Book 2

WHILE this is going on in Spain, the legate, G. Trebonius, who had been left behind for the siege of Massilia, began to push up to the town on two sides an earthwork, penthouses, and towers. One side was quite close to the harbour and docks, the other to the gate by which lies the approach from Gaul and Spain, towards that part of the sea which is adjacent to the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed by the sea on three sides of the town, more or less. There remains the fourth side, admitting of approach by land. Of this space, too, the part extending to the citadel, strengthened by the natural character of the site and a very deep valley, involves a long and difficult blockade. To carry out these works, G. Trebonius requisitions a great multitude of baggage animals and men from the whole province, and orders rushes and timber to be got together. When these supplies are collected he builds an earthwork eighty feet in height.

But there had been in the town from early days such huge military stores of every kind, and such a multitude of engines, that no penthouses woven with osiers could withstand their assault. For beams twelve feet long with spiked ends, discharged by enormous catapults, often fixed themselves in the earth after passing through four layers of hurdles. So the roofs of the penthouses were protected by timbers a foot square clamped together, and beneath this shelter material for the earthwork was carried forward from hand to hand. In front went a tortoise sixty feet in height, for the levelling of the ground, also made of very stout timbers, and wrapped over with everything that could serve to keep off showers of firebrands and stones. But the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and the towers, the multitude of engines, hindered the whole of our operations. Moreover, frequent sorties from the town were made by the Albici, and firebrands were flung upon the earthwork and the towers—all of which assaults our troops repelled with ease, and kept driving back into the town those who had made a sortie, even inflicting great losses on them.

Meanwhile L. Nasidius, who had been sent by Gn. Pompeius with a fleet of sixteen ships, a few of which had brazen beaks, to the support of L. Domitius and the Massilians, voyages along the Sicilian strait, without Curio knowing or suspecting it, and bringing his ships to anchor at Messana, when the sudden panic had caused the flight of the chiefs and the senate, removes a ship from their docks. Adding this to the rest, he finishes his course towards Massilia, and, secretly sending a small vessel in advance, informs Domitius and the Massilians of his approach and strongly urges them, now that they have received his reinforcements, again to join battle with the fleet of Brutus.

After their previous disaster the Massilians had brought out of the docks and repaired an equivalent number of old ships and equipped them with the utmost industry—there was an abundant supply of rowers and helmsmen—and had added to them some fishing-vessels which they had furnished with decks, to protect the rowers from the blows of missiles while they also manned them with archers and catapults. When the fleet was thus equipped, stimulated by the prayers and tears of all the older men, matrons and virgins, beseeching them to succour the state in its extremity, they embark with no less courage and confidence than they had shown in the previous battle. For, by a defect which is common to human nature, we are apt in unusual and unfamiliar circumstances to be too confident or too violently alarmed; and so it happened then. For the arrival of L. Nasidius had filled the community with the utmost hope and goodwill. Finding the wind favourable, they quit the port and reach Nasidius at Taurois, a Massilian fortress, and there get their ships into trim and again make up their minds to the struggle and join in arranging their plans. Operations on the right are assigned to the Massilians, on the left to Nasidius.

Brutus hurries to the same place with the number of his fleet enlarged. For six captured Massilian ships had been added to those which had been constructed by Caesar at Arelate. These he had repaired and fully equipped during the preceding days. And so, exhorting his men to despise as now conquered those whom they had worsted when unscathed, he sets out against them full of good hope and courage. It was easy to get a view into the city from the camp of G. Trebonius and from all the higher parts, and to see how all the youth that had remained in the town and all the men of more advanced age with their children and wives in the public places and guard-houses or on the wall were stretching their hands to heaven or visiting the temples of the immortal gods and, prostrate before their shrines, were beseeching the gods for victory. Nor was there a single one of them all who did not think that the issue of his whole fortunes rested on the chances of that day. For the youths of good birth and the most important men of every age had gone on board, individually called out and entreated to serve, so that if anything untoward should happen they might see that nothing would be left them to venture withal, but might be confident of securing the safety of the city, whether by domestic resources or by foreign aid, if they should win the victory.

When the battle had begun the Massilians showed no lack of valour, but, mindful of the precepts they had just received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as to resemble men who were likely to have no other opportunity for effort, and who thought that they who risked their life in battle did not anticipate by so very much the fate of the rest of the citizens, who, if the city were captured, would have to suffer the same fortune of war. And when our ships had been gradually drawn apart, scope was allowed for the skill of the pilots and the handiness of the ships, and whenever, meeting with an opportunity, our men had secured a ship by casting the grappling-irons on it, the foe went from every side to the succour of their distressed comrades. Nor indeed did the Albici, who took part in the engagement, fail in hand-to-hand fighting or fall far short of our men in valour. At the same time a great shower of missiles hurled from the smaller vessels at a distance inflicted many wounds on our men, who were unexpectedly taken off their guard and embarrassed. And two triremes, having sighted the ship of D. Brutus, which could be easily recognized from its standard, threw themselves upon it from two sides. But Brutus, seeing what was coming, made so vigorous an effort, thanks to the speed of his ship, that a brief thrust carried him ahead of them. They, borne down on one another, collided so heavily that each was seriously damaged by the crash, and one of them, having its beak broken off, collapsed altogether. When this was observed, the ships of Brutus’ fleet which were nearest to the spot set upon them while thus disabled and quickly sank them both.

But the ships of Nasidius were of no use and quickly retired from the battle; for neither the sight of their fatherland nor the promptings of kinsmen urged them to incur the supreme peril of life. Consequently from that detachment of ships none was missed; out of the fleet of the Massilians five were sunk, four captured, and one fled with the Nasidian ships, and they all made for hither Spain. And when one of the rest, sent forward to Massilia to convey this news, was now approaching the city, the whole multitude poured forth to learn the event, and. when they had learnt it such a lamentation followed that it seemed as if the city had been forthwith captured by the enemy. However, the Massilians none the less began to make the other necessary preparations for the defence of the town.

In consequence of the frequent sorties of the enemy, it was noticed by the legionaries who were conducting operations on the right that it could be a great protection to them if they made there a tower of brick under the wall to serve as a stronghold and place of retreat. This they constructed at first of low elevation and small size to meet sudden sallies. To this they used to retire; from this shelter they fought if a stronger assault pressed them; from this they issued forth to repel and pursue the foe. Its dimensions were thirty feet each way, but the thickness of the walls was five feet. But afterwards, as experience is the guide of all conduct, by applying their wits they discovered that it could be of great service to them if this tower were raised to a height. This was accomplished in the following manner.

When the height of the tower reached the level of a story they built the floor into the walls in such a way that the heads of the beams were hidden in the outside structure of the walls, to prevent any projection on which the firebrands of the enemy could lodge. Above this timber-work they built up with brick, only so far as the shelter afforded by the shed and the penthouses allowed, and above this part they laid across two beams not far from the outer walls, whereon to raise aloft the wooden frame which was to serve as the roof of the tower, and over these beams they laid joists across at right angles and fixed them in place by tie-beams. These joists they made rather longer and projecting beyond the outside of the walls, so that there might be a place to hang out screens to ward off and repel blows while the walls were being built up below this timber frame; and on the top of this flooring they made a layer of bricks and clay so that the firebrands of the enemy might do no harm. And they further laid thereon mattresses, that missiles hurled by engines might not crash through the flooring or stones from catapults dislodge the brickwork. They made moreover three fenders four feet broad out of anchor-ropes to cover the length of the walls of the tower and fastened these on the three sides towards the enemy from the beams projecting round the tower. This was the only kind of protection that they had found by experience in other places to be impervious to any missile or catapult. But when that part of the tower which was finished was protected and defended from every weapon cast by the enemy they removed their sheds to other works, and began to poise and lift the roof of the tower independently by leverage from the first-floor stage. When they had raised it to the height allowed by the hanging fenders, being thus concealed and protected within these defences they proceeded to build up the walls with brick, and again by further leverage made themselves space for fresh building. When the opportunity came for a second story they built in beams, just as at first, concealed in the outside of the walls, and from this flooring again they proceeded to raise the topmost story and the protecting fenders. So safely and without any wounds or peril they built up six stories, and in the course of erection they left openings, where it seemed suitable, for the discharge of darts from catapults.

When they were sure that from the tower they could protect all the surrounding works, they set about making out of timber two feet square a covered gallery sixty feet long, to be carried from the brick tower to the enemy’s tower and wall. And the form of the gallery was as follows. First of all two beams of equal length are laid on the ground with a distance of four feet between them, and in these posts are fixed five feet in height. These posts they con- neet by rafters of low elevation whereon to place the boarding to be laid for the roofing of the gallery. Over these rafters they lay two-foot beams and fasten them with plates and bolts. On the outside of the roof of the gallery and on the edges of these beams they fasten three-inch-square shingles to keep in place the bricks to be laid on the roof. Thus when it had all been sloped and duly constructed, after the beams had been laid on the rafters, the gallery is roofed with tiles and clay, so as to be safe from fire that might be thrown from the wall. Hides are drawn over the bricks lest water discharged at them through pipes should wash them out. The hides, too, are covered over with patchwork lest they in their turn should be spoilt by fire and stones. The whole of this work, protected by mantlets, they complete up to the tower itself, and suddenly, when the enemy were off their guard, they put rollers under it—a nautical appliance—and push it forward to the tower of the enemy, so as to join on to the structure.

Dismayed at this sudden calamity, the townsmen bring forward with cranes the largest possible stones, and roll them headlong from the wall on to the gallery. The strength of the timber bears the blow, and everything that falls on it slips off owing to the sloping roof of the gallery. Observing this, they change their plan and set on fire barrels filled with pine-wood and pitch, and roll them down from the wall on to the gallery. When, however, they had rolled on to it they slip off and, having fallen from the tiles, are removed from the work by poles and forks. Meanwhile some soldiers under the gallery prise out with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy’s tower which served to hold the foundations together. The gallery is defended by our men from the brick tower with missiles and catapults, the enemy are dislodged from their wall and towers, no free opportunity of defending their wall is allowed them. When now a number of stones had been withdrawn from the tower next the gallery, a part of it suddenly collapsed and fell. The rest was beginning to follow it and fall forward, when the enemy, terrified at the sacking of their city, without their arms and wearing fillets, fling themselves in a mass outside the gate and stretch out their hands as suppliants to the legates and the army.

In the face of this new occurrence all military operations cease, and the men turning from the fight are drawn to satisfy their longing to hear and learn the news. When the enemy reached the legates and the army they fling themselves in a body at their feet, and beseech them to wait for Caesar’s arrival: they say that they behold their city captured, the works of investment completed, their tower undermined, and so they desist from their defence. Nothing can now arise to prevent their being plundered forthwith on his arrival if they do not carry out orders at his beck. They point out that if the tower should collapse altogether the soldiers could not be withheld from bursting into the town in hope of plunder and utterly destroying it. These and many such like words, as might be expected from men of intelligence, are uttered with much pathetic appeal and weeping.

Stirred by these events, the legates withdraw their men from the work and abandon the siege, leaving sentries to guard the works. Some kind of truce having been arranged out of compassion, they wait for Caesar’s arrival. No missile is cast from the wall, none by our men; as though the business were finished, all relax their care and diligence. For Caesar in his dispatch had strongly urged Trebonius not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the troops, deeply moved by hatred of the revolt, by the contempt shown for themselves, and by their continuous labour, should slay all the youths; which in fact they were constantly threatening to do, and were now with difficulty restrained from breaking into the town, and resented the fact because it appeared to be the fault of Trebonius that they did not get possession of the town.

But the enemy, with no sense of honour, sought for time and opportunity for fraud and treachery, and after an interval of several days, when our men were weary and slack in spirit, suddenly at noon, after some had gone away and others after their long toil had surrendered themselves to sleep among the siege works, and all their arms had been put away out of sight, broke forth from the gates and set fire to the works, the wind being strong and favourable. The wind spread the fire to such an extent that the mound, the sheds, the tortoise, the machines all caught fire at once, and they were all consumed before it could be ascertained how it had happened. Our men, alarmed by the sudden mischance, snatch up such arms as they can, others fling themselves from the camp. They charge the enemy, but are prevented from following the fugitives by arrows and catapults from the wall. The foe retire beneath their wall, and there without hindrance set fire to the gallery and the brick tower. So the labour of many months perished in a moment through the perfidy of the enemy and the violence of the storm. The Massilians made a like attempt the next day. In similar weather they sallied forth and fought with greater confidence at the second tower and earthwork and cast much fire on them. But though our men had relaxed all the keen vigilance of an earlier period, yet, warned by the previous day’s disaster, they had made every preparation for defence. So after slaying many they drove back the rest into the town and prevented them from accomplishing their purpose.

Trebonius began to apply himself to the task of repairing his losses, with a great increase of zeal on the part of his troops. For they saw that all their labours and appliances had turned out ill, and were highly indignant that owing to the wicked violation of the truce their valour would be a mark for derision; and so, since there was no place left from which material for a rampart could possibly be collected, because all the trees far and wide in the Massilian district had been cut down and brought in, they set about making an earthwork of a novel kind that no one had heard of before out of two brick walls each six feet thick, and roofing these walls over, so that the width was about the same as that of the former earthwork piled up with timber. Wherever either the space between the walls or the weakness of the timber seemed to require it, piles are placed between them, cross-beams are put in to serve as a strengthening, and all the part roofed is spread over with hurdles, and the hurdles are covered with clay. Under this cover the soldiers, sheltered to right and left by the wall, in front by the defence of a screen, bring up without danger whatever is of use for the work. The business is conducted with speed; the wastage of their long-continued labour is soon made up by the skill and energy of the soldiers. Gates are left in the wall wherever seems suitable to allow of a sortie.

And when the enemy saw that the losses which they had hoped could hardly be repaired within a long period of time had been so thoroughly repaired by the work and toil of a few days, that there was now no opportunity for treachery or sortie, and that no possible chance was left for any injury to be done either to the men by weapons or to the works by fire; and when they become aware that in a like manner the whole city, where there is an approach to it by land, can be so thoroughly invested by wall and towers that there was no chance for themselves of standing their ground on their own defences, since the investing walls seemed to have been built by our army almost on to their own town walls, and missiles were being hurled by hand; and that the use of their own engines, on which they had laid great hopes, was coming to nothing owing to the narrow space that separated them; and when they understand that if equal conditions of fighting from wall and towers are afforded they cannot equal our men in valour: then they recur to the same terms of surrender.

M. Varro, at first in further Spain, when he learnt of the events that had happened in Italy, mistrusting the fortunes of Pompeius, began to speak in the most friendly terms of Caesar. He pointed out that, having been previously secured by Gn. Pompeius as his legate, he was held bound by a pledge of loyalty, yet that no less strong a tie of intimacy existed between himself and Caesar, and that he was not unaware what was the duty of a legate who held a post of trust, what his own strength was, and what was the feeling of the whole province towards Caesar. These opinions he used to express in all his talk, but meanwhile made no movement towards either side. But afterwards, when he learnt that Caesar was being detained at Massilia, that the forces of Petreius had been united with the army of Afranius, that large auxiliary forces had assembled, that other large reinforcements were in prospect and constantly expected, and that the whole hither province was unanimous; and when he heard of what had afterwards happened about the dearth of provisions at Ilerda, and when Afranius kept writing to him about this in a large and exaggerated style, he began himself to move in response to the movements of fortune.

He held a levy throughout his province, and when he had made up two legions he added about thirty auxiliary cohorts. He collected a great store of corn to be sent to the Massilians, some also to Afranius and Petreius. He ordered the Gaditanians to make ten ships of war and contracted for the building of many others at Hispalis. He bestowed in the town of Gades all the money and all the treasures from the temple of Hercules; he sent thither from his province six cohorts on garrison duty, and put in charge of the town of Gades Gaius Gallonius, a Roman knight, a friend of Domitius, who had gone thither commissioned by Domitius to take possession of an inheritance; all weapons, private and public, he bestowed in the house of Gallonius. He delivered incriminating speeches against Caesar. He often asserted from his tribunal that Caesar had fought unsuccessful battles, that a great number of soldiers had deserted him for Afranius; that he had aseer- tained this by trustworthy messengers, on trustworthy authority. He compelled the Roman citizens of the province, terrified by such proceedings, to promise him for the administration of public affairs 18,000,000 sesterces and 20,000 pounds of silver and 120,000 measures of wheat. On all the communities that he thought friendly to Caesar he proceeded to impose very heavy burdens, to move garrisons into them, and to deliver judgments against private persons who had uttered words or made speeches against the commonwealth; their property he confiscated for public purposes. He went on to compel his whole province to swear allegiance to himself and Pompeius. When he had ascertained what had happened in hither Spain he began to prepare war. His plan of campaign was to go to Gades with two legions, and to retain there the ships and all the corn, for he had found out that the whole of his province favoured the side of Caesar. If the corn and ships were collected in the island he thought it would not be difficult for the war to be prolonged. Caesar, though many urgent affairs were summoning him back to Italy, had nevertheless determined to abandon no section of the war in the two Spains, because he knew how great were the benefactions of Pompeius and what large bodies of retainers he had in the hither province.

So, having sent two legions into further Spain with Q. Cassius, tribune of the people, he himself proceeds ahead with six hundred horsemen by forced marches, and sends on an order stating on what date he wished the magistrates and chief men of all the communities to meet him at Corduba. When this edict was promulgated throughout the province there was no community that did not send a portion of its council to Corduba, no Roman citizen of any repute who did not come on the appointed day. At the same time the Roman burgess-body at Corduba of its own accord shut the gates against Varro, set outposts and sentries on the towers and walls, and detained for the defence of the town two cohorts called Colonial which had come there by chance. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is by far the strongest community in the whole province, of its own accord thrust out three cohorts which had been introduced into the citadel by Varro as a garrison, and closed its gates against them.

And this made Varro hurry all the more to reach Gades with his legions as soon as possible, that he might not be cut off from his route or from the crossing, so great and enthusiastic did he find the feeling of the province in favour of Caesar. When he had advanced a little further a dispatch from Gades is handed him stating that, as soon as it was known about Caesar’s edict, the chief men of Gades had conspired with the tribunes of the cohorts which were there on garrison duty to expel Gallonius from the town and to secure the city and island for Caesar: that on forming this design they had told Gallonius to quit Gades voluntarily while he could do so without danger; if he did not do so they would take measures for themselves: that Gallonius under the influence of this fear had quitted Gades. When these events became known one of the two legions, which was called the Native Legion, removed its colours from Varro’s camp while he was standing by and looking on, and, withdrawing to Hispalis, bivouacked in the forum and porticoes without harming anyone. The Roman citizens of the district approved this action so highly that every one of them most eagerly welcomed the men with hospitable entertainment in his own house. Varro, alarmed by these events, after sending on word that he had changed his route and was coming to Italica, was informed by his friends that the gates were shut against him. Thereupon, being shut off from every route, he sends word to Caesar that he is ready to hand over his legion to whomsoever he shall appoint. Caesar sends Sex. Caesar to him, bidding him hand it over to him. When the legion was given up Varro comes to Caesar at Corduba; after faithfully rendering him a statement of the public accounts, he hands over the money in his possession and explains what he has in the way of corn and ships, wherever it may be.

Caesar held a public meeting at Corduba and thanked all classes separately—the Roman citizens for their zeal in keeping the town under his control, the Spaniards for having cast out the garrisons, the Gaditanians for having crushed the attempts of his adversaries and having vindicated their own liberty, the military tribunes and centurions who had come there on garrison duty for having confirmed the resolutions of the others by their own valour. He remits the sums of money which the Roman citizens had promised to Varro for public purposes; he restores their property to those whom he understood to have been thus penalized for their freedom of speech. Having bestowed on certain communities public and private rewards, he fills the rest with good hope for the future, and after a stay of two days at Corduba sets out for Gades, where he orders the moneys and memorial offerings that had been brought from the shrine of Hercules to a private house to be restored to the temple, and sets Q. Cassius over the province, assigning him four legions. In a few days he arrives at Tarraco with the ships which M. Varro had built and those which the Gaditanians had built on Varro’s order. There embassies from nearly the whole of the hither province were awaiting Caesar’s arrival. Having in the same way conferred honours privately and publicly on certain communities, he leaves Tarraco and makes his way by land to Narbo and thence to Massilia. There he learns that a law had been passed about a dictator, and that he himself had been nominated dictator by the praetor M. Lepidus.

The Massilians, worn out by every form of ill, reduced to the extremest scarcity of provisions, twice beaten in a naval battle, routed in their frequent sorties, harassed moreover by a serious pestilence resulting from their long confinement and change of food—for they were all supporting themselves on an old stock of millet and stale barley which they had long ago collected for such emergencies and put in public store—their tower overthrown, a great part of their wall in ruins, with no hope of reinforcements from the provinces and the armies, which they had been informed had fallen under Caesar’s control, determined to make a loyal surrender. But a few days before L. Domitius, learning of the intention of the Massilians, having got together three ships, two of which he had assigned to his friends, himself embarking on the other, departed in stormy weather. The ships which by order of Brutus were keeping watch off the port according to their daily custom, catching sight of him, weighed anchor and began the pursuit. The ship which belonged to Domitius himself held steadily on its course in flight and, aided by the storm, passed out of sight; two, terrified by the united onset of our ships, took shelter in the harbour. The Massilians produce from the town their arms and engines according to orders, bring out their ships from the port and docks, and hand over their money from the treasury. When all this was done, Caesar, sparing them more on account of the name and antiquity of their state than for any thing they had deserved of him, leaves two legions there as a garrison, sends the rest to Italy, and himself sets out for Rome.

At the same period G. Curio, who had set out from Sicily for Africa, despising at the very outset the forces of P. Attius Varus, was transporting two of the four legions which he had received from Caesar and five hundred horsemen, and after spending two days and three nights on the voyage touches at the place called Anquillaria. This place is distant twenty-two miles from Clupea, and has an anchorage not unsuitable in summer, and is enclosed by two projecting promontories. The young L. Caesar, awaiting his arrival at Clupea with ten ships of war (which, having been laid up at Utica after the pirate war, P. Attius had caused to be repaired for the purpose of this war) being alarmed at the number of the ships, had fled from the high sea, and beaching his decked trireme on the nearest shore and leaving it there, had fled by land to Hadrumetum, a town which G. Considius Longus was protecting with a garrison of one legion; and on his flight the rest of Caesar’s ships betook themselves to Hadrumetum. The quaestor Marcius Rufus, following him with twelve ships which Curio had brought from Sicily to protect the merchant-vessels, on seeing the ship left on the shore, dragged it off with a tow-rope and himself returned to G. Curio with his fleet.

Curio sends Marcius on to Utica with his fleet; he himself sets out thither with his army, and having completed a two days’ march, arrived at the River Bagrada. There he left the legate G. Caninius Rebilus with the legions, and himself goes on in front with his cavalry to explore the Cornelian Camp, because that spot seemed particularly suitable for a camp. Now this was a straight ridge projecting into the sea, abrupt and rugged on either side, but with a somewhat gentler slope on the side facing Utica. The distance from Utica in a straight line is a little more than three miles, but in this direction a stream rises, by the bed of which the sea runs up for some distance, and the place becomes a wide marsh, and anyone wishing to avoid this only reaches the town by a circuit of six miles.

Reconnoitring this place, Curio sees the camp of Varus joined on to the wall and town near the so-called gate of Baal, strongly protected by the nature of the ground—on one side by the town of Utica itself, on the other by the amphitheatre in front of the town, the substructions of this work being very large, rendering approach to the camp difficult and narrow. At the same time he notices that all along the densely crowded roads there is much carrying and hurrying of property that is being conveyed from the country into the town in fear of a sudden tumult. Hither he sends the cavalry to seize and retain it as booty, and at the same time to protect this property six hundred Numidian horsemen and four hundred foot-soldiers, whom King Juba had sent to Utica byway of aid a few days before, are dispatched from the town by Varus. Juba had hereditary ties of hospitality with Pompeius, and between him and Curio there was a quarrel because, as tribune of the people, Curio had promulgated a law by which he had confiscated Juba’s realm. The cavalry meet in conflict, nor could the Numidians withstand the first onset of our men, but when about a hundred and twenty of them had been killed the rest retreated towards the town to their camp. Meanwhile on the approach of the warships Curio bids proclamation be made to the merchant-vessels that were stationed at Utica to the number of about two hundred that he would treat anyone as an enemy who did not forthwith transfer his ships to the Cornelian Camp. On the issue of this proclamation they all immediately weigh anchor, leave Utica, and cross over whither they are bidden. This supplied the army with an abundance of all necessaries.

After these achievements Curio withdraws to the camp by the Bagrada and is saluted as Imperator by the acclamations of the whole army, and on the next day leads his army to Utica and pitches his camp near the town. Before the work of entrenching was completed horsemen on picket duty bring word that large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry sent by the king are on their way to Utica, and at the same time a great mass of dust was seen and forthwith the van appeared in sight. Curio, disturbed by the unexpected event, sends forward horsemen to meet and cheek the first onset, and himself, hastily withdrawing his legions from their work, draws up his line of battle. The cavalry engage, and before the legions could be fully deployed and take up their positions, they threw all the king’s reinforcements into confusion and panic, since they had been marching in no order and without fear, and routed them; and though the cavalry sustained scarcely any loss, owing to their retiring quickly along the coast to the town, they slew a great number of the infantry.

On the following night two Marsic centurions from Curio’s camp, with twenty-two of their men, desert to Attius Varus. Whether they convey to him the opinion that they really held, or whether they only flatter his ears—for what we desire we gladly believe, and what we ourselves feel we hope that others feel too—at any rate they assure him that the hearts of the whole army are estranged from Curio, and that it is highly necessary that he should come within sight of the army and afford an opportunity of conference. Varus, influenced by this judgment, leads his legions out of camp early the next day. Curio does the same, and each draws up his forces with only one small valley between them.

In the army of Varus was Sex. Quintilius Varus, who, as explained above, had been at Corfinium. Dismissed by Caesar, he had come to Africa, and Curio had brought across the legions which Caesar had at an earlier period recovered from Corfinium, without altering the establishment of officers and men, though a few centurions were changed. Having this excuse for appealing to them, Quintilius began to go the round of Curio’s force and beseech the soldiers not to lay aside their early memory of the oath that they had sworn before Domitius and before himself as quaestor, nor bear arms against those who had experienced the same fortune and suffered the same hardships in the siege, nor fight for those by whom they were insultingly styled deserters. To this he adds a few words to arouse hope of bounty—such rewards as they were bound to expect from his liberality if they should follow himself and Attius. On the delivery of this speech no sign is made either way by Curio’s army, and so each commander leads back his forces.

But in Curio’s camp great alarm took possession of the minds of all, and this alarm is quickly increased by various popular rumours. For each person invented imaginary views and added something of his own fear to whatever he had heard from another. When the story had spread from the first who vouched for it to a number of others, each handing it on to his fellow, there appeared at last to be several who could vouch for its truth. It was a civil war, they said; the men were of a class which was permitted to do freely what it liked and to follow its bent; the legions were those which a little while before had been in the hands of their foes, for the custom of constantly offering gifts had depreciated even the bounty of Caesar; the municipal communities, too, were attached to different sides, for men came equally from the Marsi and the Peligni, as, for instance, those who had deserted the night before. In the tents some of the soldiers proposed strong measures. Doubtful speeches on the part of the men were harshly interpreted; some reports were even invented by those who wished to seem more zealous than their fellows.

For these reasons a council is summoned, and Curio opens a discussion on the general position. Opinions were delivered expressing the view that a bold attempt should by all means be made and the camp of Varus attacked, because in the present temper of the soldiery they thought inaction particularly inopportune; lastly, they said that it was better to tempt the fortune of war by valour in battle than, deserted and cheated by their comrades, to undergo the severest penalties. Some there were who proposed a retirement at the third watch to the Cornelian Camp, so that by the interposition of a longer interval of time the minds of the troops might be restored to sanity, and that, at the same time, if anything serious should occur, a withdrawal to Sicily might be more safely and easily secured owing to the great number of ships.

Curio, disapproving of each plan, remarked that in proportion as the one lacked spirit the other had too much of it; the one party had in view an utterly disgraceful flight, the other were thinking that they should fight even in an unfavourable position. Pray on what grounds of assurance are we confident, said he, that a camp so strongly fortified both by works and by the nature of the position can be taken by storm? Or indeed what do we gain if after sustaining serious losses we abandon the siege of the camp? As if it were not success in action that brought a commander the goodwill, and reverses that brought him the hatred, of his army! What does a change of camp imply but a discreditable flight and general despair and the estrangement of the army? For the honourable ought not to suspect that they are insufficiently trusted, nor the dishonest know that they are feared, because fear on our part increases the licence of the latter and diminishes the zeal of the former. Now if, he continues, we have full assurance of the statements that arc made about the estrangement of the army, which for my part I am confident are either altogether false or at any rate are less true than is supposed, how much better would it be for these rumours to be ignored and kept hidden than to be confirmed through our action? Is it not true that reverses of an army, like wounds of the body, should be concealed, that we may not increase the hopes of our adversaries? Why, they even add that we should set out at midnight, to give greater licence, I suppose, to those who are striving to do wrong! For misdeeds of this kind are kept in check either by shame or by fear, and to such checks night is in the highest degree unfavourable. Wherefore I am neither a man of such courage as to think that the camp should be attacked without hope of success, nor of such timidity as to be without hope, and so I think that every expedient should be tried before this, and I am confident that in the main you and I together will form a decision on the point at issue.

On the dismissal of the council he calls a meeting of the soldiers. He reminds them how zealous Caesar had found them at Corfinium, how it was, thanks to them and their powerful aid, he made a great part of Italy his own. All the municipal towns in turn, he said, followed you and your action, and it was not without reason that Caesar formed the friendliest opinion of you, and the enemy the harshest. For Pompeius, though not beaten in any battle, was thrust away by the predetermining effect of your action and quitted Italy; while Caesar entrusted to your loyalty me, whom he held most dear, and the province of Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot protect the capital and Italy. Yet there are people who urge you to fall apart from us. Why, what do our opponents pray for more than at one and the same time to take us in their toils and to entrammel you by a nefarious crime? Or what harsher idea of you can they form in their anger than that you should betray those who judge that they owe everything to you, and pass under the control of those who think that they were ruined by you? Have you really not heard of Caesar’s exploits in Spain—two armies routed, two generals overcome, two provinces recovered—these successes gained within forty days after Caesar came within sight of the enemy? Should those who could not resist when they were unharmed resist now that they are ruined? Again, should you, who followed Caesar when victory was uncertain, now, when the fortune of war is once for all decided, follow the conquered when you ought to be reaping the rewards of your dutiful allegiance? They say in reply that they were deserted and betrayed by you, and they make mention of your former oath. I ask, did you desert L. Domitius, or did Domitius desert you? Did he not cast you off when you were ready to endure the extremity of fortune? Did he not without your knowledge seek safety for himself in flight? When betrayed by him, was it not by Caesar’s kindness that you have been preserved? As for the oath, how could he hold you bound by it when, flinging aside his fasces and laying down his military command, he had himself passed, a private person and a captive, into the control of another? A novel obligation is left you, to disregard the oath by which you are bound and look back to that which has been cancelled by the surrender of the general and his civil degradation. But, I suppose, even if you approve of Caesar, you stumble at me. I am not going to talk of my services towards you; at present they are slighter than I could wish or you expect; but still, soldiers have always sought the rewards of their labour by the issue of the war, and what that will be, you, too, have no doubt. As for my diligence—or, so far as things have gone at present, our fortune—why should I pass them over? Are you dissatisfied with my having transported the army safe and sound without the loss of a single ship? With my having scattered the fleet of the enemy on my arrival at the first onset? At my having twice in two days won in a cavalry engagement? At my having taken off two hundred loaded vessels from the recesses of the enemy’s harbour, and having driven the foe to such straits that they cannot be replenished with provisions either by a land route or by sea? Repudiating such fortune, such leaders, you follow the disgrace of Corfinium, the flight from Italy, the surrender of the Spains, events which forecast the issue of the African war! I, for my part, wished to be called a soldier of Caesar: you have addressed me by the title of Imperator. If you regret this, I give you back your bounty; restore me my proper name, lest you should seem to have given me an honour only as an insult.

Moved by this speech, the men interrupted him even while speaking, making it evident that they endured with great indignation the suspicion of disloyalty; but on his leaving the assembly they exhort him in a body to be of good courage and on no occasion to hesitate to join battle and test their loyalty and valour. When by this action the feelings and thoughts of the men had been completely changed, Curio determines with their unanimous consent to commit the issue to battle as soon as opportunity is offered, and on the next day he leads them out and arranges them in order of battle in the same place in which he had taken up his position on the previous days. Nor does Varus hesitate to lead out his forces, that he may not let slip an opportunity, if chance is given him,. either of tampering with Curio’s men or of fighting in a favourable position.

Between the two lines there was, as explained above, a valley, not very large, but with a difficult and steep ascent. Each commander was waiting to see whether the enemy’s forces would attempt to cross this, in order that he might join battle on more level ground. At the same time on the left wing the whole cavalry force of P. Attius and a number of light-armed troops placed among them were seen as they were descending into the valley. Against them Curio sends his cavalry and two cohorts of the Marrucini. Their first charge the enemy’s horse failed to withstand, but fled back at a gallop to their comrades. The light-armed men who had advanced with them, being abandoned by them, were surrounded and slain by our men. The whole of Varus’ array turned and saw their men being cut down in flight. Then Rebilus, Caesar’s legate, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily, knowing him to be possessed of great experience in warfare, said: You see the enemy panic-stricken, Curio: why do you hesitate to use the opportunity of the moment? Curio, merely exclaiming that the troops should bear in mind the assurances that they had given him the day before, bids them follow him and hurries ahead of them all. Now the valley was so difficult that the front men could not easily win their way up unless assisted by their comrades. But the minds of the Attian soldiers, preoccupied by their fear and the flight and slaughter of their comrades, never gave a thought to resistance, and they all imagined that they were being already surrounded by cavalry. And so before a weapon could be cast or our men could approach nearer, the whole of Varus’ line turned to flight and withdrew to the camp.

In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian, of the lowest rank of centuries in Curio’s army, being the first man to overtake the fugitive column,kept looking for Varus, calling him with a loud voice by name, so as to seem to be one of his men and to be wishing to make some suggestion and statement. When Varus on being frequently addressed stopped and looked at him and asked who he was or what he wanted, he struck at his exposed shoulder with a sword and came within a little of killing Varus, who avoided the peril by raising his shield to meet the attempted stroke. Fabius is surrounded and killed by the nearest soldiers. The gates of the camp are beset by this throng and turmoil of fugitives and the road blocked, and more perish in this spot without wounds than in the battle or the flight; they were indeed very near being driven even out of the camp, and some, without checking their course, hurried straight into the town. But not only did the nature of the ground and the defences of the camp prohibit access, but also the fact that Curio’s men, having marched out for a battle, lacked the appliances that were required for the siege of a camp. And so Curio brings back his army into camp with all his men safe except Fabius, while of the number of the foe about six hundred were slain and a thousand wounded. And on Curio’s departure all these, and many others feigning wounds, retreat from the camp into the town by reason of their fear. And observing this and aware of the terror of his army, Varus, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a few tents for the sake of appearance, silently leads his army into the town about the third watch.

On the next day Curio sets himself to blockade Utica and invest it with an earthwork. In the town there was a multitude of people unaccustomed to war owing to the long continuance of peace; there were the inhabitants of Utica who were most friendly to Caesar on account of certain benefits that he had conferred on them; there was the Roman burgess-body, consisting of various classes, and there was also great alarm, in consequence of the previous battles. And so all now began to speak openly about surrender and to plead with P. Attius that he should not allow the fortunes of all to be upset by his own obstinacy. While this was going on some messengers sent on by King Juba arrived to say that he was close at hand with large forces and to exhort them to guard and defend the city. This strengthened their panic-stricken spirits.

The same news was conveyed to Curio, but for some time he could not be induced to believe it, such confidence had he in his own fortunes. By now, too, news of Caesar’s successes in Spain was being brought by messengers and dispatches to Africa. Elated by all this, he imagined that the king would attempt nothing against him. But when he found out on sure authority that his forces were twenty-four miles from Utica, he left his defences and withdrew to the Cornelian Camp. Here he began to bring together corn, to entrench a camp, to collect timber, and at once sent word to Sicily that two legions and the rest of the cavalry should be sent to him. The camp was most suitable for carrying on a prolonged war both from the nature of the site and from its defensive works, and also on account of the nearness of the sea, and the abundance of water and of salt, a great quantity of which had already been stored there from neighbouring salt-works. Timber could not fail, from the multitude of the trees, nor corn, of which the fields were unusually full. And so, with the approval of all his men, Curio prepared to wait for the rest of his forces and to wage a protracted war.

When these arrangements had been made and his measures approved, he learns from some deserting townsmen that Juba, recalled by a neighbouring war and by quarrels with the people of Leptis, had stayed behind in his kingdom, and that his prefect Saburra, who had been sent on with a moderate force, was approaching Utica. Rashly believing their word, he changes his purpose and determines to commit the issue to battle. In his approval of this measure he is greatly aided by his youth, his high spirits, the results of the earlier period, his confidence of success. Urged on by such considerations, he sends all his cavalry at nightfall to the enemy’s camp at the River Bagrada. Saburra, of whom he had previously heard, was in command of this camp, but the king was following on with all his forces and had taken up a position at a distance of six miles from Saburra. The cavalry whom Curio sent complete their journey by night and attack the enemy taken off their guard and unawares. For the Numidians, according to some barbarous custom of their own, had taken up their position here and there and in no set order. Attacking them when overcome by sleep and dispersed, they kill a great number of them; many fly panic-stricken. Having achieved this, the cavalry return to Curio and bring him back their captives.

Curio had gone out at the fourth watch with all his forces, leaving five cohorts to guard the camp. When he had marched six miles he met the cavalry and learnt of their success. He inquires of the captives who is in command of the camp at the Bagrada. They reply, Saburra. In his zeal to complete his march he omits other questions, and looking to the nearest colours, he says: Do you see, my men, that the story of the captives agrees with that of the deserters—that the king is absent, that scanty forces have been dispatched, insufficient to cope with a few horsemen? Hasten on then to plunder and to glory, that we may at last begin to take thought of your rewards and of the gratitude that is your due. The exploits of the horsemen were in fact considerable, especially when their small number is compared with the great multitude of the Numidians. But they were related in a somewhat inflated style by the men themselves, with the usual delight that men take in proclaiming their own merits. Moreover, many spoils were displayed, captured men and horses were produced, so that all delay that might occur seemed to be a postponement of the victory. So far was the zeal of the troops from falling short of Curio’s expectations. He bids the horsemen follow him and hastens his march that he might attack the foe just when most disordered by flight. But his men, worn out by the whole night’s march, could not maintain the pursuit, and kept stopping, one here and another there. Even this did not check Curio in his aspirations.

Juba, having been informed by Saburra of the night battle, sends to his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalry which he had been wont to keep round his person as a bodyguard, and that part of the infantry on which he most relied, and himself follows more slowly with the rest of his forces and sixty elephants. Saburra, suspecting that after sending forward the cavalry Curio would himself approach, draws up his forces, horse and foot, and orders them to feign fear and to give ground gradually and retire, saying that he himself would give the signal of battle when necessary and issue such orders as he might judge the situation to require. Curio, having the general opinion of the moment to confirm his former hopes, and thinking that the enemy was in flight, leads down his forces from the higher ground towards the plain.

When he had gone a considerable distance from this place, his army being now worn out by toil, he halted after covering twelve miles. Saburra gives his men the signal, draws up his line of battle, and starts going up and down the ranks and exhorting the men. But he uses his infantry merely to make a show a little way off and hurls his horse on the line. Curio is equal to the emergency and encourages his men, bidding them place all their hopes on valour. Nor did zeal for the fight or valour fail either the infantry, weary as they were, or the cavalry, though they were few and exhausted by toil. But these were only two hundred in number; the rest had stopped on the route. They compelled the enemy to give way at whatever point they charged, but they could neither follow them when they fled to a distance nor urge their horses to more strenuous effort. But the enemy’s cavalry begins to surround our force on either wing and to trample them down from the rear. Whenever cohorts left the main body and charged, the Numidians by their swiftness fled unscathed from the assault of our men, and, betaking themselves to their own ranks again, began to surround them and to cut them off from the main body. Thus it seemed unsafe either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks or to charge and risk the chance of conflict. As the king sent up reinforcements the forces of the enemy were constantly increasing, while fatigue kept diminishing the strength of our men, and those who had received wounds could neither quit the line nor be carried to a safe place because the whole force was surrounded and closed in by the enemy’s horse. These men, despairing of their safety, after the manner of men in the extreme crisis of life, were either bewailing their own death or commending their parents to such as fortune might he able to rescue from the peril. The whole place was full of terror and lamentation.

When all were panic-stricken and Curio understood that neither his exhortations nor his entreaties were listened to, considering that in such pitiable plight only one hope of safety remained, he ordered them in a body to occupy the nearest hills and the colours to be transferred thither. These, too, were outstripped by the cavalry sent by Saburra. Then indeed our men touch the extremity of despair, and some are slain as they fly from the cavalry, others fall to the ground unwounded. Gn. Domitius, prefect of the horse, surrounding Curio with a few horsemen, begs him to seek safety in flight and hurry to the camp, promising not to leave him. But Curio declares that he will never present himself again before the eyes of Caesar after losing the army that he has received from him on trust, and so dies fighting. Very few horsemen come safe out of the battle, but those who, as was explained, halted in the extreme rear for the purpose of refreshing their horses, observing from a distance the flight of the whole army, retreat to the camp unhurt. The foot-soldiers are slain to a man.

On learning of these events Marcius Rufus, the quaestor, who had been left in the camp by Curio, exhorts his men not to lose heart. They beg and beseech him to transport them back by sea to Sicily. Promising to do so, he bids the captains of the ships have all their boats drawn up on shore by the early evening. But so great was the general terror that some declared that the forces of Juba were close at hand, others that Varus was upon them with his legions and that already they saw the dust of their approach, though in reality nothing of the kind had happened; others suspected that the enemy’s fleet would quickly hurry up to the attack. And so, amid the universal panic, each took counsel for himself. Those who were in the fleet hastened to depart. Their flight instigated the captains of the merchant-ships; only a few boats gathered at the call of duty and the word of command. But on the closely packed shores so great was the struggle to be the first out of the multitude to embark that some of the boats were sunk by the weight of the crowd, and the rest in fear of this hesitated to approach nearer.

Thus it fell out that only a few soldiers and fathers of families, who prevailed either by influence or by exciting compassion, or who could swim to the ships, were received on board and reached Sicily in safety. The rest of the forces sent centurions by night to Varus in the capacity of ambassadors and surrendered themselves to him. And Juba, seeing the men of these cohorts next day in front of the town, declaring that they were his booty, ordered a great part of them to be slain and sent back a few picked men to his kingdom, Varus the while complaining that his own honour was being injured by Juba, but not venturing to resist. Juba, himself riding into the town with an escort of several senators, among them Ser. Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, briefly arranged and ordered what he wanted to be done at Utica, and a few days afterwards withdrew with all his forces to his own kingdom.