Book 1

Thucydides, an Athenian wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, how they warred against each other; having begun from its very outset, with the expectation that it would prove a great one, and more worthy of relation than all that had been before it; inferring so much, as well from the fact that both sides were at the height of all kinds of preparation for it, as also because he saw the rest of Greece joining with the one side or the other, some immediately, and some intending so to do.

For this was certainly the greatest movement that ever happened amongst the Greeks, and some part of the barbarians, and extending, as one may say, even to most nations of the world.

For the events that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, it was impossible, through length of time, to ascertain with certainty; but from such evidence as I am led to trust, on looking back as far as possible, I do not think they were great, either with respect to wars or otherwise.

For it is evident, that what is now called Hellas, was not of old inhabited in a settled manner; but that formerly there were frequent removals, and that each tribe readily left the place of their abode, being forced by such as were from time to time more numerous.

For as there was no traffic, and they did not mix with one another without fear, either by sea or land; and they each so used what they had as but barely to live on it, without having any superfluity of riches, or planting their land, (because it was uncertain when another should invade them, and carry all away, especially as they had not the defence of walls;) and as they thought that they might any where obtain their necessary daily sustenance, they made little difficulty in removing: and for this cause they were not strong, either in greatness of cities, or other resources.

And the best of the land was always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessaly, and Boeotia, and the greatest part of the Peloponnese, (except Arcadia,) and of the rest of Greece whatsoever was most fertile.

For through the goodness of the land, both the power of some particular men growing greater caused factions among them, whereby they were ruined; and withal they were more exposed to the plots of strangers.

Attica, at any rate, having through the poverty of the soil been for the longest period free from factions, was always inhabited by the same people.

And this which follows is not the least evidence of my assertion, that it was owing to its migrations that Greece did not equally increase in other parts. For such as by war or sedi tion were driven out of the rest of Greece, the most powerful of them retired to Athens, as to a place of security; and becoming citizens at a very early period, made the city still greater in the number of inhabitants; so that afterwards they even sent out colonies into Ionia, as Attica itself was not able to contain them.

And to me the weakness of ancient times is not a little demonstrated by this too. Before the Trojan war, Greece appears to have done nothing in common;

and, as it seems to me, the whole of it had not as yet even this name; nay, before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, it does not appear that this appellation existed at all; but that in their different tribes, and the Pelasgian to the greatest extent, they furnished from themselves the name [of their people.]

But when Hellen and his sons had grown strong in Phthiotis, and men invited them for their aid into the other cities; from associating with them, separate communities were now more commonly called Hellenes: and yet not for a long time after could that name prevail amongst them all.

And Homer proves this most fully; for, though born long after the Trojan war, he has no where called them all by that name, nor indeed any others but those that came with Achilles out of Phthiotis; who were the very original Hellenes; but in his poems he mentions Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor again does he speak of barbarians; because neither were the Hellenes, in my opinion, as yet distinguished by one common term in opposition to that.

The several Hellenic communities, then, who in the different cities understood each other's language, and were afterwards all so called, did nothing in a body before the Trojan war, through want of strength and mutual intercourse. Nay, even for this expedition they united [only] because they now made more use of the sea.

For Minos was the most ancient of all with whom we are acquainted by report, that acquired a navy: and he made himself master of the greater part of what is now the Grecian sea; and both ruled over the islands called Cyclades, and was the first that colonized most of them, having expelled the Carians, and established his own sons in them as governors; and, as was natural, he swept piracy from the sea as much as he could, for the better coming in to him of his revenues.

For the Grecians in old time, and of the barbarians both those on the continent who lived near the sea, and all who inhabited islands, after they began to cross over more commonly to one another in ships, turned to piracy, under the conduct of their most powerful men, with a view both to their own gain, and to maintenance for the needy; and falling upon towns that were unfortified, and inhabited like villages, they rifled them, and made most of their livelihood by this means; as this employment did not yet involve any disgrace, but rather brought with it even somewhat of glory.

This is shown by some that dwell on the continent even at the present day, with whom it is an honour to perform this cleverly; and by the ancient poets, who introduce men asking the question of such as sail to their coasts, in all cases alike, whether they are pirates: as though neither those of whom they inquire, disowned the employment; nor those who were interested in knowing, reproached them with it.

They also robbed one another on the continent; and to this day many parts of Greece live after the old fashion; as the Locri Ozolae, the Aetolians, and Acarnanians, and those in that part of the continent. And the fashion of wearing arms has continued amongst these continental states from their old trade of piracy.

For the whole of Greece used to wear arms, owing to their habitations being unprotected, and their communication with each other insecure; and they passed their ordinary life with weapons, like the barbarians.

And those parts of Greece which still live in this way, are a proof of the same mode of life having also formerly extended to all.

Now the Athenians were the first who laid down their armour, and by a more easy style of life changed to greater luxury. And the elders of their rich men no long time ago ceased wearing from delicacy linen tunics, and binding up a knot of the hair on their heads with a tie of golden grasshoppers. Whence also this fashion prevailed for a long time with the elders of the Ionians, from their affinity to them.

But on the contrary, a moderate style of dressing, and according to the present mode, was first used by the Lacedaemonians; and in other respects their wealthier men most conformed themselves in their living to the common people.

And they were the first who stripped themselves, and undressing in public, smeared themselves with grease, in their gymnastic exercises. And formerly even at the Olympic games the combatants contended with girdles round their middle; and it is not many years since it ceased to be so. Nay even now amongst some of the barbarians, and especially those of Asia, prizes for boxing and wrestling are given, and they wear girdles when they contend for them.

And in many other respects also one might show that the ancient Greeks lived in a manner similar to the barbarians of the present age

Of the cities, again, such as were founded most recently and when there were now greater facilities of navigation, having greater abundance of wealth, they were built with walls on the very shores; and occupied isthmuses, with a view both to commerce and to security against their several neighbours: whereas the old ones, owing to the long continuance of piracy, were built farther off from the sea, both those in the islands and those on the mainlands; (for they used to plunder one another, and all the rest who lived by the sea without being seamen;) and even to the present day they are built inland.

And the islanders especially were pirates, being Carians and Phoenicians. For it was these that had colonized most of the islands. And this is a proof of it:—When Delos was purified by the Athenians in the course of this war, and all the sepulchres of those who had died in the island were taken up, above half were found to be Carians; being known by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the manner in which they still bury.

But when the navy of Minos was established, there were greater facilities of sailing to each other. For the malefactors in the islands were expelled by him, at the same time that he was colonizing most of them.

And the men on the sea-coast, now making greater acquisition of wealth, led a more settled life: and some of them even surrounded themselves with walls, on the strength of growing richer than they had before been. For through desire of gain, the lower orders submitted to be slaves to their betters; and the more powerful, having a superabundance of money, brought the smaller cities into subjection.

And being now more in this state of things, some time after they made the expedition against Troy.

And Agamemnon appears to me to have assembled the armament because he surpassed the men of that day in power, and not so much because he took the suitors of Helen bound by their oaths to Tyndarus.

It is said too by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the most certain accounts by tradition from their forefathers, that Pelops first acquired power by the abundance of riches with which he came from Asia to men who were in needy circumstances; and although a new-comer, yet gave his name to the country;

and that afterwards still greater power fell to the lot of his descendants, as Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the Heraclidae, and Atreus was his mother's brother, and Eurystheus, when going on the expedition, intrusted Mycenae and the government to Atreus, on the ground of their connexion; (he happened to be flying from his father on account of the death of Chrysippus:) and when Eurystheus did not return again, they say that at the wish of the Mycenaeans themselves, through their fear of the Heraclidae, and also because he appeared to be powerful, and had courted the commons, Atreus received the kingdom of the Mycenaeans and all that Eurystheus ruled over; and that so the descendants of Pelops became greater than those of Perseus.

And I think that Agamemnon, from having received this inheritance, and from being strong in his navy also at the same time to a greater extent than others, assembled and made the expedition not so much by favour as by fear.

For he appears to have both come himself with most ships, and to have furnished them for the Arcadians besides; as Homer has also shown, if he is sufficient authority for any one, and also, in [his account of] the transmission of the sceptre, he has mentioned that he

O'er numerous islands and all Argos ruled.

Now, as he lived on the mainland, he would not have been master of islands, except those that were adjacent, (and those would not be numerous,) if he had not also had some naval force. And we must conjecture by this expedition, what was the character of those before it.

And as to Mycenae having been a small place, or if any town in those times appear now to be inconsiderable, this would be no certain proof to rest upon, for disbelieving that the armament was as large as the poets have said, and as report prevails.

For if the city of the Lacedaemonians were laid desolate, and the temples and foundations of the public buildings were left, I think that when a long time had passed by, posterity would have great disbelief of their power in proportion to their fame. (And yet they occupy two of the five divisions of the Peloponnese, and take the lead of the whole of it, and of their allies out of it in great numbers. Still, as the city is neither built closely, nor has sumptuous temples and public buildings, but is built in villages, after the old fashion of Greece, it would have an inferior appearance.) Whereas if the Athenians were to suffer the same fate, I think their power would be conjectured, from the appearance of the city to the eye, to have been double what it is.

It is not therefore right to be incredulous, nor to look at the appearance of cities rather than their power; but to think that that expedition was greater indeed than any that were before it, but inferior to those of the present day; if on this point again we must believe the poetry of Homer, which it is natural that he, as a poet, set off on the side of exaggeration; but, nevertheless, even on this view it appears inferior.

For he has made it to consist of twelve hundred ships, those of the Boeotians carrying 120 men, and those of Philoctetes 50; meaning to show, as I think, the largest and the least; at any rate he has made no mention of the size of any others in the catalogue of the ships. And that they all were themselves rowers and fighting men, he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes. For he has represented all the men at the oar as bowmen. And it is not probable that many supernumeraries would sail with them, except the kings and highest officers; especially as they were going to cross the open sea with munitions of war; and, on the other hand, had not their vessels decked, but equipped, after the old fashion, more like privateers.

Looking then at the mean of the largest and the smallest ships, they do not appear to have gone in any great number, considering that they were sent by the whole of Greece in common.

And the reason was not so much scarcity of men as want of money. For owing to difficulty of subsistence, they took their army the smaller, and such only as they hoped would live on the country itself while carrying on the war; and when on their arrival they were superior in battle, (and that they were so is evident, for they would not else have built the fortification for their camp,) they appear not even then to have employed all their force, but to have turned to the cultivation of the Chersonese, and to piracy, for want of food. And in this way the Trojans, owing to their being scattered, the more easily held out by open force those ten years;

being a match for those who successively were left behind. But if they had gone with abundance of food, and in a body had continuously carried through the war, without foraging and agriculture, they would easily have conquered them in battle, and taken the place; since even though not united, but only with the part that was successively present, they held out against them. Now by pressing the siege, [I say,] they would have taken Troy both in less time and with less trouble; but through want of money both the undertakings before this were weak, and this itself, though more famous than the former, is shown by facts to have been inferior to its fame, and to the present report of it, which has prevailed by means of the poets.

For even after the Trojan war Greece was still moving about, and settling itself;

so that it could not increase its power by remaining at rest.

For the return of the Greeks from Troy, having taken place so late, caused many revolutions; and factions, generally speaking, arose in the states; in consequence of which men were expelled, and founded cities.

For those who are now called Boeotians, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, settled in what is now called Boeotia, but was before called the Cadmean country. (Though there was a division of them in this country before, some of whom also joined the expedition against Troy.) And the Dorians in the eightieth year took possession of the Peloponnese with the Heraclidae.

And Greece having with difficulty, after a long time, enjoyed settled peace, and being no longer subject to migrations, began to send out colonies; and the Athenians colonized Ionia, and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and some places in the rest of Greece.

But all these places were founded after the Trojan war.

Now when Greece was becoming more powerful, and acquiring possession of money still more than before, tyrannies, generally speaking, were established in the cities, from the revenues becoming greater; whereas before there had been hereditary kingly governments with definite privileges; and Greece began to fit out navies, and they paid more attention to the sea.

Now the Corinthians are said first to have managed naval matters most nearly to the present fashion, and triremes to have been built at Corinth first in Greece.

And Aminocles, a Corinthian shipwright, appears to have built four ships for the Samians also. Now it is about three hundred years to the end of this war from the time that Aminocles went to the Samians;

and the most ancient sea-fight with which we are acquainted was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. And from that too it is about two hundred and sixty years to the same period.

For the Corinthians, having their city situated on the isthmus, had always possessed an emporium; as the Greeks of old, both those within the Peloponnese and those without, had intercourse with each other by land more than by sea, through their country: and they were very rich, as is shown even by the old poets; for they gave the title of wealthy to the place. And when the Greeks began to make more voyages, having got their slips they put down piracy; and rendered their city rich in income of money, as they afforded an emporium both ways.

And the Ionians afterwards had a large navy in the time of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and Cambyses his son; and while at war with Cyrus, commanded the sea along their coast for some time. Polycrates also, tyrant of Samos, in the time of Cambyses, having a strong fleet, both made some other of the islands subject to him, and took Rhenea and dedicated it to the Delian Apollo. And the Phocaeans, while founding Massalia, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

These were the strongest of their navies. But even these, though many generations after the Trojan war, appear to have used but few triremes, and to have been still fitted out with fifty-oared vessels, and long boats, as that fleet was.

And it was but a short time before the Median war, and the death of Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were possessed in any number by the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans. For these were the last navies worth mentioning established in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes:

as the Aeginetans and Athenians, and whoever else had any, possessed but small ones, and of those the greater part fifty-oared vessels; and it was only lately that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when at war with the aeginetans, and when the barbarian was also expected, to build those very ships with which they fought him by sea; and these were not yet decked throughout.

Of such a [deficient] character then were the navies of the Greeks, both the ancient ones and those which were built afterwards. And yet those who paid attention to them obtained the greatest power, both by income of money and dominion over others: for they sailed against the islands, and subdued them; especially those who had not sufficient extent of country.

But as for war by land, from which any power was acquired, there was none. Such as did arise, were all against their several neighbours; and the Greeks did not go out in any foreign expeditions far from their country for the subjugation of others. For they had not ranged themselves with the chief states as subjects; nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord, on fair and equal terms, make common expeditions; but it was rather neighbouring states that separately waged war upon each other.

But it was for the war carried on at an early period between the Chalcidians and Eretrians, that the rest of Greece also was most generally divided in alliance with one side or the other.

Now to others there arose in other ways obstacles to their increase; and in the case of the Ionians, when their power had advanced to a high pitch, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, having subdued Croesus and all within the Halys to the sea, marched against them, and reduced to bondage their cities on the mainland, as Darius afterwards did even the islands, conquering them by means of the fleet of the Phoenicians.

As for the tyrants, such as there were in the Grecian cities, since they provided only for what concerned themselves, with a view to the safety of their own persons, and the aggrandizement of their own family, they governed their cities with caution, as far as they possibly could; and nothing memorable was achieved by them; [indeed nothing,] except it might be against their own several border states. [I speak of those in old Greece,] for those in Sicily advanced to a very great degree of power. Thus on all sides Greece for a long time was kept in check; so that it both performed nothing illustrious in common, and was less daring as regards individual states.

But after the tyrants of the Athenians and those in the rest of Greece, (which even at an earlier period was for a long time subject to tyrants,) the most and last, excepting those in Sicily, had been deposed by the Lacedaemonians; (for Lacedaemon, after the settlement of the Dorians who now inhabit it, though torn by factions for the longest time of any country that we are acquainted with, yet from the earliest period enjoyed good laws, and was always free from tyrants; for it is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end of this war, that the Lacedaemonians have been in possession of the same form of government; and being for this reason powerful, they settled matters in the other states also;) after,

I say, the deposition of the tyrants in the rest of Greece, not many years subsequently the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and Athenians.

And in the tenth year after it, the barbarians came again with the great armament against Greece to enslave it. And when great danger was impending, the Lacedaemonians took the lead of the confederate Greeks, as being the most powerful; and the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, determined to leave their city, and having broken up their establishments, went on board their slips, and became a naval people. And having together repulsed the barbarian, no long time after, both those Greeks who had revolted from the king, and those who had joined in the war [against him], were divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. For these states respectively appeared the most powerful; for the one was strong by land, and the other by sea.

And for a short time the confederacy held together; but afterwards the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, having quarrelled, waged war against each other with their allies: and of the rest of the Greeks, whoever in any quarter were at variance, now betook themselves to these. So that, from the Persian war all the time to this, making peace at one time, and at another war, either with each other or with their own revolting allies, they prepared themselves well in military matters, and became more experienced from going through their training in scenes of danger.

Now the Lacedaemonians did not treat as tributaries the allies whom they led, but only took care that they should be governed by an oligarchy, in accordance with their own interest; whereas the Athenians had in course of time taken ships from the states [in their league,] except the Chians and Lesbians, and had commanded all to pay a tribute in money. And their own separate resources for this war were greater than when before they had been in their fullest bloom with their entire alliance.

Such then I found to be the early state of things, though it is difficult to trust every proof of it in succession. For men receive alike without examination from each other the reports of past events, even though they may have happened in their own country.

For instance, the mass of the Athenians think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton; and do not know that Hippias held the government as being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, and Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. But Harmodius and Aristogiton having suspected that on that day, and at the very moment, some information had been given to Hippias by their accomplices, abstained from attacking him, as being fore-warned; but as they wished before they were seized to do something even at all hazards, having fallen in with Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it is called, while arranging the Panathenaic procession, they slew him.

And there are many other things also, even at the present day, and not such as are thrown into oblivion by time, of which the rest of the Greeks too have not correct notions; as, that the kings of the Lacedaemonians do not vote with one vote each, but with two; and that they have a Pitanensian Lochus; which never yet existed. With so little pains is the investigation of truth pursued by most men; and they rather turn to views already formed.

If, however, from the proofs which have been mentioned any one should suppose that things were, on the whole, such as I have described them; instead of rather believing what either poets have sung of them, setting them off in terms of exaggeration, or historians have composed, in language more attractive to the ear than truthful, their subjects admitting of no proof, and most of them, through length of time, having come to be regarded as fabulous—and if he should consider that, allowing for their antiquity, they have been sufficiently ascertained from the most certain data; he would not be mistaken in his opinion.

And though men always think the war of their own times to be the greatest while they are engaged in it, but when they have ceased from it, regard earlier events with more admiration; yet, to such as look at it from the facts themselves, this war will evidently appear to be greater than those.

And as for what they severally advanced in speaking, either when about to go to war, or when already in it, it was hard to remember the exact words of what was said; both for myself, with regard to what I heard in person, and for those who reported it to me from any other quarters: but as I thought that they would severally have spoken most to the purpose on the subjects from time to time before them, while I adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was really said so have I recorded it.

But with regard to the facts of what was done in the war, I did not presume to state them on hearsay from any chance informant, nor as I thought probable myself; but those at which I was personally present, and, when informed by others, only after investigating them accurately in every particular, as far as was possible.

And it was with labour that they were ascertained; because those who were present in the several affairs did not give the same account of the same things, but as each was well inclined to either party, or remembered [the circumstances.] Now, for hearing it recited, perhaps the unfabulous character of my work will appear less agreeable:

but as many as shall wish to see the truth of what both has happened, and will hereafter happen again, according to human nature—the same or pretty nearly so—for such to think it useful will be sufficient. And it is composed as a possession for ever, rather than as a prizetask to listen to at the present moment.

Now of former achievements, the greatest that was performed was the Median; and yet that had its decision quickly, in two battles by sea and two by land. But of this war both the duration was very long, and sufferings befell Greece in the course of it, such as were never matched in the same time.

For neither were so many cities ever taken and laid desolate, some by barbarians, and some by the parties themselves opposed in the war;

(some, too, changed their inhabitants when taken;) nor was there so much banishing of men and bloodshed, partly in the war itself, and partly through sedition.

And things which before were spoken of from hearsay, but scantily confirmed by fact, were rendered not incredible; both about earthquakes, which at once extended over the greatest part of the world, and most violent at the same time; and eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than was on record of former times; and great droughts in some parts, and from them famines also; and what hurt them most, and destroyed a considerable part—the plague. For all these things fell upon them at once along with this war:

which the Athenians and Peloponnesians began by breaking the thirty years' truce after the taking of Euboea.

As for the reason why they broke it, I have first narrated their grounds of complaint and their differences, that no one might ever have to inquire from what origin so great a war broke out amongst the Greeks. For the truest reason, though least brought forward in words, I consider to have been, that the Athenians, by becoming great, and causing alarm to the Lacedaemonians, compelled them to proceed to hostilities.

But the following were the grounds of complaints openly alleged on either side, from which they broke the truce, and set to the war.

Epidamnuis is a, city situated on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian Gulf; bordering upon it, are the Taulantii, a barbarian people of Illyria.

It was planted by the Corcyraeans, but the leader of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules who, according to the ancient custom, was invited for this object from the mother city.

There were also some of the Corinthians, and of the rest of the Doric nation, who joined in the colony.

In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but having for many years together, as is reported, been torn by factions arising from a war made upon them by the neighboring barbarians, they were brought low, and deprived of the greatest part of their power.

But the last thing which had taken place before this war was, that the commons had driven out the nobles, who, having retired, were plundering those in the city both by land and sea, in conjunction with the barbarians.

The Epidamnians that were in the town, being hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, praying the Corcyraens not to stand by and see them perish, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to put an end to the barbarian war.

And this they entreated in the character of suppliants, sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyraeans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

So the Epidamnians, finding that there was no relief for them from the Corcyraeans, were at a loss how to settle the present affair; and sending to Delphi, inquired of the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians, as their founders, and try to obtain some aid from them. He answered, that they should deliver it to them, and make them their leaders.

So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle, gave up their city, declaring how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them; and entreated that they would not stand by and see them destroyed, but help them.

And the Corinthians undertook their defence, both on the ground of equity, (as thinking the colony no less their own than the Corcyraeans',) and also for hatred of the Corcyraeans; because, although they were their colony, they slighted them.

For they neither gave to them the customary privileges in their general religious assemblies, nor to any individual Corinthian, when performing the initiatory rites of sacrifice, as their other colonies did; but despised them, as they were both equal in wealth to the very richest of the Greeks at that time, and more powerful in resources for war, and sometimes prided themselves on being even very far superior in their fleet; and on the ground of the Phaeacians, who were famous in naval matters, having before lived in Corcyra. And on this account too they prepared their navy with the greater spirit, and were not deficient in power; for they had 120 triremes when they began the war.

The Corinthians therefore, having complaints against them for all these things, gladly proceeded to send the aid to Epidamnus, not only telling whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sending a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and their own citizens;

which succours marched by land to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, for fear of the Corcyraeans, lest they should be hindered by them in their passage by sea.

The Corcyraeans, on finding that the settlers and the garrison were come to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered up to the Corinthians, were very angry; and sailing immediately thither with twenty-five ships, and afterwards with another fleet, commanded them, by way of insult, both to recall those whom they had banished, (for the exiles of the Epidamnians had come to Corcyra, pointing out the sepulchres of their ancestors and their kindred to them, on the plea of which they begged that they would restore them,) and to dismiss the garrison sent thither by the Corinthians and the settlers.

But the Epidamnians gave no ear to them. Whereupon the Corcyraeans went against them with forty ships, together with the banished men, with a view to restore them;

taking with them the Illyrians also. And sitting down before the city, they made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when they did not obey them, the Corcyraeans proceeded (the place being an isthmus) to besiege the city.

Now the Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus of its being besieged, immediately began to prepare an army; and at the same time proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, and that any one who would might go on a fair and equal footing; and that if any one should not be willing to join the expedition immediately, but still wished to have a share in the colony, he might stay behind on depositing fifty Corinthian drachmas. And there were many both that went, and that paid down the money.

Moreover, they begged the Megareans to convoy them with some ships, in case they might be stopped in their passage by the Corcyraeans; and they prepared to sail with them with eight, and the citizens of Pale, in Cephalonia, with four. They also begged the Epidaurians, who furnished five, the citizens of Hermione one, the Traezenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. The Thebans and Phliasians they asked for money; and the Eleans both for money and empty ships: while of the Corinthians themselves there were getting ready thirty ships, and three thousand heavy-armed.

Now when the Corcyraeans heard of this preparation, they went to Corinth in company with some Lacedaemonian and Sicyonian ambassadors, whom they took with them, and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and settlers that were in Epidamnus, as they had nothing to do with the place.

But if they laid any claim to it, they were willing to submit to trial in the Peloponnesus before such cities as they should both agree on; and to which ever of the two parties it should be decided that the colony belonged, they should retain it. They were willing also to refer their cause to the oracle of Delphi.

But they told them not to proceed to war; else they would themselves also, they said, be forced by their violence to make very different friends from those they already had, for the sake of gaining assistance.

The Corinthians answered them, that if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would consult on the matter; but till that was done, it was not right that the Epidamnians should be besieged, while they were appealing to justice.

The Corcyraeans replied, that if the Corinthians too would withdraw the men they had in Epidamnus, they would do so; or they were also content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to make a treaty till the cause should be decided.

The Corinthians did not listen to any of these proposals; but when their ships were manned, and their confederates had come, having first sent a herald to declare war upon the Corcyraeans, they weighed anchor with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy-armed, and set sail for Epidamnus to wage war against the Corcyraeans.

Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

After they were come to Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the temple of Apollo, at the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyraeans sent forward a herald to them to forbid their sailing against them; and at the same time were manning their ships, having both undergirded the old ones, so as to make them sea-worthy, and equipped the rest.

When the herald brought back from the Corinthians no peaceable answer, and their ships were manned, to the number of eighty sail, (for forty were besieging Epidamnus,) they put out against them, and formed their line, and engaged them:

and the Corcyraeans won a decided victory, and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. It happened likewise the same day, that those too who were besieging Epidamnus reduced it to surrender, on condition that they should sell the strangers, and keep the Corinthians in bonds, till something else should be determined.

After the battle, the Corcyraeans having set up a trophy on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew the other prisoners they had taken, but kept the Corinthians in bonds.

Subsequently, when the Corinthians and their allies, after being vanquished at sea, were gone home, the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea in those parts, and sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and wasted part of the territory; and burnt Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished both money and shipping to the Corinthians.

And most of the time after the battle they were masters of the sea, and continued sailing against and ravaging the allies of the Corinthians; until, on the return of summer, the Corinthians sent ships and an army, in consequence of the distress of their allies, and formed an encampment on Actium, and about Chimerium in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and such other states as were friendly to them.

The Corcyraeans also formed an encampment in opposition to them, on Leucimna, both for their ships and land-forces. And neither party sailed against the other; but remaining in opposite stations this summer, at the approach of winter they then each retired homeward.

Now the whole of the year after the sea-fight, and the succeeding one, the Corinthians, being indignant about the war with the Corcyraeans, were building ships, and preparing with all their might a naval armament, drawing together rowers both from the Peloponnese itself and the rest of Greece, by the inducement of the pay they gave.

And the Corcyraeans, on hearing of their preparations, were alarmed; and being in alliance with none of the Greeks, and not having enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, they determined to go to the Athenians, and make alliance with them, and endeavour to obtain some assistance from them.

And the Corinthians, on hearing this, went themselves also to Athens on an embassy, to prevent the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyraeans being an impediment to their concluding the war as they wished.

And an assembly having been convened, they came to controversy; and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:-

"It is but just, Athenians, that those who without any previous obligation, either of great benefit or alliance, come to their neighbours, as we now do, to beg their assistance, should convince them in the first place, if possible, that they ask what is even expedient but if not that, at any rate what is not injurious; and in the second place, that they will also retain a lasting sense of the favour: and if they establish none of these points clearly, they should not be angry if they do not succeed.

Bat the Corcyraeans have sent us with a conviction that, together with their request for alliance, they will show that these points may be relied on by you.

Now the same policy has happened to prove inconsistent in your eyes, with regard to our request, and inexpedient, with regard to our own interest at the present time.

For having never yet in time past voluntarily become the allies of any party, we are now come to beg this of others; and at the same time we have, owing to it, been left destitute with regard to the present war with the Corinthians; and what before seemed our prudence, viz. not to join in the peril of our neighbour's views by being in alliance with others, has turned out now to be evident folly and weakness.

In the late sea-fight, indeed, by ourselves and single-handed we repulsed the Corinthians. But since they have set out against us with a larger force from the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we see ourselves unable to escape by our own power alone; and at the same time our peril is great, if we are subjugated by them; we must beg assistance both from you and every one else: and it is pardonable, if we venture on a course contrary to our former non-interference, [which was practised,] not from any evil intention, but rather from an error of judgment.

"Now if you are persuaded by us, the occurrence of our request will be honourable to you in many respects: first, because you will be granting the assistance to men who are injured, and not injuring others: in the next place, by receiving men who have their highest interests at stake, you would bestow the obligation with testimony [to the fact]

that would, as far as possible, be always remembered;

and, [lastly,] we are in possession of a navy the largest except yours. And consider what good fortune is more rare, or what more annoying to the enemy, than if that power, the addition of which to yours you would have valued above much money and favour, come of its own accord, offering itself without dangers and expense; and moreover affording, in the eyes of the world at large, a character for goodness, and to those whom you will assist, obligation; and to yourselves, strength; all of which advantages together have fallen to the lot of few indeed in the whole course of time: and few are there who, when begging alliance, go conferring safety and honour on the men whose aid they invoke, no less than to receive them.

And as for the war in which we should be useful, if any of you do not think that it will arise, he is deceived in his opinion; and does not observe that the Lacedaemonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war and that the Corinthians have power with them, and are hostile to you, and are now first subduing us with a view to attacking you, that we may not stand with each other in common hostility to them; and that they may not fail to gain one of two advantages, either to injure us, or to strengthen themselves.

But it is our business, on the contrary, to be beforehand with them, by our offering and your accepting the alliance; and to plot against them first, rather than to meet their plots against us.

"But should they say that it is not just for you to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony, if well treated, honours its mother-country; but if wronged, is estranged from it; for they are not sent out to be slaves, but to be on the same footing with those who are left at home.

And that they wronged us, is evident; for when challenged to a judicial decision respecting Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute the charges by war rather than by equity.

And let what they are doing to us, their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you may both avoid being seduced by them, through any false pretence; and may refuse to assist them, if they ask you in a straightforward manner: for he who incurs the fewest regrets from gratifying his enemies would continue in the greatest safety.

"But neither will you break the treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party.

For it is mentioned in it, that whichever of the Grecian states is in alliance with no other, it has permission to go to whichever side it may please.

And it is hard if these shall be allowed to man their ships both from the confederates, and moreover from the rest of Greece also, and especially from your subjects, while they will exclude us both from our proposed alliance, and from assistance from any other quarter; and then consider it an injustice if you are persuaded to what we request. But much greater fault shall we find with you, if we do not persuade you.

For us who are in peril, and not actuated by any hostile feeling, you will reject; while these men who are thus actuated, and have made the attack, you will be so far from restraining, that you will even overlook their gaining additional power from your dominions; which you should not do; but should either stop their mercenaries drawn from your country, or send succour to us also, in what ever way you may be persuaded; but it were best of all to receive us openly, and assist us.

And many, as we hinted at the beginning, are the advantages we hold forth to you; bat the greatest of them is, that we both have the same enemies,

(which is the surest bond,) and those not weak, but able to harm such as have stood aloof from them. And as it is a naval, and not a land alliance that is offered you, the loss of it is not the same; but it were best, if possible, to allow no one else to possess ships; but if not, whoever is strongest in them, to have him for your friend.

And whoever thinks that these things which we have urged are indeed expedient, but is afraid that through being persuaded by them he would break the treaty; let him know that his fear, being attended by strength, will cause greater alarm to his enemies; but that his confidence in not having received us, being powerless will be less formidable to his foes who are strong; and also, that it is not about Corcyra more than about Athens too that he is deliberating; and that he is not providing the best for her, when for the war that is coming, and all but here, he hesitates, from present considerations, to receive a country which is made either a friend or a foe, with the greatest opportunities [for good or evil].

For it lies well for the voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily, so as both to prevent a navy from coming thence to the Peloponnesians, and to help on its way a fleet from these parts to those;

and in other respects it is most advantageous. But the shortest summary, both for general and particular statements, from which you may learn not to give us up, is the following: There being but three navies worth mentioning amongst the Greeks, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians. if you allow two of these to come together, and the Corinthians bring us under their power first, you will have to fight at sea with both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians; but if you receive us you will be able to contend against them with the greater number of ships on your side.

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans; and the Corinthians after them as follows.

"Since these Corcyraeans have made their harangue, not only about receiving them. but also to show that we are acting unjustly, and they are unfairly attacked; it is necessary that we too should first touch on both these points, and so proceed to the rest of our speech; that you may know more certainly beforehand the grounds of our request, and may with good reason reject their petition. Now they say that it was from regard to prudence that hitherto they accepted the alliance of no party:

whereas they adopted this practice for villany, and not for virtue; but from wishing to have no ally or witness in their unjust deeds, nor to be put to the blush by calling him to their aid.

And their city also, lying in a self-sufficient position, makes them judges of the injuries they inflict on any one, rather than that there should be judges appointed by agreement; because, while they very seldom sail from home to their neighbours, they very frequently receive others, who of necessity touch there. And herein consists the specious shunning of confederacies, which they have put forward;

not that they may avoid committing injustice with other, but that they may commit them by themselves; and that wherever they have the power, they may act with violence; and where they escape observation, they may take unfair advantage; and if in any case they have seized on something, they may not be put to the blush.

And yet, if they were, as they say, honest men, the more impregnable they were to their neighbours, the more manifestly might they have shown their virtue, by giving and taking what was just.

"But neither to others nor to us are they of such a character; but although our colonists, they have all along revolted from us, and are now making war upon us; saying that they were not sent out to be ill-treated.

But we say that neither did we settle them there to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders, and to be properly respected by them.

Our other colonies, at least, honour us, and we are very much beloved by our colonists;

and it is evident, that if we are pleasing to the greater part, we should not, on a right view of the case, be displeasing to these alone; nor do we attack them unbecomingly, without being also signally injured by them.

Even if we were in the wrong, it had been honourable for them to have yielded to our humour; but disgraceful for us to have done violence to their moderation: but through pride, and power of wealth, they have both acted wrongly towards us in many other things, and with regard to Epidamnus, which belonged to us, when it was ill-treated they did not claim it; but when we went to its assistance, they took it by force, and keep it.

"And they say, forsooth, that they were before willing to have it judicially decided: but with regard to this, it is not the man who proposes it with superiority, and in safety, that should be considered to say any thing; but that man, who puts alike his actions and words on the same footing, before he enters on the struggle.

But as for these men, it was not before they besieged the place, but when they thought that we should not put up with it, that they also advanced the specious plea of a judicial decision. And they are come hither, not only having themselves done wrong there, but now requesting you also to join them, not in alliance, but in injury; and to receive them, when they are at variance with us. But then ought they to have applied to you, when they were most secure;

and not at a time when we have been injured, and they are in peril; nor at a time when you, though you did not share their power then, will now give them a share of your aid; and though you stood aloof from their misdeeds, will incur equal blame from us; but they ought long ago to have communicated their power to you, and so to have the results also in common. [As, however, you have had no share only in the accusations brought against them, so you should not participate in the consequences of their actions.]

"That we ourselves, then, come with accusations on proper grounds, and that these are violent and rapacious, has been proved: and that you could not with justice receive them, you must now learn.

For if it is said in the treaty, that any of the states not registered in it may go to whichever side it please, the agreement was not meant for those who go to the detriment of others; but to any one who, without withdrawing himself from another, is in need of protection; and who will not cause war instead of peace to those who receive him, ([as they will not do

] if they are wise;) which would now be your case, if not persuaded by us.

For you would not only become auxiliaries to these, but also enemies to us, instead of being connected by treaty; for if you come with them, we must defend ourselves against them without excepting you.

And yet you ought, if possible, to stand aloof from both parties; or if not that, on the contrary, to go with us against them; (with the Corinthians, at any rate, you are connected by treaty; while with the Corcyraeans you were never yet so much as in truce;) and not to establish the law, that we should receive those who are revolting from others.

For neither did we, when the Samnians had revolted, give our vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided in their votes, as to whether they should assist them; but we openly maintained the contrary, that each one should punish his own allies.

For if you receive and assist those who are doing wrong, there will be found no fewer of your allies also who will come over to us; and you will make the law against yourselves, rather than against us.

"These, then, are the pleas of right which we have to urge to you, sufficiently strong according to the laws of the Greeks; and we have the following advice, and claim on you for favour, which, being not enemies so as to hurt you, nor, on the other hand, suck friends as to be very intimate with you, we say ought to be repaid to us at the present time.

For once, when you were in want of long ships for the war with the aeginetans, before that with the Medes, you received from the Corinthians twenty ships. And this service, and that with regard to the Samians, namely, that it was through us that the Peloponnesians did not assist them, gave you the mastery of the aeginetans, and the chastisement of the Samians: and it took place in those critical times in which men, when proceeding against their enemies, are most regardless of every thing besides victory.

For they esteem him a friend who assists them, even though he may before have been an enemy; and him a foe who opposes them, though he may have happened to be a friend; nay they even mismanage their own affairs for the sake of their animosity at the moment.

"Thinking then of these things, and each younger man having learned them from some one older, let him resolve to requite us with the like, and not deem that these things are justly urged, but that others are expedient in case of his going to war.

For expediency most attends that line of conduct in which one does least wrong. And as for the coming of the war, frightening you with which the Corcyrraeans bid you commit injustice, it lies as yet in uncertainty; and it is not worth while, through being excited by it, to incur a certain enmity with the Corinthians, immediate, and not coming; but rather it were prudent to remove somewhat of our before existing suspicion on account of the Megareans.

For the latest obligation, when well timed, even though it may be comparatively small, has power to wipe out a greater subject of complaint.

And be not induced by the fact that it is a great naval alliance that they offer you. For not to injure your equals is a power more to be relied on, than, through being buoyed up by momentary appearances, to gain an unfair advantage by a perilous course.

We then, having fallen under the rule which we propounded ourselves at Lacedaemon, that every one should punish his own allies, now claim to receive the same from you; and not that you, after being benefited by our vote, should harm us by yours. Make us then a fair return;

knowing that this is that very crisis, in which he that helps is most a friend, and he that opposes, a foe.

And for these Corcyraeans, neither receive them as allies in spite of us, nor help them in doing wrong.

By thus acting, you will both do what becomes you, and advise the best for yourselves.

To this effect then did the Corinthians also speak.

Now the Athenians, after hearing both sides, when an assembly had been even twice held, in the former rather admitted the arguments of the Corinthians; but in the one held the next day they changed their minds, and determined, not indeed to make an alliance with the Corcyraeans, so as to have the same enemies and friends, (for if the Corcyraeans had desired them to sail against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken by them;) but they made a defensive alliance, to succour each other's country, should any one go against Corcyra, or Athens, or their allies. For they thought that, even as it was, they should have the war with the Peloponnesians;

and they wished not to give up Corcyra to the Corinthians, with so large a navy as it had, but to wear them out as much as possible against each other, that both the Corinthians and the rest who had navies might be in a weaker condition when they went to war with them, if it should be necessary to do so.

And at the same time the island appeared to them to lie well in the line of voyage along shore to Italy and Sicily.

With such a view of the case the Athenians admitted the Corcyraeans into alliance; and when the Corinthians had departed, they sent ten ships to assist them.

Tile commanders of them were Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epiclees.

They charged them not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyra, and threaten to land, or against any of the places belonging to them; but in that case to prevent them to their utmost: and this charge they gave them with a view to not breaking the treaty. So the ships arrive at Corcyra.

But the Corinthians, when they had made their preparations, set sail against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. There were ten of the Eleans, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots seven and twenty, of the Anactorians one, and of the Corinthians themselves ninety.

In command of these there were different men for the different forces according to their states, and of the Corinthians, Xenoclides, the son of Euthycles, with four others.

And when, in their course from Leucas, they made land on the continent opposite Corcyra, they came to anchor at Chimerium in the territory of Thesprotis.

It is a harbour, and a city named Ephyre lies beyond it, away from the sea, in the Elean district of Thesprotis. By it the Acherusian lake empties itself into the sea; and into this lake the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis, empties itself; from which also it takes its name. The river Thyamis also flows there, bounding Thesprotis and Cestrine; and between these rivers the promontory of Chimerium rises.

The Corinthians then came to anchor at that part of the continent, and formed their encampment.

But the Corcyraeans, when they perceived them sailing up, manned a hundred and ten ships, which were commanded by Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybates; and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota; and the ten Athenian ships were with them.

And on the promontory of Leucimna was their land force, and a thousand heavy-armed of the Zacynthians, who had come to their assistance.

The Corinthians also had on the mainland many of the barbarians, who had joined them to give assistance; for the people in that part of the continent have always been friendly with them.

When the preparations of the Corinthians were made, taking three days' provision, they put out from Chimerium by night, with the purpose of engaging;

and in the morning, while on their course, they observed the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea, and sailing against them.

And when they saw each other, they drew up in opposite lines of battle. On the right wing of the Corcyraeans were the Athenian ships, but the rest of the line they themselves occupied, having formed three squadrons of their ships, which were commanded each by one of the three generals.

In this way did the Corcyraeans form their line. On the side of the Corinthians, the Megarean and Ambraciot ships occupied the right wing; in the centre were the rest of the allies severally; while the left wing was occupied by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right of the Corcyraeans.

As soon as the signals on each side were raised, they closed, and fought; both sides having many heavy-armed on the decks, and many bowmen and dartmen; as they were still rudely equipped in the old fashion.

And the battle was well contested; not so much in point of skill, but more like a land fight.

For whenever they happened to run on board one another, they did not easily get clear again, owing to the numbers and confusion of the ships; and because they trusted for victory, in a greater measure, to the heavy-armed on deck, who set to and fought, while the ships remained stationary. There was no breaking through the line, but they fought with fierceness and strength, more than with science.

On all sides then there was much confusion, and the battle was a disorderly one; and during it the Athenian vessels coming up to the Corcyraeans, if they were pressed at any point, struck fear into the enemy, but did not begin fighting, as the commanders were afraid of the charge given by the Athenians.

It was the right wing of the Corinthians which was most distressed; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships having routed and pursued them in a scattered condition to the continent, sailed up to their encampment, and having made a descent upon them, burnt the deserted tents, and plundered their goods.

On that side then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans were victorious: but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they had a decided victory; as twenty ships of the Corcyraeans, from a number [originally] smaller, had not returned from the pursuit.

But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, assisted them now more unequivocally; though at first they refrained from charging any vessel; but when the rout had clearly taken place, and the Corinthians were lying close on them, then indeed every one at length set to work, and there was no longer any distinction, but it had come to such urgent necessity, that the Corinthians and Athenians attacked each other.

Now when the rout had taken place, the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the vessels which they might happen to have sunk, but turned their attention to the men, sailing throughout to butcher, rather than to make prisoners; and some of their own friends, not being aware that those in the right wing had been worsted, they unwittingly killed.

For as both fleets were numerous, and extended over a wide space of the sea; when they closed with each other, they did not easily distinguish, who were conquering, or being conquered; for this engagement, for one of Greeks against Greeks, was greater in the number of vessels than any of those before it.

After the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned their attention to the wrecks, and their own dead, and got possession of most of them, so as to take them to Sybota, where their land force composed of the barbarians had come to their assistance. Now Sybota is a desert port of Thesprotis.

Having done this, they mustered again, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who with their seaworthy ships, and such as were left, in conjunction with those of the Athenians, on their side also sailed out to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land on their territory.

It was now late, and the Paean had been sung by them for the advance, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row sternwards, on observing twenty ships of the Athenians sailing up; which the Athenians had sent after the ten to help them fearing, (as was the case,) that the Corcyraeans might be conquered, and their own ten ships be too few to aid them.

These, then, the Corinthians having first seen, and suspecting that they were from Athens, [and were] not merely as many as they saw, but more, began to retreat.

But by the Corcyraeans they were not seen, (for they were advancing more out of their view,) and they wondered at the Corinthians rowing astern, till some saw them and said,

There are slips yonder sailing towards us.

Then they also withdrew;

for it was now growing dark, and the Corinthians by turning back had occasioned the suspension of hostilities.

In this way they parted from each other, and the battle ceased at night. And when the Corcyraeans were encamped on Leucimna, these twenty ships from Athens, which were commanded by Glauco, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogoras, coming on through the dead bodies and the wrecks, sailed up to the camp not long after they had been descried.

Now the Corcyraeans (it being night) were afraid they might be enemies; but afterwards they recognised them, and they came to anchor.

The next day the thirty Athenian ships, and as many of the Corcyraean as were sea-worthy, put out and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, in which the Corinthians were anchored, wishing to know whether they would engage.

But they, having put out with their ships from the land, and formed them in line at sea, remained quiet; not intending voluntarily to begin a battle, since they saw that fresh ships from Athens had joined them; and that they themselves were involved in many difficulties, with regard to the safe keeping of the prisoners they had on board, and because there were no means of refitting their ships in so deserted a place.

Nay, they were thinking of their voyage home, how they should return; being afraid that the Athenians might consider the treaty to have been broken, because they had come to blows, and not allow them to sail away.

They determined therefore to put some men on board a skiff and send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, and make an experiment.

And having sent them, they spoke as follows:

You do wrong, Athenians, in beginning war, and breaking treaty: for while we are avenging ourselves on our enemies, you stand in our way, and raise arms against us. Now if your purpose is to stop our sailing to Corcyra, or wherever else we wish, and if you mean to break the treaty, then seize us here in the first place, and treat us as enemies.

They spoke to this effect, and all the army of the Corcyraeans that heard them immediately cried out,

Seize them and put them to death!

But the Athenians answered as follows:

We are neither commencing war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty; but we have come to assist the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If therefore you wish to sail any where else, we do not stop you; but if you sail against Corcyra, or to any of the places belonging to them, we shall, to the best of our power, not permit it.

The Athenians having made this reply, the Corinthians began to prepare for their voyage homewards, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent: while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which had been carried to them by the current and the wind, which had risen in the night, and scattered them in all directions; and erected a counter-trophy at Sybota on the island, considering that they had been victorious.

It was on the following view of the case that each side claimed the victory.—The Corinthians erected a trophy, as having had the advantage in the battle until night, so that they got possession of most wrecks and dead bodies; as having no less than a thousand prisoners; and as having sunk more than seventy ships. The Corcyraeans erected a trophy for these reasons;—because they had destroyed about thirty ships; and after the Athenians were come, had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; and because the Corinthians the day before had rowed sternwards and retreated from them, on seeing the Athenian ships; and after they were come, did not sail out from Sybota to oppose them. Thus each side claimed to be victorious.

As the Corinthians were sailing away homeward, they took by treachery Anactorium, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was possessed in common by the Corcyraeans and them; and after establishing in it a Corinthian population [only], they retired homewards; and of the Corcyraeans, eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody, and treated with great attention, that on their return they might win over Corcyra to them. For most of them happened to be the first men of the city in power.

Corcyra then in this way outlived the war with the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians returned from it. This was the first ground the Corinthians had for their war against the Athenians, namely, that in time of peace they had fought with them by sea in conjunction with the Corcyraeans.

Immediately after this the following disagreements arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, to lead them to war.

While the Corinthians were contriving how to avenge themselves on them, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, ordered the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene, being colonists of the Corinthians, but their own subjects and tributaries, to throw down the wall towards Pallene, and give hostages; and to dismiss, and not receive in future, the magistrates whom the Corinthians used to send every year; being afraid that they might revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and lead the rest of their allies Thrace-ward to revolt with them.

These precautionary measures with regard to the Potidaeans the Athenians began to adopt immediately after the sea-fight at Corcyra.

For the Corinthians were now openly at variance with then; and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had been made their enemy, though he was before an ally and a friend.

He became such, because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, when acting together against him.

And being alarmed, he both sent to Lacedaemon, and tried to contrive that they might be involved in war with the Peloponnesians, and endeavoured to win over the Corinthians, with a view to Potidaea's revolting;

and made proposals also to the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had in alliance with him these places on his borders, he should more easily carry on the war in conjunction with them.

The Athenians perceiving these things, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, as they happened to be sending out thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed against his country, with Archestratus, the son of Lycomedes, as general with ten others, gave orders to the commanders of the fleet to take hostages of the Potidaeans, and throw down the wall, and keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities, to prevent their revolting.

Now the Potidaeans sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to try if by any means they might persuade them to adopt no new measures against them; and went also to Lacedaemon in company with the Corinthians, to provide themselves with assistance, should it be necessary; and when, after long negotiating, they obtained no favourable answer from the Athenians, but the ships commissioned against Macedonia were sailing just as much against them and when the authorities at Lacedaemon promised them, that should the Athenians go against Potidaea, they would make an incursion into Attica; then indeed, at that favourable moment, they revolted with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having entered into a league together.

And Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and throw down their cities on the sea, and remove inland to Olynthus, and make that one city a place of strength for themselves. And to those who abandoned them he gave a part of his own territory in Mygdonia, round lake Bolbe, to enjoy as long as the war with the Athenians lasted. And so, throwing down their cities, they removed inland, and prepared for war.

The thirty ships of the Athenians arrived at the Thraceward towns, and found Potidaea and the rest in revolt:

and the generals thinking it impossible with their present force to carry on war both with Philip and the revolted towns, turned their attention to Macedonia, the object for which they were first sent out; and having established themselves there, carried on the war in conjunction with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country with an army from the interior.

And at this time, when Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were cruising about Macedonia, the Corinthians, being alarmed for the place, and considering the danger to affect themselves, sent volunteers of their own people and mercenaries of the rest of the Peloponnesians, sixteen hundred heavy-armed in all and four hundred light-armed.

Their general was Aristeus, the son of Adimantus; and it was from friendship for him especially that most of the soldiers from Corinth joined the expedition as volunteers; for he was always favourably disposed towards the Potidaeans.

And they arrived in Thrace the fortieth day after Potidaea had revolted.

To the Athenians too came immediately the tidings of the cities having revolted; and when they found that the forces with Aristeus had gone there besides, they sent two thousand heavy-armed of their own men and forty slips to the revolted towns, with Callias, the son of Calliades, as general with four others;

who, on arriving in Macedonia first, found that the former thousand had just taken Therme, and were besieging Pydna.

So they also sat down before Pydna, and besieged it; but afterwards, having made terms and a compulsory alliance with Perdiccas, as they were hurried on by Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus there, they withdrew from Macedonia;

and having gone to Beroea, and thence turned again [to the coast], (after first attempting the place without taking it,) they continued their march by land to Potidaea, with three thousand heavy-armed of their own, and many of the allies besides, and six hundred horse of the Macedonians with Philip and Pausanias. At the same time seventy ships were sailing in a line with them.

And advancing by short marches, they arrived at Gigonus, and pitched their camp.

Now the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, in expectation of the Athenians, were encamped towards Olynthus, on the isthmus, and had established their market outside the city.

As general of all the infantry the allies had chosen Aristeus; of the cavalry, Perdiccas; for he had broken terms again immediately with the Athenians, and was in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus to represent him as commander.

The plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and watch the Athenians, in case of their coming against them; while the Chalcidians, and the allies beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry with Perdiccas, should remain at Olynthus; and when the Athenians advanced against his force, they should come up in their rear to assist him, and enclose the enemy between them.

But on the other hand, Callias, the general of the Athenians and his fellow-commanders, despatch the cavalry of the Macedonians and a few of the allies towards Olynthus, to prevent the troops there from giving any assistance; while they themselves broke up their camp, and proceeded to Potidaea.

And when they were at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they also took an opposite position; and not long after they began the engagement.

And just the wing of Aristeus, and such picked troops of the Corinthians and the rest as were around him, routed the wing opposed to them, and advanced in pursuit a considerable distance; but the remaining force of the Potidaeans and Peloponnesians was beaten by the Athenians, and fled within the wall for refuge.

When Aristeus was returning from the pursuit, seeing the rest of the army conquered, he was at a loss which place he should risk going to, whether towards Olynthus, or to Potidaea. He determined, however, to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and at a running pace force his way into Potidaea: and he passed along the breakwater through the sea, annoyed by missiles [from the Athenian slips], and with difficulty; having lost a few men, but saved the rest.

Now the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans from Olynthus, (the town is about sixty stades off, and within sight,) when the battle was beginning, and the signals had been hoisted, advanced a short distance to give succour, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them to prevent it; but when the victory soon declared for the Athenians, and the signals had been taken down, they retired again within the wall, and the Macedonians to the Athenians. So neither side had any cavalry present [in the engagement].

After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidaeans under truce. There were killed of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, and Callias their general.

Now against the wall on the side of the isthmus the Athenians immediately raised works, and manned them. But that towards Pallene had no works raised against it; for they did not think themselves strong enough both to keep a garrison on the isthmus, and to cross over to Pallene and raise works there; fearing that the Potidaeans and their allies might attack them when divided.

And the Athenians in the city, hearing that Pallene had no works on it, some time after send sixteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and Phormio, the son of Asopius, as general; who reached Pallene, and setting out from Aphytis, led his army to Potidaea, advancing by short marches, and ravaging the country at the same time: and when no one came out to offer him battle, he threw up works against the wall on the side of Pallene.

And thus Potidaea was now besieged with all their power, on both sides, and from the sea at the same time by ships that were blockading it.

Now Aristeus, when it was surrounded with works, and he had no hope of its escape, unless some movement from the Peloponnese, or something else beyond their calculation, should occur, advised all, except five hundred, to watch for a wind and sail out of it, that their provisions might hold out the longer; and he was willing himself to be one of those who remained. But when he did not persuade them, from a wish to provide what was the next best thing to be done, and in order that affairs out of the place might proceed in the best way possible, he sailed out, without being observed by the guard-ships of the Athenians.

And remaining amongst the Chalcidians, he joined in the other measures of the war; and laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; and sending to the Peloponnese, endeavoured to contrive a way in which some assistance might be brought. After the works round Potidaea were finished, Phormio with his sixteen hundred men proceeded to ravage Chalcidice and Bottice, and took some of the towns also.

The Athenians then and Peloponnesians had had these previous grounds of complaint against each other; the Corinthians, because Potidaea, which was a colony of their own, and men of Corinth and from the Peloponnese in it, were being besieged; the Athenians against the Peloponnesians, because they had caused the revolt of a city which was their ally and tributary, and had come and openly fought with them in conjunction with the Potidaeans. The war however had not yet positively broken out, but at present there was a suspension of hostilities; for the Corinthians had done these things on their own responsibility alone.

When, however, Potidaea was being besieged, they did not remain quiet, as they had men in it, and were alarmed for the place. And immediately they summoned the allies to Lacedaemon, and came and cried out against the Athenians, as having broken the treaty, and as injuring the Peloponnese.

And the aeginetans, though they did not openly send ambassadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet in secret most of all urged on the war in conjunction with them, saying that they were not independent according to the treaty.

So the Lacedaemonians, after summoning any one of the allies besides, who said that in any other respect he had been injured by the Athenians, held their ordinary assembly, and told them to speak.

And others came forward and severally made their complaints, and especially the Megareans, who urged no few other grounds of quarrel, but most of all their being excluded from the ports in the Athenian dominions, and from the Attic market, contrary to the treaty.

And the Corinthians came forward last, after permitting the others first to exasperate the Lacedaemonians; and they spoke after them as follows.

"The trustiness of your policy and intercourse amongst yourselves, Lacedaemonians, renders you the more distrustful with regard to others, if we say any thing [against them]; and from this you have a character for sober-mindedness, but betray too great ignorance with regard to foreign affairs.

For though we often forewarned you what injuries we were going to receive from the Athenians, you did not gain information respecting what we told you from time to time, but rather suspected the speakers of speaking for their own private interests. And for this reason it was not before we suffered, but when we are in the very act of suffering, that you have summoned the allies here; amongst whom we may speak with the greatest propriety, inasmuch as we have also the greatest complaints to make, being insulted by the Athenians, and neglected by you. And if they were an obscure people any where who were injuring Greece, you might have required additional warning, as not being acquainted with them;

but as it is, why need we speak at any great length, when you see that some of us are already enslaved, and that they are plotting against others, and especially against our allies, and have been for a long time prepared beforehand, in case they should ever go to war.

For they would not else have stolen Corcyra from us, and kept it in spite of us, and besieged Potidaea; of which places, the one is the most convenient for their deriving the full benefit from their possessions Thrace-ward, and the other would have supplied the largest navy to the Peloponnesians.

"And for these things it is you who are to blame, by having at first permitted them to fortify their city after the Median war, and subsequently to build the long walls; and by continually up to the present time depriving of liberty, not only those who had been enslaved by them, but your own allies also now. For it is not he who has enslaved them, but he who has the power to stop it, but overlooks it, that more truly does this; especially if he enjoys the reputation for virtue as being the liberator of Greece.

But with difficulty have we assembled now, and not even now for any clearly defined object. For we ought to be considering no longer whether we are injured, but in what way we shall defend ourselves. For the aggressors come with their plans already formed against us who have not made up our minds; at once, and not putting it off.

And we know in what way, and how gradually, the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. And while they think that they are not observed through your want of perception, they feel less confident; but when they know that you are aware of their designs, but overlook them, they will press on you with all their power.

For you alone of the Greeks, Lacedaemonians, remain quiet, defending yourselves against any one, not by exertion of your power, but by mere demonstration of it;

and you alone put down the power of your enemies, not when beginning, but when growing twice as great as it was. And yet you used to have the name of cautious; but in your case the name, it seems, was more than the reality. For we ourselves know that the Mede came from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese, before your forces went out to meet him as they should have done; and now the Athenians, who are not far removed, as he was, but close at hand, you overlook; and instead of attacking them, prefer to defend yourselves against their attack, and to reduce yourselves to mere chances in struggling with them when in a much more powerful condition: though you know that even the barbarian was chiefly wrecked upon himself;

and that with regard to these very Athenians, we have often ere this escaped more by their errors than by assistance from you. For indeed hopes of you have before now in some instances even ruined some, while unprepared through trusting you.

And let none of you think that this is spoken for enmity, rather than for expostulation; for expostulation is due to friends who are in error, but accusation to enemies who have committed injustice.

"At the same time we consider that we, if any, have a right to administer rebuke to our neighbours; especially as the differences [between you and them] are great; of which you do not seem to us to have any perception, nor to have ever yet considered with what kind of people you will have to struggle in the Athenians, and how very, nay, how entirely different from yourselves.

They, for instance, are innovating, and quick to plan and accomplish by action what they have designed; while you are disposed to keep what you have, and form no new design, and by action not even to carry out what is necessary.

Again, they are bold even beyond their power, and adventurous beyond their judgment, and sanguine in dangers; while your character is to undertake things beneath your power, and not to trust even the sure grounds of your judgement, and to think that you will never escape from your dangers. Moreover, they are unhesitating, in opposition to you who are dilatory;

and fond of going from home, in opposition to you who are most fond of staying at home: for they think that by their absence they may acquire something; whereas you think that by attempting [more] you would do harm to what you have.

When they conquer their enemies, they carry out their advantage to the utmost; and when conquered, they fall back the least.

Further, they use their bodies as least belonging to them, for the good of their country;

but their mind, as being most peculiarly their own, for achieving something on her account.

And what they have planned but not carried out, they think that in this they lose something already their own; what they have attempted and gained, that in this they have achieved but little in comparison with what they mean to do. Then, if they fail in an attempt at any thing, by forming fresh hopes in its stead, they supply the deficiency: for they are the only people that succeed to the full extent of their hope in what they have planned, because they quickly undertake what they have resolved.

And in this way they labour, with toils and dangers, all their life long; and least enjoy what they have, because they are always getting, and think a feast to be nothing else but to gain their ends, and inactive quiet to be no less a calamity than laborious occupation.

So that if any one should sum up their character, by saying, that they are made neither to be quiet themselves, nor let the rest of the world be so, he would speak correctly.

And yet when such is the character of this state that is opposed to you, Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying, and think that peace is not most lasting in the case of those men, who with their resources do what is right, while as regards their feelings, they are known to be determined not to put up with it, if they are injured: but you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither annoying others, nor being hurt yourselves in self-defence.

Scarcely, however, could you have succeeded in this, though you had lived by a state of congenial views: while as it is, your ways, as we just now showed you, are old-fashioned compared with them.

But, as in the case of art, improvements must ever prevail; and though for a state that enjoys quiet, unchanged institutions are best; yet, for those who are compelled to apply to many things, many a new device is also necessary. And for this reason the institutions of the Athenians, from their great experience, have been remodelled to a greater extent than yours.

At this point then let your dilatoriness cease: and now assist us, and especially the Potidaeans, as you undertook, by making with all speed an incursion into Attica; that you may not give up men who are your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and turn the rest of us in despair to some other alliance.

And in that we should do nothing unjust, in the sight either of the gods who received our oaths or of the men who witness [our conduct]: for the breakers of a treaty are not those who from destitution apply to others, but those who do not assist their confederates.

If, however, you will be zealous, we will stand by you; for neither should we act rightly in changing, nor should we find others more congenial.

Wherefore deliberate well, and endeavour to keep a supremacy in the Peloponnese no less than your fathers bequeathed to you.

To this effect spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, happening before this to have an embassy at Lacedaemon, and hearing what was said, thought that they ought to come before the Lacedaemonians, not to make any defence on the subject of' the charges which the states brought against them. but to prove, on a general view of the question, that they ought not to deliberate in a hurry, but take more time to consider it. They wished also to show how powerful their city was; and to remind the older men of what they knew, and to relate to the younger what they were unacquainted with; thinking that in consequence of what they said, they would be more disposed to remain quiet than to go to war.

So they came to the Lacedaemonians, and said that they also, [as the Corinthians had done,] wished to speak to their people, if nothing prevented. They told them to come forward; and the Athenians came forward, and spoke as follows.

"Our embassy was not sent for the purpose of controversy with your allies, but on the business on which the state sent us. Perceiving, however, that there is no small outcry against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the states, (for our words would not be addressed to you as judges, either of us or of them,) but to prevent your adopting bad counsel through being easily persuaded by the allies on matters of great importance; and at the same time with a wish to slow, on a view of the general argument as it affects us, that we do not improperly hold what we possess, and that our state is worthy of consideration. Now as to things of very ancient date why need we mention them? since hearsay must attest them, rather than the eyes of those who will be our auditors.

But the Median war, and the deeds with which you yourselves are acquainted, we must speak of; though it will be rather irksome to us to be for ever bringing them forward: for when we performed them, the danger was run for a benefit, of the reality of which you had your share; and let us not be deprived of the whole credit, if it is of any service to us.

Our words, however, will be spoken, not so much for the purpose of exculpation, as of testimony, and of showing with what kind of a state you will have to contend, if you do not take good counsel.

For we say that at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the barbarian; and that when he came the second time, though we were not able to defend ourselves by land, we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis; which prevented his sailing against and ravaging the Peloponnese, city by city. while you would have been unable to assist one another against his numerous ships.

And he himself gave the greatest proof of this; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was no longer what it had been, retreated as quickly as he could with the greater part of his army.

"Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things towards it; viz. the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a genera, and the most unshrinking zeal. Towards the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts;

and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honoured him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you.

And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us.

So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For you, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance, [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us; (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us;) but we, setting out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves.

But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterwards had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.

"Do we not then deserve, Lacedaemonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess?

For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian, and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders:

and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honour also, and afterwards of advantage too.

And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you.

And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils.

"You, at least, Lacedaemonians, have settled to your own advantage the government of the states in the Peloponnese over which you have a supremacy; and if at that time you had remained through the whole business, and been disliked in your command, as we were, we know full well that you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or yourselves be exposed to danger.

So neither have we done any thing marvellous, or contrary to the disposition of man, in having accepted an empire that was offered to us, and not giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives honour, and fear, and profit; and when, again, we had not been the first to set such a precedent, but it had always been a settled rule that the weaker should be constrained by the stronger; and when at the same time we thought ourselves worthy of it, and were thought so by you, until, from calculations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever yet brought forward when lie had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained from taking the advantage.

Nay, all are worthy of praise, who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, have been more just than their actual power enabled them to be.

At any rate we imagine, that if some others had possessed our means, they would have best shown whether we are at all moderate or not; though to us there has unfairly resulted from our good nature disrepute rather than commendation.

"For from putting up with less than we might have had in contract-suits with the allies, and from having made our decisions in our own courts on the footing of equal laws, we are thought to be litigious.

And none of them considers why this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in any other quarter also, and are less moderate towards their subjects than we have been: for those who can act with violence have no need besides to act with justice.

But they, from being accustomed to have intercourse with us on a fair footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been worsted in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by the power of our empire, even in any degree whatever; they feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost than if from the first we had laid aside law, and openly taken advantage of them.

In that case not even they themselves would have denied that it was right for the weaker to yield to the stronger. But when injured it seems men are more angry than when treated with violence: for the one case is regarded as an advantage taken by their compulsion by their superior.

At least they endured much harder treatment than this at the hand of the Medes; whereas our rule is thought to be severe; and naturally so;

for their present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any rate, should you subdue us and possess an empire, would quickly lose the good-will which you have enjoyed through their fear of us; if you have the same views now as you gave symptoms of then, when you led then against the Mede for a short time. For you have institutions by yourselves, distinct from the rest of the world; and moreover, each individual of you, on going abroad., neither acts according to these, nor to those which the rest of Greece recognises.

Deliberate therefore slowly, as on no trifling matters; and do not, through being influenced by other people's views and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: but consider before on previously to your being engaged in it, how for when long protracted, it generally comes in the end to depend on chances;

from which we are equally removed, and run the risk in uncertainty as to which way it will turn out.

And in going to war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do afterwards; and when they are in distress, then they have recourse to words.

We however, being neither ourselves yet involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, while good counsel is still eligible to both sides, not to break treaty nor offend against your oaths, but to let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we will call to witness the gods who received cur oaths, and endeavour to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as you may set the example.

Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them.

And the opinions of the majority went the same way; viz. that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they ought to go to war with all speed. But Archidamus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.

"I have both myself already had experience in many wars, Lacedaemonians, and see that those of you who are of the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither desire the business from inexperience, as might be the case with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one.

But this war, about which you are now consulting, you would find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly consider it.

For against the Peloponnesians and our neighbours our strength is of the same description, and we can quickly reach our destination in each case. But against men who live in a country far away, and besides are most skilful by sea, and most excellently provided with every thing else, with riches, both private and public, and ships, and horses, and heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in any one Grecian town beside, and moreover, have many allies under payment of tribute; how can it be right to declare war rashly against these men? and in what do we trust, that we should hurry on to it unprepared? Is it in our ships? Nay, we are inferior to them:

but if we shall practise and prepare against them, time will pass in the interval. Well then, is it in our money? Nay, but we are still more deficient in this, and neither have it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it from our private funds.

"Perhaps some one might feel confident because we excel them in heavy-armed troops, and in numbers, so that we might invade and ravage their land.

But they have other land in abundance, over which they rule, and will import what they want by sea.

If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders.

What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage;

and at such a time it will no longer even be honourable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they.

For let us now not be buoyed up with this hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.

"I do not however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them, without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies whether Greeks or barbarians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who. like us are plotted against by the Athenians. may without (odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also;) and at the same time let us bring out our own resources.

And if they listen at all to our ambassadors. that is the best conclusion; but if not. after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think tit, in a better state of defence.

And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed.

For in their land consider that you have nothing else but a hostage; and the more so, the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, and not, through having reduced them to desperation, find them the more difficult to subdue.

For if we are hurried on by the complaints of our allies, and ravage it while we are unprepared, see that we do not come off in a manner more disgraceful and perplexing to the Peloponnese [than we should wish

For complaints, both of states and individuals, it is possible to settle: but when all together have, for their own separate interests, undertaken a war, of which it is impossible to know how it will go on, it is not easy to effect a creditable arrangement.

"And let no one think it shows a want of courage for many not at once to advance against one state.

For they too have no fewer allies who pay them tribute;

and war is not so much a thing of arms as of money, by means of which arms are of service; especially in the case of continental against maritime powers.

Let us first then provide ourselves with this, and not be excited beforehand by the speeches of the allies; but as we shall have the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences either way, so also let us quietly take a view of them beforehand.

"And as for the slowness and dilatoriness which they most blame in us, be not ashamed of them. For by hurrying [to begin the war] you would be the more slow in finishing it because you took it in hand when unprepared:

and at the same time we always enjoy a city that is free and most glorious; and it is a wise moderation that can best constitute this. For owing to it we alone do not grow insolent in success, and yield less than others to misfortunes. We are not excited by the pleasure afforded by those who with praise stimulate us to dangers contrary to our conviction; and if any one provoke us with accusation, we are not the more prevailed on through being thus annoyed.

We are both warlike and wise through our orderly temper: warlike, because shame partakes very largely of moderation, and courage of shame; and wise, because we are brought up with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them; and are not over-clever in useless things, so that while in word we might ably find fault with our enemies' resources, we should not go against them so well in deed;

but are taught to think that our neighbours' plans, and the chances which befall in war, are very similar as things not admitting of nice distinction in language. But we always provide in deed against our adversaries with the expectation of their planning well and must not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but on the belief our own taking cautious forethought. Again, we should not think that one man differs much from another, but that he is the best who is educated in the most necessary things.

These practices then, which our fathers bequeathed to us, and which we have always retained with benefit, let us not give up, nor determine hurriedly, in the short space of a day, about many lives, and riches, and states, and honours, but let us do it calmly; as we may do more than others, on account of our power.

And send to the Athenians respecting Potidaea, and send respecting those things in which the allies say they are injured; especially as they are ready to submit to judicial decision; and against the party which offers that, it is not right to proceed as against a guilty one. But prepare for war at the same time. For in this you, will determine both what is best, and what is most formidable to your adversaries.

Archidamus spoke to this effect; but Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at that time, came forward last, and spoke before the Lacedaemonians as follows.

As for the long speech of the Athenians, I do not understand it; for though they praised themselves a great deal, in no part did they deny than they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they were good men then against the Medes, but are bad ones now against us, they deserve double punishment for having become bad instead of good. But we are the same both then and now;

and shall not, if we are wise, overlook our allies' being injured, nor delay to assist them; for there is no longer delay in their being ill-treated. Others have in abundance riches, and ships, and horses;

but we have good allies, whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor decide the question with suits and words, while it is not also in word that we are injured; but we must assist them with speed and with all our might. And let no one tell me that it is proper for us to deliberate who are being wronged.

It is for those who are about to commit the wrong that it is much more proper to deliberate for a long time.

Vote then, Lacedaemonians, for war, as is worthy of Sparta; and neither permit the Athenians to become greater, nor let us betray our allies; but with the help of the gods let us proceed against those who are wronging them.

Having spoken to this effect he himself, as ephor, put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians.

As they decide by acclamation and not by vote, he said that he did not distinguish on which side the acclamation was greater; but wishing to instigate them the more to war by their openly expressing their views, he said,

Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks the treaty to have been broken, and the Athenians to have been guilty, let him rise and go yonder

(pointing out a certain place to them);

and whoever does not think so, let him go to the other side.

They arose and divided, and there was a large majority who thought that the treaty had been broken.

And having summoned the allies, they told them that their own opinion was that the Athenians were in the wrong; but that they wished to summon all the allies also, and to put it to the vote; that after general consultation they might declare war, if they thought fit.

They then, after having settled this, returned home; as did the ambassadors of the Athenians afterwards, when they had despatched the business they had gone on.

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the continuance of the thirty years' truce, which had been concluded after the war with Euboea.

Now the Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war should be declared, not so much because they were convinced by the arguments of the allies, as because they were afraid that the Athenians might attain to greater power, seeing that most parts of Greece were already under their hands.

For it was in the following manner that the Athenians were brought to those circumstances under which they increased their power.

When the Medes had retreated from Europe after being conquered both by sea and land by the Greeks, and those of them had been destroyed who had fled with their ships to Mycale; Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was the leader of the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies that were from the Peloponnese; while the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, stayed behind, and laid siege to Sestos, of which the Medes were in possession. Having spent the winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacuated it; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city.

And the people of Athens, when they found the barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immediately to carry over their children and wives, and the remnant of their furniture, from were they had put them out of the way; and were preparing to rebuild their city and their walls. For short spaces of the enclosure were standing; and though the majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained; in which the grandees of the Persians had themselves taken up their quarters.

The Lacedaemonians, perceiving what they were about to do, sent an embassy [to them]; partly because they themselves would have been more pleased to see neither them nor any one else in possession of a wall; but still more because the allies instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in the Median war.

And they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnese; not betraying their real wishes, and their suspicious feelings towards the Athenians; but representing that the barbarian, if he should again come against them, would not then be able to make his advances from any strong hold, as in the present instance he had done from Thebes; and the Peloponnese, they said, was sufficient for all, as a place to retreat into and sally forth from.

When the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, answered that they would send ambassadors to them concerning what they spoke of; and immediately dismissed them. And Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as possible to Lacedaemon, and having chosen other ambassadors besides himself, not to despatch them immediately, but to wait till such time as they should have raised their wall to the height most absolutely necessary for fighting from; and that the whole population in the city, men, women, and children, should build it, sparing neither private nor public edifice, from which any assistance towards the work would be gained, but throwing down every thing.

After giving these instructions, and suggesting that he would himself manage all other matters there, he took his departure.

On his arrival at Lacedaemon he did not apply to the authorities, but kept putting off and making excuses. And whenever any of those who were in office asked him why he did not come before the assembly, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues; that owing to some engagement they had been left behind; he expected, however, that they would shortly come, and wondered that they were not already there.

When they heard this, they believed Themistocles through their friendship for him; but when every one else came and distinctly informed them that the walls were building, and already advancing to some height, they did not know how to discredit it.

When he found this, he told them not to be led away by tales, but ratter to send men of their own body who were of good character, and would bring back a credible report after inspection.

They despatched them therefore; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to the Athenians, to detain them, with as little appearance of it as possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had returned back; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, had also come to him with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced;) for he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not then let them go.

So the Athenians detained the ambassadors, as was told them; and Themistocles, having come to an audience of the Lacedaemonians, then indeed told them plainly that their city was already walled, so as to be capable of defending its inhabitants; and if the Lacedaemonians or the allies wished to send any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who could discern what were their own and the general interests.

For when they thought it better to abandon their city and to go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their minds, and had the courage to do it, without consulting them; and again, on whatever matters they had deliberated with them, they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment.

And so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that their city should have a wall, and that it would be more expedient for their citizens in particular, as well as for the allies in general;

for it was not possible for any one without equal resources to give any equal or fair advice for the common good. Either all therefore, he said, should join the confederacy without walls, or they should consider that the present case also was as it ought to be.

The Lacedaemonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians; (for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state;

and besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against the (Mede;) in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time.

And the building still slows even now that it was executed in haste; for the foundations are laid with stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the several parties at any time brought them to the spot: and many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were worked up in them. For the enclosure of the city was carried out to a greater extent on every side; and for this reason they hurried on the work, removing every tiling alike.

Themistocles also persuaded them to build the remaining walls of the Piraeus, (they had been begun by him before, at the time of his office as archon, which he had held for a year over the Athenians,) thinking that the site was a fine one, as it contained three natural harbours; and that by becoming a naval people they would make a great advance towards the acquisition of power.

For he was the first who ventured to tell them that they must apply closely to the sea;

and he began immediately to assist in paving the way for their empire. It was by his advice that they built the walls of that thickness which is still seen round the Piraeus; for two waggons meeting each other brought up the stones. And in the inside there was neither rubble nor mortar, but large and square-cut stones wrought together, cramped on the outside with iron and lead. But only about half of the height he intended was finished.

For he wished by their great dimensions and thickness to keep off the attacks of their enemies; and thought that the protection of a few, and those the least efficient troops, would be sufficient, while the rest would go on board their ships.

For to the navy he paid the greatest attention; seeing, I suppose, that the approach of the king's forces against them was easier by sea than by land: and he considered the Piraeus more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, in case of their ever being hard pressed by land, to go down into it, and defy the world with their navy.

Thus then the Athenians were enclosed with walls, and began to furnish themselves with other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Medes.

Now Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; there sailed with him also the Athenians with thirty ships, and a large number of the other allies.

And they made an expedition against Cyprus, and subdued the greater part of it; and afterwards against Byzantium, of which the Medes were in possession, and reduced it during this period of his command.

But when he was now acting with violence, the rest of the Greeks were offended, and especially the Ionians, and such as had lately been liberated from the king; and going to the Athenians, they begged them to become their leaders, on the ground of their relationship; and not to overlook it in Pausanias, if in any case he should treat them with violence.

The Athenians received their proposals, and attended to them with a determination not to overlook it, and to settle all other matters as might seem best to them.

At this time the Lacedaemonians sent for Pausanias, to bring him to account for what they had heard of him; for many charges were brought against him by the Greeks who came to them; and it appeared to be an imitation of a tyranny, rather than the command of a general.

It happened that he was summoned at the very time the allies, through their hatred of him, went over and ranged themselves with the Athenians, except the soldiers from the Peloponnese.

So when he came to Lacedaemon, he was censured for the wrongs he had done to any one individually; but was acquitted, as not guilty, on the heaviest charges. (He was especially accused of medizing, and it appeared to be most clearly established.)

Him they sent out no more as commander, but Dorcis and some others with him, with no great number of troops; but the allies would no longer give up the command to them.

On finding this, they returned; and the Lacedaemonians sent out no others after them; fearing that they might find those who went abroad becoming corrupted, just as they saw in the case of Pausanias; and also because they wished to be rid of the Median war, and considered the Athenians competent to take the lead, and well disposed towards themselves at that time.

The Athenians having in this way succeeded to the command at the wish of the allies, owing to their hatred of Pausanias, arranged which of the states were to furnish money against the barbarian. and which of them ships: for their pretext was to avenge themselves for what they had suffered, by ravaging the king's country.

And the office of treasurers of Greece was then first established by the Athenians; who received the tribute, for so the contribution-money was called. The first tribute that was fixed was 460 talents. Their treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were held in the temple.

Now they led the allies at first as possessing independence, and deliberating in common councils; and executed, both in the field and in their administration of affairs, between this war and the Median, the following undertakings; which were achieved by them against the barbarian, and against their own innovating allies, and those of the Peloponnesians who from time to time came in contact with them in each matter.

I have written an account of these events, and made this digression from my history, because this subject was omitted by all before me; who either wrote the history of Greece before the Median war, or of that war itself: and Hellanicus, who did touch on them in his Attic history, mentioned them but briefly, and not accurately with regard to their chronology. Besides, they also afford an opportunity of showing in what manner the empire of the Athenians was established.

In the first place, Eion on the Strymon, of which the Medes were in possession, was taken by them after a siege, and reduced to slavery, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades.

In the next place, Scyros, the island in the Aegean Sea, which was inhabited by Dolopes, was reduced to slavery, and colonized by themselves.

They had a war also with the Carystians, without the rest of the Euboeans joining in it;

and in course of time they surrendered on conditions. With the Naxians, who had revolted, they afterwards waged war, and reduced them after a siege; and this was the first allied city that was subjugated contrary to the agreement; then the rest, as each happened.

Now there were other reasons for the revolts, but the principal were arrears of tribute and ships, and failing (if any did so) in military service: for the Athenians strictly exacted these things, and were offensive by usingcompulsion to men who were neither accustomed nor willing to do hard work.

In some other respects also they were no longer liked in their government, as they had been; and while they did not join in the service on an equal footing, at the same time it was easy for them to bring to subjection those who revolted.

And for this the allies themselves were to blame; for owing to this aversion to expeditions, the greater part of them, to avoid being away from home, agreed to contribute money instead of ships as their quota of the expense; and so the fleet of the Athenians was increased from the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced for war.

After this was fought the battle at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, both by land and sea, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes; and the Athenians were victorious in both engagements on the same day, under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades; and took and destroyed in all two hundred triremes of the Phoenicians.

Some time after it happened that the Thasians revolted from them, having quarrelled about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace and the mine of which they were in possession. And the Athenians, having sailed with their fleet to Thasos, gained the victory in a sea-fight, and made a descent on their land.

About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to the Strymon, to colonize what was then called the Nine Ways, but new Amphipolis; and they made themselves masters of the Nine Ways, which was held by the Edones; but having advanced into the interior of Thrace, were cut off at Drabescus, a town of the Edones, by the united Thracians, by whom the settlement of the town of Nine Ways was regarded with hostility.

The Thasians, having been conquered in some engagements, and being invested, called the Lacedaemonians to their aid, and desired that they would assist them by invading Attica.

They promised to do so, without letting the Athenians know, and intended it; but were prevented by the earthquake which took place; on which occasion also they saw the Helots, and the Thurians and oethieans amongst the Perioeci, establish themselves in revolt at Ithome.

Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians who were enslaved at that time [with which all are acquainted and for this reason the whole body of them were called Messenians. A war then was commenced by the Lacedaemonians against those in Ithome: and the Thasians in the third year of the siege came to terms with the Athenians, throwing down their wall, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing both to pay immediately the sum of money required, and to pay tribute in future, and surrendering their mainland towns and the mine.

The Lacedaemonians, when they found the war against those in Ithome prolonged, called other allies to their aid, and the Athenians also; who went under the command of Cimon with no small force.

They asked their aid, because they were considered to be skilful in conducting sieges: whereas in themselves, from the siege having been so protracted, there seemed to be a deficiency of this skill; for else they would have taken the place by assault.

It was from this expedition that the first open quarrel arose between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. For the Lacedaemonians, when the place was not taken by storm, fearing the boldness and innovating spirit of the Athenians—and moreover considering that they were of a different race from themselves—lest, if they remained, they might at the persuasion of those in Ithome attempt some revolution, dismissed them alone of all the allies; not letting their suspicion appear, but saying that they were no longer in any need of them.

The Athenians, however, knew that they were dismissed, not on the more creditable reason assigned, but from some suspicion having arisen: and considering it hard usage, and not thinking that they deserved to be so treated by the Lacedaemonians, immediately on their return they broke off the alliance which they had made with them against the Mede, and became allies of the Argives, their enemies. The same oaths also were taken, and the same alliance made by both with the Thessalians.

Those in Ithome, in the tenth year, when they could hold out no longer, surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on condition of their going out of the Peloponnese under truce, and never setting foot on it again;

and that if any one were caught doing so, he should be the slave of him who caught him. The Lacedaemonians had also before this a Pythian response made to them, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter at Ithome.

So they went out, themselves, and their children, and their wives; and the Athenians received them, on the strength of the hatred they now felt for the Lacedaemonians, and settled them at Naupactus, which they had lately taken from the Locri Ozolae who held it.

The Megareans also came over into alliance with the Athenians, having revolted from the Lacedaemonians, because the Corinthians were pressing them with war about the boundaries of their territory. And the Athenians received possession of Megara and Pegae, and built for the Messenians the long walls from the city to Nisaea, and themselves manned them. And it was chiefly from this that their excessive hatred of the Athenians first began to be felt by the Corinthians.

Now Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, the Libyan king of the Libyans bordering on Egypt, having his headquarters at Maraea, the city above Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from king Artaxerxes, and being himself made ruler of it, invited the Athenians to his aid.

They, happening to be engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, left Cyprus and came to him; and having sailed up from the sea into the Nile, and being masters of the river and two thirds of Memphis, proceeded to hostilities against the third division, which is called the White-castle, and in which were those of the Persians and Medes who had fled there for refuge, and those of the Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt.

The Athenians, having with their fleet made a descent on Haliae, had a battle with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians gained the victory. Afterwards this Athenians had a sea-fight with the fleet of the Peloponnesians off Cecryphalea, and the Athenians gained the victory.

After this, war having been commenced by the Athenians on the aeginetans, a great sea-fight took place off aegina, between the Athenians and the aeginetans, and the allies were present on both sides; and the Athenians gained the victory, and having taken seventy of their ships, made a descent on the country, and besieged them, under the command of Leocrates, the son of Straebus.

Then the Peloponnesians, wishing to assist the aeginetans, sent over to aegina three hundred heavy-armed, who were before auxiliaries of the Corinthians and Epidaurians. And the Corinthians with their allies seized the heights of Geranea, and marched down into the Megarid, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to succour the Megareans, while a large force was absent at aegina and in Egypt; but that if they did assist them, they would raise the siege of aegina.

The Athenians, however, did not remove the army that was at aegina, but the oldest and the youngest of those who had been left behind in the city came to Megara under the command of Myronides.

After an indecisive battle had been fought with the Corinthians, they separated, each side thinking that they had not had the worst in the action.

And the Athenians (for they notwithstanding had the advantage rather [than their opponents]) on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the elder men in the city, made preparations for about twelve days after, and went out and proceeded to set up a counter-trophy on their side also, as having been victorious. And the Athenians, having sallied out from Megara, cut to pieces those who were erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest.

The conquered forces commenced a retreat;

and a considerable division of them, being hard pressed and having missed their way, rushed into a field belonging to a private person, which had a deep trench enclosing it, and there was no road out. the Athenians, perceiving this, hemmed them in with heavy-armed in front, and having placed their light armed all round, stoned to death all who had gone in; and this was a severe blow for the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

About this time the Athenians began also to build their long walls down to the sea, both that to Phalerus, and that to Piraeus.

And the Phocians having marched against the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, [whose towns were] Boeum, and Citinium, and Erineum, and having taken one of these places, the Lacedaemonians under the command of Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, in the stead of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was yet a minor, went to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their own, and ten thousand of the allies; and having compelled the Phocians to restore the town on certain conditions, they proceeded to return back.

Now by sea, if they should wish to cross over the Crissaean Gulf, the Athenians were ready to stop them, having sailed round with a fleet: while the march over Geranea did not appear safe for them as the Athenians were in possession of Megara and Pega. For Geranea was both [naturally] difficult to cross, and was continually guarded by the Athenians: and at that time they knew they were going to stop them that way, as well [as by sea].

So they determined to wait in Boeotia, and see in what way they might march across most safely. They were also in some measure urged to this in secret by certain of the Athenians, who hoped to put a stop to the democracy, and to the long walls that were building.

But the Athenians sallied out against them with all their citizens, and a thousand Argives, and the several contingents of the other allies. amounting in all to fourteen thousand.

They marched against them because they thought they were at a loss how to effect a passage, and in some measure also from a suspicion of the democracy being put down.

The Athenians were also joined, in accordance with the treaty, by a thousand horse of the Thessalians, who went over during the action to the Lacedaemonians.

A battle having been fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much bloodshed on both sides.

And the Lacedaemonians, after going into the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, returned back home across Geranea and the isthmus:

while the Athenians, on the sixty-second day after the battle, marched, under the command of Myronides, against the Boeotians, and having defeated them in an engagement at oenophyta, made themselves masters of the country of Boeotia and Phocis, and demolished the wall of the Tanagraeans, and took from the Opuntian Locrians their richest hundred men as hostages, and finished their own long walls.

The aegine tans also after this surrendered on condition to the Athenians, demolishing their walls, and giving up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.

And the Athenians sailed round the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmaeus, and burnt the arsenal of the Lacedaemonians, and took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians in a battle during a descent which they made on their land.

The Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still remaining there, and hostilities assumed many different phases with them.

For at first the Athenians were masters of Egypt; and the king sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacedaemon with a sum of money, that he might cause the recall of the Athenians from Egypt by the Peloponnesians being persuaded to invade Attica.

But when he did not succeed, and the money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus with the remainder of it went back to Asia; and he sent Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large force;

who, having arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis, and at last shut them up in the island of Prosopis, and besieged them in it a year and six months, till by draining the canal and turning off the water by another course, he left their ships on dry ground, and joined most of the island to the mainland, and crossed over and took it on foot.

Thus the cause of the Greeks was ruined, after a war of six years: and only a few of many marched through Libya and escaped to Cyrene, while most of them perished.

So Egypt again came under the power of the king, excepting Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they could not take owing to the extent of the fen; and besides, the marsh-men are the most warlike of the Egyptians.

As for Inarus, the king of the Libyans, who had concocted the whole business respecting Egypt, he was taken by treachery and crucified.

Moreover, fifty triremes that were sailing to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve their former force, put in to shore at the Mendesian branch, knowing nothing of what had happened: and the land forces falling on them from the shore, and the fleet of the Phoenicians by sea, destroyed the greater part of the ships: the smaller part escaped back. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

Now Orestes, son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, being banished from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him: and taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians, who were their allies, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And they were masters of the country, as far as they could be so without advancing far from their camp,

(for the cavalry of the Thessalians kept them in check,) but did not take the city, nor succeed in any other of the designs with which they made the expedition; but they returned with Orestes without effecting any thing.

Not long after this, one thousand Athenians having embarked in the ships that were at Pegae, (for they were themselves in possession of that port,) coasted along to Sicyon, under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus, and landed, and defeated those of the Sicyonians who met them in battle.

And immediately taking with them the Achaeans, and sailing across, they turned their arms against $Oeniadae in Acarnania, and besieged it: they did not, however, take it, but returned home.

Subsequently, after an interval of three years, a truce for five years was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians.

So the Athenians ceased from prosecuting the war in Greece, but made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of the allies, under the command of Cimon;

sixty of which sailed from them to Egypt, being sent for by Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes;

while the rest besieged Citium. Cimon having died, and there being a dearth of provisions, they retired from Citium; and while sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought both by sea and land at the same time with the Phoenicians and Cilicians; and having conquered in both engagements, returned home, and with them the ships that had come back from Egypt.

After this, the Lacedaemonians waged what is called the sacred war, and having taken possession of the temple at Delphi, gave it up to the Delphians: and the Athenians again afterwards, on their retiring, marched and took possession of it, and restored it to the Phocians.

Some time having elapsed after these things, the Boeotian exiles being in possession of Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia, the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, marched with one thousand heavy-armed of their own and the several contingents of the allies, against these places; for they were hostile to them.

Having taken Chaeronea, [and reduced it to slavery,

] they were retiring, after placing a garrison in it. But as they were on their march, the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, and with them some Locrians and exiles of the Euboeans, and all that were of the same views, attacked them at Coronea, and, having defeated them in battle, slew some of the Athenians, and took others of them alive.

So the Athenians evacuated all Boeotia, having made peace on condition of recovering their men.

And the exiles of the Boeotians were restored, and they and all the rest became independent again.

Not long after this, Euboea revolted from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already crossed over to it with an army of Athenians, news was brought him that Megara had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica; and that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans, except as many as had escaped to Nisaea. Now the Megareans had revolted, after calling to their aid the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. So Pericles took the army back from Euboea as quickly as possible.

After this the Peloponnesians made an incursion as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and ravaged the country, under the command of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians; and without advancing any farther they returned home.

And the Athenians having again crossed over to Euboea under the command of Pericles, subdued the whole of it, and settled the rest of the island by treaty; but the Histiaeans they expelled from their homes, and held the territory themselves.

Having returned from Euboea, not long after they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, Achaia; for of these places in the Peloponnese the Athenians were in possession. Now in the sixth year a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene;

and the Milesians being worsted in the war went to the Athenians, and raised an outcry against the Samians; some private individuals from Samos itself taking part with them, from a wish to effect a revolution in the government.

The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships, and established a democracy; and taking as hostages from the Samians fifty boys and as many men, deposited them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island, withdrew.

But the exiles of the Samians (for there were some who did not remain in the island, but fled to the continent) having made arrangements with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pisuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had the satrapy of Sardis at that time, and having collected auxiliaries to the number of seven hundred, crossed over to Samos towards night, and in the first place rose up against the commons, and secured most of them;

then, having secretly removed their hostages from Lemnos, they revolted, and gave up to Pisuthnes the garrison and its commanders that were with them, and immediately prepared to go against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.

The Athenians, when they were aware of it, sailed with sixty ships for Samos, but did not use sixteen of them (for some were gone towards Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet; others towards Chios and Lesbos, carrying about orders to bring reinforcements); with forty-four, however, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a battle near the island of Tragia with seventy ships of the Samians, twenty of which were transports, (they all happened to be sailing from Miletus,) and the Athenians were victorious.

Afterwards there came to them a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens, and five and twenty from Chios and Lesbos; and when they had disembarked, and had the superiority in land forces, they invested the city with three walls, and blockaded it by sea at the same time.

Then Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading squadron, and went as quickly as possible in the direction of Caunus and Caria, news having been brought that the Phoenician fleet was sailing against them: for there had also gone from Samos Stesagoras and some others with five ships to fetch those of the Phoenicians.

At this time the Samians, having suddenly sallied out, fell on the unprotected camp, and destroyed the guard-ships, and in a sea-fight defeated those that put out against them, and were masters of the sea along their coasts about fourteen days, carrying in and out what they pleased.

But on the arrival of Pericles they were again closely blockaded by the fleet. Afterwards there came reinforcements, of forty ships with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, from Athens, and of thirty from Chios and Lesbos.

Against these the Samians fought a short battle by sea, but being unable to hold out, were reduced in the ninth month, and surrendered on conditions; dismantling their wall, and giving hostages, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay back by instalments the expenses of the war. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.

After these things, though not many years later, what we have before narrated now took place, namely, the affair of Corcyra, and that of Potidaea, and whatever was made a pretext for this war.

All these things that the Greeks performed against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war: in the course of which the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great pitch of power; while the Lacedaemonians, though they perceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but remained quiet the greater part of the period. For even before this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and to a certain extent also they were hindered by intestine wars;

until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedaemonians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, and that the Athenians were guilty;

but they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god, whether it would be better for them if they went to war: and he answered them, as it is reported, that if they carried on the war with all their might, they would gain the victory; and said that he would himself take part with them, whether called upon or not.

Still they wished to summon the allies again, and put it to the vote, whether they should go to war. When the ambassadors had come from the confederates, and an assembly had been held, the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians, and demanding that war should be declared; and the Corinthians, who had even before begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for the war—being afraid for Potidaea, lest it should be destroyed first—and who were present then also, came forward last, and spoke as follows:

"We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedaemonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose:

[though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all; as they are also in other respects honoured above all.

Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the high way of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others].

And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of pence For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured; but of brave men, when injured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace.

For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that cannot be trusted.

For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.

"Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time preparing for war because we are injured, and have sufficient grounds of complaint;

and when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And for many reasons it is likely that we should have the advantage; first, as we are superior in numbers and military experience;

and secondly, as we all proceed with equal obedience to do what we are ordered. And for a fleet, in which they are so strong, we will equip one from the property we severally possess, and from the money at Delphi and Olympia; for by contracting a loan of that we shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of their foreign sailors. For the power of the Athenians is mercenary, rather than native: but ours would be less exposed to this, as it is strong in men more than in money.

And by one victory [gained by us] in a sea-fight, in all probability they are ruined; but should they hold out, we too shall have more time for studying naval matters; and when we have put our skill on an equal footing with theirs, in courage we shall most certainly excel them. For the advantage which we possess by nature cannot be acquired by them through learning;

whereas the superiority which they have in point of skill may be attained by us through practice. And to have money for this purpose, we will raise contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own slavery, while we would not spend it to be avenged on our enemies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid suffering by means of this very money, through having it taken from us by them.

"We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt, (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong,) and raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure.

Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne: but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright slavery:

which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas we do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up amongst us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state.

And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.

"With regard then to what has been done before, why need we find fault with it at greater length than is expedient for what is doing now? But with respect to what will be hereafter, we must labour for it by supporting what is present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by labours; and you must not change the fashion, if you have a slight superiority now in wealth and power; (for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in abundance;) but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds; since the god has commanded it, and promised to take part with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty;

for even the god himself considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to war; but you will rather come to its support after it has been wronged: for the breakers of it are, not those who defend themselves, but those who were the first aggressors.

So then, since on every ground you have good reason for going to war, and since we all in common recommend this, inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for states and individuals [in our league]; do not defer to assist the Potidaeans, who are Dorians, and are besieged by Ionians, (the contrary of which used formerly to be the case,) and to vindicate the liberty of the rest; since it is no longer possible for them to wait, while some are already injured, and others will be treated in the same way not much later, if we shall be known to have come together, but not to dare to avenge ourselves:

but considering, allies, that we have reached a point of necessity, and, moreover, that what is mentioned is the best course, vote for the war; not being afraid of the immediate danger, but setting your hearts on the more lasting peace that will result from it. For it is by war that peace is rendered the more stable; but to refuse to pass from a state of quiet to one of war is not equally free from danger.

Being of opinion then that the tyrant state which has set itself up in Greece, has set itself up against all alike, so that it already rules over some, and is designing to rule over others, let us go against it and reduce it; and live ourselves free from danger in future, and give freedom to the Greeks who are now enslaved.

To this effect spoke the Corinthians.

The Lacedaemonians, after they had heard from all what they thought, put the question to the vote of all the allies who were present in succession, both to greater and smaller states alike: and the majority voted for war.

But though they had resolved on it, it was impossible to take it in hand immediately, as they were unprepared; but it was determined that suitable means should be provided by the several states, and that there should be no delay. A year, however, did not pass while they were settling all that was necessary, but less, before they invaded Attica, and openly proceeded to the war.

During this time they were sending ambassadors to the Athenians with complaints, in order that they might have as good a pretext as possible for the war, in case they should not listen to them.

In the first place the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors, and ordered the Athenians to drive out the pollution of the goddess; which pollution was of the following nature.

There was one Cylon, a man who had conquered at the Olympic games, an Athenian of the olden time, both noble and powerful; he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, who at that time was tyrant of Megara.

Now when Cylon was consulting the oracle at Delphi, the god told him to seize on the Acropolis of the Athenians during the greatest feast of Jupiter.

So having received a force from Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to it, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came on, he seized the Acropolis with a view to establishing a tyranny;

thinking that that was the greatest festival of Jupiter, and that it was a very proper time for him, as he had conquered at the Olympic games. But whether it was the greatest festival in Attica, or elsewhere, that had been alluded to, lie neither stopped to consider, nor did the oracle express. For the Athenians also have a Diasian festival, which is called the greatest festival of Jupiter Milichius, held outside the city, in which all the people offer [something, though] many of them not victims, but country-offerings.

Thinking, however, that he understood it rightly, he took the business in hand.

The Athenians, on perceiving it, ran in a body from the fields to resist them, and sitting down before the place besieged them. But as time went on, being tired out by the blockade, most of them went away, having commissioned the nine Archons to keep guard, and to arrange every thing with full powers, as they should consider best:

for at that time the nine Archons transacted most of the state affairs.

Now those who were besieged with Cylon were in a wretched condition for want of food and water. Cylon therefore and his brother made their escape, but when the rest were pressed hard, and some were even dying of famine, they seated themselves as suppliants on the altar of the Acropolis.

And those of the Athenians who had been commissioned to keep guard, when they saw them dying in the temple, raised them up on condition of doing them no harm, and led them away and killed them; while some who were seated before the Awful Goddesses they despatched on the altars at the side entrance. And from this both they and their descendants after them were called accursed of, and offenders against, the goddess.

The Athenians therefore expelled these accursed ones, and Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian also expelled them subsequently, in conjunction with some Athenian partisans, both driving out the living, and taking up and casting out the bones of the dead. They returned, however, afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.

This pollution then the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive out; principally, as they professed, to avenge the honour of the gods; but really, because they know that Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, was connected with it on his mother's side, and thought that if he were banished, their business with the Athenians would more easily succeed.

They did not, however, so much hope that he would be treated in that way, as that it would cause a prejudice against him in the city; from an idea that the war would in part be occasioned by his misfortune.

For being the most powerful man of his time, and taking the lead in the government, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in every thing, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but instigated them to hostilities.

The Athenians also, in return, commanded the Lacedaemonians to drive out the pollution of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians having formerly raised up some suppliants of the Helots from the temple of Neptune at Taenarus, led them away and slew them: and for this they think they were themselves also visited with the great earthquake at Sparta.

They likewise ordered them to drive out the curse of Minerva of the Brazen-House; which was of the following kind.

When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, after being sent for by the Spartans for the first time from his command in the Hellespont, and brought to trial, was acquitted by them as not guilty, he was not sent out again in a public capacity; but in a private capacity, of his own accord, he took a trireme of Hermione, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and came to the Hellespont; nominally, to join in the war of the Greeks; but really, to carry out his measures with the king; which he had undertaken, in the first instance, from a desire of sovereignty over Greece.

Now it was from the following fact that he first established a claim for service with the king, and made a commencement of the whole business.

Having taken Byzantium when he was there before, after the return from Cyprus, (the Medes were in possession of it, and some connexions and relations of the king were taken in it,) on that occasion he sent back to the king those whom he had taken, not letting the other allies know, but giving out that they had escaped from him.

This he managed in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, to whom he had committed Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus with a letter to him; in which, as was afterwards discovered, the following was written:

Pausanias, the general of Sparta, wishing to oblige thee, sends these men back to thee, after taking them in war. And I make a proposal, if thou also art pleased with it, that I should marry thy daughter, and make Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to thee. And I think that I am able to do this in concert with thee. If then any of these proposals please thee, send a trustworthy man to the sea, through whom in future we will confer.

Such was the purport of the writing; and Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea, and ordered him to succeed to the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor be fore; and gave him a letter in answer, to send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium, and to show him the seal; and whatever message Pausanias should send him on his own affairs, to execute it in the best and most faithful manner possible.

On his arrival he did every thing as had been told him, and also sent over the letter; the following being written in reply to him:

Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom thou hast saved from Byzantium, and sent over the sea to me, there is laid up for thee in our house

[the record of] a benefit registered for ever; and I am also pleased with thy proposals. And let neither night nor day stop thee, that thou shouldst be remiss in doing any of the things which thou hast promised me: neither let them be impeded by outlay of gold or silver, nor by number of troops, whithersoever there is need of their coming; but in conjunction with Artabazus, an honourable man, whom I have sent to thee, fear not to promote both my interest and thine own, as shall be most creditable and advantageous for both.

On the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, though he was even before held in high repute by the Greeks for his generalship at Plataea, was then much more exalted; and could no longer live in the ordinary style, but went out of Byzantium clothed in a Median dress; and when he went through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians formed his body-guard; and he had a Persian table laid for him, and could not conceal his purpose, but betrayed beforehand by trifling actions what he intended to practise in future on a larger scale.

He also made himself difficult of access, and indulged such a violent temper towards all, that no one dared to approach him; and this was none of the least reasons why the confederates went over from him to the Athenians.

The Lacedaemonians, on becoming acquainted with it, recalled him the first time on this very account; and when he went out the second time in the vessel of Hermione, without their orders, and appeared to be acting in this way, and did not return to Sparta when forcibly driven out from Byzantium by the Athenians after a siege, but news came of his being settled at Colonae in the Troad, and intriguing with the barbarians, and making his stay there for no good; under these circumstances they waited no longer, but the ephors sent a herald and a scytale, and told him not to leave the herald, else that they declared war against him.

Wishing to be as little suspected as possible, and trusting to quash the charge by means of money, he proceeded to return the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, (for the ephors have power to do this to the king,) but afterwards, having settled the business, he subsequently came out, and offered himself for trial to those who wished to examine into his case.

Now the Spartans had no clear proof, neither his enemies nor the state at large, on which they could safely rely in punishing a man who was of the royal family and at present holding an honourable office; (for as his cousin and guardian, he was regent for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was king and at present a minor;) but by his contempt of the laws, and imitation of the barbarians, he gave room for many suspicions of his not wishing to be content with things as they were.

And they reviewed his other acts, in whatever on any occasion he had lived beyond the established usages; and especially, that on the tripod at Delphi, which the Greeks dedicated as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, he had formerly on his own individual responsibility presumed to have the following distich inscribed:—

The Greek Pausanias, victor o'er the Mede, To Phoebus this memorial decreed.

This distich then the Lacedaemonians at the very time erased from the tripod, and engraved by name all the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian, and had dedicated the offering. This, however, was considered to be an act of guilt in Pausanias; and since he had put himself in his present position, it appeared to have been done in much closer keeping with his present views. They also heard that he was tampering with the Helots; and it was the fact too;

for he was promising them liberation and citizenship, if they would join in an insurrection, and in carrying out the whole of his plan. But not even then did they think right to believe even any of the Helots [themselves] as informers, and to proceed to any great severity against him;

acting according to the custom which they usually observe towards their own citizens, not to be hasty in adopting any extreme measure in the case of a Spartan without unquestionable evidence: until a man of Argilus, it is said, who was about to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the king, and who had before been his favourite and very much trusted by him, gave information to them; having been alarmed at a thought which struck him, that none of the messengers before him had hitherto come back again; and so, having counterfeited the seal, in order that if he were mistaken in his surmise, or if Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the writing, he might not discover it, he opened the letter, and found written in it—having suspected some additional order of the kind—directions to put him also to death.

Then, however, the ephors, on his showing them the letter, gave greater credence to it; but still wished to be ear-witnesses of Pausanias' saying something. When therefore, from a concerted plan, the man had gone to Taenarus as a suppliant, and had built himself a hut, divided into two by a partition wall, in which he concealed some of the ephors; and when Pausanias came to him, and asked the reason for his becoming a suppliant, they heard all distinctly; while the man charged him with what had been written, and set forth the other particulars, one by one, saying that he had never yet endangered him at all in his services with respect to the king, yet had been, just like the mass of his servants, preferred to death; and Pausanias acknowledged these very things, and desired him not to be angry for what had happened, but gave him the security of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to go as quickly as possible, and not to put an obstacle in the way of his designs.

After hearing him accurately, the ephors then went away, and having now certain knowledge [of his guilt], were preparing to arrest him in the city. But it is said that when he was just going to be arrested in the street, from seeing the face of one of the ephors as he approached him, he understood for what purpose he was coming; and on another of them making a secret nod, and out of kindness showing him [their object], he set off running to the temple of Minerva of the Brazen-House, and reached his place of refuge first; for the sacred ground was near at hand. To avoid suffering from exposure to the open air, he entered a building of no great size, which formed part of the temple, and remained quiet in it.

The ephors were at the moment distanced in the pursuit; but afterwards they took off the roof of the building; and having watched him in, and cut him off from egress, they barricaded the doors; and sitting down before the place, reduced him by starvation.

When he was on the point of expiring in his present situation in the building, on perceiving it, they took him out of the temple while still breathing;

and when he was taken out, he died immediately. They were going therefore to cast him, as they do malefactors, into the Caeadas; but afterwards they thought it best to bury him some where near But the god at Delphi subsequently ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to where he died, (and he now lies in the entrance to the sacred ground, as monumental columns declare in writing;) and as what had been done was a pollution to them, he ordered them to give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen-House. So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias.

The Athenians then, inasmuch as the god himself had decided this to be a pollution, retorted by commanding the Lacedaemonians to drive it out.—

Now the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians, and charged Themistocles also as an accomplice in the medizing of Pausanias, as they discovered from the examinations in his case; and demanded that he should be punished with the same penalties.

In compliance with this,

(he happened to have been ostracised, and though he had a residence at Argos, used to travel about to the rest of the Peloponnese,) they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were very ready to join in the pursuit, certain men who were told to bring him wherever they might fall in with him.

Themistocles, being aware of this beforehand, fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra; for he had been a benefactor to that people. But when the Corcyraeans alleged that they were afraid to keep him at the risk of incurring the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was carried over by them to the main-land opposite.

And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the work, as they heard on inquiry in what direction he was going, he was compelled in a strait to stop at the house of Admetus, the king of the Molossians, who was not on friendly terms with him.

He happened to be from home; but Themistocles, addressing himself as a suppliant to his wife, was instructed by her to take their child, and seat himself on the hearth.

And when Admetus came not long after, he declared who he was, and begged him not to avenge himself on a banished man, for whatever he himself might have urged against any request of his to the Athenians;

for in that case he would receive evil from the king, when he was far his inferior in power; whereas it was the part of a noble nature to avenge itself on its equals [alone], and on fair terms. Besides, he had himself opposed the king with regard to some request merely, and not on a point of bodily safety; whereas he, if he gave him up, (he mentioned by whom and for what he was being pursued, would deprive him of security of life.

The king, after hearing him, raised him up with his son (for so he was sitting with him, and this was the most prevailing mode of supplication).

And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came no long time after, he did not give him up; but as he wished to go to the king, sent him by land to the other sea, to Pydna, which was in Alexander's dominions. There he found a merchant vessel putting to sea for Ionia, and having gone on board, was carried by a storm to the armament of the Athenians, that was blockading Naxos.

In his fear he told the master who he was, (for he was unknown to those in the vessel,) and on what account he was flying; and said, that if he did not save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a pecuniary consideration; that their only hope of safety lay in no one's leaving the vessel till the voyage could be continued; and that if he complied with his request, he would remember him with becoming gratitude. The master did so; and after lying out at sea off the naval encampment a day and a night, subsequently arrived at Ephesus.

And Themistocles rewarded him by a present of money (for there came to him afterwards money from Athens, sent by his friends, and from Argos that which had been secretly laid up there): and having gone up the country with one of the Persians on the coast, he sent a letter to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who was lately come to the throne. The purport of the letter was this:

I Themistocles am come to thee, who have done most harm of all the Greeks to your house, as long as I was compelled to defend myself against thy father who had attacked me, but still far more good, when he was retreating in circumstances of safety to me, but of peril to him. And return for a benefit is owed me;

(he mentioned his sending to him from Salamis previous information of the retreat of the Greeks, and the non-destruction of the bridges at that time through his instrumentality, to which he falsely laid claim;)

and now I am come with power to do thee great good, being persecuted by the Greeks because of my friendship for thee. But I wish to wait a year, and then explain in person to thee the objects of my coming.

The king, it is said, approved of his plan, and told him to do so. During the time that he waited he learnt as much as he could of the Persian language, and the institutions of the country;

and having gone to him after the expiration of the year, he became an influential person with him, so as none of the Greeks had hitherto been, both on account of his previous reputation, and the hope which he suggested with regard to Greece, namely, that he would make it subject to him; but most of all, from his showing himself talented by actual proofs.

For Themistocles was one who most clearly displayed the strength of natural genius, and was particularly worthy of admiration in this respect, more than any other man: for by his own talent, and without learning any thing towards it before, or in addition to it, he was both the best judge of things present with the least deliberation, and the best conjecturer of the future, to the most remote point of what was likely to happen. Moreover, the things which he took in hand he was also able to carry out; and in those in which he had no experience he was not at a loss to form a competent judgment. He had too the greatest foresight of what was the better course or the worse in what was as yet unseen. In a word, by strength of natural talent, and shortness of study, he was the best of all men to do off-hand what was necessary.

He ended his life by disease; though some say that he purposely destroyed himself by poison, on finding that he was unable to perform what he had promised to the king.

Now there is a monument to him in the Asiatic Magnesia, in the market-place; for he was governor of the country, the king having given him

Magnesia, which brought him in fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus for wine, (for it was considered more productive of wine than any other place at that time,) and Myus for provisions in general.

But his relations say that his bones were carried, by his own command, and laid in Attica without the knowledge of the Athenians; for it was not lawful to give them burial, as they were the bones of a man banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who had been the most distinguished of all the Greeks in their day.

On the occasion then of their first embassy the Lacedaemonians gave orders to this effect, and received commands in return about driving out the accursed. But on going subsequently to the Athenians, they commanded them to raise the siege of Potidaea, and leave, Aegina independent; and declared, most especially and distinctly of all, that there would be no war, if they rescinded the decree respecting the Megareans, in which it had been declared that they should not use the ports in the Athenian empire, or the Attic market.

But the Athenians were neither disposed to obey them in the other points nor to rescind the decree; as they charged the Megareans with an encroaching cultivation of the consecrated and unenclosed land, and with receiving the run-away slaves.

Finally, when the last ambassadors had come from Lacedaemonians, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and mentioned none of the things which they usually had before, but simply this,

The Lacedaemonians are desirous that there should be peace; and there would be, if you were to leave the Greeks independent;

the Athenians called an assembly, and proposed the subject for their consideration, and resolved, once for all, to deliberate and answer respecting all their demands.

And many others came forward and spoke, supporting both views of the question; both that they should go to war, and that the decree should not be an obstacle to peace, but that they should rescind it: and then came forward Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the first man of the Athenians at that time, and most able both in speaking and acting, and advised them as follows.

"I always adhere to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should make no concessions to the Lacedaemonians; although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, according to results, they also change their views. Still I see that the same advice, or nearly the same, must be given by me now as before; and I claim from those of you who are being persuaded to war, that you will support the common resolutions, should we ever meet with any reverse; or not, on the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. For it frequently happens that the results of measures proceed no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man; and therefore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all things that turn out contrary to our expectation.

Now the Lacedaemonians were both evidently plotting against us before, and now especially are doing so. For whereas it is expressed in the treaty, that we should give and accept judicial decisions of our differences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what we have; they have neither themselves hitherto asked for such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it; but wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating.

For they command us to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megareans; while these last envoys that have come charge us also to leave the Greeks independent.

But let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle, if we did not rescind the decree respecting the Megareans, which they principally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any room for self-accusation hereafter, as though you had gone to war for a trivial thing.

For this trifle involves the whole confirmation, as well as trial, of your purpose. If you yield to these demands, you will soon also be ordered to do something greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear: but by resolutely refusing you would prove clearly to them that they must treat with you more on an equal footing.

"Henceforth then make up your minds, either to submit before you are hurt, or, if we go to war, as I think is better, on important or trivial grounds alike to make no concession, nor to keep with fear what we have now acquired; for both the greatest and the least demand from equals, imperiously urged on their neighbours previous to a judicial decision, amounts to the same degree of subjugation.

Now with regard to the war, and the means possessed by both parties, that we shall not be the weaker side, be convinced by hearing the particulars. The Peloponnesians are men who cultivate their land themselves;

and they have no money either in private or public funds. Then they are inexperienced in long and transmarine wars, as they only wage them with each other for a short time, owing to their poverty. And men of this description can neither man fleets nor often send out land armaments;

being at the same time absent from their private business, and spending from their own resource sand, moreover, being also shut out from the sea: but it is super-abundant revenues that support wars, rather than compulsory contributions.

And men who till the land themselves are more ready to wage war with their persons than with their money: feeling confident, with regard to the former, that they will escape from dangers; but not being sure, with regard to the latter, that they will not spend it before they have done; especially should the war be prolonged beyond their expectation, as [in this case] it probably may. For in one battle the Peloponnesians and their allies might cope with all the Greeks together;

but they could not carry on a war against resources of a different description to their own; since they have no one board of council, so as to execute any measure with vigour; and all having equal votes, and not being of the same races, each forwards his own interest; for which reasons nothing generally is brought to completion. For some of them wish to avenge themselves as much as possible on some particular party;

while others wish as little as possible to waste their own property. And after being slow in coming together, it is but during a small part of the time that they look to any of the general interests, while during the greater part they are contriving for their own. And each individual does not imagine that he will do any harm by his own neglect, but thinks that it is the business of every one else too to look out for himself; so that through the same idea being individually entertained by all, the common cause is collectively sacrificed without their observing it.

" Most of all will they be impeded by scarcity of money, while, through their slowness in providing it, they continue to delay their operations;

whereas the opportunities of war wait for no one. Neither, again, is their raising works against us worth fearing, or their fleet.

With regard to the former, it were difficult even in time of peace to set up a rival city; much more in a hostile country, and when we should have raised works no less against them:

and if they build [only] a fort, they might perhaps hurt some part of our land by incursions and desertions; it will not, however, be possible for them to prevent our sailing to their country and raising forts, and retaliating with our ships, in which we are so strong.

For we have more advantage for land-service from our naval skill, than they have for naval matters from their skill by land.

But to become skilful at sea will not easily be acquired by them.

For not even have you, though practising from the very time of the Median war, brought it to perfection as yet; how then shall men who are agriculturalists and not mariners, and, moreover, will not even be permitted to practise, from being always observed by us with many ships, achieve any thing worth speaking of?

Against a few ships observing them they might run the risk, encouraging their ignorance by their numbers; but when kept in check by many, they will remain quiet; and through not practising will be the less skilful, and therefore the more afraid. For naval service is a matter of art, like any thing else;

and does not admit of being practised just when it may happen, as a by-work; but rather does not even allow of any thing else being a by-work to it.

"Even if they should take some of the funds at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavour, by higher pay, to rob us of our foreign sailors, that would be alarming, if we were not a match for them, by going on board ourselves and our resident aliens; but now this is the case; and, what is best of all, we have native steersmen, and crews at large, more numerous and better than all the rest of Greece.

And with the danger before them, none of the foreigners would consent to fly his country, and at the same time with less hope of success to join them in the struggle, for the sake of a few days' higher pay. The circumstances of the Peloponnesians then seem, to me at least, to be of such or nearly such a character;

while ours seem both to be free from the faults I have found in theirs, and to have other great advantages in more than an equal degree.

Again, should they come by land against our country, we will sail against theirs; and the loss will be greater for even a part of' the Peloponnese to be ravaged, than for the whole of Attica. For they will not be able to obtain any land in its stead without fighting for it; while we have abundance, both in islands and on the mainland. Moreover, consider it [in this point of view]: if we had been islanders, who would have been more impregnable?

And we ought, as it is, with views as near as possible to those of islanders, to give up all thought of our land and houses, and keep watch over the sea and the city; and not, through being enraged on their account, to come to an engagement with the Peloponnesians, who are much more numerous; (for if we defeat them, we shall have to fight again with no fewer of them: and if we meet with a reverse, our allies are lost also; for they will not remain quiet if we are not able to lead our forces against them;) and we should make lamentation, not for the houses and land, but for the lives [that are lost]; for it is not these things that gain men, but men that gain these things. And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would bid you go out yourselves and ravage them, and show the Peloponnesians that you will not submit to them for these things, at any rate.

I have also many other grounds for hoping that we shall conquer, if you will avoid gaining additional dominion at the time of your being engaged in the war, and bringing on yourselves dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.

But those points shall be explained in another speech at the time of the events. At the present time let us send these men away with this answer: that with regard to the Megareans, we will allow them to use our ports and market, if the Lacedaemonians also abstain from expelling foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies ( for it forbids neither the one nor the other in the treaty): with regard to the states, that we will leave them independent, if we also held them as independent when we made the treaty; and when they too restore to the states a permission to be independent suitably to the interests, not of the Lacedaemonians themselves, but of the several states, as they wish: that we are willing to submit to judicial decision, according to the treaty: and that we will not commence hostilities, but will defend ourselves against those who do. For this is both a right answer and a becoming one for the state to give.

But you should know that go to war we must; and if we accept it willingly rather than not, we shall find the enemy less disposed to press us hard; and, moreover, that it is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honours also are gained, both by state and by individual.

Our fathers, at any rate, by withstanding the Medes—though they did not begin with such resources [as we have], but had even abandoned what they had—and by counsel, more than by fortune, and by daring, more than by strength, beat off the barbarian, and advanced those resources to their present height. And we must not fall short of them; but must repel our enemies in every way, and endeavour to bequeath our power to our posterity no less [than we received it].

Pericles spoke to this effect; and the Athenians, thinking that he gave them the best advice, voted as he desired them, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his views, both on the separate points, as he told them, and generally, that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to have their complaints settled by judicial decision, according to the treaty, on a fair and equal footing. So they went back home, and came on no more embassies afterwards.

These were the charges and differences that each side had before the war, beginning from the very time of the affairs at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless they continued to have intercourse during them, and to go to each other's country without any herald, though not without suspicion; for what was taking place served to break up the treaty, and was a pretext for war.