Book 2

The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and their respective allies now begins from this period, at which they ceased from further intercourse with each other without a herald, and having once proceeded to hostilities, carried them on continuously; and the history of it is written in order, as the several events happened, by summers and winters.

For the thirty years' truce which was made after the reduction of Euboea lasted fourteen years; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still two months to be archon at Athens; in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea, and in the beginning of spring, rather more than three hundred men of the Thebans, (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylidas, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Boeotarchs,) about the first watch entered with their arms into Plataea, a town of Boeotia, which was in alliance with the Athenians.

There were certain men of the Plataeans who called them in, and opened the gates to them, namely, Nauclides and his party, who wished, for the sake of their own power, to put to death those of the citizens who were opposed to them, and to put the city into the hands of the Thebans.

They carried on these negotiations through Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, a very influential person at Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing that the war would take place, wished to surprise Plataea, which had always been at variance with them, while it was still time of peace, and the war had not openly broken out. And on this account, too, they entered the more easily without being observed, as no guard had been set before [the gates].

After piling their arms in the market-place, they did not comply with the wish of those who called them in by immediately setting to work, and going to the houses of their adversaries; but determined to make a proclamation in friendly terms, and to bring the city to an agreement rather, and to friendship; and the herald proclaimed, that whoever wished to make alliance according to the hereditary principles of all the Boeotians, should come and pile his arms with them, supposing that the city would easily come over to them by this method.

The Plataeans, on finding that the Thebans were within their walls, and that their city was unexpectedly taken, being very much alarmed, and thinking that far more had entered than really had, (for they did not see them in the night,) came to an agreement, and having accepted the terms, remained quiet; especially since they were proceeding to no violent measures against any one.

But by some means or other while making these negotiations, they observed that the Thebans were not numerous, and thought that by attacking them they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the great body of the Plataeans to revolt from the Athenians.

They determined therefore to make the attempt; and proceeded to join each other by digging through the partition-walls [of their houses], that they might not be seen going through the streets; and set waggons without the cattle in the streets, to serve for a barricade; and got every thing else ready, as each seemed likely to be of service for the business in hand.

When things were in readiness, as far as they could make them so, having watched for the time when it was still night and just about day-break, they began to go out of their houses against them; that they might not attack them by day-light, when they would be more bold, and on equal terms with themselves, but in the night, when they would be more timid, and fight at a disadvantage through their own acquaintance with the city. So they assailed them immediately, and came to close quarters with them as quickly as they could.

The Thebans, on finding themselves outwitted, proceeded to close their ranks, and repel their attacks, wherever they might fall upon them.

And twice or thrice they beat them off; but afterwards, when the men were assailing them with a great clamour, and the women and slaves were raising a loud shouting and screaming from the houses, and pelting them with stones and tiles, and a violent rain also had come on in the night, they were frightened, and turned and fled through the city, the greater part of them, through the dark and dirt, (for the event happened at the end of the month,) being unacquainted with the ways out, by which they were to save themselves; while they had pursuers who were acquainted with them, to prevent their escaping: so that many were put to death.

Moreover, one of the Plataeans had shut the gate by which they had entered, and which was the only one opened, by driving the spike of a spear into the bar, instead of a bolt; so that there was no longer any way out even by that.

As they were chased up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, and perished most of them: others came to a lone gate, and, a woman having given them an axe, cut through the bar without being observed, and went out, but in no great numbers, for it was quickly discovered; while others met their fate scattered about in different parts of the city.

But the largest and most united body of them rushed into a spacious building which joined on to the wall, and the near door of which happened to be open, thinking that the door of the building was a gate [of the city], and that there was a passage straight through to the outside.

When the Plataeans saw them cut off, they consulted whether they should burn them where they were, by setting fire to the building, or treat them in any other way.

At last, both those and all the rest of the Thebans that were yet alive, and wandering up and down the city, agreed to deliver up themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to do with them as they pleased.

Thus then fared the party who were in Plataea.

The rest of the Thebans, who were to have joined them with all their forces while it was still night, in case those who had entered should be at all unsuccessful, on receiving on their march the tidings of what had happened, advanced to their succour.

Now Plataea is seventy stades distant from Thebes, and the rain which had fallen in the night made them proceed the slower; for the river Asopus was flowing with a full stream, and was not to be crossed easily.

So by marching through the rain, and having passed the river with difficulty, they arrived too late; as some of the men had been by this time slain, and others of them were kept alive as prisoners.

When the Thebans learned what had happened, they formed a design against those of the Plataeans who were outside the city, (for there were both men and stock in the fields, inasmuch as the evil had happened unexpectedly in time of peace,) for they wished to have all they could take to exchange for their own men within, should any happen to have been taken alive. Such were their plans.

But the Plataeans, while they were still deliberating, having suspected that there would be something of this kind, and being alarmed for those outside, sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had not acted justly in what had been done, by endeavouring to seize their city in time of treaty; and told them not to injure what was without; else they also would put to death the men whom they had alive in their hands; but if they withdrew again from the territory, they would give the men back to them.

The Thebans give this account of the matter, and say that they swore to it. But the Plataeans do not acknowledge that they promised to give back the men immediately, but when proposals had first been made, in case of their coming to any agreement: and they deny that they wore to it.

At any rate the Thebans retired from the territory without having done any injury; but the Plataeans, after getting in as quickly as possible whatever they had in the country, immediately put the men to death. Those who had been taken were one hundred and eighty, and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had negotiated, was one of them.

When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged matters in the city to suit their present circumstances, as seemed best to them.—Now news had immediately been taken to the Athenians of what had been done with respect to the Plataeans;

and they straightway seized as many of the Boeotians as were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea, with orders to forbid their proceeding to extremities, in the case of the Thebans whom they had in their hands, till they also should take counsel about them:

for tidings of their being dead had not yet reached them. For the first messenger [of the Plataeans] had gone out at the very time of the entering of the Thebans; and the second, when they had just been conquered and taken: so that of the subsequent events they knew nothing. Thus then the Athenians were in ignorance when they sent their order; and the herald, on his arrival, found the men slain.

After this the Athenians marched to Plataea, and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in it, and took out the least efficient of the men with the women and children.

When the business at Plataea had occurred, and the treaty had been clearly broken, the Athenians began to prepare for going to war; and so did the Lacedaemonians and their allies, both intending to send embassies to the king, and to the barbarians in other parts, from whatever quarter either party hoped to gain any assistance, and bringing into alliance with them such states as were not in their power.

And on the side of the Lacedaemonians, in addition to the ships already on the spot in Sicily and Italy, belonging to those who had espoused their cause, they were ordered to build more according to the greatness of the cities, so that in the whole number they should amount to five hundred; and to get ready a certain sum of money which was mentioned, while they remained quiet in other respects, and received the Athenians coming with a single ship, till these preparations should be made.

The Athenians, on the other hand, were inspecting their present confederacy, and sending ambassadors to the countries more immediately around the Peloponnese, as Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; seeing that if these were firm friends to them, they would successfully carry on the war round the Peloponnese.

Indeed both parties had no small designs, but put forth their strength to the war: and not unnaturally; for all men at the beginning apply themselves to it more eagerly; and at that time the young men, being numerous in the Peloponnese, and also at Athens, were, through their inexperience, not unwilling to engage in the war. And the rest of Greece was all in excitement at the conflict of the principal states.

And many prophecies were repeated, and reciters of oracles were singing many of them, both amongst those who were going to war and in the other states.

Moreover, Delos had been visited by an earthquake a short time before this, though it had never had a shock before in the memory of the Greeks; and it was said and thought to have been ominous of what was about to take place. And whatever else of this kind had happened to occur was all searched up.

The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians, especially as they gave out that they were the liberators of Greece. And every individual, as well as state put forth his strength to help them in whatever he could, both by word and deed,; and each thought that the cause was impeded at that point at which he himself would not be present. So angry were the generality with the Athenians;

some from a wish to be released from their dominion, others from a fear of being brought under it. With such preparations and feelings then did they enter on the contest.

Each party had the following states in alliance when they set to the war. The allies of the Lacedaemonians were these:

all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achaeans (these were in friendship with both parties; and the Pellenians were the only people of the Achaeans that joined in the war at first, though afterwards all of them did); and without the Peloponnese, the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.

Of these, the states which furnished a navy were the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. Those that supplied cavalry were the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The rest of them sent infantry. This then was the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

That of the Athenians comprehended the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians at Naupactus, the greater part of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, the Zacynthians: also some other states which were tributary amongst the following nations; as the maritime parts of Caria, and Doris adjacent to it, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Greek towns Thrace-ward; the islands, which were situated between the Peloponnese and Crete, towards the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades except Melos and Thera.

Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans furnished a naval force, the rest of them infantry and money.

Such was the confederacy on each side, and their resources for the war.

The Lacedaemonians, immediately after what had happened at Plataea, sent round orders through the Peloponnese and the rest of their confederacy, for the states to prepare an army and such provisions as it was proper to have for a foreign expedition, with a view to invading Attica.

When they had each got ready by the appointed time, two thirds from every state assembled at the Isthmus.

And after the whole army was mustered, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who led this expedition, summoned to his presence the generals of all the states, and those highest in office and of most importance, and spoke to the following purport:

Men of the Peloponnese and allies, both our fathers made many expeditions, as well in the Peloponnese as out of it, and the elder part of ourselves are not without experience in wars. Never yet, however, have we marched out with a greater force than this; but we are now going against a most powerful state, and with a most numerous and most excellently equipped army on our own side.

We ought then to show ourselves neither inferior to our fathers, nor degenerated from our own character. For the whole of Greece has its expectation raised, and is paying attention to this attack, with good wishes that we may succeed in our designs, through their hatred of the Athenians.

Though, then, some may think that we are making the attack with superior numbers, and that it is very certain our adversaries will not meet us in battle, we must not, for this reason, go at all less carefully prepared; but both the general and soldier of each state should, as far as concerns himself, be always expecting to come into danger. For the events of war are uncertain, and attacks are generally made in it with short notice, and under the impulse of passion;

frequently, too, has the less number, through being afraid, more successfully repelled the more numerous forces, through their being unprepared in consequence of their contempt.

In the enemy's country indeed men ought always to march with boldness of feeling, but at the same time to make their actual preparations with a degree of fear; for in this way they would be at once most full of courage for attacking their adversaries, and most secure against being attacked.

But in our own case, we are not going against a state that is so powerless to defend itself, but against one most excellently provided with every thing; so that we must fully expect that they will meet us in battle; and if they have not already set out before we are there, yet [that they will do so], when they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their property.

For all are angry, when suffering any unwonted evil, to see it done before their eyes, and in their very presence: and those who [on such provocation] reflect the least, set to work with the greatest passion [to avenge themselves].

And it is natural that the Athenians should do so even to a greater extent than other, since they presume to rule the rest of the world, and to go against and ravage their neighbours' land, rather than see their own ravaged.

As then we are marching against a state of this description, and shall gain for our forefathers, as well as for ourselves, the most decided character, one way or the other, from the results; follow where any one may lead you valuing order and caution above every thing, and with quickness receiving your commands. For this is the finest and the safest thing that can be seen, for a large body of men to show themselves maintaining uniform discipline.

Having thus spoken, and dismissed the assembly, Archidamus first sent Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens; in case the Athenians might be more disposed to submit, when they saw that the Peloponnesians were now on their march. But they did not admit him into the city, nor to their assembly;

for the opinion of Pericles had previously been adopted, not to admit any herald with an embassy from the Lacedaemonians, when they had once marched out from their frontiers. They sent him back therefore before hearing him, and ordered him to beyond the borders that same day, and [to tell those who sent him] that in future, if they wished to propose any thing, they should send ambassadors after they had retired to their own territories.

And they sent an escort with Melesippus, to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he was on the frontiers, and was about to be dismissed, he spoke these words and departed

This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece.

When he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus found that the Athenians would not yet submit at all, he then set out and advanced with his army into their territory.

At the same time, the Boeotians, while they furnished their contingent and their cavalry to join the Peloponnesians in their expedition, went to Plataea with the remainder of their force, and laid waste their land.

While the Peloponnesians were still assembling at the Isthmus, and were on their march, before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, who was general of the Athenians with nine colleagues, when he found that the invasion would take place, suspected that either Archidamus, because he happened to be his friend, might frequently pass over his lands, and not ravage them, from a personal wish to oblige him; or that this might be done at the command of the Lacedaemonians for the purpose of raising a slander against him —as it was also with reference to him that they had charged them to drive out the accursed; and therefore he publicly declared to the Athenians in the assembly, that though Archidamus was his friend, he had not been admitted into his friendship for any harm to the state; should, then, the enemy not lay waste his lands and houses, like those of the rest, he gave them up to be public property, and that no suspicion might arise against him on these grounds.

He gave them advice also on their present affairs, the same as he had before given; namely, to prepare for the war, and bring in their property from the country, and not go out against them to battle, but to come in and guard the city, and get ready their fleet, in which they were so strong, and keep the allies tight in hand; reminding them that their main strength was derived from the returns of the money paid by these, and that most of the advantages in war were gained by counsel and abundance of money.

And [on this head] he told them to be of good courage, as the state had, on an average, six hundred talents coming in yearly as tribute from the allies, not reckoning its other sources of income; while there were still at that time in the Acropolis 6000 talents of coined silver;

(for the greatest sum there had ever been was 9700 talents, from which had been taken what was spent on the propylaea of the citadel, and the other buildings, and on Potidaea;) and besides, of uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, and all the sacred utensils for the processions and games, and the Median spoils, and every thing else of the kind, there was not less than 500 talents.

Moreover, he added the treasures in the other temples, to no small amount, which they would use; and, in case of their being absolutely excluded from all resources, even the golden appendages of the goddess herself; explaining to them that the statue contained 40 talents of pure gold, and that it was all removable; and after using it for their preservation they must, he said, restore it to the same amount.

With regard to money, then, he thus encouraged them. And as for heavy-armed troops, he told them that they had thirteen thousand, besides those in garrisons and on the ramparts to the number of sixteen thousand.

For this was the number that kept guard at first, whenever the enemy made an incursion, drawn from the oldest and the youngest, and such of the resident aliens as were heavyarmed. For of the Phaleric wall there were five and thirty stades to the circuit of the city wall; and of that circuit itself the guarded part was three and forty stades; a certain part of it being unguarded, viz. that between the long wall and the Phaleric. There were also the long walls to the Piraeus, a distance of forty states, of which the outer one was manned; while the whole circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was sixty stades, though the guarded part was only half that extent. Of cavalry, again, he showed them that they had twelve hundred, including mounted bowmen;

with sixteen hundred bowmen [on foot], and three hundred triremes fit for service.

These resources, and no fewer than these in their several kinds, had the Athenians, when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first going to be made, and when they were setting to the war. Other statements also did Pericles make to them, as he was accustomed, to prove that they would have the superiority in the war.

The Athenians were persuaded by what they heard from him; and proceeded to bring in from the country their children and wives, and all the furniture which they used in their houses, pulling down even the wood-work of their residences; while they sent their sheep and cattle over to Euboea and the adjacent islands.

But the removal was made by them with reluctance, from the greater part having always been accustomed to live in the country.

This had, from the very earliest times, been the case with the Athenian; more than with others. For under Cecrops, and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, the population of Athens had always inhabited independent cities, with their own guild-halls and magistrates; and at such times as they were not in fear of any danger, they did not meet the king to consult with him, but themselves severally conducted their own government, and took their own counsel;

and there were instances in which some of them even waged war [against him], as the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did against Erectheus. But when Theseus had come to the throne, who along with wisdom had power also, he both regulated the country in other respects, and having abolished the council-houses and magistracies of the other cities, he brought them all into union with the present city, assigning them one guild-hall and one council-house; and compelled them all, while they enjoyed each their own property as before, to use this one city only; which, since all were counted as belonging to it, became great, and was so bequeathed by Theseus to those who came after him. And from that time even to this the Athenians keep, at the public expense, a festival to the goddess, called

Synoecia.

Before that time, what is now the citadel was the city, with the district which lies under it, looking chiefly towards the south.

And this is a proof of it; the temples of the other gods as well [as of Minerva] are in the citadel itself, and those that are out of it are situated chiefly in this part of the city; as that of the Olympian Jupiter, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra and of Bacchus in Limnae, in whose honour the more ancient festival of Bacchus is held on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion; as the Ionians also, who are descended from the Athenians, even to this day observe it. And there are other ancient temples also situated in this quarter.

The conduit too, which is now called Enneacrunus, [or, nine-pipes,] from the tyrants having so constituted it, but which had formerly the name of Calirrhoe, when the springs were open, the men of that day used, as it was near, on the most important occasions; and even at the present time they are accustomed, from the old fashion, to use the water before marriages, and for other sacred purposes.

Moreover, from their living of old in this quarter, the citadel even to this day is called by the Athenians the city.

For a long time then the Athenians enjoyed their independent life in the country; and after they were united, still, from the force of habit, the generality of them at that early period, and even afterwards, down to the time of this war, having with all their families settled and lived in the country, did not remove without reluctance, (especially as they had but lately recovered their establishments after the Median war,) but were distressed and grieved to leave their houses, and the temples which, according to the spirit of the ancient constitution, had always been regarded by them as the places of their hereditary worship;

going, as they now were, to change their mode of life, and each of them doing what was equivalent to leaving his native city.

When they came into the city, some few indeed had residences, and a place of refuge with some of their friends or relations; but the great bulk of them dwelt in the unoccupied parts of the city, and in all the temples and hero-chapels, except the Acropolis, and the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and any other that was kept constantly locked up. The Pelasgium also, as it is called, under the Acropolis, which it was even forbidden by a curse to inhabit, and prohibited by the end of a Pythian oracle, to this effect, the Pelasgium is better unoccupied, was, nevertheless, built over, from the immediate necessity of the case. And, in my opinion, the oracle proved true in the contrary way to what was expected.

For it was not, I think, because of their unlawfully inhabiting this spot, that such misfortunes befell the city; but it was owing to the war that the necessity of inhabiting it arose; which war though the god did not mention, he foreknew that [owing to it] the Pelasgium would hereafter be inhabited for no good.

Many, too, quartered themselves in the towers of the walls, and in whatever way each could: for the city did not hold them when they were come all together; but subsequently they occupied the long walls, partitioning them out amongst them, and the greater part of the Piraeus.

At the same time they also applied themselves to matters connected with the war; mustering their allies, and equipping an armament of a hundred ships for the Peloponnese.

The Athenians then were in this state of preparation.

As for the army of the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, the first town it came to in Attica was Oenoe, at which point they intended to make their inroad.

And having sat down before it, they prepared to make assaults on the wall, both with engines and in every other way. For Oenoe, as lying on the frontiers of Attica and Boeotia, had been surrounded with a wall, and the Athenians used it as a garrisoned fort, whenever any war befell them.

They prepared then for assaulting it, and wasted their time about it to no purpose. And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest censure: though he had, even while the war was gathering, been thought to show a want of spirit, and to favour the Athenians, by not heartily recommending hostilities. And again, after the army was mustered, the stay that was made at the Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, gave occasion for charges against him, but most of all his stopping at Oenoe.

For the Athenians during this time were carrying in their property, and the Peloponnesians thought that by advancing against them quickly they would have found every thing still out, but for his dilatoriness.

Such resentment did the army feel towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, was waiting in expectation that the Athenians would give in, while their land was still unravaged, and would shrink from enduring to see it wasted.

When, however, after assaulting Oenoe, and trying every method, they were unable to take the place, and the Athenians sent no herald to them, then indeed they set out from before it, and about eighty days after the events at Plataea, caused by the Thebans who had entered it, when the summer was at its height, and the corn ripe, they made their incursion into Attica; Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, being their commander.

After pitching their camp there, they first ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and put to flight some Athenian cavalry near a place called Rheiti [or the brooks

]. Afterwards they continued their march, keeping Mount Aegaleos on their right through Cropaea, till they came to Acharnae, a place which is the largest of the demes, [or townships,] as they are called, of Attica. And sitting down before it they formed an encampment, and stayed a long time in the place, and continued ravaging it.

It was with the following views that Archidamus is said to have remained in order of battle at Acharnae, and not to have gone down to the plain during that incursion.

He hoped that the Athenians, abounding as they were in numbers of young men, and prepared for war as they had never before been, would perhaps come out against him, and not stand still and see their land ravaged.

Since, then, they had not met him at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, he pitched his camp at Acharnae, and tried whether they would now march out against him.

For he thought the post a favourable one for encamping in, and moreover that the Acharnians, forming as they did a large part of the state, (for they amounted to three thousand heavy-armed,) would not overlook the destruction of what belonged to them, but would stir up the whole army also to an engagement. If, on the other hand, the Athenians should not come out against him during that incursion, he would then lay waste the plain with less fear in future, and advance to the city itself; for the Acharnians, after losing their own property, would not be so forward to run into danger for that of other people, but there would be a division in their counsels.

It was with this view of the case that Archidamus remained at Acharnae.

As for the Athenians, so long as the army was in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they had some hope of its not advancing nearer; remembering the case of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, the king of the Lacedaemonians, when with a Peloponnesian army he made an inroad into Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, fourteen years before this war, and retired again without advancing any further (for which reason indeed he was banished from Sparta, as he was thought to have been bribed to make the retreat).

When, however, they saw the army at Acharnae, only sixty stades from the city, they considered it no longer bearable, and, as was natural, when their land was being ravaged before their eyes—a thing which the younger men had never yet seen, nor even the elder, except in the Persian wars—it was thought a great indignity, and all of them, especially the young men, determined to go out against them, and not to put up with it.

They met therefore in knots and were in a state of great dissension, some urging them to go out, others dissuading them from it. Prophets too were repeating all kinds of oracles, to which they eagerly listened, as they were severally disposed. The Acharnians especially, thinking that no considerable part of the Athenian forces was in their ranks, urged them to march out, while their land was being ravaged. Nay, in every way the city was excited; and they were angry with Pericles, and remembered none of the advice which he had before given them, but abused him for not leading them out, as their general; and they regarded him as the author of all that they were suffering.

He, in the mean time, seeing them angry at the present state of things, and not in the best mind; and being confident that he took a right view in not wishing to march out against the enemy, did not call them to an assembly, or any other meeting (that they might not commit themselves by coming together with more anger than judgment);

but looked to the defence of the city and kept it quiet, as far as possible. He was, however, continually sending out cavalry, to prevent the advanced guard of the army from falling on the estates near the city and ravaging them. There was also a skirmish of cavalry at Phrygia, between one squadron of the Athenian horse, joined by some Thessalians, and the cavalry of the Boeotians, in which the Athenians and Thessalians had rather the advantage, until, on the heavy-armed coming to the succour of the Boeotians, they were routed, and some few of them killed: they took up their bodies however on the same day without a truce;

and the Peloponnesians erected a trophy the day after. This assistance on the part of the Thessalians was given to the Athenians on the ground of their ancient alliance; and those who came to them consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, [Parasians,] Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. Their commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, each from his own faction, and Menon from Pharsalus. The rest also had their commanders according to their respective cities.

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not come out against them to battle, broke up from before Acharnae, and proceeded to ravage some others of the townships between Mount Parnes and Brilessus.

While they were in the country, the Athenians despatched round the Peloponnese the hundred ships they were preparing, [when I last mentioned them,] with a thousand heavy-armed on board, and four hundred bowmen under the command of Caranus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes.

So they weighed anchor, and were cruising round with this armament; while the Peloponnesians, after staying in Attica the time for which they had provisions, retired through Boeotia, (not by the same way they had made their inroad,) and passing by Oropus ravaged the Piraic territory, as it is called, which the Oropians inhabit as subjects of the Athenians. On arriving at the Peloponnese, they were disbanded, and returned to their several cities.

When they had retired, the Athenians set guards by land and by sea, as they intended to keep them through the whole war. And they resolved to take out and set apart a thousand talents from the money in the Acropolis, and not to spend them, but to carry on the war with their other resources; and if any one should move or put to the vote a proposition for applying that money to any other purpose, except in case of the enemy sailing against the city with a naval armament, and its being necessary to defend themselves, they declared it a capital offence.

Together with this sum of money, they also laid by a hundred triremes, the best they had each year, and trierarchs for them; none of which were they to use except with the money, and in the same peril [as that was reserved for], should any such necessity arise.

The Athenians on board the hundred ships around Peloponnese, and the Corcyraeans with them, who had come to their aid with fifty ships, and some others of the allies in those parts, ravaged other places as they cruised round, and landed at Methone in Laconia, and assaulted the wall, which was weak and had no men within it.

Now Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in command of a guard for the defence of those parts; and, on hearing of the attack, he came to the assistance of those in the place with a hundred heavy-armed. Dashing, therefore, through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country, and had its attention directed towards the wall, he threw himself into Methone; and having lost a few of his own men in entering it, both saved the city, and from this daring deed was the first that received praise at Sparta in the course of the war.

Upon this the Athenians weighed anchor, and coasted along; and landing at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the territory for two days, and conquered in battle three hundred picked men, who had come to the rescue from the inhabitants of the Vale of Elis, and from the Eleans in the immediate neighbourhood.

But a violent wind coming down upon them, being exposed to the storm in a harbourless place, the greater part of them went on board their ships, and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys, into the port at Pheia; but the Messenians, and some others who would not go on board, went in the mean time by land, and took Pheia.

Afterwards the fleet sailed round and picked them up, and they evacuated the place and put out to sea; the main army of the Eleans having by this time come to its rescue. The Athenians then coasted along to other places and ravaged them.

About the same time they sent out thirty ships to cruise about Locris, and also to serve as a guard for Euboea.

Their commander was Cleopompus, son of Clinias, who, making descents, ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium, and took hostages from them; defeating also, in a battle at Alope, those of the Locrians who had come to the rescue.

This summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from their island, themselves, their children, and wives, charging them with being the chief authors of the war they were engaged in; besides Which, it appeared safer to send settlers of their own to hold Aegina, lying so near as it does to the Peloponnese. No long time after therefore they sent the colonists to it;

while to the Aeginetans who were expelled the Lacedaemonians gave Thyrea to live in, and the territory to occupy, as well on the ground of their quarrel with the Athenians, as because they had been benefactors to themselves at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, stretching down to the sea. So some of them dwelt there, while others were scattered through the rest of Greece.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, (the only time at which it appears possible,) the sun was eclipsed after mid-day, and became full again after it had assumed a crescent form, and after some of the stars had shone out.

It was also in the course of the same summer that Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister was the wife of Sitalces, and who had great influence with that monarch, was made their proxenus by the Athenians, who had before considered him hostile to them, and was sent for by them, because they wished Sitalces, son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally.

Now this Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first who founded the great kingdom of the Odrysae on a larger scale than those in the rest of Thrace;

for indeed a large part of the Thracians are independent. This Teres is not at all connected with Tereus who married from Athens Procne, the daughter of Pandion; nor were they of the same part of Thrace. The latter lived in Daulis, a part of what is now called Phocis, which was then inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the [cruel] deed to Itys, and by many of the poets, when they mention the nightingale, it is called the Daulian bird. Besides, it is probable that Pandion should have formed the connexion for his daughter [with one who lived] at that distance, with a view to mutual succour, rather than at the distance of several days' journey, [as it is] to the Odrysae. On the other hand, Teres, besides not having the same name, was the first king of the Odrysae that attained to any power.

Sitalecs then, being this man's son, the Athenians made their ally, wishing him to join them in conquering the Thrace-ward towns and Perdiccas.

So Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance with Sitalces, and made his own son Sadocus a citizen of Athens, and undertook to bring to a close the war on the side of Thrace; for he said he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers.

Moreover, he reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and also persuaded them to restore Therme to him; and Perdiccas immediately joined in an expedition against the Chalcidians with the Athenians and Phormio.

Thus Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, as also did Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels, still cruising around the Peloponnese, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, and gave it up to the Palaereans alone of the Acarnanians, to enjoy the territory and city; and having stormed Astacus, of which Evarchus was tyrant, they expelled him, and won the place for their confederacy.

They then sailed to the island of Cephallenia, and brought it over to their side without fighting. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long after, the ships returned to Athens.

About the autumn of this summer, the Athenians invaded the Megarid with all their forces, themselves and the resident aliens, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. And the Athenians in the hundred ships around the Peloponnese, (for they happened at this time to be at Aegina on their return home,) finding that the men of the city were in full force at Megara, sailed and joined them. And this was certainly the largest army of the Athenians that ever assembled together;

as the city was at the height of its strength, and not yet afflicted with the plague; for of the Athenians themselves there were not fewer than ten thousand heavy-armed, (besides which they had the three thousand at Potidaea,) and of resident aliens who joined them in the incursion not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed; and added to these, there was all the crowd of light-armed in great numbers. After ravaging the greater part of the territory, they returned.

Other incursions into the Megarid were also afterwards made annually by the Athenians in the course of the war, both with their cavalry and with all their force, until Nisaea was taken by them.

Moreover Atalanta, the island near the Opuntian Locrians, which had previously been unoccupied, was fortified by the Athenians as a stronghold at the close of this summer, to prevent privateers from sailing out from Opus and the rest of Locris, and plundering Euboea. These were the events which occurred in the course of this summer, after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

The following winter Evarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy-armed and restore him, he himself hiring some auxiliaries besides: the commanders of the army were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. So they sailed and restored him;

and wishing to gain certain places in the rest of Acarnania, along the coast, and having made an attempt without being able to succeed, they sailed back homeward.

Having landed, as they coasted along, on Cephallenia, and made a descent on the territory of the Cranians, they were deceived by them after an arrangement that they had come to, and lost some of their men in an unexpected attack of the Cranians; then, having put out to sea with some precipitation, they returned home.

In the course of this winter the Athenians, in accordance with the custom of their forefathers, buried at the public expense those who had first fallen in this war, after the following manner.

Having erected a tent, they lay out the bones of the dead three days before, and each one brings to his own relative whatever [funeral offering] he pleases.

When the funeral procession takes place, cars convey coffins of cypress wood, one for each tribe; in which are laid the bones of every man, according to the tribe to which he belonged; and one empty bier is carried, spread in honour of the missing, whose bodies could not be found to be taken up.

Whoever wishes, both of citizens and strangers, joins in the procession; and their female relatives attend at the burial to make the wailings.

They lay them then in the public sepulchre, which is in the fairest suburb of the city, and in which they always bury those who have fallen in the wars (except, at least, those who fell at Marathon; but to them, as they considered their valour distinguished above that of all others, they gave a burial on the very spot).

After they have laid them in the ground, a man chosen by the state—one who in point of intellect is considered talented, and in dignity is pre-eminent— speaks over them such a panegyric as may be appropriate; after which they all retire. In this way they bury them:

and through the whole of the war, whenever they had occasion, they observed the established custom. Over these who were first buried at any rate, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak.

And when the time for doing so came, advancing from the sepulchre on to a platform, which had been raised to some height, that he might be heard over as great a part of the crowd as possible, he spoke to the following effect:

"The greater part of those who ere now have spoken in this place, have been accustomed to praise the man who introduced this oration into the law; considering it a right thing that it should be delivered over those who are buried after falling in battle. To me, however, it would have appeared sufficient, that when men had shown themselves brave by deeds, their honours also should be displayed by deeds—as you now see in the case of this burial, prepared at the public expense—and not that the virtues of many should be perilled in one individual, for credit to be given him according as he expresses himself well or ill.

For it is difficult to speak with propriety on a subject on which even the impression of one's truthfulness is with difficulty established. For the hearer who is acquainted [with the facts], and kindly disposed [towards those who performed them], might perhaps think them somewhat imperfectly set forth, compared with what he both wishes and knows; while he who is unacquainted with them might think that some points were even exaggerated, being led to this conclusion by envy, should he hear any thing surpassing his own natural powers. For praises spoken of others are only endured so far as each one thinks that he is himself also capable of doing any of the things he hears;

but that which exceeds their own capacity men at once envy and disbelieve. since, however our ancestors judged this to be a right custom, I too, in obedience to the law, must endeavour to meet the wishes and views of every one, as far as possible.

"I will begin then with our ancestors first: for it is just, and becoming too at the same time, that on such an occasion the honour of being thus mentioned should be paid them. For always inhabiting the country without change, through a long succession of posterity, by their valour they transmitted it free to this very time.

Justly then may they claim to be commended; and more justly still may our own fathers. For in addition to what they inherited, they acquired the great empire which we possess, and by painful exertions bequeathed it to us of the present day:

though to most part of it have additions been made by ourselves here, who are still, generally speaking, in the vigour of life; and we have furnished our city with every thing, so as to be most self-sufficient both for peace and for war.

Now with regard to our military achievements, by which each possession was gained, whether in any case it were ourselves, or our fathers, that repelled with spirit hostilities brought against us by barbarian or Greek; as I do not wish to enlarge on the subject before you who are well acquainted with it, I will pass them over. But by what a mode of life we attained to our power, and by what form of government and owing to what habits it became so great, I will explain these points first, and then proceed to the eulogy of these men; as I consider that on the present occasion they will not be inappropriately mentioned, and that it is profitable for the whole assembly, both citizens and strangers, to listen to them.

" For we enjoy a form of government which does not copy the laws of our neighbours; but we are ourselves rather a pattern to others than imitators of them. In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the few, but of the many it is called a democracy; but with regard to its laws, all enjoy equality, as concerns their private differences; while with regard to public rank, according as each man has reputation for any thing, he is preferred for public honours, not sc much from consideration of party, as of merit; nor, again, on the ground of poverty, while he is able to do the state any good service, is he prevented by the obscurity of his position.

We are liberal then in our public administration; and with regard to mutual jealousy of our daily pursuits, we are not angry with our neighbor, if he does any thing to please himself; nor wear on our countenance offensive looks, which though harmless, are yet unpleasant.

While, however, in private matters we live together agreeably, in public matters, under the influence of fear, we most carefully abstain from transgression, through our obedience to those who are from time to time in office, and to the laws; especially such of them as are enacted for the benefit of the injured, and such as, though unwritten, bring acknowledged disgrace [on those who break them].

"Moreover, we have provided for our spirits the most numerous recreations from labours, by celebrating games and sacrifices through the whole year, and by maintaining elegant private establishments, of which the daily gratification drives away sadness.

Owing to the greatness too of our city, every thing from every land is imported into it; and it is our lot to reap with no more peculiar enjoyment the good things which are produced here, than those of the rest of the world likewise.

"In the studies of war also we differ from our enemies in the following respects. We throw our city open to all, and never, by the expulsion of strangers, exclude any one from either learning or observing things, by seeing which unconcealed any of our enemies might gain an advantage; for we trust not so much to preparations and stratagems, as to our own valour for daring deeds. Again, as to our modes of education, they aim at the acquisition of a manly character, by laborious training from their very youth; while we, though living at our ease, no less boldly advance to meet equal dangers.

As a proof of this, the Lacedaemonians never march against our country singly, but with all [their confederates] together: while we, generally speaking, have no difficulty in conquering in battle upon hostile ground those who are standing up in defence of their own. And no enemy ever yet encountered our whole united force, through our attending at the same time to our navy, and sending our troops by land on so many different services:

but wherever they have engaged with any part of it, if they conquer only some of us, they boast that we were all routed by them; and if they are conquered, they say it was by all that they were beaten.

And yet if with careless ease rather than with laborious practice, and with a courage which is the result not so much of laws as of natural disposition, we are willing to face danger, we have the advantage of not suffering beforehand from coming troubles, and of proving ourselves, when we are involved in them, no less bold than those who are always toiling; so that our country is worthy of admiration in these respects, and in others besides.

"For we study taste with economy, and philosophy without effeminacy; and employ wealth rather for opportunity of action than for boastfulness of talking; while poverty is nothing disgraceful for a man to confess, but not to escape it by exertion is more disgraceful.

Again, the same men can attend at the same time to domestic as well as to public affairs; and others, who are engaged with business, can still form a sufficient judgment on political questions. For we are the only people that consider the man who takes no part in these things, not as unofficious but as useless an we ourselves Judge rightly of measures, at any rate, if we do not originate them; while we do not regard words as any hinderance to deeds, but rather [consider it a hinderance] not to have been previously instructed by word, before undertaking in deed what we have to do.

For we have this characteristic also in a remarkable degree, that we are at the same time most daring and most calculating in what we take in an hand; whereas to other men it is ignorance that brings daring, while calculation brings fear. Those, however, would deservedly be deemed most courageous, who know most fully what is terrible and what is pleasant, and yet do not on this account shrink from dangers. As regards beneficence also we differ from the generality of men;

for we make friends, not by receiving, but by conferring kindness. Now he who has conferred the favour is the firmer friend, in order that he may keep alive the obligation by good will towards the man on whom he has conferred it; whereas he who owes it in return feels less keenly, knowing that it is not as a favour, but as a debt, that he will repay the kindness.

Nay, we are the only men who fearlessly benefit any one, not so much from calculations of expediency, as with the confidence of liberality.

"In short, I say that both the whole city is a school for

Greece, and that, in my opinion, the same individual would amongst us prove himself qualified for the most varied kinds of action, and with the most graceful versatility. And that this is not mere vaunting language for the occasion, so much as actual truth, the. very power of the state, which we have won by such habits, affords a proof. For it is the only country at the present time that, when brought to the test, proves superior to its fame; and the only one that neither gives to the enemy who has attacked us any cause for indignation at being worsted by such opponents, nor to him who is subject to us room for finding fault, as not being ruled by men who are worthy of empire. But we shall be admired both by present and future generations as having excited our power with great proofs, and by no means without evident and as having no further need, either of Homer to praise us, or any one else who might charm for the moment by his verses, while the truth of the facts would mar the idea formed of them; but as having compelled every sea and land to come accessible to our daring, and every where established everlasting records, whether of evil or of good. It was for such a country then at these men, nobly resolving not to have it taken from them, fell fighting; and every one of their survivors may well be willing to suffer in its behalf.

"For this reason, indeed, it is that I have enlarged on the characteristics of the state; both to prove that the struggle is not for the same object in our case as in that of men who have none of these advantages in an equal degree; and at the same time clearly to establish by proofs [the truth of] the eulogy of those men over whom I am now speaking.

And now the chief points of it have been mentioned; for with regard to the things for which I have commended the city, it was the virtues of these men, end such as these, that adorned her with them; and few of the Greeks are there whose fame, like these men's, would appear but the just counterpoise of their deeds. Again, the closing scene of these men appears to me to supply an illustration of human worth, whether as affording us the first information respecting it, or its final confirmation.

For even in the case of men who have been in other respects of an inferior character, it is but fair for them to hold forth as a screen their military courage in their country's behalf;

for, having wiped out their evil by their good, they did more service collectively, than harm by their individual offences. But of these men there was none that either was made a coward by his wealth, from preferring the continued enjoyment of it; or shrank from danger through a hope suggested by poverty, namely, that he might yet escape it, and grow richly; but conceiving that vengeance on their foes was more to be desired than these objects, and at the same time regarding this as the most glorious of hazards, they wished by risking it to be avenged on their enemies, and so to aim at procuring those advantages; committing to hope the uncertainty of success, but resolving to trust to action, with regard to what was visible to themselves; and in that action, being minded rather to resist and die, than by surrendering to escape, they fled from the shame of [a discreditable] report, while they endured the brunt of the battle with their bodies; and after the shortest crisis, when at the very height of their fortune, were taken away from their glory rather than their fear.

"Such did these men prove themselves, as became the character of their country. For you that remain, you must pray that you may have a more successful resolution, but must determine not to have one less bold against your enemies; not in word alone considering the benefit [of such a spirit], (on which one might descant to you at great length—though you know it yourselves quite as well—telling you how many advantages are contained in repelling your foes;) but rather day by day beholding the power of the city as it appears in fact, and growing enamoured of it, and reflecting, when you think it great, that it was by being bold, and knowing their duty, and being alive to shame in action, that men acquired these things; and because, if they ever failed in their attempt at any thing, they did not on that account think it right to deprive their country also of their valour, but conferred upon her a most glorious joint-offering.

For while collectively they gave her their lives, individually they received that renown which never grows old, and the most distinguished tomb they could have; not so much that in which they are laid, as that in which their glory is left behind them, to be everlastingly recorded on every occasion for doing so, either by word or deed, that may from time to time present itself.

For of illustrious men the whole earth is the sepulchre; and not only does the inscription upon. columns their own land point it out, but in that also which is not their own there dwells with every one an unwritten memorial of the heart, rather than of a material monument.

Vieing then with these men in your turn, and deeming happiness to consist in freedom, and freedom in valour, do not think lightly of the hazards of war.

For it is not the unfortunate, [and those] who have no hope of any good, that would with most reason be unsparing of their lives; but those who, while they live, still incur the risk of a change to the opposite condition, and to whom the difference would be the greatest, should they meet with any reverse.

For more grievous, to a man of high spirit at least, is the misery which accompanies cowardice, than the unfelt death which comes upon him at once, in the time of his strength and of his hope for the common welfare.

"Wherefore to the parents of the dead—as many of them as are here among you—I will not offer condolence, so much as consolation. For they know that they have been brought up subject to manifold misfortunes; but that happy is their lot who have gained the most glorious—death, as these have, —sorrow, as you have; and to whom life has been so exactly measured, that they were both happy in it, and died in [that happiness].

Difficult, indeed, I know it is to persuade you of this, with regard to those of whom you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others, in which you yourselves also once rejoiced; and sorrow is felt, not for the blessings of which one is bereft without full experience of them, but of that which one loses after becoming accustomed to it.

But you must bear up in the hope of other children, those of you whose age yet allows you to have them. For to yourselves individually those who are subsequently born will be a reason for your forgetting those who are no more; and to the state it will be beneficial in two ways, by its not being depopulated, and by the enjoyment of security; for it is not possible that those should offer any fair and just advice, who do not incur equal risk with their neighbours by having children at stake.

Those of you, however, who are past that age, must consider that the longer period of your life during which you have been prosperous is so much gain, and that what remains will be but a short one; and you must cheer yourselves with the fair fame of these [your lost ones]. For the love of honour is the only feeling that never grows old; and in the helplessness of age it is not the acquisition of gain, as some assert, that gives greatest pleasure, but the enjoyment of honour.

"For those of you, on the other hand, who are sons or brothers of the dead, great, I see, will be the struggle of competition. For every one is accustomed to praise the man who is no more; and scarcely, though even for an excess of worth, would you be esteemed, I do not say equal to them, but only slightly inferior.

For the living are exposed to envy in their rivalry; but those who are in no one's way are honoured with a good will free from all opposition.

If; again, I must say any thing on the subject of woman's excellence also, with reference to those of you who will now be in widowhood, I will express it all in a brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not tailing short of the natural character that belongs to you; and great is hers, who is least talked of amongst the men, either for good or evil.

I have now expressed in word, as the law required, what I had to say befitting the occasion; and, in deed, those who are here interred, have already received part of their honours; while, for the remaining part, the state will bring up their sons at the public expense, from this time to their manhood; thus offering both to these and to their posterity a beneficial reward for such contests; for where the greatest prizes for virtue are given, there also the most virtuous men are found amongst the citizens.

And now, having finished your lamentations for your several relatives, depart.

Such was the funeral that took place this winter, at the close of which the first year of this war ended.

At the very beginning of the next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two thirds of their forces, as on the first occasion, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; and after encamping, they laid waste the country.

When they had not yet been many days in Attica, the plague first began to show itself amongst the Athenians; though it was said to have previously lighted on many places, about Lemnos and elsewhere. Such a pestilence, however, and loss of life as this was no where remembered to have happened.

For neither were physicians of any avail at first, treating it as they did, in ignorance of its nature,—nay, they themselves died most of all, inasmuch as they most visited the sick,—nor any other art of man. And as to the supplications that they offered in their temples, or the divinations, and similar means, that they had recourse to, they were all unavailing; and at last they ceased from them, being overcome by the pressure of the calamity.

It is said to have first begun in the part of Aethiopia above Egypt, and then to have come down into Egypt, and Libya, and the greatest part of the king's territory.

On the city of Athens it fell suddenly, and first attacked the men in the Piraeus; so that it was even reported by them that the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the cisterns; for as yet there were no fountains there. Afterwards it reached the upper city also; and then they died much more generally. Now let every one, whether physician or unprofessional man, speak on the subject according to his views;

from what source it was likely to have arisen, and the causes which he thinks were sufficient to have produced so great a change [from health to universal sickness]. I, however, shall only describe what was its character; and explain those symptoms by reference to which one might best be enabled to recognise it through this previous acquaintance, if it should ever break out again; for I was both attacked by it myself, and had personal observation of others who were suffering with it.

That year then, as was generally allowed, happened to be of all years the most free from disease, so far as regards other disorders; and if any one had any previous sickness, all terminated in this.

Others, without any ostensible cause, but suddenly, while in the enjoyment of health, were seized at first with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes; and the internal parts, both the throat and the tongue, immediately assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted an unnatural and fetid breath.

Next after these symptoms sneezing and hoarseness came on; and in a short time the pain descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled in the stomach, it caused vomiting and all the discharges of bile that have been mentioned by physicians succeeded, and those accompanied with great suffering.

An ineffectual retching also followed in most cases, producing a violent spasm, which in some cases ceased soon afterwards, in others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor was it pale;

but reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and sores. But the internal parts were burnt to such a degree that they could not bear clothing or linen of the very lightest kind to be laid upon them, nor to be any thing else but stark naked; but would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water if they could. Indeed many of those who were not taken care of did so, plunging into cisterns in the agony of their unquenchable thirst: and it was all the same whether they drank much or little.

Moreover, the misery of restlessness and wakefulness continually oppressed them: The body did not waste away so long as the disease was at its height, but resisted it beyond all expectation: so that they either died in most cases on the ninth or the seventh day, through the internal burning, while they had still some degree of strength; or if they escaped [that stage of the disorder], then, after it had further descended into the bowels, and violent ulceration was produced in them, and intense diarrhaea had come on, the greater part were afterwards carried off through the weakness occasioned by it.

For the disease, which was originally seated in the head, beginning from above, passed throughout the whole body; and if any one survived its most fatal consequences, yet it marked him by laying hold of his extremities;

for it settled on the pudenda and fingers, and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, while some also lost theirs eyes. Others, again, were seized on their first recovery with forgetfulness of every thing alike, and did not know either themselves or their friends.

For the character of the disorder surpassed description; and while in other respects also it attacked every one in a degree more grievous than human nature could endure, in the following way, especially, it proved itself to be something different from any of the diseases familiar to man. All the birds and beasts that prey on human bodies, either did not come near them, though there were many lying unburied, or died after they had tasted them.

As a proof of this, there was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they were not seen either engaged in this way, or in any other; while the dogs, from their domestic habits, more clearly afforded opportunity of marking the result I have mentioned.

The disease, then, to pass over many various points of peculiarity, as it happened to be different in one ease from another, was in its general nature such as I have described. And no other of those to which they were accustomed afflicted them besides this at that time; or whatever there was, it ended in this. And [of those who were seized by it] some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention.

And there was no one settled remedy, so to speak, by applying which they were to give them relief; for what did good to one, did harm to another. And no constitution showed itself fortified against it, in point either of strength or weakness;

but it seized on all alike, even those that were treated with all possible regard to diet.

But the most dreadful part of the whole calamity was the dejection felt whenever any one found himself sickening, (for by immediately falling into a feeling of despair, they abandoned themselves much more certainly to the disease, and did not resist it,) and the fact of their being charged with infection from attending on one another, and so dying like sheep. And it was this that caused the greatest mortality amongst them;

for if through fear they were unwilling to visit each other, they perished from being deserted, and many houses were emptied for want of some one to attend to the sufferers; or if they did visit them, they met their death, and especially such as made any pretensions to goodness; for through a feeling of shame they were unsparing of themselves, in going into their friends' houses [when deserted by all others]; since even the members of the family were at length worn out by the very moanings of the dying, and were overcome by their excessive misery.

Still more, however, than even these, did such as had escaped the disorder show pity for the dying and the suffering, both from their previous knowledge of what it was, and from their being now in no fear of it themselves; for it never seized the same person twice, so as to prove actually fatal. And such persons were felicitated by others; and themselves, in the excess of their present joy, entertained for the future also, to a certain degree, a vain hope that they would never now be carried off even by any other disease.

In addition to the original calamity, what oppressed them still more was the crowding into the city from the country, especially the new comers.

For as they had no houses, but lived in stifling cabins at the hot season of the year, the mortality amongst them spread without restraint; bodies lying on one another in the death-agony, and half-dead creatures rolling about in the streets and round all the fountains, in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves, were full of the corpses of those that died there in them:

for in the surpassing violence of the calamity, men not knowing what was to become of them, came to disregard every thing, both sacred and profane, alike. And all the laws were violated which they before observed respecting burials;

and they buried them as each one could. And many from want of proper means, in consequence of so many of their friends having already died, had recourse to shameless modes of sepulture; for on the piles prepared for others, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would lay their own dead relative and set fire to them; and others, while the body of a stranger was burning, would throw on the top of it the one they were carrying, and go away.

In other respects also the plague was the origin of lawless conduct in the city, to a greater extent [than it had before existed]. For deeds which formerly men hid from view, sc as not to do them just as they pleased, they now more readily ventured on; since they saw the change so sudden in the case of those who were prosperous and quickly perished, and of those who before had had nothing, and at once came into possession of the property of the dead.

So they resolved to take their enjoyment quickly, and with a sole view to gratification; regarding their lives and their riches alike as things of a day.

As for taking trouble about what was thought honourable, no one was forward to do it; deeming it uncertain whether, before he had attained to it, he would not be cut off; but every thing that was immediately pleasant, and that which was conducive to it by any means whatever, this was laid down to be both honourable and expedient.

And fear of gods, or law of men, there was none to stop them; for with regard to the former they esteemed it all the same whether they worshipped them or not, from seeing all alike perishing; and with regard to their offences [against the latter], no one expected to live till judgment should be passed on him, and so to pay the penalty of them; but they thought a far heavier sentence was impending in that which had already been passed upon them; and that before it fell on them, it was right to have some enjoyment of life.

Such was the calamity which the Athenians had met with, and by which they were afflicted, their men dying within the city, and their land being wasted without.

In their misery they remembered this verse amongst other things, as was natural they should; the old men saying that it had been uttered long ago;

A Dorian war shall come, and plague faith it.

Now there was a dispute amongst them, [and some asserted,] that it was not a plague

[ loimos] that had been mentioned in the verse by the men of former times, but a famine,

[ limos]: the opinion, however, at the present time naturally prevailed that a plague had been mentioned: for men adapted their recollections to what they were suffering. But, I suppose, in case of another Dorian war ever befalling them after this, and a famine happening to exist, in all probability they will recite the verse accordingly.

Those who were acquainted with it recollected also the oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when on their inquiring of the god whether they should go to war, he answered, that if they carried it on with all their might, they would gain the victory;

and that he would himself take part with them in it.

With regard to the oracle then, they supposed that what was happening answered to it. For the disease had begun immediately after the Lacedaemonians had made their incursion; and it did not go into the Peloponnese, worth even speaking of, but ravaged Athens most of all, and next to it the most populous of the other towns. Such were the circumstances that occurred in connexion with the plague.

The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, passed into the Paralian territory, as it is called, as far as Laurium, where the gold mines of the Athenians are situated. And first they ravaged the side which looks towards Peloponnese; afterwards, that which lies towards Euboea and Andrus.

Now Pericles being general at that time as well as before, maintained the same opinion as he had in the former invasion about the Athenians not marching out against them.

While they were still in the plain, before they went to the Paralian territory, he was preparing an armament of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnese;

and when all was ready, he put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then for the first time made out of old vessels:

a Chian and Lesbian force also joined the expedition with fifty ships.

When this armament of the Athenians put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in the Paralian territory of Attica. On arriving at Epidaurus, in the Peloponnese, they ravaged the greater part of the land, and having made an assault on the city, entertained some hope of taking it;

but did not, however, succeed. After sailing from Epidaurus, they ravaged the land belonging to Troezen, Haliae, and Hermione;

all which places are on the coast of the Peloponnese. Proceeding thence they came to Prasiae, a maritime town of Laconia, and ravaged some of the land, and took the town itself, and sacked it. After performing these achievements, they returned home; and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but returned.

Now all the time that the Peloponnesians were in the Athenian territory, and the Athenians were engaged in the expedition on board their ships, the plague was carrying them off both in the armament and in the city, so that it was even said that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the disorder, when they heard from the deserters that it was in the city, and also perceived them performing the funeral rites, retired the quicker from the country.

Yet in this invasion they stayed the longest time, and ravaged the whole country: for they were about forty days in the Athenian territory.

The same summer Hagnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, who were colleagues with Pericles, took the army which he had employed, and went straightway on an expedition against the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, and Potidaea, which was still being besieged: and on their arrival they brought up their engines against Potidaea, and endeavoured to take it by every means.

But they neither succeeded in capturing the city, nor in their other measures, to any extent worthy of their preparations: for the plague attacked them, and this indeed utterly overpowered them there, wasting their force to such a degree, that even the soldiers of the Athenians who were there before were infected with it by the troops which came with Hagnon, though previously they had been in good health. Phormio, however, and his sixteen hundred, were no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians [and so escaped its ravages].

Hagnon therefore returned with his ships to Athens, having lost by the plague fifteen hundred out of four thousand heavy-armed, in about forty days. The soldiers who were there before still remained in the country, and continued the siege of Potidaea.

After the second invasion of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, when their land had been again ravaged, and the disease and the war were afflicting them at the same time, changed their views, and found fault with Pericles, thinking that he had persuaded them to go to war, and that it was through him that they had met with their misfortunes;

and they were eager to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. Indeed they sent ambassadors to them, but did not succeed in their object. And their minds being on all sides reduced to despair, they were violent against Pericles.

He therefore, seeing them irritated by their present circumstances, and doing every thing that he had himself expected them to do, called an assembly, (for he was still general,) wishing to cheer them, and by drawing off the irritation of their feelings to lead them to a calmer and more confident state of mind. So he came forward and spoke as follows:

"I had both expected the proofs of your anger against me, which have been exhibited, (for I am aware of the causes of it,) and have now convened an assembly for this purpose, that I may remind you [of what you have forgotten], and reprove you if in any respect you are wrong, either in being irritated against me or in succumbing to your misfortunes.

For I consider that a state which in its public capacity is successful confers more benefit on individuals, than one which is prosperous as regards its particular citizens, while collectively it comes to ruin.

For though a man is individually prosperous, yet if his country is ruined, he none the less shares in its destruction; whereas, if he is unfortunate in a country that is fortunate, he has a much better hope of escaping his dangers.

Since then a state is able to bear the misfortunes of individuals, while each individual is unable to bear hers, how can it fail to be the duty of all to support her, and not to act as you are now doing, who, being panic-stricken by your domestic afflictions, give up all thought of the public safety, and are blaming both me who advised you to go to war, and yourselves who joined in voting for it.

And yet I, with whom you are angry, am a man who deem myself second to none in at once knowing what measures are required, and explaining them to others; a lover too of my country, and superior to the influence of money.

For he who knows a thing that is right, but does not explain it with clearness is no better than if he had never had a conception of it; and he, gain, who has both these requisites, but is ill-affected toward his country, would not so well speak for her interest And even this qualification be added to the others, while he is influenced by regard for money, all of them together would be sacrificed for this one consideration.

So that if you were persuaded by me to go to war, because you thought that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than other men, I cannot now fairly be charged with injuring you, at any rate.

"For those indeed to go to war, who, while successful in other things, have had a choice in the matter allowed them, it is great folly. But if [in our case] it were necessary, either immediately to submit to our neighbours, if we made concessions, or to preserve our independence by running a great risk;

then he who shrank from the risk is more reprehensible than he who faced it. For my part then, I am the same that I ever was, and do not depart from my opinion; but you are changing, since it happens that you were persuaded [to go to war] while unscathed, but repent of it now you are suffering: and that my advice appears wrong through the weakness of your resolution; because pain is now in possession of each man's feeling, while the certainty of the benefit is as yet hidden from all: and a great reverse having befallen you, and that suddenly, your mind is too prostrated to persevere in your determinations.

For the spirit is enslaved by what is sudden and unlooked for, and most beyond our calculation; which has been your case, in addition to every thing else, more especially with regard to the plague.

Living, however, as you do in a great city, and brought up with habits corresponding to it, you ought to be willing to encounter the greatest misfortunes, and not to sully your reputation; (for men think it equally just to find fault with him who weakly falls short of his proper character, and to hate him who rashly grasps at that which does not belong to him;) and you ought to cease grieving for your private sufferings, and to devote yourselves to the safety of the commonwealth.

"But with regard to your trouble in the war, lest you should fear that it may prove great, and we may still be none the more successful, let those arguments suffice you, with which on many other occasions I have proved the error of your suspicions respecting it. At the same time, I will also lay before you the following advantage, which yourselves do not appear ever yet to have thought of as belonging to you, respecting the greatness of your empire, and which I never urged in my former speeches; nor would I even now, as it has rather too boastful an air, if I did not see you unreasonably cast down.

You think then that you only bear rule over your own subject allies; but I declare to you that of the two parts of the world open for man's use, the land and the sea, of the whole of the one you are most absolute masters, both as far as you avail yourselves of it now, and if you should wish to do so still further; and there is no power, neither the king nor any nation besides at the present day, that can prevent your sailing [where you please] with your present naval resources.

This power then evidently is far from being merely on a level with the benefits of your houses and lands, which you think so much to be deprived of: nor is it right for you to give about them, but rather to hold them cheap, considering them, in comparison with this, as a mere gardenplot and embellishment of a rich man's estate You should know, too, that liberty, provided we devote ourselves to that and preserve t, will easily recover these losses; whereas those who have once submitted to others find even their greatest gains diminish. Nor should you how yourselves interior in both respect to your fathers, who with labour, and not by inheritance from others, acquired these possessions, and moreover kept them, and bequeathed them to us for it is more disgraceful to be deprived of a thing when we have got it, than to fail in getting it. On the contrary, you should meet your enemies, nor only with spirit, but also with a spirit of contempt.

For confidence is produced even by lucky ignorance, ay, even in a coward; but contempt is the feeling of the man who trusts that he is superior to his adversaries in counsel also, which is our case.

And ability, with a high spirit, renders more sure the daring which arises from equal fortune; and does not so much trust to mere hope, whose strength mainly displays itself in difficulties; but rather to a judgment grounded upon present realities, whose anticipations may be more relied upon.

"It is but fair, too, that you should sustain the dignity of the state derived from its sovereignty, on which you all pride yourselves; and that either you should not shrink from its labours, or else should lay no claim to its honours either. Nor should you suppose that you are struggling to escape one evil only, slavery instead of freedom; but to avoid loss of dominion also, and danger from the animosities which you lave incurred in your exercise of that dominion.

And from this it is no longer possible for you to retire; if through fear at the present time any one is for so playing the honest man in quiet. For you now hold it as a tyranny, which it seems wrong to have assumed, but dangerous to give up.

And men with these views would very quickly ruin the state, whether they persuaded others [to adopt the same], or even lived any where independently by themselves; for quietness is not a safe principle, unless ranged with activity; nor is it for the interest of a sovereign state, but of a subject one, that it may live in safe slavery.

Do you then neither be seduced by such citizens, nor be angry with me, whom yourselves also joined in voting for war, though the enemy has invaded our country, and done what it was natural that he should do, if you would not submit; and though, besides what we looked for, this disease also has come upon us—the only thing, indeed, of all that has happened beyond our expectations. And it is through this, I well know, that in some degree I am still more the object of your displeasure;

yet not with justice, unless you will also give me the credit when you meet with any success beyond your calculation, The evils then which are sent by heaven, you must bear perforce; those which are inflicted by your enemies c with courage: for such was formerly the custom of this country, and let it not now meet with a check in your case.

But consider that it has the greatest name in all the world from not yielding to misfortunes, and from expending in war more lives and labours than any other state; and that it has now the greatest power that ever existed up to the present time; the memory of which, even should we now at length give way, (for every thing is naturally liable to decrease,) will be left to posterity for ever, namely, that we had dominion over more Greeks than any other Greek state ever had; and held out in the greatest wars against them, both collectively and singly;

and inhabited a city better provided with all things than any other, and greater. And yet your quiet man would find fault with these things;

but the man who has himself a wish to achieve something, will emulate them; while whoever does not possess them will envy them. But to be hated and offensive for the time resent has been the lot of all who ever presumed rule over others; that man however, takes wise counsel, who envy for the greatest thins. For odium does not last long; but present splendour and future glory are handed down to perpetual memory.

Do you then, providing both for your future honour, and for your immediate escape from disgrace, secure both objects by your present spirit: and neither send any heralds to the Lacedaemonians, nor show that you are weighed down by your present troubles; for such as in feeling are least annoyed at their misfortunes, while in action they most courageously resist them, these, both of states and of individuals, are the best.

By speaking to this effect Pericles endeavoured both to divert the Athenians from their anger towards himself, and to lead away their thoughts from their present hardships.

And in a public point of view they were persuaded by his speech, and were no longer for sending to the Lacedaemonians, but were more resolute for the war; though in their private feeling they were distressed by their sufferings; the commons, because, having set out with less resources, they had been deprived of even those; the higher orders, because they had lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and expensive establishments, and, what was the greatest evil of all, had war instead of peace.

They did not, however, cease from their public displeasure toward him, till they had fined him in a sum of money.

But no long time after, as the multitude to they again elected him general, and committed every thing to him; for on the points in which each man was vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly; but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought that he was most valuable.

For as long as he was at the head of the state in time of peace, he governed it with moderation, and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in his time: and when the war broke out, he appears to have foreknown its power in this respect also.

He survived its commencement two years and six months; and when he was dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated to a still greater degree.

For he said that if they kept quiet and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both towards themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conducted the honour and benefit of individuals; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war.

And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multiude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them; for he did not say any thing to humour them, for the acquisition of power by improper means; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure.

Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language he would dash them down to alarm; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in name it was democracy, in fact it was a government administered by he first man.

Whereas those w o came after, being more on level with each other, and each grasping to become first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, but] even their measures, to the humours of the people.

In consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially the expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of judgment with respect to the people they went against, as that those who had sent them out, by not afterwards voting supplies required by the armament, but proceeding with their private criminations, to gain the leadership of the commons, both blunted the spirit of measures in the camp, and for the first time were embroiled with one another in the affairs of the city.

But even when they had suffered in Sicily the loss of other forces, and of the greater part of their fleet, and were now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out three years, both against their former enemies, and those from Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of their allies who had revolted, and Cyrus, the king's son, who afterwards joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet: nor did they succumb, before they were overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their private quarrels.

Such a superabundance of means had Pericles at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with the greatest ease he could gain the advantage in the war over the Peloponnesians by themselves.

The Lacedaemonians and their allies the same summer made an expedition with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The inhabitants are a colony of the Achaeans of the Peloponnesus, and were in alliance with the Athenians.

On board the fleet were a thousand heavy-armed of the Lacedaemonians, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. Having made a descent on the country, they ravaged the greater part of it; and when they did not surrender, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer, Aristeus, a Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians, Timagoras, a Tegean, and Pollis, an Argive in a private capacity, being on their way to Asia, to obtain an interview with the king, if by any means they might prevail on him to supply money and join in the war, went first to Thrace, to Sitalces the son of Teres, wishing to persuade him, if they could, to withdraw from his alliance with the Athenians, and make an expedition against Potidaea, where was an armament of the Athenians besieging the place; and then, to proceed by his assistance to their destination across the Hellespont, to Pharnaces the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them up the country to the king.

But some Athenian ambassadors, Learchus son of Callimachus, and Aminiades son of Philemon, happening to be with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus his son, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands, that they might not, by passing over to the king, do their best to injure [what was now] his own country.

He, in compliance with their request, having sent some other men with Learchus and Aminiades, seized them as they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the Hellespont, before they went on board, and gave orders to deliver them up to the Athenian ambassadors;

who, having received them, took them to Athens. On their arrival the Athenians, being afraid that if Aristeus escaped he might do them still more mischief, (for even before this he had evidently conducted all the measures in Potidaea and their possessions Thrace-ward,) without giving them a trial, though they requested to say something [in their own defence], put them to death that same day, and threw them into pits; thinking it but just to requite them in the same way as the Lacedaemonians had begun with; for they had killed and thrown into pits the merchants, both of the Athenians and their allies, whom they had taken on board trading vessels about the coast of the Peloponnese. Indeed all that the Lacedaemonians took on the sea at the beginning of the war, they butchered as enemies, both those who were confederates of the Athenians and those who were neutral.

About the same time, when the summer was drawing to a close, the Ambraciots, with their own forces and many of the barbarians whom they had raised, made an expedition against Argos in Amphilochia, and the rest of that country.

Now their enmity against the Argives first arose from the following circumstances.

Argos in Amphilochia and The rest of the country was colonized by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the Trojan war, and was not pleased with the state of things at Argos;

[and he built it] on the Ambracian Gulf, and called it Argos after the name of his own country.

This was the largest city of Amphilochia, and had the most powerful inhabitants. But many generations afterwards, being pressed by misfortunes, they called in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Amphilochia, as joint-inhabitants; and from the Ambraciots who joined them they were taught the Greek language which they now speak, the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians.

Now the Ambraciots in process of time drove out the Argives, and held the city by themselves.

Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves up to the Acarnanians; and both together having called in the Athenians, who sent them Phormio for a general and thirty ships, on the arrival of Phormio they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots;

while the Amphilochians and Acarnanians occupied the town in common.

And it was after this event that the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians was first made. The Ambraciots then first conceived their enmity to the Argives from this enslavement of their people; and afterwards, during the war, formed this armament from themselves and the Chaonians, and some other of the neighboring barbarians. Having come to Argos, they obtained command of the country; but being unable to take the city by assault, they retired homeward, and disbanding returned to their different nations. These were the events of the summer.

The following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnese, with Phormio as commander, who, making Naupactus his station, kept watch that no one either sailed out from Corinth and the Crisaean Bay, or into it. Another squadron of six they sent towards Caria and Lycia, with Melesander as commander, to raise money from those parts, and to hinder the privateers of the Peloponnesians from making that their rendezvous, and interfering with the navigation of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenice, and the continent in that direction.

But Melesander, having gone up the country into Lycia with a force composed of the Athenians from the ships and the allies, and being defeated in a battle, was killed, and lost a considerable part of the army.

The same winter, when the Potidaeans could no longer hold out against their besiegers, the inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica having had no more effect towards causing the Athenians to withdraw, and their provisions being exhausted, and many other horrors having befallen them in their straits for food, and some having even eaten one another; under these circumstances, I say, they make proposals for a capitulation to the generals of the Athenians who were in command against them, Xenophon son of Euripides, Histiodorus son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus;

who accepted them, seeing the distress of their army in so exposed a position, and the state having already expended 2000 talents on the siege. On these terms therefore they came to an agreement;

that themselves, their children, wives, and auxiliaries, should go out of the place with one dress each-but the women with two-and with a fixed sum of money for their journey.

According to this treaty, they went out to Chalcidice, or where each could: but the Athenians blamed the generals for having come to an agreement without consulting them; for they thought they might have got possession of the place on their own terms; and afterwards they sent settlers of their own to Potidaea and colonized it. These were the transactions of the winter; and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not make an incursion into Attica, but marched against Plataea, being led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Having encamped his army, he was going to ravage the land; but the Plataeans immediately sent ambassadors to him, and spoke as follows:

Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are not doing what is right, or worthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, in marching against the territory of the Plataeans. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he had liberated Greece from the Medes, in conjunction with those Greeks who had been willing to incur with him the peril of the battle that was fought near our city, after sacrificing in the market-place of Plataea to Jupiter the Deliverer, and assembling all the allies, proceeded to grant to the Plataeans to live in independent possession of their land and city, and that no one should ever make war upon them unjustly, or to enslave them else that the allies then present should assist them to their utmost.

These rewards your fathers gave us for our valour and zeal, shown in those scenes of danger; but you are doing the very contrary; for in conjunction with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are come to enslave us.

Calling the gods then to witness, both those who at that time received the oaths, and those of your own fathers, and those of our country, we charge you not to injure the Plataean territory, nor break the oaths, but to let us live independent, as Pausanias thought right to grant us.

When the Plataeans had spoken thus much, Archidamus took them up and said:

You speak what is just, Plataeans, if you act in accordance with your speech. As then Pausanias bequeathed to you, so both enjoy independence yourselves, and assist in liberating the rest, as many as shared the dangers of that day, and are now under the rule of the Athenians; and for whose liberation, and that of the rest [of their subjects], all this provision and war has been undertaken. Do you then yourselves abide by the oaths, by taking your part in this liberation, if possible; but if not, then, as we before proposed, keep quiet in the enjoyment of your own possessions, and do not join either side, but receive both as friends, and for warlike purposes neither the one nor the other.

And this will satisfy us.

Thus much said Archidamus. The Plataeans having heard it went into the city, and after communicating to the whole people what had been said, answered him, that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians; for their children and wives were with them; and that they had also fears for the whole city, lest when the Lacedaemonians had retired, the Athenians should come and not leave it in their hands; or the Thebans, as being included in the treaty, on the strength of their receiving both parties, should again endeavour to seize on it.

To encourage them on these points he said,

Do you then give up your city and houses to us Lacedaemonians, and point out the boundaries of your territory, and your trees in number, and whatever else can be reduced to number; and yourselves remove wherever you please for as long as the war may last. When it is over, we will restore to you whatever we may have received. Till then we will hold it in trust, cultivating it, and bringing to you such of the produce as will be sufficient for you.

When they had heard his proposal, they went again into the city, and after consulting with the people, said that they wished first to communicate to the Athenians what he proposed, and should they gain their consent, then to do so; but till that time they begged him to grant them a truce, and not to lay waste the land. So he granted them a truce for the number of days within which it was likely they would return home, and in the mean time did not begin to ravage the land.

The Plataean ambassadors having come to the Athenians and consulted with them, returned with the following message to those in the city:

Men of Plataea, the Athenians say, that never in time past, since we became their allies, have they on any occasion deserted us when injured; nor will they neglect us now, but will succour us to the best of their power. And they charge you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to make no innovation in the terms of the alliance.

The ambassadors having delivered this message, they resolved not to prove false to the Athenians, but to endure, it necessary, both to see their land ravaged, and to suffer whatever else might befall them. They resolved also that no one should go out again, but that they should reply from the walls, that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians proposed.

When they had given this answer, king Archidamus proceeded in the first place to call to witness the gods and heroes of the country, in these words:

Ye gods and heroes that dwell in the land of Plataea, bear witness that it was neither unjustly in the first instance, but when these men had first broken the agreement they had sworn to, that we came against this land, in which our fathers prayed to you before they conquered the Medes, and which you rendered an auspicious one for the Greeks to contend in; nor shall we act unjustly now, whatever we may do; for though we have made many fair proposals, we have not succeeded in gaining their assent. Grant then that those may be punished for the wrong who were the first to begin it, and that those may obtain their revenge who are lawfully trying to inflict it.

Having thus appealed to the gods, he set his army to the war. In the first place he enclosed them with a palisade, made of the trees which they cut down, that no one might go out of the town any longer.

Next they began to throw up a mound against the city, hoping that the reduction of it would be very speedily effected with so large an army at work. Cutting down timber therefore from Cithaeron, they built it up on each side, laying it like lattice-work, to serve as walls, that the mound might not spread over a wide space;

and they carried to it brush-wood, and stone, and soil, and whatever else would help to complete it when thrown on. Seventy days and nights continuously they were throwing it up, being divided into relief-parties, so that some should be carrying, while others were taking sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian officers who shared the command over the contingents of each state urging them to the work.

But the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together a wooden wall, and placed it on the wall of their city, where the mound was being made, and built bricks inside it, which they took from the neighbouring houses.

The timbers served as a frame for them, to prevent the building from being weak as it became high; and for curtains it had skins and hides, so that the workmen and the timbers were not exposed to fiery missiles, but were in safety.

So the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound rose opposite to it no less quickly. The Plataeans also adopted some such device as follows: they took down a part of the wall, where the mound lay against it, and carried the earth into the city.

The Peloponnesians, on perceiving this, rammed down clay in wattles of reed, and threw it into the breach, that it might not be loose, and so carried away like the soil.

Being thus baffled, the Plataeans ceased from this attempt; but having dug a passage under ground from the city, and having guessed their way under the mound, they began again to carry the soil in to them. And for a long time they escaped the observation of the enemy outside; so that though they continued to throw on materials, they were further from finishing it; as their mound was carried away from beneath, and continually sinking down into the vacuum.

Fearing, however, that they might not even by this means be able to hold out, so few in numbers against so many, they adopted the following additional contrivance. They ceased to work at the great building opposite to the mound; but beginning at either end of it, where the wall was of its original height, they built another in the form of a crescent, running inwards into the city; that if the great wall were taken, this might hold out, and their opponents might have to throw up a second mound against it, and as they advanced within, might have double trouble and be more exposed to missiles on both their flanks.

At the same time that they were raising the mound, the Peloponnesians brought engines also to play upon the city; one of which, being brought up close to the wall, shook down a considerable part of the great building, and terrified the Plataeans. Others were advanced against different parts of the wall; but the Plataeans broke them off by throwing nooses around them. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains from the extremity of two levers, which were laid upon the wall, and stretched out beyond it; and having drawn them up at an angle, whenever the engine was going to fall on any point, by loosing the chains and not holding them tight in hand, they let the beam drop; which, falling on it with great impetus, broke off the head of the battering-ram.

After this, when their engines were of no avail, and the building of the wall was going on in opposition to the mound, the Peloponnesians, thinking it impossible to take the city by their present means of offence, prepared for circumvallating it.

First however they determined to make an attempt upon it by fire, [and see] whether with the help of a favourable wind they could burn the town, as it was not a large one: for they thought of every possible device, if by any means it might be reduced by them without the expense of a siege.

They took therefore faggots of brushwood, and threw them from the mound; at first into the space between it and the wall, and when that had soon been filled by the many hands at work, they piled them up also as far into the town as they could reach from the height; and then lighted the wood by throwing on it fire with sulphur and pitch.

By this means such a flame was raised as no one had ever yet seen produced by the hand of man; [though natural conflagrations might have exceeded it;] for ere now the wood of a mountain forest has been known to take fire of itself, and to emit a flame in consequence, through the mutual attrition of the boughs by high winds.

This fire, however, was a great one, and was within very little of destroying the Plataeans, after they had escaped all their other dangers; for there was a considerable part of the town within which it was not possible to approach; and if a wind had risen to blow upon it, as their enemy hoped, they would not have escaped.

As it was, however, the following occurrence is also said to have favoured them; a heavy rain and thunder-storm came on, and quenched the flame; and so the danger ceased.

When the Peloponnesians had failed in this attempt also, they left behind them a certain part of their force, [having disbanded the rest,] and proceeded to raise a wall of circumvallation round the town, dividing the whole extent amongst the contingents of the different states. There was a ditch, too, both inside and outside of the lines, from which they made their bricks.

All being finished by about the rising of Arcturus, they left troops to man half the extent of the wall, (the other half being manned by the Boeotians,) and retired with their army, and dispersed to their different cities.

Now the Plataeans had previously carried out of the town to Athens their children, and wives, and oldest men, and the mass of the inhabitants that would be of no service; but the men themselves who were left in the place and stood the siege, amounted to four hundred, with eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to make bread for them.

This was the total number of them when they began to be besieged, and there was no one else within the walls, either bond or free. Such was the provision made for the siege of Plataea.

The same summer, and at the same time as the expedition was made against the Plataeans, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy-armed of their own, and two hundred horse, against the Thrace-ward Chalcidians, and the Bottiaeans, when the corn was ripe, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides, and two colleagues.

On arriving under the walls of Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn; and expected that the town would also surrender to them, through the intrigues of a party within. Those, however, who did not wish this, having sent to Olynthus, a body of heavy-armed and other troops came as a garrison for the place;

and on their making a sally from it, the Athenians met them in battle close to the town. The heavy-armed of the Chalcidians, and some auxiliaries with them, were defeated by the Athenians, and retired into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light-armed defeated the horse and light-armed of the Athenians.

They had [from the first] some few targeteers from the district of Crusis, as it is called; and when the battle had just been fought, others joined them from Olynthus.

When the light-armed from Spartolus saw these, being encouraged by the accession to their force, and by the fact that they were not worsted before, in conjunction with the Chalcidian horse and the late reinforcement they attacked the Athenians again; who retired to the two divisions they had left with the baggage.

Whenever the Athenians advanced against them, they gave way; but on their beginning to retreat, they pressed them close, and harassed them with their darts. The cavalry of the Chalcidians also rode up and charged them wherever they pleased;

and having struck the greatest panic into them, routed and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fled for refuge to Potidaea, and having subsequently recovered their dead by truce, returned to Athens with the remnant of the army; four hundred and thirty of them having been killed, and all the generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans erected a trophy, and after taking up their dead, separated to their different cities.

Tile same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania, and to separate it from its connexion with Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their confederacy, and to send one thousand heavy-armed to Acarnania; saying that if they were to join them with both a naval and land force, while the Acarnanians on the coast were unable to succour [their countrymen], after gaining possession of Acarnania, they would easily make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia; and so the Athenians would no longer find the circumnavigation of the Peloponnese what it had hitherto been. They suggested too that there was a hope of taking Naupactus also.

Being thus persuaded, the Lacedaemonians despatched immediately Cnemus, who was still high-admiral, and the heavy-armed on board a few vessels; while they sent round orders for the fleet to prepare as quickly as possible, and sail to Leucas.

Now the Corinthians were most hearty in the cause of the Ambraciots, who were a colony of theirs; and the squadrons from Corinth and Sicyon, and those parts were in preparation; while those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived before, and were waiting for them at Leucas.

In the mean time Cnemus and the one thousand heavy-armed with him had effected a passage unobserved by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian ships that kept guard off Naupactus; and they immediately prepared for the expedition by land. There were with him, of the Greeks, the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and his own force of one thousand Peloponnesians;

of the barbarians, one thousand Chaonians, who were not under kingly government, but who were led by Photys and Nicanor, of the family to which the chieftainship was confined, with a yearly exercise of that power. With the Chaonians some Thesprotians also joined the expedition, being [like them] not under kingly government.

Some Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, as guardian of Tharypus, their king, who was yet a minor; and some Paravaeans by Oroedus their king. One thousand of the Orestians, of whom Antiochus was king, accompanied the Paravaeans, Oroedus being intrusted with the command of them by that monarch.

Perdiccas also, without the knowledge of the Athenians, sent one thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late.

With this force Cnemus commenced his march, without waiting the arrival of the fleet from Corinth: and in their passage through the Argive country they sacked Limnaea, an unfortified village; and then went against Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, thinking that if they took that first, the other towns would readily surrender to them.

The Acarnanians, finding that a large army had invaded them by land, and that the enemy would also be upon them with a fleet by sea, did not prepare to make any united resistance, but to defend their own separate possessions; while they sent to Phormio, and desired him to succour them; who, however, said that it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus unprotected, while a fleet was on the point of sailing out from Corinth.

So the Peloponnesians and their allies, having formed themselves into three divisions, were advancing to the city of Stratus;

that after encamping near to it, they might attempt the wall by force, if they could not prevail on them [to surrender] by words. As they advanced, the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians occupied the centre; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and those with them, were on their right; and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on their left: but they were at a considerable distance from each other, and sometimes not even within sight.

The Greeks advanced in good order, and keeping a look-out, until they had encamped in a convenient position; but the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and being reputed by the inhabitants of those parts of the continent to be the most warlike tribe, did not wait to take up their position, but rushing on with the rest of the barbarians thought they should take the town at the first assault, and so the achievement would be all their own.

The Stratians, informed of this while they were yet coming on, and thinking that if they could defeat them while thus by themselves, the Greeks would not attack them with the same eagerness, laid an ambush near the walls; and when they had come near, attacked them in close combat, both from the town and from the ambuscade.

Being thrown into consternation, great numbers of the Chaonians were slain; and when the rest of the barbarians saw them giving way, they no longer stood their ground, but took to flight.

Now neither of the Greek divisions was aware of the battle, as their confederates had proceeded far in advance, and had been supposed to be hurrying on to occupy their encampment.

But when the barbarians broke in upon them in their flight, they rallied them; and after uniting their separate divisions. remained there quiet during the day; as the Stratians did not come to close quarters with them, because the rest of the Acarnanians had not arrived to help them; but annoyed them with their slings from a distance, and distressed them, (for it was impossible for them to stir without their armour,) the Acarnanians being considered to excel very much in this mode of warfare.

When night came on, Cnemus retired as quickly as he could with his army to the river Anapus, which is eighty stades distant from Stratus, and the next day recovered his dead by truce; and the $Oeniadae having joined him, on the ground of a friendly connexion, he fell back upon that city before the reinforcements of the enemy had arrived. Thence they departed to their respective homes; while the Stratians erected a trophy for the result of their engagement with the barbarians.

Now the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates coming from the Crisaean Bay, which ought to have joined Cnemus, in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succouring their countrymen in the interior, did not do so; but they were compelled, about the same time as the battle was fought at Stratus, to come to an engagement with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels that kept guard at Naupactus.

For Phormio kept watching them as they coasted along out of the gulf, wishing to attack them in the open sea.

But the Corinthians and the allies were not sailing to Acarnania with any intention to fight by sea, but were equipped more for land service. When, however, they saw them sailing along opposite to them, as they themselves proceeded along their own coast; and on attempting to cross over from Patrae in Achaia to the mainland opposite, on their way to Acarnania, observed the Athenians sailing against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus; (for they had not escaped their observation when they had endeavoured to bring to secretly during the night;) under these circumstances they were compelled to engage in the mid passage.

They had separate commanders for the contingents of the different states that joined the armament, but those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharcidas.

And now the Peloponnesians ranged their ships in a circle, as large as they could without leaving any opening, with their prows turned outward and their sterns inward; and placed inside all the small craft that accompanied them, and their five best sailers, to advance out quickly and strengthen any point on which the enemy might make his attack.

On the other hand, the Athenians, ranged in a single line, kept sailing round them, and reducing them into a smaller compass; continually brushing past them, and making demonstrations of an immediate onset; though they had previously been commanded by Phormio not to attack them till he himself gave the signal.

For he hoped that their order would not be maintained like that of a land-force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of each other, and that the other craft would cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf, in expectation of which he was sailing round them, and which usually rose towards morning, that they would not remain steady an instant. He thought too that it rested with him to make the attack, whenever he pleased, as his ships were better sailers [than those opposed to him];

and that then would be the best time for making it. So when the wind came down upon them, and their ships, being now brought into a narrow compass, were thrown into confusion by the operation of both causes—the violence of the wind, and the small craft dashing against them—and when ship was falling foul of ship, and the crews were pushing them off with poles, and in their shouting, and trying to keep clear, and abusing each other, did not hear a word either of their orders or the boatswains' directions; while, through inexperience, they could not lift their oars in the swell of the sea, and so rendered the vessels less obedient to the helmsmen; just then, at that favourable moment, he gave the signal. And the Athenians attacked them, and first of all sunk one of the admiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and reduced them to such a condition, that owing to their confusion none of them thought of resistance, but they fled to Patrae and Dyme, in Achaia.

The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrium;

and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle at Stratus, to the same port.

Then the Lacedaemonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected;

(particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them therefore in anger;

and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement.

Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for lie was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty;

but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitae, who bordered on the Cydonians.

The commander therefore of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitae laid waste the territory of the Cydonians; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.

During the time that the Athenians were thus detained on the coast of Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, where the land-force of the Peloponnesians had come to support them.

Phormio, too, coasted along to the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor outside of it, with twenty ships, the same as he had before fought with.

This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other, namely, that in the Peloponnese, is opposite to it; the distance between the two being about seven stades of sea, which forms the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf.

At the Rhium in Achaea, then, being not far from Panormus, where their land-force was, the Peloponnesians also came to anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw that the Athenians had done the same.

And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practising and preparing for the battle; the Peloponnesians intending not to sail beyond the Rhia into the open sea, for they were afraid of a disaster like the former; the Athenians, not to sail into the straits, for they bought that fighting in a confined space was in favour of the enemy.

Afterwards Cnemus, and Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement as quickly as they could, before any reinforcement came from Athens, assembled the men first; and seeing the greater part of them frightened in consequence of their former defeat, and not eager for the battle, they cheered them by speaking as follows:

The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if owing to it any one be afraid of this before us, affords no just grounds for his alarm. For it was deficient, as you know, in preparation;

and we were sailing not so much for a naval engagement as for a land expedition. It happened too that not a few of the chances of war were against us; while partly, perhaps, our inexperience caused our failure, as it was our first battle by sea. It was not then through our cowardice that we experienced the defeat;

nor is it right that our spirits, which were not crushed by force, but still retain a measure of defiance to the enemy, should lose their edge from the result of that mishap. We should rather think, that men may indeed be overthrown by mere chances, but that in spirit the same men ought always to be brave; and that while their courage remains, they cannot reasonably on any occasion act like cowards under the cloak of inexperience.

In your case, however, you are not so far inferior to the enemy, even through your inexperience, as you are superior to him in daring. As for their skill, of which you are most afraid, if indeed it be joined with courage, it will also be accompanied with presence of mind in danger to execute what it has learned; but without gallantry no art whatever is of any avail in the face of perils. For fear banishes presence of mind; and art without bravery is good for nothing.

Against their greater experience then put your own greater daring; against your fear in consequence of your defeat put the fact of your having then been unprepared;

and there is in your favour a clear balance of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast in the presence of your heavy-armed; and victory, generally speaking, declares for those who are the more numerous and better appointed.

On no one single ground then do we find it probable that we should be defeated. As for the blunders we committed before, the very fact of their having been committed will now teach us a lesson.

With good courage, therefore, both steersmen and sailors, do every man your own duty, without leaving the post assigned to each.

And we will prepare for the engagement not worse than your former commanders; and will give no one any excuse for being a coward: but if any one should wish to be one, he shall be visited with the punishment he deserves; while the brave shall be honoured with the rewards befitting their bravery.

Such was the exhortation given to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio, on the other hand, being also alarmed at the apprehensions of his men, and perceiving that they formed in groups amongst themselves, and showed their fears of the superior numbers of the ships opposed to them, wished to assemble and cheer them, and offer them some advice at the present juncture.

For before this he always used to tell them, and prepare their minds for the conviction, that there was no number of ships whatever so great that they ought not to face it, if it sailed against them; and his men had for a long time entertained this resolution, that from no multitude of Peloponnesian ships whatever would they, Athenians as they were, retire.

Seeing them, however, at that time out of spirits, he wished to remind them of their former confidence, and therefore called them together, and addressed them as follows:

Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of your opponents, I have called you together; as I do not wish you to be in dread of what is not really to be feared.

For these men, in the first place, because they have been previously conquered by us, and do not even themselves think that they are a match for us, have equipped this great number of ships, and not such as would be merely equal to ours. Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against us—that it is their natural character to be courageous—they feel this confidence for no other reason than because they are generally successful owing to their experience in land-service;

and they think it will do the same for them at sea. But this, in all reason, will rather be our advantage now, as it is theirs in that case: for in valour they are not at all superior to us;

but from our being respectively more experienced in one particular service, we are also more confident respecting it. Moreover, the Lacedaemonians lead their allies from regard to their own glory, and bring the greater part of them into dangers against their will;

else, [without such compulsion,] they would have never dared to fight again by sea, after being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their boldness. It is you that cause them a much greater and better-founded alarm, both on the ground of your having previously conquered them, and because they think we should not have faced them if we did not mean to do something worthy our decisive victory.

For when equal to their opponents, men generally come against them, as these do, trusting to their power rather than to their spirit; but those who dare to meet them with far inferior resources, and yet without being compelled, do so because they have the strong assurance of their own resolution.

From this consideration these men fear us more for the inequality of our preparations, than they would have done for more proportionate ones. Many armies, too, have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through want of skill, and others through want of daring;

with neither of which have we now any thing to do. As for the battle, I will not, if I can help, fight it in the strait; nor will I sail in there at all; being aware that for a few skilfully managed and fast-sailing vessels, against a large number unskilfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For one could neither sail up as he ought to the charge, without having a view of the enemy from a distance; nor retire at the proper time, if hard-pressed; and there is no breaking through the line, nor returning to a second charge—which are the manoeuvres of the better-sailing vessels—but the sea-fight must in that case become a land-fight; and then the greater number of ships gain the superiority.

On these points ther I will exercise as much forethought as possible; and do you, remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving the word of command; especially as our post of observation is at so short a distance: and during the action attach the greatest imporance to order and silence, which is of service for operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement more particularly: and repel these your enemies in a manner worthy of your former achievements.

Great indeed is the struggle in which you are engaged, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesians as regards their navy, or to bring nearer home to the Athenians apprehensions for the command of the sea.

Again I remind you that you have already conquered the greater part of them; and the spirits of defeated men will not be what they were, in the face of the same dangers.

Such was the exhortation that Phormio, on his side, addressed to his men. Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land towards the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor.

In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailers; that if Phormio, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in.

As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore;

while the land-forces of the Messenians at the same time came to support him. When the Peloponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and already within the gulf and near the shore, (which was just what they wished,) at one signal they suddenly brought their ships round and sailed in a line, as fast as each could, against the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships.

Eleven of them, however, which were taking the lead, escaped the wing of the Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into the open gulf; but the rest they surprised, and drove them on shore, in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such of the crews as had not swum out of them.

Some of the ships they lashed to their own and began to tow off empty, and one they took men and all; while in the case of some others, the Messenians, coming to their succour, and dashing into the sea with their armour, and boarding them, fought from the decks, and rescued them when they were already being towed off.

To this extent then the Peloponnesians had the advantage, and destroyed the Athenian ships; while their twenty vessels in the right wing were in pursuit of those eleven of the enemy that had just escaped their turn into the open gulf. They, with the exception of one ship, got the start of them and fled for refuge to Naupactus; and facing about, opposite the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves, in case they should sail to shore against them.

Presently they came up, and were singing the paean as they sailed, considering that they had gained the victory; and the one Athenian vessel that had been left behind was chased by a single Leucadian far in advance of the rest.

Now there happened to be a merchant-vessel moored out at sea, which the Athenian ship had time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in pursuit of her amid-ship, and sunk her.

The Peloponnesians therefore were panic-stricken by this sudden and unlooked for achievement; and moreover, as they were pursuing in disorder, on account of the advantage they had gained, some of the ships dropped their oars, and stopped in their course, from a wish to wait for the rest—doing what was unadvisable, considering that they were observing each other at so short a distance—while others even ran on the shoals, through their ignorance of the localities.

The Athenians, on seeing this, took courage, and at one word shouted for battle, and rushed upon them. In consequence of their previous blunders and their present confusion, they withstood them but a short time, and then fled to Panormus, whence they had put out.

The Athenians pursued them closely, and took six of the ships nearest to them, and recovered their own, which the enemy had disabled near the shore and at the beginning of the engagement. and had taken in tow. Of the men, they put some to death, and made others prisoners.

Now on board the Leucadian ship, which went down off the merchant-vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedaemonian; who, when the ship was destroyed, killed himself, and falling overboard was floated into the harbour of Naupactus.

On their return the Athenians erected a trophy at the spot from which they put out before gaining the victory; and all the dead and the wrecks that were near their coast they took up, and gave back to the enemy theirs under truce.

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, as victors, for the defeat of the ships they had disabled near the shore;

and the ship they had taken they dedicated at Rhium, in Achaea, by the side of the trophy. Afterwards, being afraid of the reinforcement from Athens, all but the Leucadians sailed at the approach of night into the Crisaean Bay and the port of Corinth.

Not long after their retreat, the Athenians from Crete arrived at Naupactus, with the twenty ships that were to have joined Phormio before the engagement. And thus ended the summer.

Before, however, the fleet dispersed which had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Bay, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the suggestion of the Megareans, to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of Athens; which, as was natural from their decided superiority at sea, was left unguarded and open.

It was determined, therefore, that each man should take his oar, and cushion, and tropoter, and go by land from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens; and that after proceeding as quickly as possible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Nisaea, forty vessels that happened to be there, and sail straightway to Piraeus. For there was neither any fleet keeping guard before it, nor any thought of the enemy ever sailing against it in so sudden a manner;

and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately [to execute it];

and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk, ( some wind or other was also said to have prevented them,) but to the headland of Salamis looking towards Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three ships to prevent any thing from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assaulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

Now fire-signals of an enemy's approach were raised towards Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus; while those in Piraeus thought that Salamis had been taken, and that they were all but sailing into their harbours: which indeed, if they would but have not been afraid of it, might easily have been done; and it was not a wind that would have prevented it.

But at day-break the Athenians went all in a body to Piraeus to resist the enemy; and launched their ships, and going on board with haste and much uproar, sailed with the fleet to Salamis, while with their land-forces they mounted guard at Piraeus.

When the Peloponnesians saw them coming to the rescue, after overrunning the greater part of Salamis, and taking both men and booty, and the three ships from the port of Budorum, they sailed for Nisaea as quickly as they could; for their vessels too caused them some alarm, as they had been launched after lying idle a long time, and were not at all water-tight. On their arrival at Megara they returned again to Corinth by land.

When the Athenians found them no longer on the coast of Salamis, they also sailed back; and after this alarm they paid more attention in future to the safety of Piraeus, both by closing the harbours, and by all other precautions.

About the same period, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces son of Teres, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Thrace-ward Chalcidians; of two promises wishing to enforce the one, and himself to perform the other.

For Perdiccas had made him certain promises if he would effect a reconciliation between him and the Athenians, when he was hard pressed by the war at its commencement, and if he would not restore his brother Philip, who was at enmity with him, to place him on the throne; but he was not disposed to perform what he had promised. On the other hand, Sitalces had pledged himself to the Athenians, when he entered into alliance with them, to bring the Chalcidian war in Thrace to a successful issue.

It was with both these objects then that he made the invasion; in which he took with him Philip's son Amyntas, to set him on the throne of Macedonia, and some envoys from Athens, who happened to be at his court on this business, and Hagnon as commander; for the Athenians also were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet, and as large an army as they could raise.

Setting out then from the Odrysians, he summoned to his standard, first the Thracians within Mount Haemus and Rhodope, as many as were subject to him, as far as the coast of the Euxine and the Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and all the other hordes that were settled south of the Danube, more towards the sea-board of the Euxine; the Getae and the tribes in this part being both borderers on the Scythians, and equipped in the same manner, for they are all mounted bowmen.

He also invited many of the Highland Thracians, who are independent, and armed with swords; they are called the Dii, and are mostly inhabitants [of the valleys] of Haemus: some of these he engaged as mercenaries, while others followed him as volunteers.

Moreover, he summoned the Agrianians and Laeaemans and all the other Paeonian tribes that acknowledged his sway. And these were the last people in his dominion, for at the Graaeans and Laeaeans, both of them Paeonian tribes, and at the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scomius through their country, his empire terminated on the side of the Paeonians, who from this point were independent.

On the side of the Triballi, who were also independent, the border tribes were the Treres and Tilataeans, who live to the north of Mount Scombrus, and stretch towards the west as far as the river Oscius. This river flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebrus, an uninhabited and extensive range, joining on to Rhodope.

The extent then of the Odrysian dominion, taking the line of its sea-coast, was from the city of Abdera to the Euxine, up to the mouth of the Danube. This tract is by the shortest way a voyage of four days and nights for a merchant-vessel, supposing the wind to be always steady astern. By land, taking the shortest way from Abdera to the [mouth of] the Danube, a quick traveller performs the journey in eleven days.

Such was the extent of its sea-board. As for the in terror, from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, (for at this point it reached its greatest extent up the country from the sea,) for a quick traveller it was a journey of thirteen days.

The tribute raised from all the barbarian dominions and the Grecian cities, taking the sum which they paid under Seuthes, who was successor of Sitalces, and raised it to its greatest amount, was about 400 talents in gold and silver. Presents were also made to no less an amount in gold and silver; and besides these there was all the clothing, both figured and plain, and other articles for use; and that not only for himself, but for those of the Odrysians also who were his lords and nobles.

For they established their custom the very reverse of that in the Persian kingdom, (though it prevails amongst the rest of the Thracians also,) namely, to receive rather than to give; and it was considered more disgraceful not to give when asked, than not to succeed by asking. But [though the other Thracians practised the same thing], still the Odrysians, owing to their greater power, practised it to a greater extent; for it was impossible to get any thing done without making presents.

The kingdom then had reached a high pitch of power. For of all those in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in amount of revenue and general prosperity; while in military power and number of troops it was decidedly next to that of the Scythians.

But with this not only is it impossible for those in Europe to vie, but even in Asia, putting one nation against another, there is none that can stand up against the Thracians, if they are all unanimous. Not, however, that they are on a level with other men in general good management and understanding in the things of common life.

Sitalces, then, being king over all this extent of country, prepared his army to take the field. And when all was ready for him, he set out and marched against Macedonia; at first through his own dominions, then over Cercine, a desert mountain, which forms the boundary between the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing it by a road which he had himself before made, by felling the timber, when he turned his arms against the Paeonians.

In crossing this mountain from the Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on their right, and on their left the Sintians and Maedians; and after crossing it they arrived at Doberus in Paeonia.

While he was on the march, there was no diminution of his army, (except by disease,) but accessions to it; for many of the independent Thracians, though uninvited, followed him for plunder; so that the whole number is said to have been not less than one hundred and fifty thousand, of which the greater part was infantry, but about a third cavalry.

Of the cavalry the Odrysians themselves furnished the largest portion; next to them, the Getae. Of the infantry, the most warlike were those armed with swords, the independent tribe that came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him, was far more formidable for its numbers than any thing else.

They mustered, then, at Doberus, and made their preparations for bursting from the highland down upon the lower Macedonia, which formed the dominion of Perdiccas.

For under the name of Macedonians are included also the Lyncestae and Elemiotae, and other highland tribes, which are in alliance with the lowlanders and subject to them, but have separate kingdoms of their own.

But the Macedonia along the coast, now properly so called, was first acquired and governed by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, who were originally of the family of Temenus of Argos. These expelled by force of arms the Pierians from Pieria, who afterwards lived under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon, in Phagres and some other places (and even now the country under Pangaeus down to the sea continues to be called the Pierian Gulf). They also drove out of the country called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now live on the confines of the Chalcidians;

while in Paeonia they acquired a narrow strip of territory along the river Axius, stretching down to Pella and the sea-coast; and beyond the Axius, as far as the Strymon, they occupy what is called Mygdonia, having expelled the Edonians from it.

Again, they drove out the Eordians from what is now called Eordia, (of whom the greater part perished, though a small division of them is settled about Physca,) as also the Almopians from Almopia.

Those Macedonians, moreover, subdued [the places belonging to] the other tribes, which they still continue to hold, such as Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of the country that belonged to the original Macedonians. The whole of it is called Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, was king of the country when Sitalces invaded it.

These Macedonians, then, on the approach of so large an enemy, not being able to offer any resistance, betook themselves to their strong-holds and fortifications, such as they had in the country. These, however, were not numerous;

but it was at a later period that Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he came to the throne, built those which are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and made other arrangements, both for its having horses and arms for war, and resources of all other kinds, better than had been provided by all the rest of the kings, eight in number, who had preceded him.

Now the army of the Thracians, advancing from Doberus, overran first of all what had once been the government of Philip; and took Idomene by storm, and Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by capitulation, as they came over to him from their friendship for Amyntas, Philip's son, who was with him. To Europus they laid siege, but could not reduce it. Afterwards he advanced into the rest of Mace- Ionia, on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus.

Beyond these they did not march, namely, into Bottiaea and Pieria, but stayed to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians, meanwhile, had not even a thought of resisting them with their infantry;

but having sent for an additional supply of horse from their allies in the interior, attacked the Thracian host, few as they were against so many, wherever an opportunity offered. And wherever they charged them, no one stood his ground against troops who were excellent horsemen and armed with breastplates; but surrounded as they were by superior numbers, they exposed themselves to peril by fighting against that crowd of many times their own number: so that at length they kept quiet, not thinking themselves able to run such hazards against a force so far superior.

In the mean time, Sitalces conferred with Perdiccas on the objects of his expedition; and since the Athenians had not joined him with their fleet, (not believing that he would come,) but had sent presents and envoys to him, he sent a part of his forces against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and after shutting them up within their walls, laid waste their country.

While he was staying in these parts, the people towards the south, as the Thessalians, the Magnesians, with others who were subject to the Thessalians, and the Greeks as far as Thermopylae, were afraid that the army might advance against them, and were preparing [for such an event].

The northward Thracians, too, beyond the Strymon were alarmed, as many as lived in a champaign country, namely, the Panaei, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaei; who are all independent.

Nay, it afforded subject of discussion even with the Greeks who were enemies of the Athenians, whether they were not led on by that people on the strength of their alliance, and might not come against them also.

Sitalces then was commanding at once Chalcidice, Bottica, and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all. But when none of the objects for which he made the expedition was being gained by him, and he found his army without provisions and suffering from the severity of the weather, he was persuaded by Seuthes the son of Spardacus, who was his nephew and next in authority to himself, to return with all speed. For Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a sum of money with her.

Thus persuaded then, after remaining [in the enemy's country] thirty days in all, and eight of them in Chalcidice, he retired home with his army as quickly as he could: and Perdiccas subsequently gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. Such were the events that happened in the expedition of Sitalces.

During this winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus under the command of Phormio, after coasting along to Astacus, and there disembarking, marched into the interior of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed of the Athenians from the ships and four hundred of the Messenians. From Stratus, Coronta, and some other places, they expelled certain individuals who were not thought to be true to them; and having restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, returned again to their vessels.

For against the Aeniadae, who alone of the Acarnanians had always been hostile to them, they did not think it possible to march during the winter, as the river Achelous, which flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, passing by the town of Stratus in the upper part of its course, and by Aeniadae near its mouth, forms lakes round their city, and so makes it impracticable to lead an army against it in the winter on account of the water.

Opposite to Aeniadae he most of the islands called Echinades, close to the mouths of the Achelous; so that the river, being so large as it is, continually forms depositions round them, and some of the islands have been joined to the continent, as I expect will be the case with all of them in no long period of time.

For the stream is strong, and deep, and turbid, and the islands are thick together, and mutually serve to connect the alluvium so as to prevent its being dispersed; as they lie in alternating rows, not in one line, and have no free passages for the water into the open sea. They are uninhabited, and of no great extent.

There is a report which I may also mention, that when Alemaeon, son of Amphiaraus, was wandering about after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by an oracle to inhabit this region, by suggesting to him that he would have no release from his terrors till he should discover and inhabit a country which had not yet been seen by the sun, nor existed as land, at the time he slew his mother; since all the rest of the earth was polluted to him.

He was perplexed, they say, [by such a command]; but at length observed this alluvial deposition of the Achelous, and thought that enough might have been thrown up to support life during the long period that he had been a wanderer since killing his mother. Accordingly he settled in the parts about Aeniadae, and became powerful, and left the name to the country from his son Acarnan. Such is the account we have received respecting Alcmaeon.

The Athenians then, and Phormio, having departed from Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens at the return of spring, taking with them such of the prisoners from the naval battles as were freemen, (who were exchanged man for man,) and the ships they had captured.

And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.