a great part of the praise and credit for this achievement will fall to Libo if a cessation of hostilities should take place by his advice and efforts. Libo, quitting his interview with Caninius, goes to see Pompeius. Soon after he brings back word that, the consuls being absent, negotiations for a settlement cannot be carried on without them. So Caesar decides that he must at last abandon an attempt so often made in vain and must apply himself to warfare.

When nearly half the work had been completed by Caesar and nine days had been spent on it, the ships which had conveyed to Dyrrachium the first part of the army and had been sent back thence by the consuls return to Brundisium. On the arrival of the ships Pompeius, either because he was perturbed by Caesar’s siege-works or else because he had originally intended to quit Italy, begins to prepare his departure, and in order to delay with greater ease any sudden attack on the part of Caesar, and prevent his troops breaking into the town at once after his departure, he blocks the gates, barricades lanes and streets, d raws transverse trenches across the thoroughfares, and fixes therein stakes and blocks of wood sharpened at the ends. These he levels over with light hurdles and earth, while he shuts off the approaches and the two routes which led outside the wall to the harbour by planting in the ground huge balks of timber also sharpened to a point. Having made these preparations, he bids the soldiers embark in silence, and places light-armed men, drawn from the reserves, the archers, and the slingers, at intervals along the wall and in the towers. These he arranges to recall at a given signal when all the troops had embarked, and leaves some merchant-vessels for them in an accessible place.

The Brundisians, embittered by the wrongs inflicted on them by the Pompeian soldiery and by the insults of Pompeius himself, favoured the cause of Caesar. And so when they heard of the departure of Pompeius, while his men were hurrying about occupied in the business in hand, they signalled the fact from every house. Learning through them the state of affairs, Caesar orders ladders to be prepared and men to be armed, so as not to lose any opportunity of action. Pompeius weighs anchor at nightfall. The men who were placed on the wall on garrison duty are recalled by the signal agreed on and run down to the ships by familiar routes. The soldiers bring up scaling-ladders and mount the walls, but, warned by the Brundisians to beware of the blind stockade and ditches, they halt, and, taking a circuitous route, under their guidance reach the harbour, and by means of boats and punts arrest and capture two ships with troops on board which had fallen foul of Caesar’s piers.

Though Caesar, in the hope of finishing the business, particularly approved the plan of collecting ships and then crossing the sea and following Pompeius before he should strengthen himself by oversea support, yet he feared the delay and length of time involved, because Pompeius by collecting all the ships had robbed him of any present opportunity of following him. It remained to wait for ships from the more distant parts of Gaul and Picenum and from the strait. This, owing to the time of year, seemed a protracted and difficult task. Meanwhile he was unwilling that a veteran army and two Spanish provinces, one of which was under obligation to Pompeius for very great benefits, should be confirmed in their allegiance, that auxiliary forces and cavalry should be provided, that Gaul and Italy should be tampered with, all in his absence.

So for the present he gives up his plan of following Pompeius and determines to go into Spain. He bids the officials of all the municipal towns to find ships and see that they are conveyed to Brundisium. He sends his legate Valerius into Sardinia with one legion and Curio as propraetor into Sicily with two, and bids him on recovering Sicily to transport his army forthwith to Africa. M. Cotta was in control of Sardinia and M. Cato of Sicily; Tubero ought by the allotment of offices to have been in command of Africa. The people of Caralis, as soon as they heard that Valerius was being sent to them, before he had quitted Italy, of their own accord eject Cotta from the town. Terror-struck, because he gathered that the whole province was in accord with them, he flies from Sardinia to Africa. Cato in Sicily was repairing the old warships and requisitioning new ones from the communities, devoting much zeal to the performance of his task. Among the Lucani and Bruttii he was raising levies of Roman citizens through his legates, and was exacting a fixed number of cavalry and infantry from the townships of Sicily, When these measures were almost completed, hearing of the approach of Curio he complains in a public meeting that he had been flung aside and betrayed by Gn. Pompeius, who, while utterly unprepared in every particular, had undertaken an unnecessary war, and when questioned by himself and the rest in the senate had assured them that he had everything fit and ready for war. After making these complaints in the assembly he fled from the province.

Valerius and Cotta, finding Sardinia and Sicily bereft of military control, proceed thither with their armies. Tubero on reaching Africa finds Attius Varus in the province in military command; he, as we have explained above, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum had immediately fled and gone to Africa and had on his own account seized on the vacant province. By raising a levy he had made up two legions, having by his knowledge of the people and the district and his familiarity with the province gained an opening for engaging in such undertakings, as he had held the province a few years previously after his praetorship. He prevents Tubero on arrival at Utica with his ships from approaching the port and the town, and does not allow him to land his son who was stricken with illness, but compels him to weigh anchor and quit the district.

Having carried out these measures, Caesar withdraws his men into the nearest towns that for the rest of the time they might have some intermission of toil. He himself proceeds to the city. Having called the senate together, he recounts the wrongs done him by his personal enemies. He explains that he had sought no extraordinary office, but, waiting for the legitimate time of his consulship, had been content with privileges open to all the citizens. A proposal had been carried by the ten tribunes while Pompeius himself was consul that he should be allowed to compete in absence, though his enemies spoke against it, while Cato opposed with the utmost vehemence and after his old habit spun out the days by obstructive speech. If Pompeius disapproved, why did he allow it to be carried? If he approved, why did he prohibit him from taking advantage of the people’s kindness? He sets forth his own patience when under no pressure he had made the request about the disbandment of the armies, a point in which he was ready to make a personal sacrifice of dignity and position. He tells them of the bitterness of his foes who refused in his case what they demanded in the other, and preferred utter confusion to the surrender of military power and armed force. He tells of their injustice in robbing him of his legions, of their cruelty and insolence in infringing the rights of the tribunes; he enumerates the terms that he had offered, the conferences asked for and refused. On these considerations he exhorts and charges them to take up the burden of state and administer it with his help; but if they shrink through fear he will not burden them, and will administer the state himself. Envoys should be sent to Pompeius to effect a settlement, nor was he afraid of the remark made by Pompeius a little before in the senate, to the effect that undue influence is attributed to those to whom envoys are sent and fear argued on the part of those that send them. Such considerations seemed to belong to a poor and weak spirit. His own wish was to be superior to others in justice and equity as he had striven to surpass them in action.

The senate approves his proposal about the sending of envoys, but no one was found to be sent, each refusing for himself the duty of this embassy mainly through fear. For Pompeius when quitting the city had said in the senate that he would regard in the same light those who remained at Rome and those who were in Caesar’s camp. Thus three days are spun out with discussion and excuses. Also L. Metellus, the tribune, is put up by Caesar’s enemies to thwart this proposal and to hinder everything else that he proposed to do. When his design was understood, several days having been already wasted, Caesar, in order to avoid throwing away any more time, having failed to do what he had proposed, leaves the city and goes into further Gaul.

On his arrival there he learns that Vibullius Rufus, whom he had captured at Corfinium and dismissed a few days before, had been dispatched by Pompeius; also that Domitius had gone to seize Massilia with seven merchant-vessels which he had requisitioned and had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and tenants; and also that some Massilian envoys had been previously sent home, youths of noble birth, whom Pompeius when quitting the city had exhorted not to let Caesar’s fresh services drive from their minds the memory of his own earlier kindnesses. Receiving these instructions, the people of Massilia had closed their gates against Caesar, and had called to their aid the Albici, a barbarian tribe, who owed allegiance to them from olden times, and inhabited the hills above Massilia; they had collected and brought into their town corn from the neighbouring districts and from all the strongholds; they had set up manufactories of arms in the town, and were engaged in repairing their walls, gates, and fleet.

Caesar summons fifteen of the chief men of Massilia. He pleads with them not,to let the first outbreak of hostilities come from the Massilians; they ought to follow the authority of the whole of Italy rather than be subservient to the will of one man. He leaves no point unmentioned that he thought adapted to restore their minds to sanity. The envoys report his speech, and bring back to Caesar the following authoritative reply: We understand that the Roman people is from private persons divided into two parties. It is not within our discretion or our power to discriminate which side has the juster cause. The leaders of the two sides are Gn. Pompeius and G. Caesar, patrons of our state, one of whom has officially granted us the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and of the Helvii; the other, after conquering the Sallyes by armed force, has assigned them to us and increased our revenues. Wherefore it is our duty to show them equal goodwill, as their benefits are equal, and to aid neither of them against the other, nor to receive either within our city or ports.

While they are engaged on these proceedings, Domitius, arriving by sea at Massilia, is received by the inhabitants and put in command of the city; the whole control of the War is placed in his hands. Under his authority they send the fleet in every direction; they seize all the merchant-ships they can find and bring them into the harbour. Those which are insufficiently provided with bolts or timber, and with tackle, they use for fitting out and repairing the rest. All the corn that they can find they collect for the general use. The rest of the merchandise and provisions they reserve for the blockade, if it should ensue. Stirred by these wrongs, Caesar conducts three legions to Massilia; he determines to bring up towers and penthouses for the siege of the city, and make twelve warships at Arelate. These having been made and equipped within thirty days from the day on which the timber was first cut down, and having been brought to Massilia, he puts D. Brutus in command of them, and leaves his legate, G. Trebonius, to conduct the siege of Massilia.

While arranging and carrying out these measures he sends forward his legate, G. Fabius, into Spain with three legions, which he had stationed at Narbo and elsewhere round that district in winter quarters, and gives orders that the Pyrenean passes, which were then held with outposts by the legate L. Afranius, should be at once seized. He orders the rest of the legions, which are wintering further off, to follow up. Fabius, in obedience to orders, acting with promptitude, drove the outpost from the pass,and hurried by forced marches to the army of Afranius.

On the arrival of L. Vibullius Rufus, who, as we have shown, was sent by Pompeius into Spain, Afranius and Petreius and Varro, legates of Pompeius, of whom one held hither Spain with three legions, another further Spain from the pass of Castulo to the Anas with two legions, a third the district of the Vettones from the Anas and also Lusitania with an equal number of legions, divide their tasks in such a way that Petreius should march from Lusitania through the Vettones with all his forces to join Afranius, while Varro should protect the whole of further Spain with the legions under his command. When these arrangements were made Petreius requisitions cavalry and auxiliary troops from the whole or Lusitania, Afranius from Celtiberia, the Cantabri, and all the barbarous tribes that extend to the ocean. When they were collected Petreius quickly makes his way through the Vettones to Afranius, and with common consent they agree to wage war at Ilerda owing to the natural advantages afforded by the position.

There were, as I have explained above, three legions belonging to Afranius, two to Petreius, besides about eighty cohorts, some heavy-armed from the hither province, others light-armed from further Spain, and about five thousand cavalry from each province. Caesar had sent forward six legions into Spain, five thousand auxiliary infantry and three thousand cavalry which he had had with him during all his former wars, and an equal number from Gaul, which he had himself pacified, having specially called to arms all the men of conspicuous rank and bravery from every state; to these he had added men of the best class from among the Aquitani and the mountaineers who border on the province of Gaul. He had heard that Pompeius was marching at the head of his legions through Mauritania into Spain and would very soon arrive. At the same time he borrowed sums of money from the tribunes and centurions and distributed them among the soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two results: he established a lien on the loyalty of the centurions and purchased by the bounty the goodwill of the troops.

Fabius was tampering with the loyalty of the neighbouring communities by letters and messengers. Over the River Sicoris he had constructed two bridges four miles apart. Over these he kept sending supplies, because during the preceding days he had exhausted all that there was this side the river. The generals of the Pompeian army were doing pretty much the same thing and for the same reason, and they were engaged in constant cavalry skirmishes. When two Fabian legions, going out to protect the foragers according to their usual custom, had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and the pack-horses and the whole cavalry force were following them, the bridge was suddenly broken down by a storm of wind and a great rush of water, and a large force of cavalry that remained behind was cut off. When Petreius and Afranius discovered what had happened from the earth and faseines which were being carried down the river, Afranius immediately threw across four legions and all his cavalry by his own bridge with which he had joined the town and his camp, and goes to meet the two Fabian legions. On the news of his approach L. Plancus, who was in command of the legions, under the stress of necessity occupies the higher ground and draws up his lines facing in opposite directions that he might not be surrounded by cavalry. So going into action with unequal numbers, he sustains impetuous charges of the legions and cavalry. After the cavalry had engaged, the standards of two legions are seen by each side some little way off. These Fabius had sent by the further bridge to support our men, suspecting that what actually occurred would happen, namely, that the commanders on the other side would employ the opportunity which a kind chance afforded them of crushing our men. On their arrival the battle is broken off and each leader marches his legions back to camp.

Within two days Caesar reached the camp with nine hundred horsemen whom he had reserved as a bodyguard for himself. The bridge which had been broken down by the storm was almost repaired: he ordered it to be finished at night. Having made himself acquainted with the character of the country, he leaves six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp together with all his baggage, and on the following day, with his whole force drawn up in three lines, he sets out for Ilerda and halts close to the camp of Afranius, and, having waited there for a little while under arms, offers his foe an opportunity of fighting on level ground. The opportunity being thus allowed him, Afranius leads out his forces and posts them half way up the slope under shelter of his camp. When Caesar learned that it was only owing to Afranius that a pitched battle was not fought he determined to pitch his camp at an interval of about four hundred paces from the lowest spurs of the mountain, and in order that his men might not be panic-stricken by a sudden onset of the foe while engaged on their task and so be prevented from working, he forbade the erection of a rampart, which could not fail to be prominent and visible from a distance, but ordered a ditch of fifteen feet width to be constructed facing the enemy. The first and second line remained under arms as they had been posted at first; behind these the work was being secretly done by the third line. So it was all completed before Afranius could become aware that the camp was being fortified. Towards evening Caesar withdraws the legions within the fosse and bivouacs there under arms the following night.

On the following day he keeps the whole army within the fosse and, as material for earthworks could only be procured at a distance, he arranges a similar method of work for the present and assigns the fortifying of each side of the camp to a single legion, ordering fosses of a similar size to the first to be constructed; the rest of the legions he draws up under arms lightly equipped over against the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, with the object of causing alarm and so impeding the work, draw out their forces towards the lower spurs of the hill and harass our men. Caesar, however, does not on that account interrupt his work, trusting in the protection of the three legions and the defensive nature of the fosse. The enemy, without staying long or advancing further from the bottom of the hill, withdraw their forces into camp. On the third clay Caesar strengthens his camp with a rampart and orders the rest of the cohorts which he had left in his previous camp, and their baggage, to be brought over to him.

Between the town of Ilerda and the nearest hill on which Petreius and Afranius were encamped was a plain about three hundred paces in width, and in about the middle of this space was a rather high mound. Caesar was confident that if he occupied and fortified this he would cut off his adversaries from the town and the bridge and from all the stores which they had brought into the town. In this hope he leads out of the camp three legions, and having drawn up the line in a suitable position, he orders a picked advance guard from one legion to charge and occupy the mound. This movement being quickly discovered, the cohorts of Afranius which were stationed in front of the camp are sent by a shorter route to occupy the same position. A battle is fought, and, as the Afranians had reached the mound first, our men are driven back and, fresh supports being sent up, are compelled to turn and retreat to the standards of the legions.

The method of fighting adopted by the enemy’s troops was to charge at first at full speed, boldly seize a position, take no particular trouble to preserve their ranks, but fight singly and in loose order; if they were hard pressed they did not consider it a disgrace to retire and quit their position, for, waging a continuous warfare against the Lusitanians and other barbarous tribes, they had become used to a barbarous kind of fighting, as it usually happens that when troops have spent a long time in any district they are greatly influenced by the methods of the country. It was this system that now threw our men into confusion, unaccustomed as they were to this kind of fighting; for as the enemy kept charging singly they thought that they were being surrounded on their exposed flank. As for themselves, they had judged it right to keep their ranks and not to desert their standards nor to give up without grave cause the position they had taken. And so when the vanguard was thrown into confusion the legion posted on that wing could not stand its ground and withdrew to the nearest hill.

Finding nearly the whole of his line panic-stricken— an event as unusual as it was unexpected—Caesar exhorts his men and leads the Ninth Legion to their support. He checks the foe who are pursuing our men with insolent daring, and compels them again to turn and retreat to the town of Ilerda and halt beneath the walls. But the men of the Ninth Legion, carried away by zeal in their desire to repair the loss received, rashly pursuing the flying foe too far, get into unfavourable ground and approach close under the hill on which the town of Ilerda was situated. When our men wished to retreat from this position, the enemy in turn kept pressing them hard from the higher ground. The place was precipitous with a steep descent on either side, and extended only so far in width as just to give room for three cohorts drawn up in battle array, so that supports could not be sent up on the flanks nor could cavalry be of any use if the men were in difficulties. But on the side of the town sloping ground with a slight descent stretched to the length of about four hundred paces. In this direction our men stood at bay, since, carried forward by their zeal, they had recklessly advanced thus far. The fighting took place in this spot, which was unfavourable both from its confined limits and because they had halted just under the very spurs of the mountain, so that no missile failed to reach them. Nevertheless they strove with valour and endurance and sustained every description of wound. The forces of the foe were increasing and cohorts were continually being sent up to them from the camp through the town so that the unexhausted were always taking the place of the exhausted. Caesar was obliged to adopt the same course of withdrawing the exhausted and sending up supporting cohorts to the same place.

When they had fought in this way continuously for five hours, and our men were being grievously harassed by superior numbers, having spent all their missiles, they draw their swords and, breasting the hill, charge the cohorts, and after laying a few low, they force the rest to retreat. When the cohorts were thus pushed close up to the wall, and to some extent driven by terror to enter the town, an easy withdrawal was allowed our men. Our cavalry, however, on each flank, though it had been stationed on low-lying ground at the foot of the cliff, yet forces its way with the utmost valour to the ridge, and, riding between the two lines of battle, allows our men a more convenient and safer withdrawal. Thus the contest was waged with varying fortune. At the first attack about seventy of our men fell, among them Q. Fulginius, a principal centurion of the Fourteenth Legion, who by his remarkable valour had risen to that post from the lower rank of centurions, and more than six hundred are wounded. Among the Afranians, T. Caecilius, a centurion of the first company, is slain, and besides him four centurions and more than two hundred men.

But the commonly received view of the day’s events was that each side thought it had come off superior; the Afranians because, though they were generally deemed inferior, they had stood their ground so long in close combat and borne the assault of our men, and at the outset held the position and the mound which had been the object of the battle, and at the first encounter had compelled our men to retreat; our troops, on the other hand, claimed the victory because, engaging the foe on unfavourable ground and with unequal number, they had sustained the fight for five hours, had mounted the hill with drawn swords, had compelled their adversaries to retreat from a higher position, and had driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill, for possession of which they had fought, with great works, and placed a garrison on it.

There also happened an unforeseen disaster within two days of these occurrences. A storm of such intensity springs up that it was agreed that there had never been a greater rainfall in that district. On this occasion it washed down the snow from all the mountains, overtopped the banks of the river, and in one day broke down both the bridges which G. Fabius had made. This caused serious difficulties to Caesar’s army. For the camp being situated, as has been explained above, between the two rivers Sicoris and Cinga, thirty miles apart, neither of these could be crossed, and they were all necessarily confined in this narrow space. The states which had entered into friendly relations with Caesar could not supply provisions, nor could those who had travelled some distance for forage return, being cut off by the rivers, nor could the huge supplies which were on their way from Italy and Gaul reach the camp. It was, moreover, the most difficult season of the year, when there was no corn in the winter stores and the crops were not far from being ripe, while the communities were exhausted because Afranius had conveyed nearly all the corn to Ilerda before Caesar’s arrival, and whatever there was left Caesar had consumed during the previous days; and the cattle which could have served as a second reserve against want had been removed to a distance by the neighbouring states because of the war. The men who went out to collect fodder or corn were followed by light-armed Lusitanians and skirmishers from hither Spain acquainted with the district; and for them it was easy to swim across the rivers, it being their general custom never to join the main army without bladders.

But the army of Afranius had abundance of provisions of every kind. Much corn had been provided and collected previously, much was being brought together from every province, and there was a great supply of fodder. The bridge at Ilerda and the untouched districts across the river, which Caesar was quite unable to approach, gave opportunities for all these measures without any risk.

The above-mentioned floods lasted several days. Caesar made an attempt to repair the bridges, but the strength of the current did not allow it, nor did the cohorts of the enemy, distributed along the bank, suffer the work to be completed. It was easy for them to prevent it from the character of the river itself and the excessive flood, and also because from all along the banks missiles were being discharged at one narrow spot, and so it was difficult, owing to the extreme rapidity of the current, at once to carry on the work and avoid the missiles.

Word is brought to Afranius that the great supplies on their way to Caesar are stopped by the stream. There had come thither archers from the Ruteni and horsemen from Gaul with a number of wagons and heavy baggage, after the Gallic custom. There were, moreover, about six thousand men of every class with their slaves and children, but there was no method, no fixed authority, each following his own devices, and all journeying without fear, adopting the licence of earlier days and journeys. There were a number of honourable youths, sons of senators or of the equestrian order; there were deputations from the states; there were envoys from Caesar. All these were checked by the rivers. To crush them Afranius sets forth at night with all his cavalry and three legions, and sending his horsemen on in front attacks them off their guard. Nevertheless the Gallic horsemen quickly rally and join battle. Though few, they stood their ground against a great number of the enemy, so long as an encounter on equal conditions was possible; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, after the loss of a few men, they withdraw to the nearest hills. This period of the battle was of great moment for the safety of our men, for by getting free room they withdrew to higher ground. On that day about two hundred archers were lost, a few horsemen, and a small number of camp followers and beasts of burden.

Nevertheless in all these circumstances the price of provisions rose, a difficulty which is wont to increase, not merely from the immediate dearth, but also from fear for the future. Already the price of corn had risen to fifty denarii a peck, and the lack of it had diminished the strength of the soldiery and their troubles were increasing daily. So completely had the situation been reversed in a few days, and such had been the shifting of the balance of fortune, that our men were being oppressed by a serious deficiency of necessaries, while the enemy had abundance of everything and were in an acknowledged position of superiority. The supply of corn being too small, Caesar began to requisition cattle from the states which had gone over to his side, sent sutlers to the more distant communities, and himself endeavoured by all possible resources to meet the present want.

Afranius and Petreius and their friends wrote to their partisans at Rome an amplified and exaggerated account of these events. Rumour added much, so that the war seemed almost finished. When these letters and messages were conveyed to Rome great crowds thronged the house of Afranius and hearty congratulations were offered. Many set out from Italy for Gn. Pompeius, some that they might show themselves the first to bring him such news, others that they might not appear to have waited for the issue of the war and to have been the last of all to come.

As things were reduced to such a strait and all the roads were blocked by the Afranian soldiers and horsemen and the bridges could not be completed, Caesar orders his men to build ships of the kind that his experience in Britain in previous years had taught him to make. The keels and the first ribs were made of light timber, the rest of the hull was wattled and covered with hides. These when finished he conveys by night on coupled wagons to a distance of twenty-two miles from the camp and transports his men in them across the river and occupies unobserved the hill adjoining the bank. This he fortifies hastily before the foe should find it out. Hither he afterwards transfers a legion and sets about making a bridge from either side, finishing it in two clays. Thus he recovers in safety the stores and the men who had gone out on the foraging expedition, and begins to settle the difficulties of his food supply.

On the same day he threw a great part of his cavalry across the river, who, attacking the foragers when off their guard and scattered about without any fear of danger, cut off a great number of men and beasts; and when some light-armed cohorts had been sent in support of the foe they skilfully distribute themselves into two divisions, some to guard the booty, others to resist and repel aggressors; and one cohort, which had rashly advanced from the main body before the others, they cut off from the rest and surround it and put it to the sword, and return to the camp by the same bridge, unharmed, with much booty.

While this is going on at Ilerda the Massilians, following the advice of L. Domitius, equip seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked. To these they add many smaller vessels, so that our fleet may be terrified by the mere multitude. On board they put a great number of archers and of the Albici, about whom I have explained before, and stimulate them by prizes and promises. Domitius demands special ships for himself, and mans them with farmers and herdsmen whom he had brought with him. Their fleet thus fully equipped, they advance with great confidence against our ships, of which D. Brutus was in command. These ships were stationed by the island which lies over against Massilia.

Brutus was far inferior in number of ships, but Caesar had assigned to his fleet the bravest men, front-line men and centurions, picked from all the legions, who had demanded this charge for themselves. They had prepared iron claws and grapplings and had furnished themselves with a great number of javelins, looped darts, and other weapons. So, having learnt of the arrival of the enemy, they bring their ships out of port and join battle with the Massilians. The fight was maintained with the utmost bravery and impetuosity on both sides, nor Sid the Albici, rough mountaineers trained in arms, fall far below our men in valour, and having lately come from the Massilians, they kept in mind their recent promises, while the herdsmen of Domitius, stimulated by the hope of liberty, were eager to display their zeal before their master’s eyes.

The Massilians themselves, trusting in the speed of;heir ships and the skill of their pilots, eluded our men and parried their attacks, and so long as they were free to make use of a wider space they extended their line to some distance and strove to surround our men, or to attack single ships with several, or to run by them and if possible sweep off their oars. When they were forced to come to close quarters, instead of the skill and devices of pilots they had recourse to the valour of mountaineers. Our men had not only lo employ less well-trained rowers and less skilled pilots who had suddenly been taken out of merchant-ships, not yet knowing even the names of the various tackle, but were also retarded by the slowness and heaviness of their ships. For, having been made in a hurry of unseasoned timber, they did riot display the same handiness in respect of speed. And so, provided that an opportunity of fighting hand to hand were given them, with quiet courage they confronted two ships with one, and throwing aboard the iron claw and holding each ship fast, they fought on opposite sides of their vessel and so boarded the enemy’s ships; and after slaying a large number of the Albici and the herdsmen they sink some of the ships, take others with their crews, and drive the rest into port. On that day nine ships of the Massiliaus are lost, including those that were captured.

This news is first brought to Caesar at Ilerda; at once on the completion of the bridge there is a rapid change of fortune. The enemy, terror-struck by the bravery of the cavalry, now roamed with less freedom and audacity; at one time, staying their advance at no great distance from the camp, in order to ensure a speedy retreat, they foraged within narrower limits; at another, taking a wider circuit, they tried to avoid the outposts and cavalry pickets, or, on sustaining some loss or catching sight of the cavalry at a distance, they broke off their march, flung away their packs, and fled. Finally, they made up their mind to stay action for several days and, contrary to the general custom, to forage by night.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Osca, and those of Calagurris who were politically associated with them, send envoys to him and promise to do his bidding. These are followed by the people of Tarraco, the Iacetani, the Ausetani, and a few days afterwards the Illurgavonenses, who border on the River Ebro. He begs all of these to assist him with corn. They promise to do so and, collecting all the pack-horses available, bring it into camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses also goes over to him on ascertaining the intention of their state and transfers its colours from its quarters. A great change of fortune rapidly follows. The bridge being completed, five important states brought over to his side, the corn supply made easy, the rumours about the auxiliaries of the legions which were said to be coming with Pompeius through Mauritania being suppressed, a number of more distant communities desert Afranius and take the side of Caesar.

When the spirits of his adversaries were cowed by these events, Caesar, to prevent the need of always sending the cavalry over the bridge by a long circuitous route, found a suitable spot and decided to construct several ditches thirty feet wide, whereby he might divert some part of the Sicoris and make a ford in the river. When these were nearly completed Afranius and Petreius fall into great alarm lest they should be cut off altogether from collecting forage and fodder, as Caesar was particularly strong in cavalry. And so they determine to quit these districts and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. This design was also favoured by the fact that of the two different classes of states, those which in the earlier war had taken the side of Sertorius and had been conquered feared the name and authority of the absent Pompeius, and those which had remained loyal, having received great kindnesses, were devoted to him, while the name of Caesar was only dimly known among the barbarians. In this district they were expecting to find large reinforcements of cavalry and auxiliaries, and were proposing to prolong the war into the winter in a place of their own choosing. Having formed this plan, they order ships to be sought for along the whole course of the Ebro and to be brought to Octogesa. This town was situated on the Ebro, and was thirty miles from the camp. They order a bridge to be made at this part of the river by coupling ships together and bring two legions over the Sicoris. A camp is entrenched with a rampart twelve feet high.

When this was ascertained by means of scouts, Caesar, continuing day and night his task of diverting the stream by the utmost efforts of his soldiery, had so far advanced operations that the horsemen were able to cross the river, and ventured to do so, though the feat was laborious and difficult; while the foot-soldiers had only their shoulders and the upper part of their bodies above the surface, and were impeded in crossing both by the depth of the water and also by the rapidity of the current. Nevertheless about one and the same time the bridge over the Ebro was announced to be nearly finished and a ford was being found in the Sicoris.

Now, however, the enemy thought it the more necessary that their march should be hastened. So, leaving two auxiliary cohorts to garrison Ilerda, they cross the Sicoris in full force and join camp with the two legions which they had led across on a previous day. The only course left for Caesar was to annoy and harass the enemy’s line of march with his cavalry; for his own bridge involved a wide circuit, so that the enemy could reach the Ebro by a much shorter route. He sends horsemen who cross the river and, although Petreius and Afranius had moved camp about the third watch, suddenly show themselves in the rear of the column and begin to delay them and impede their march by pouring a great number of men around their flanks.

At early dawn it was observed from the higher ground adjacent to Caesar’s camp that the enemy’s rear was being hard pressed by the attack of our cavalry, and that sometimes the end of the column was being held up and even being cut off from the rest, while at other times their colours were pushed forward and our men were driven back by a charge of the cohorts in a body, and then again wheeled round and pursued the foe. And now throughout the camp the men gathered in groups, indignantly complaining that the enemy were being let slip from their hands, and that the war was being needlessly protracted to an undue length. They went to the centurions and military tribunes, and besought them to assure Caesar that he was not to shrink from exposing them to labour or peril. We are ready, they said; we can and we dare cross the river by the way the cavalry passed over. Caesar, urged by their zeal and their clamour, though he feared to expose his army to such a strength of current, nevertheless decides that he must attempt the experiment. So he orders the weaker men, whose spirit or strength seemed unequal to the effort, to be set aside from all the centuries. These he leaves with one legion to guard the camp. The rest of the legions he leads out lightly equipped, and after placing a great number of pack-horses in the river above and below leads across his force. A few of these men were carried away by the strength of the current, but were caught and supported by the horsemen; not one, however, was lost. When his army had been led across without loss, he draws up his forces and proceeds to lead his battle in three lines. And there was such zeal in the soldiery that, though a circuit of six miles was added to their route and a long delay was interposed at the ford, they overtook by the ninth hour of the day those who had gone out at the third watch.

And when Afranius with Petreius beheld these troops, whom he caught sight of from a distance, he was dismayed by an event so startling, and halting on higher ground drew up his line. Caesar re-forms his army on the plains that he may not expose it to battle exhausted with fatigue. When they again attempt to advance he follows and checks them. The foe of necessity pitch their camp earlier than they had intended, for the hills were close by and difficult and narrow routes awaited them only five miles off. These hills they were eager to penetrate in order to escape Caesar’s cavalry and, by placing outposts in the defiles, to stop the march of his army, and themselves to conduct their forces across the Ebro without danger and alarm. This they should have attempted and carried out by every possible means, but worn out by a whole day’s fighting and the toil of their march, they postponed the business till the next day. Caesar also pitches camp on the nearest hill.

About midnight, when some men who had gone some distance from their camp to fetch water were seized by his horsemen, Caesar is informed by them that the officers of the enemy are silently leading their forces out of camp. Having learnt this, he bids the signal be given and the usual military order for striking camp to be proclaimed. The foe, having caught the sound of the proclamation, fearing lest, impeded and over-burdened, they should be compelled to engage by night, or lest they should be held up by Caesar’s cavalry in the defiles, stop their march and keep their forces in camp. Next day Petreius sets forth secretly with a few horsemen to explore the district. The same thing is done from Caesar’s camp. L. Decidius Saxa is sent with a few men to reconnoitre the character of the place. Each brings back the same message to his people: that nearest them there lie five miles of level route, then follows rugged and hilly ground, that there is no difficulty in the enemy being stopped by whosoever first occupies these defiles.

Petreius and Afranius hold a discussion in council, the question before them being the time of starting. Many thought that they should march by night, urging that they could reach the defiles before it was noticed. Others took the fact that the cry had been raised the previous night in Caesar’s camp as a proof that secret departure was impossible. They pointed out that Caesar’s horsemen poured around at night and beset every place and every path; that night battles should be avoided because the soldiers in the terror of civil strife are wont to consider their fears rather than their obligations. But daylight, they urged, in itself brings a sense of shame when all are looking on, and the presence of military tribunes and centurions also contributes much, and that it was by such considerations that troops are wont to be restrained and kept in allegiance. On every ground, therefore, they must break through by day: though some loss should be sustained, yet the place they are after can be captured without impairing the army as a whole. This opinion prevails in the council and they determine to set out next day at early dawn.

Caesar after reconnoitring the district leads all his forces out of camp when the sky grows light and, making a wide circuit, conducts his army by no clearly marked route. For the roads that led to the Ebro and to Octogesa were blocked by the interposition of the enemy’s camp. He himself had to cross very large and difficult valleys, steep rocks in many places impeded their march, so that arms were of necessity passed from hand to hand, and the men accomplished a great part of their way unarmed and helped up one by another. But no one shirked this toil, because they thought it would prove the end of all their labours, if only they should be able to cut off the foe from the Ebro and prevent him from foraging.

And first of all the Afranian soldiers joyfully ran out of their camp to see the spectacle and pursued our men with insulting cries, saying that they were fleeing under the stress of lack of necessary food, and were on their way back to Ilerda. For the direction of their march was different from that proposed, and they seemed to be going in the contrary direction. The Afranian officers extolled their own policy in having kept themselves in camp, and their opinion was greatly strengthened by the fact that they saw the foe started on their way without any baggage train, so that they were confident that they could not hold out much longer against privation. But when they saw the column gradually wheeling to the right and observed the vanguard already outflanking the line of their own camp, no one was so slow, so impatient of labour, as not to feel that they must at once leave the camp and go to meet the foe. The cry To arms! is raised, and the whole force, a few cohorts only being left on guard, goes forth and hurries on a straight course to the Ebro.

The whole contest turned on speed—which of the two would first seize the defiles and the hills—but the difficulties of the roads delayed Caesar’s army, while Caesar’s pursuing cavalry hindered the forces of Afranius. Matters, however, had of necessity come to such a pass with the Afranians that, if they should first reach the hills that they aimed at, they would themselves escape peril, while they would be unable to save the baggage of the whole army and the cohorts left in the camp; for when these were cut off by Caesar’s army it was by no means possible for assistance to be conveyed to them. Caesar completed the distance first, and finding a plain after crossing the great rocks, he draws up his line therein opposite the enemy. Afranius, seeing the foe in front of him, while his rear was being harassed by the cavalry, finding a hill near, halted on it. From this spot he dispatches four light-armed cohorts to a mountain which was the loftiest of all in sight. He orders them to hurry at full speed and occupy it, with the intention of himself hastening thither with all his forces, and by a change of route arriving at Octogesa by the ridge. When the light-armed men were making for this by an oblique route, Caesar’s horsemen, perceiving it, charged the cohorts; nor could they, with their small shields, hold out for ever so short a time against the cavalry attack, but are all surrounded by them and slain in the sight of both armies.

There was now opportunity for a successful action. Nor, indeed, did it escape Caesar that an army demoralized by such a loss received under their eyes could not hold out, especially as they were surrounded on every side by cavalry, since the engagement was taking place in level and open country; and such action was demanded of him from every quarter. Legates, centurions, and tribunes hurried to him begging him not to hesitate to join battle; they pointed out that the spirits of the whole force were as keen as possible; on the other hand, the Afranians had in many ways shown signs of fear, by the fact that they had not succoured their own men, that they were not going down from the hill, that they were scarcely holding their ground against the cavalry charges, and that, crowded together, with their colours congregated in one spot, they were keeping neither to their ranks nor to their standards. If it was the inequality of site that he feared, yet an opportunity of fighting in some place or other would be afforded him, because Afranius was certainly bound to come down from his position, and could not continue to hold it without water.

Caesar had entertained the hope that, having cut off his adversaries from their food supply, lie would be able to finish the business without exposing his men to fighting or bloodshed. Why should he lose any of his men even in a successful battle? Why should he suffer soldiers who had served him so well to be wounded? Why, in a word, should he make trial of fortune? Especially as it was as much the duty of a commander to win by policy as by the sword. He was moved, moreover, by compassion for his fellow-citizens whose slaughter he saw to be inevitable. He preferred to gain his object without loss or harm to them. This policy of his did not commend itself to the majority; in fact, the soldiers said openly among themselves that, since such an opportunity of victory was being let slip, they would not fight even when Caesar wished them to. He adheres to his intention, and moves a little way from his position so as to diminish the alarm of the foe. Petreius and Afranius return to their camp when the chance is offered them. Caesar, after distributing outposts on the hills, shutting off every route to the Ebro, entrenches himself as near as possible to the enemy’s camp.

On the next day the enemy’s officers, dismayed at having lost all prospect of supplies and of reaching the Ebro, took counsel on their other measures. There was one route in case they wished to return to Ilerda, another if they made for Tarraco. While deliberating thereon, word is brought them that their water-carriers are being harassed by our cavalry. Having ascertained this, they distribute numerous outposts of horsemen and auxiliary cohorts, and between them place cohorts of the legions, and set about making a line of rampart from the camp to the water, so that they might be able to get water within their defences, both without alarm and without outposts. Petreius and Afranius share this task between them, and themselves proceed to some distance for the purpose of carrying out the work.

At their departure the soldiers, getting a free opportunity for conversation, come out everywhere, and each one inquires after any acquaintance or fellow-townsman that he had in Caesar’s camp and summons him forth. First they all express gratitude to the others collectively for having spared them the day before, when they were in a state of panic: To your kindness, they said, we owe our life. Then they inquire about the good faith of the general, whether they would be justified in committing themselves to him, and express regret that they did not do so at first, and that they engaged in a conflict with friends and kinsmen. Stirred by such speeches, the men demand a solemn promise from the general for the life of Petreius and Afranius, fearing lest they should seem to have conceived some crime in their hearts or to have betrayed their party. If these conditions are assured they guarantee to transfer their colours at once and send centurions of the first rank to Caesar as deputies to treat of peace. Meanwhile some bring their friends into the camp to entertain them, others are led off by their acquaintances, so that the two camps seemed already fused into one, and many military tribunes and centurions come to Caesar and commend themselves to him. The same thing is done by the Spanish chieftains whom the enemy had called out and were keeping with them in camp as hostages. These sought for their own acquaintances and guest-friends by whom they might severally have an opportunity of being commended to the notice of Caesar. The youthful son of Afranius also pleaded with Caesar through the envoy Sulpicius for his own and his father’s safety. The whole place was full of rejoicing and congratulation, on the one side of those who were deemed to have avoided such perils, on the other of those who were seen to have wrought such achievements without bloodshed; and Caesar in the general estimation reaped a great advantage from his traditional leniency, and his policy met with the approval of all.

When these events were announced Afranius abandons the work that he had begun and returns to camp, apparently resolved to bear with a quiet and equal mind whatever chance should befall. But Petreius does not fail himself. He arms his retinue; with this and his official staff of light-armed men and with a few barbarian horsemen, his own retainers, whom he had been wont to maintain to guard his person, he makes a sudden onset on the rampart, interrupts the soldiers’ colloquies, drives our men from the camp, and slays all he catches. The rest gather together and, territos- fied by the sudden peril, wrap their left hands in their cloaks, draw their swords, and thus defend themselves from the light infantry and horsemen, trusting in the proximity of their camp, and retire to it, defended by the cohorts which are on guard at the gates.

When this action was over Petreius goes the round of the maniples and calls on his men, beseeching them with tears not to hand over himself or their commander Pompeius to the foe for punishment. A crowd quickly gathers at the general’s headquarters. He demands that all should swear not to desert or betray the army and its officers, nor to take measures for their own safety apart from the rest. He first takes this oath himself, and also compels Afranius to take the same. Next come the military tribunes and centurions; the rank and file come forward and take the oath century by century. They issue orders that any soldier of Caesar who is in the company of one of their men should be brought forward by him. When produced they kill him publicly at the headquarters. But many of them are concealed by those who had entertained them, and are let go at. night through the ramparts. Thus the intimidation employed by the generals, cruelty in punishment, and the obligation of their fresh oath removed all prospect I of present surrender, changed the inclination of the soldiery, and brought matters back to the old condition of hostility.

Caesar gives orders that the men of the other side who had come into his camp at the time of the colloquy should be sought for with the utmost diligence and sent back. But out of their number several military tribunes and centurions remained with him of their own accord. These he afterwards held in high honour; centurions he restored to their former ranks, Roman knights to the post of tribune.

The Afranians were in straits with their foraging and were getting water with difficulty. The legionaries had some store of corn because they had been ordered to bring a twenty-two days’ supply from Ilerda; the light-armed and auxiliaries had none, since their opportunities for providing it were scanty and their bodies were not trained to carry burdens. And so a great number of them fled to Caesar every day. Such were the straits of the enemy’s situation. But of the two plans set before them the simpler seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left a little corn there. They were confident that they would there evolve their plans for the future. Tarraco was a long way off, and they understood that in so long a journey their fortune might meet with various mischances. This plan having approved itself, they depart from the camp. Caesar, after sending forward his cavalry to annoy and hinder their rear, himself follows with the legions. No moment passed without their rearguard having to fight with the horsemen.

Their method of fighting was as follows: lightly equipped cohorts closed in their rearguard and several of these kept halting in the level districts; if a hill had to be climbed, the nature of the ground in itself averted peril, since from the higher ground those who had gone in front protected their comrades who were ascending; whenever a valley or a slope lay before them and those who had gone on in front could not bring aid to those who were delayed, while the horsemen from higher ground kept hurling missiles against them from behind, then indeed the position was most critical. The only course left for them was, whenever they approached such places, to order a halt of the legions and to repel the cavalry by a vigorous charge, and when they had dislodged it, starting forward immediately at a run, to descend in a body into the valleys, and so, after crossing them, again to halt on the higher ground. For they were so far from being aided by their cavalry,of whom they had a considerable number, that they actually received them for protection, demoralized as they were by the previous battles, into the centre of their column, and none of them could stray from the route without being caught by Caesar’s horse.

Fighting in this way, men advance slowly and tentatively, frequently halting to support their comrades, and so it happened on this occasion. For after proceeding four miles and being seriously harassed by the cavalry, they occupy a lofty hill and there entrench a camp with one front only facing the foe, and do not unload their baggage animals. When they observed Caesar’s camp pitched, his tents set up, and the horsemen dispersed on foraging duty, they suddenly sally forth about the sixth hour of the same day and, hoping that the pursuit would be delayed by the departure of our cavalry, begin their march. On observing this, Caesar, having rested his legions, follows them up and leaves a few cohorts to guard the baggage. He orders the foragers to follow on at the tenth hour and the horsemen to be recalled. The cavalry quickly returns to its daily employment during the march. Keen fighting goes on in the rear of the foe so that they are almost put to flight, and many men from the ranks, also several centurions, are slain. Meanwhile Caesar’s main force was pressing on and threatening them in mass.

Then, indeed, having no opportunities of searching for a suitable place for their camp nor of advancing, they are obliged to halt and pitch their camp far from water and in a place unfavourable by nature. But, for the same reasons that are set forth above, Caesar no longer harasses them with hostilities, and on that day he did not allow tents to be set up, in order that his men might all be more ready to pursue, in case they should break out either by night or by day. Observing the faulty position of their camp, the enemy push forward outworks throughout the night and exchange one camp for another. They engage in the same task next day from early dawn, and spend the whole day over it. But the more they advanced with their work and pushed forward their camp, the further they were from water, and remedies were provided for their present ill only by incurring fresh ills. On the approach of night no one goes out of camp for watering; on the following day, leaving a guard in the camp, they lead out all their forces for water, but no one is sent out for fodder. Caesar preferred that they should be harassed by such sufferings and submit to a compulsory surrender rather than fight a pitched battle. Nevertheless he attempts to fence them in with a rampart and ditch, so as to hinder as far as possible sudden sallies on their part, to which he thought they would necessarily have recourse. And so forced by want of fodder, and to lighten their equipment for marching, they order all their baggage animals to be killed.

In these operations and plans two days are consumed; on the third day a great part of Caesar’s work had already reached completion. The enemy, in order to hinder the rest of the defences, giving the signal about the ninth hour, lead out the legions and draw up their line close to the camp. Caesar recalls his legions from their work, orders all the cavalry to assemble, and draws up his line; for to appear to have shunned a battle against the general sentiment of the troops, and his credit in the eyes of the world, involved serious detriment to his cause. But, for the same reasons that have been already made known, he was led to object to a pitched battle, and all the more because by reason of the narrow intervening space, even if the enemy were driven to flight, a victory could not greatly promote his final success. For the two camps were distant from one another not more than two thousand paces. The two lines occupied two-thirds of this space; the remaining third was empty, left free for the onset and charge of the troops. If battle were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the conquered a speedy retreat in their flight. For this reason he had made up his mind to resist them if they advanced their colours, but not to be the first to attack.

The Afranian line was a double one of five legions. The third line of reserves was occupied by the auxiliary cohorts. Caesar’s line was threefold, but the first line was held by four cohorts from each of the five legions, next to these came three reserve cohorts, and again three more, each from its respective legion; the bowmen and slingers were enclosed in the centre of the force, while cavalry protected the flanks. The battle array being thus drawn out, each commander seemed to have gained his purpose, Caesar not to engage in battle unless compelled, Afranius to hinder Caesar’s works. However, the situation is prolonged and the battle array is main- tained till sunset; then each side withdraws to camp. On the next day Caesar prepares to complete the defence works he had started; the enemy make trial of the ford of the River Sicoris to see if they could cross. Observing this, Caesar throws his light-armed Germans and part of his cavalry across the river and places frequent outposts along the banks.

At last blockaded in every way, their baggage animals now kept without fodder for four days, through their want of water, firewood, and forage, they beg for a conference, and that too, if possible, in a place out of reach of the soldiers. When this stipulation was refused by Caesar, but permission was granted provided they chose to confer in public, the son of Afranius is offered to Caesar as a hostage. They come to a place which Caesar chose. In the hearing of each army Afranius speaks. You must not be angry with us or our men because we have chosen to keep faith with our commander Gn. Pompeius. But we have already done enough for duty and we have suffered punishment enough by enduring the want of every necessary; now indeed, hemmed in almost like wild beasts, we are kept from water, kept from moving, and cannot bear the pain in our bodies or the shame in our minds. And so we confess ourselves beaten: we pray and beseech, if any room for compassion is left, that you should not think it necessary to proceed to the extreme of punishment. Such are the sentiments he expresses in the most humble and submissive language.

To this Caesar replies: No one in the whole army could have played this part, whether of querulous lament or of self-commiseration, less suitably than you. All the rest have done their duty: I, who was unwilling to fight even when conditions were favourable, time and place suitable, that there might be absolutely nothing to prejudice the chances of peace,; my army, which preserved and protected those whom it held in its power, even when it had been injured and its soldiers slain; lastly, the men of your army who voluntarily pleaded for reconciliation, a matter wherein they thought it right to have regard to the life of all their comrades. Thus the part played by all ranks has been based on compassion, but the leaders themselves have shrunk from peace; they have observed the rights neither of conference nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were deceived by a pretended colloquy. So that has happened to them which is usually wont to happen to men of overmuch obstinacy and arrogance—namely, to recur to that which they have a little while before despised and to make that the chief object of their desire. Nor do I now make demands whereby my resources may be increased by reason of your humiliation or some fortunate conjuncture of events, but I wish the armies which you have now maintained against me for so many years to be disbanded. For no other reason but this were six legions sent into Spain and a seventh levied there, or so many large fleets equipped or leaders of military experience sent to the front. None of these provisions were made for the pacifying of the Spanish provinces, none for the advantage of the province, which from the long continuance of peace required no assistance. All these measures have been for long in course of preparation against me; against me imperial powers of a novel kind are set up, such as that one and the same person should preside over city affairs outside the gates and should hold in absence two of the most warlike provinces for so many years; against me are the rights of magistrates subverted, so that they are not sent into the provinces as always hitherto after the praetorship and consulship, but as approved and elected by a small clique; against me even the plea of age is of no avail to prevent men approved in former wars being called out to control armies; in my case alone the rule is not observed which has always been allowed to all commanders, that when they have conducted affairs successfully they should return home, either with some distinction or at any rate without ignominy, and disband their army. Yet I have borne all these wrongs patiently and will bear them, nor is it my present object to retain for myself an army taken from you, which, however, it would not be difficult for me to do, but to prevent you from having one that you can use against me. So then, as has been said, let us quit our provinces and disband our army; if that is so arranged I will injure no one. This is my one and final condition of peace.

Now it was very acceptable and pleasant to the troops, as could be known merely by the indications they gave, that men who had expected some merited penalty should win the boon of discharge without asking for it. For when a discussion was introduced about the place and time of the arrangement, the whole body of men began to signify by voice and hand from the rampart where they stood that they should be discharged at once, and that the undertaking could not be assured if it were put off to another time, whatever pledges might be given in the interval. When the point had been briefly discussed in either sense, the final result was that those who had a domicile or holding in Spain should be discharged at once, the rest at the River Varus. Pledges are given by Caesar that no wrong should be done to them, and that no one should be compelled to take the oath of allegiance against his will.

Caesar promises to provide them with corn from that time while on their way to the River Varus. He also adds that whatever any one of them has lost in war, when such property is in the hands of his own soldiers, should be restored to the losers; after making a fair valuation, he pays the men a sum of money for these effects. Hereafter whatever disputes the soldiers had amongst themselves, of their own accord they came to Caesar for final decision. When the legions on the verge of mutiny were demanding their pay from Petreius and Afranius, who said that the time for it had not yet come, a request was made that Caesar should investigate the point, and each was satisfied with his decision. About a third of the army having been discharged within two days, Caesar ordered his own two legions to march first, the rest to follow close, so as to encamp at no great distance apart, and set the legate, Q. Fufius Calenus, in charge of this duty. In accordance with this instruction they marched from Spain to the River Varus, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.