Book 4

THE following summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and an equal number of Locrians sailed and occupied Messana in Sicily, at the invitation of the inhabitants; and so Messana revolted from the Athenians.

This was chiefly done, by the Syracusans, because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and were afraid that the Athenians might hereafter make it their head-quarters and proceed against them with a larger force; by the Locrians, for hatred of the people of Rhegium, and with a wish to reduce them by hostilities on both sides.

At the same time too the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with all their forces, to prevent their going to the rescue of Messana, and also at the instigation of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them. For that town had been for a long time torn by faction, and it was impossible at the present time to resist the Locrians; for which reason they were the more determined to attack them.

After devastating the country, the Locrians retired with their land-forces, but their ships remained to guard Messana; and others that were being manned were to go to that station, and carry on the war from it.

About the same period of the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an incursion into Attica, under the conduct of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; and pitching their camp in the country, proceeded to lay it waste.

But the Athenians despatched the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of them, had already arrived in Sicily before them.

These they also ordered to attend, as they sailed by the island, to those of the Corcyraeans who were in the city, and who were being plundered by the exiles on the mountain; sixty ships having likewise sailed from the Peloponnese to assist those on the mountain, and with an idea, that as there was a great famine in the city, they should easily possess themselves of the government.

Demosthenes, who had continued in a private capacity since his return from Acarnania, was, at his own request, authorized by them to use that fleet, if he wished, for service about the Peloponnese.

When, on their voyage, they were off Laconia, and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for hastening thither, but Demosthenes desired them to touch first at Pylus, and after doing what was necessary, then to proceed on their voyage. While they were making objections, a storm happened to come on, and carried the fleet to Pylus.

So Demosthenes immediately begged them to fortify the place, (for this, he said, was his object in sailing with them,) and showed them that there was great abundance of timber and stone, and that the post was a strong one, and unoccupied, both itself and a considerable distance of the country round. For Pylus is about four hundred stades from Sparta, and is situated in what was once the Messenian territory, being called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium. But the commanders said that there were many unoccupied promontories in the Peloponnese, if he wished to put the state to expense by occupying them.

He, however, considered that this was a more advantageous post than any other, inasmuch as there was a harbour close by, and the Messenians, who in early times were connected with the place, and spoke the same dialect with the Lacedaemonians, would do them very great injury by their excursions from it, and at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

When he could not convince either the generals or the soldiers, having subsequently communicated his views to the subordinate officers also, he remained quiet from stress of weather; till the soldiers themselves, in their want of occupation, were seized with a desire to set to and fortify the post.

Accordingly they took the work in land, and proceeded with it, though they had no iron tools, but carried stones just as they picked them up, and put them together, as they severally might happen to fit; while the mortar, wherever it was necessary to use any, for want of hods they carried on their back, stooping down in such a way that it might best he on, and clasping their hands behind them, to prevent its falling off.

Indeed in every way they made haste to anticipate the Lacedaemonians, by completing the most assailable points of tie work before they came to the rescue; for the greater part of the position was strong by nature, and had no need of fortifications.

Now the Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival; and, moreover, when they heard it, they made light of it, thinking that when they took the field, either the enemy would not wait their attack, or they should easily take the place by storm. To a certain extent also the fact of their army being still before Athens delayed them.

So the Athenians, after fortifying in six days the side towards the interior, and what most required it, left Demosthenes there with five ships to protect the place, while with the main body of the fleet they hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

When the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylus, they returned home with all speed; for the Lacedaemonians and Agis their king thought that the affair of Pylus closely affected them; and, besides, having made their incursion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, they were in want of provisions for most of their troops; while stormy weather, coming on with greater violence than was usual at that season, distressed the army.

So that for many reasons it happened that they returned quicker than usual, and that this was the shortest incursion they had made; for they remained in Attica but fifteen days.

At this same period, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having got together a few Athenians from the guard-stations, and a large body of the allies in that neighbourhood, took possession of Eion in Thrace, a colony from Mende, and hostile [to Athens], which was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans having immediately come to its rescue, he was beaten out of it, and lost many of his soldiers.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci immediately went to the rescue of Pylus; but the other Lacedaemonians were more slow in marching against it, as they had but just reached home from a different expedition.

They despatched orders also through the rest of the Peloponnese to bring up their reinforcements to Pylus as quickly as possible and sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra. These having been hauled over the isthmus of Leucas, and having so escaped the observation of the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, reached Pylus; the land-forces also having by that time arrived.

While the Peloponnesians were yet sailing up, Demosthenes anticipated them by secretly sending two ships with a message to Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus to join him, as the place was in danger.

So the ships sailed with all speed, according to the orders of Demosthenes; while the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the place both by land and sea, hoping easily to take a building completed in haste, and with only a few men in it.

At the same time, expecting the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus to its relief, they intended, in case of their not having taken it before, to bar also the entrances into the harbour, that the Athenians might not be able to come to anchor in it.

For the island that is called Sphacteria both secures the harbour, by stretching in a line with it, and close off it, and narrows its entrances; on one side, near the Athenian fortifications and Pylus, leaving a passage for two ships; on the other, towards the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. It was all woody and pathless from its desert condition, and in extent about fifteen stades. The entrances then they intended to bar with a close line of vessels, with their heads looking outwards;

while fearing this island, lest the enemy should carry on their operations against them from it, they conveyed over some heavy-armed troops into it, and posted others along the mainland.

For so they thought that both the island would be unfavourable to the Athenians, and the mainland also, as it did not afford any landing-place; for the shores of Pylus itself outside the inlet, looking towards the open sea, would present no ground from which they might proceed to the aid of their countrymen; and so they should storm the place, in all probability, without the risk of a sea-fight, as there were no provisions in it, and it had been occupied after short preparation.

Having adopted these resolutions, accordingly they conveyed over the heavy-armed into the island, drafting them by lot from all the lochi There had also been some others sent over before in turns; but these last who went, and who were left there, were four hundred and twenty in number, with their attendant Helots; their commander being Epitadas son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him both by sea and land at once, made his own preparations also; and having drawn up under the fortifications the triremes he had remaining from those that had been left him, he enclosed them in a stockade, and armed the crews taken out of them with shields of an inferior kind, and in most cases made of osiers. For it was not possible in so lonely a place to provide themselves with arms; but even these they had got from a thirty-oared privateer and skiff belonging to some Messenians, who happened to have come to them. Of these Messenians there were also about forty heavy-armed, whose services he used with the rest.

The main body, both of the unarmed and the armed, he posted at the most fortified and secure points of the place, facing the interior, with orders to repel the land-forces, should they make an assault; while lie himself, having picked from the whole force sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, proceeded outside the wall to the sea, where he most expected that they would attempt a landing, on ground which was difficult, indeed, and rocky, looking as it did to the open sea, but still, as their wall was weakest at that point, he thought that this would tempt them to be eager in attacking it.

For they built it of no great strength just there, expecting never to be beaten at sea themselves; and also thinking that if the enemy once forced a landing, the place then became easy to take.

At this point then he went down to the very sea, and posted his heavy-armed, to prevent a landing, if possible; while he encouraged them with these words:

Soldiers, who have shared with me this adventure, let none of you in such an emergency wish to show himself clever by calculating the whole amount of the danger that surrounds us, but rather to charge the enemy with reckless confidence, and with the probability of escaping by these means. For circumstances which are as pressing as ours by no means admit of calculation, but require the danger to be faced as quickly as possible.

But indeed I see the greater part of them favourable to us, if we will but stand our ground, and not, through being alarmed at the enemy's numbers, throw away the advantages we have. For the difficulty of landing which the place presents I consider to be in our favour:

for while we remain where we are, this assists us in the struggle; but if we retreat, we shall find that though [naturally] difficult, it will be easy when there is no one to offer resistance. And in that case we shall find the enemy the more formidable on this very account, because his retreat will not be easily effected, even though he may be driven back by us. For while on board their ships, they are most easy to repel; but when they have once landed, they are then on equal terms with us.

Nor should you be very much alarmed at their numbers; for though great, they will engage in small detachments, through the impossibility of bringing to: and it is not an army on the land, fighting on equal ground, while superior in numbers; but one on board a fleet, for which, when at sea, many lucky chances are required [to make it effective]. So that I consider their difficulties a fair equivalent for our numbers;

and at the same time I call on you, Athenians as you are, and knowing from experience as you do the nature of a naval descent on the coast of others, namely, that if a man should stand his ground, and not retreat for fear of the roaring surf and the terrors of the ships sailing to shore, he would never be driven back; [I call on you, I say,] now in your own case to stand your ground, and by resisting them along the very beach to save both yourselves and the place.

When Demosthenes had thus encouraged them, they were more inspirited, and went down against them, and ranged themselves close along the sea.

The Lacedaemonians, moved from their position, and assaulted the fort at the same time both with their army by land and with their ships, of which there were forty-three; the admiral on board being Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he assaulted it just where Demosthenes was expecting him.

So the Athenians defended themselves on both sides, landward and seaward; while their opponents, divided into detachments of a few ships, because it was not possible for more to bring to, and relieving each other in turn, were sailing up against them with all eagerness and mutual exhortation, if by any means they might force their passage and take the place.

The most distinguished of all, however, was Brasidas. For being captain of a trireme, and seeing that, in consequence of the difficulty of the position, the captains and steersmen, even where it did seem possible to land, shrunk back and were cautious of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out, and said, that it was not right to be chary of timbers, and put up with the enemy's having built a fort in their country; but he bade them shiver their vessels to force a landing, and told the allies not to shrink, in return for great benefits received, to sacrifice their ships for the Lacedaemonians on the present occasion, but to run them ashore, and land by any means, and secure both the men and the place.

In this way he urged on the rest, and having compelled his own steersman to run the ship ashore, he stepped on the gang-board, and was endeavouring to land when he was cut down by the Athenians, and fainted away after receiving many wounds. Having fallen into the ship's bows, his shield slipped from around his arm into the sea; and on its being thrown ashore, the Athenians picked it up, and afterwards used it for the trophy which they erected for this attack.

The rest were eager to land, but unable, both from the difficulty of the ground and from the Athenians standing firm and not giving way.

And such was the revolution of fortune, that Athenians fighting from land, and that a part of Laconia, were repelling Lacedaemonians when sailing against them; while Lacedaemonians were landing from ships, and on their own country, now hostile to them, to attack Athenians. [I call it a revolution of fortune,] for it formed at that time the main glory of the Lacedaemonians, that they were an inland people, and most powerful by land; and of the Athenians, that they were a maritime people, and had by far the most powerful navy.

Having then made their attacks during that day and part of the following, they ceased from them, and on the third sent some of their ships to Asine, to fetch timber for the construction of their engines; hoping that though the wall opposite the harbour was high, yet as the landing was most practicable there, they would take it by means of engines.

Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, fifty in number; for they were reinforced by some of the guard-ships at Naupactus, and four Chians.

When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with heavy-armed, and the ships in the harbour, and not sailing out of it; being at a loss where to get anchorage, they sailed at the time to the island of Prote, which is not far off, and is uninhabited, and there they passed the night. The next day they weighed anchor in readiness for an engagement in the open sea, should the enemy be disposed to put out to meet them there; if not, intending to sail in and attack them.

They, however, neither put out to meet them, nor had done what they had intended, viz. to bar the entrances; but remaining quiet on shore, were manning their ships, and preparing, in case of any one's sailing in, to engage in the harbour, which is of no small extent.

The Athenians, on perceiving this, advanced against them by each entrance; and finding most of their ships already afloat and drawn up to meet them, they attacked and put them to flight, and chasing them as well as the short distance permitted, disabled many, and took five, one of them with its crew; while the rest they charged after they had taken refuge under the land. Some too were battered while still being manned, before they got under weigh; while others they lashed to their own, and began to tow off empty, the crews having taken to flight.

The Lacedaemonians seeing this, and being exceedingly distressed at the disaster, because their men were being intercepted on the island, went to the rescue, and rushing into the sea with their arms, laid hold of the vessels, and began to pull them back again; every one thinking the business to be obstructed in that part in which he was not himself engaged.

Thus the uproar occasioned was great, and the very reverse of what was habitual to both parties with regard to ships: for the Lacedaemonians, in their eagerness and dismay, were absolutely engaged in a sea-fight, so to speak, from the land; and the Athenians, victorious as they were, and wishing to follow up their present success as far as possible, were engaged in a land-fight from their vessels.

After inflicting much labour and many wounds on each other, they separated;

and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty vessels, excepting those first taken. Both sides having returned to their encampment, the Athenians erected a trophy, gave back the slain, secured the wrecks, and immediately began to cruise round the island, and guarded it vigilantly, considering the men as intercepted; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had by this time come with their contingents from all the cities, remained stationary at Pylus.

When tidings of what had taken place at Pylus reached Sparta, it was determined that, in so great a calamity, the authorities should go down to the camp, and immediately decide on inspection what they thought best.

They, seeing that it was impossible to assist their men, and not wishing to run the risk of their perishing by starvation, or being overpowered and taken by superior numbers, determined to conclude with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, an armistice concerning matters at Pylus, and then send ambassadors to Athens on the subject of a convention, and to try to recover their men as quickly as possible.

The generals having acceded to their proposal, an armistice was concluded on the following terms:

That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians, the ships with which they had fought the battle, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war; and should make no attack on the fort, either by land or sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send over to their men in the island a stipulated quantity of corn, ready-kneaded, viz. two Attic choenixes of barley-meal a man, with two cotylae of wine and a piece of flesh; and half that quantity for each attendant. That they should send in these rations under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no vessel should sail in by stealth. That the Athenians should keep guard over the island, nevertheless, so long as they did not land on it, and should abstain from attacking the forces of the Peloponnesians, either by land or by sea.

That if either party should break any of these terms, in any particular whatever, the armistice should at once be void. That it should be in force till the Lacedaemonian ambassadors returned from Athens, the Athenians conveying them thither in a trireme, and bring ing them back again. That on their arrival this armistice should be void, and the Athenians should deliver back the ships, in the same condition as they had received them.

The armistice was concluded on these terms; and accordingly the ships, amounting to about sixty, were given up, and the ambassadors despatched; who, on their arrival at Athens, spoke as follows:

"Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to effect, in behalf of our men in the island, whatever arrangement we may prove to be most advantageous for you, while at the same time it would be most creditable for us with regard to our misfortune, as far as present circumstances allow.

Nor will it be contrary to our habit that we shall address you at some length; but it is the fashion of our country, where few words are sufficient, not to use many; but to use more than ordinary, when there is occasion for proving by words a point of importance to us, and so effecting our purpose.

Receive then what we say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were considered ignorant and were being instructed by us;

but rather regarding it as an admonition to take good advice, offered to men who are well informed. For it is in your power honourably to secure your present good fortune, keeping the advantages you have, and receiving an recession of honour and renown; and not to feel as men do that gain any advantage contrary to their habit; for through hope they are ever grasping for more, because they have unexpectedly enjoyed even their present good luck.

But those who have had most changes of fortune both ways, ought fairly to be most distrustful of prosperity. And this might reasonably be the case, both with your city, owing to its great experience, and with ourselves.

"You may learn this lesson by looking at our present misfortunes; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, though we were before accustomed to think that we had ourselves more power to grant what we have now come to sue for.

And yet we were not reduced to this either from decay of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession to it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordinary resources;

a subject in which the same thing is alike incident to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that because of the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune too will be always on your side.

They indeed are wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more discreetly than others;) and who think that war does not conform itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success, would be most inclined to bring the war to a conclusion during their prosperity.

And you, Athenians, have now an excellent opportunity of doing this with us; and of escaping hereafter, should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet with reverses, (which is very possible,) the imputation of having gained even your present advantages by mere chance; when you might have left behind you a character for power and wisdom exposed to no such hazard.

"Now the Lacedaemonians invite you to a treaty and conclusion of the war, offering you peace and alliance, and that there should subsist between us in other respects close friendship and intimacy with one another; while they ask back, in return, their men in the island; at the same time, thinking it better for both parties not to try the chances of war to the uttermost, whether they may escape by force through some accidental means of preservation, or be reduced to surrender, and be more severely dealt with.

And we think that great enmities would be most effectually reconciled, not if one party, acting in a revengeful spirit, and after gaining most advantages in the war, should bind the other down by compulsory oaths, and make an arrangement with him on unequal terms; but if, when he might do so, showing regard for fairness, and conquering him by a display of goodness, he should, beyond his expectations, be reconciled to him on moderate terms.

For his adversary being now bound, not to retaliate on him, as one who had been treated with violence, but to make him a return of goodness, is more disposed, for very shame, to abide by the terms of his agreement.

And men act thus towards their greatest enemies, more than towards those who have quarrelled with them in an ordinary degree: and they are naturally disposed with pleasure to give way in their turn to such as willingly yield to them; but against those that are overbearing, to hazard all, even against their better judgment.

To come to terms then were good for both of us now, if ever, before any irremediable disaster overtake us in the mean time; in which case we must for ever feel a private hatred of you, in addition to the public one; and you must lose the advantages to which we now invite you.

But whilst things are undecided, and whilst glory and friendship with us are offered to you, our own misfortune, on the other hand, being adjusted on moderate terms, before any disgrace befalls us, let us be reconciled, and both ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant a respite from their miseries to the rest of the Greeks; who herein also will think you the chief agents. For they are harassed with war without knowing which of the two parties began it; but if a pacification be effected, on which you have now the greater power to decide, they will refer the obligation to you.

If you thus decide, you have an opportunity of becoming firm friends with the Lacedaemonians, at their own request, and by conferring a favour on them, rather than by treating them with violence.

And in this consider what great advantages are likely to be involved; for if we and you agree together, be assured that the rest of Greece, being inferior in power, will honour us in the highest degree.

The Lacedaemonians then spoke to this effect, thinking that the Athenians were before desirous of a truce, but debarred from it through their own opposition; and that if peace were offered, they would gladly accept it, and give back the men.

They, however, since they had the men in the island, thought the treaty was now ready for them, whenever they might wish to conclude it with them, and were grasping after further advantage.

They were especially urged to this by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a demagogue at that time, and most influential with the populace; who persuaded them to answer, that the men in the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be conveyed to Athens; and that on their arrival, when the Lacedaemonians had restored Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia—which they had taken, not by war, but by virtue of the former arrangement, when the Athenians had conceded them under the pressure of calamities, and were at that time somewhat more in need of a truce —they should then recover their men, and conclude a treaty for as long a period as both sides might wish.

To this answer they made no reply, but desired them to choose commissioners to meet them, who should speak and hear on each point, and so calmly come to any arrangement to which they might persuade each other.

Upon that Cleon fell violently upon them, saying that he knew beforehand that they had no sound purpose; and it was evident now; since they were unwilling to say any thing before the people, but wished to meet in council with a few individuals; if, however, they had any honest intentions, he told them to declare it before all.

But the Lacedaemonians seeing that they could not speak before the multitude, (even though they did think it best, in consequence of their misfortune, to make some concessions,) lest they should lose favour with their allies by speaking and not succeeding; and being convinced that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on moderate terms, returned from Athens without effecting their purpose.

On their arrival, the truce concluded at Pylus was immediately at an end, and the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships, according to agreement. But the Athenians, alleging as grounds of complaint an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other particulars which appear not worth mentioning, refused to return them; laying stress on its having been said, that if there were any violation of it whatever, the truce was at an end. The Lacedaemonians denied it, and charging them with injustice in their conduct respecting the ships, went away, and set themselves to the war.

And now hostilities were carried on at Pylus with the greatest vigour on both sides; the Athenians cruising round the island continually with two ships in opposite directions during the day, while by night they were all moored round it, except on the side of the open sea, whenever there was a wind blowing; (twenty ships too had joined them from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that in all they amounted to seventy; and the Peloponnesians being encamped on the continent, and making attacks on the fort, on the look-out for an opportunity, should any offer, of rescuing their men.

In the mean time the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken to join the ships on guard at Messana the other squadron which they were preparing, carried on the war from that place.

They were especially urged on to this by the Locrians, out of hatred for the people of Rhegium, whose territory they had themselves also invaded with all their forces.

And they wished to try the result of a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenian ships stationed at Messana were but few; while by the greater part of them, including those that were to come thither, they heard that the island was being blockaded.

For if they gained the advantage by sea, they hoped that by blockading Rhegium both with their land-forces and their ships they would easily reduce it, and then their success would be secured; for as the promontory of Rhegium in Italy, and that of Messana in Sicily, lay close together, the Athenians would not be able to cruise against them, and command the strait.

This strait is formed by the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is at the least distance from the continent; and is the Charybdis, so called, through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. And as the sea falls into it through a narrow passage from two great mains, the Tuscan and Sicilian, flowing at the same time with a strong current, it has naturally been considered dangerous.

In this strait then the Syracusans and their allies, with rather more than thirty ships, were compelled to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, and put out to meet sixteen vessels from Athens and eight from Rhegium.

Being defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off with all speed, as they severally happened, to their own camps, the one at Rhegium, the other at Messana, after the loss of one ship, night having overtaken them in the action. After this, the Locrians withdrew from the Rhegian territory;

and the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces having also joined them.

The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and seeing their ships unmanned, attacked them, and now on their side lost a ship, through an iron grapple having been thrown on it, but the men swam out of it.

Afterwards, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships, and were being towed along shore to Messana, the Athenians again advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy having got their ships out into the open sea, and charged them first.

Thus the Syracusans had the advantage in the passage along shore and in the engagement, which was such as has been described, and passed on to the port of Messana.

The Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; while the Messanians, in the mean time, with all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders.

The first day, having driven the Naxians within their walls, they ravaged the land, and the next day sailed round with their fleet, and did the same in the direction of the river Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incursion towards the city.

Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the highlands in great numbers to assist against the Messanians; and when the Naxians saw them, they took courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Grecian allies were coming to their aid, made a sudden sally from the town, and fell upon the Messanians, and having routed them, slew more than a thousand, the rest having a miserable return homeward; for the barbarians fell upon them on the road, and cut off most of them.

The ships, having put in at Messana, subsequently dispersed for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, turned their arms against Messana, in the belief of its having been weakened; and attempted it by an attack, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, the land-forces on the side of the town.

But the Messanians, and some Locrians with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a garrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part of the Leontine troops, and slew many of them. The Athenians, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their assistance, and drove the Messanians back again into the town, having come upon them while in confusion; they then erected a trophy and returned to Rhegium.

After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without the co-operation of the Athenians.

At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water;

for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylus itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space;

and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation;

for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink.

The cause of this delay was the Lacedaemonians having proclaimed, that any one who wished should carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be serviceable in the siege; rating it at a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who should carry it in. Many others therefore carried it in, at all risks, and especially the Helots, putting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, and landing by night on the side of the island towards the open sea.

But what they particularly watched for was a chance of being carried to shore by a wind;

for they more easily escaped the look-out of the triremes, when there was a breeze from sea-ward; as it was then impossible for the cruisers to anchor round it, while their own landing was effected in a reckless manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, they drove them up on the beach, while the soldiers were watching for them at the landing-places in the island. But all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners.

Divers also swam in under water on the side of the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but though these escaped unobserved at first, precautions were afterwards taken against them.

Indeed each party contrived in every possible manner, the one to throw in provisions, the other to prevent its being done without their observation.

When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves,] and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harbourless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them.

Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedaemonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them;

and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said that their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose.

Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true.

And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it.

Nicias, observing that the Athenians began to murmur at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at him, desired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the generals were concerned, and make the attempt.

Cleon, thinking at first that he only pretended to give up the command to him, was prepared to accept it; but when he found that he really wished to transfer it to him, he drew back, and said that he was not general, but they; being afraid now, and not supposing that Nicias would have brought himself to retire in his favour.

He, however, again urged him to undertake it, and resigned the command against Pylus, and called on the Athenians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to escape from what he had said, pressed Nicias the more to give up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set sail.

So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, he undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would set sail, taking with him no one out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, with some targeteers that had come to their aid from Oenus, and four hundred bowmen from other quarters. With these, in addition to the soldiers at Pylus, he said that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot.

The Athenians were seized with laughter at his vain talking, but nevertheless the sensible part of them were pleased with the business, reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; either to be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedaemonians into their hands.

When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible.

He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence.

For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favour of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack.

And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other.

It was, above all, from his disaster in Aetolia, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him.

The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners, with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterwards risen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it.

In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the Athenians were more in earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighbouring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when Cleon, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at Pylus with the forces he had asked for.

After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded.

When they did not accept their proposal, they waited one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a little before morning effected a landing on each side of the island, both that of the open sea and that of the harbour, amounting to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a run against the first post in the island.

For the following was the way in which the men were disposed. In this first guard there were thirty heavy-armed; the centre and most level part was held by their main body, and Epitadas their commander; while a small division guarded the very corner of the island, towards Pylus, which on the sea side was precipitous, and on the land side least exposed to assault. For there stood there an old fort, rudely built of stone, which they thought might be of service to them, if they should be driven to a compulsory retreat. In this way then were they posted.

The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night.

As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz. all the crews of seventy ships and rather more,

(except the lowest rank of rowers,) with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications.

By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, if they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement.

And so, wherever they went, they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it.

The party under Epitadas, which was also the main division in the island, on seeing the first post cut off, and an army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and advanced to meet the heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a wish to engage with them; for they were stationed on their front, but the light-armed on their flanks and rear. They could not however come up with them, and avail themselves of their superior skill in arms;

(for the light troops kept them in check with their missiles from both sides; while at the same time the heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, but remained still;) but the irregulars, on whatever point they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed; and these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flight, from the difficult nature of the ground, and its rough condition through being before uninhabited, over which the Lacedaemonians with their heavy armour could not pursue them.

For some short time then they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able with vigour to dash out against them where they made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they were now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving most confidence from a closer view—appearing as they did many times more numerous than the enemy—and having now more accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as they had expected, when they were first landing with spirits cowed at the thought of attacking Lacedaemonians; [under these circumstances, I say,] they despised them, and with a shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand.

From the shouting thus raised, while they ran upon them, bewilderment seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. The dust also from the wood that had been burnt was rising thick into the air, and it was impossible for any one to see before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the dust, were flying from such a host of men.

And here the action became distressing to the Lacedaemonians; for their caps were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken in them, when they were struck; and they could make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as sight was concerned, from any view before them; and not hearing, for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of command, while danger surrounded them on every side, and they had no hope of any means of defending and saving them selves.

At last, when many were now being wounded from constantly moving in the same place, they formed into a close body, and went to the fort in the corner of the island, which was not far off, and to their own guards there.

On their giving way, the light-armed then at once took courage, and pressed on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of the Lacedaemonians then who were overtaken in the retreat were slain; but the greater part escaped to the fort, and with the garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to defend themselves where it was assailable.

The Athenians, on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to the natural strength of the place, but advanced in front, and endeavoured to force their position.

And thus for a long time, indeed for the greater part of the day, though suffering from the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out; the one striving to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give way; and the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks.

When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were labouring in vain; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach.

Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedaemonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labour and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for.

And now the Lacedaemonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylae; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches.

Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger.

And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be treated at their discretion.

On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their shields, and waved their hands, to show that they accepted the proposal. After this, when the cessation of hostilities had taken place, a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the other side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, was lying amongst the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take the command in case of any thing happening to them.

He, then, and those who were with him, said that they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, and ask what they should do.

When the Athenians would not allow any of them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland; and when questions had passed between them twice or thrice, the last man that came over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought them this message;

The Lacedaemonians bid you to provide for your own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonourable.

So after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their arms and their persons.

That day and the following night the Athenians kept them in custody; but the next day, after erecting a trophy on the island, they made all their other arrangements for sailing, and distributed the men amongst the captains of the fleet, to take charge of; while the Lacedaemonians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the number of those who were killed in the island, or were taken alive, was as follows.

There had crossed over in all four hundred and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of which were taken [to Athens] alive, and the rest were slain. Of those that were living about one hundred and twenty were Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many killed; for the battle was not fought hand to hand.

The whole length of time that the men were blockaded, from the sea-fight to the battle in the island, was seventy-two days; for about twenty of which, whilst the ambassadors were gone to treat of peace, they had provisions given;

but for the remainder, they were fed by those that sailed in by stealth. And there was still corn in the island, and other kinds of food were found in it; for Epitadas, the commander, supplied them with it more sparingly than he might have done.

The Athenians then and the Peloponnesians returned with their forces from Pylus to their several homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, was fulfilled; for within twenty days he took the men to Athens, as he engaged to do.

And of all the events of the war this happened most to the surprise of the Greeks; for their opinion of the Lacedaemonians was, that neither for famine nor any other form of necessity would they surrender their arms, but would keep them, and fight as they could, till they were killed.

Indeed they did not believe that those who had surrendered were men of the same stamp with those who had fallen; and thus one of the allies of the Athenians some time after asked one of the prisoners from the island, by way of insult, if those of them who had fallen were honourable and brave men? to which he answered, that the atractus (meaning the arrow) would be worth a great deal, if it knew the brave men from the rest; thus stating the fact, that any one was killed who came in the way of the stones and arrows.

On the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison, fill some arrangement should be made; and if the Lacedaemonians should before that invade their territory, to take them out and put them to death.

They also arranged for the defence of Pylus; and the Messenians of Naupactus sent to the place, as to the land of their fathers, (for Pylus is a part of what was formerly the Messenian country,) such of their men as were most fit for the service, and plundered Laconia, and annoyed them most seriously by means of their common dialect.

The Lacedaemonians having had no experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and finding their Helots deserting, and fearing that they might see their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, were not easy under it; but, although unwilling to show this to the Athenians, they sent ambassadors to them, and endeavoured to recover Pylus and the men.

They, however, were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often went to them, sent them back without effecting any thing. These then were the things that happened about Pylus.

The same summer, immediately after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and two hundred cavalry on board horse-transports; the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, from amongst the allies, accompanying them, and Nicias the son of Niceratus taking the command, with two colleagues.

Setting sail, they made land in the morning between the Chersonesus and Rheitus, on the beach adjoining to the spot above which is the Solygian hill, on which the Dorians in early times established themselves, and carried on war against the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and on which there now stands a village called Solygia. From this beach, where the ships came to land, the village is twelve stades off, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

The Corinthians, having heard long before from Argos that the armament of the Athenians was coming, went with succours to the Isthmus, all but those who lived above it: there were absent too in Ambracia and Leucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison; but the rest, with all their forces, were watching where the Athenians would make the land.

But when they had come to during the night unobserved by them, and the appointed signals were raised to tell them of the fact, they left half their forces at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should advance against Crommyon, and went to the rescue with all speed.

And Battus, one of the generals, (for there were two present in the engagement,) took a battalion, and went to the village of Solygia to defend it, as it was unwalled; while Lycophron gave them battle with the rest.

First, the Corinthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, immediately after it had landed in front of Chersonesus; then the rest of their army also. And the battle was an obstinate one, and fought entirely hand to hand.

The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for these had been posted in the extremity of the line) received the charge of the Corinthians, and drove them back after some trouble; but after retreating to a wall (for the ground was all on a rise) they assailed them with stones from the higher ground, and singing the paean, returned to the attack; which being received by the Athenians, the battle was again fought hand to hand.

Meanwhile a battalion of the Corinthians, having gone to the relief of their left wing, broke the right of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians from the ships drove them back again.

The rest of the army on both sides was fighting without cessation, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, in which Lycophron was opposed to the left of the Athenians, and acting on the defensive; for they expected them to try for the village of Solygia.

For a long time then they held out without yielding to each other; but afterwards (the Athenians having a serviceable force on their side in their cavalry, while the others had no horse) the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they piled their arms, and did not come down again, but remained quiet.

It was in this rout of the right wing that the greater part of them fell, and Lycophron their general. The rest of the army, whose flight, when it was broken, was effected in this manner—with neither hot pursuit nor hurry—withdrew to the higher ground, and there took up its position.

The Athenians, finding that they no longer advanced to engage them, spoiled the dead, and took up their own, and immediately erected a trophy.

But to that half of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchreae for protection, lest the enemy should sail against Crommyon, the battle was not visible, owing to [an intervening ridge of] Mount Oneum; but when they saw dust, and were aware of it, they immediately went to the scene of action; as also did the older Corinthians from the city, when they found what had been done.

The Athenians, seeing them coming all together against them, and thinking that reinforcements were being brought by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, retreated with all speed to their ships, with the spoils and their own dead, except two whom they had left on the field because they could not find them.

Having gone on board their ships, they crossed over to the islands that lie off the coast, and from them sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies they had left behind them. There were killed in the battle, on the side of the Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; of the Athenians, rather less than fifty.

Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, distant from the city one hundred and twenty stades, and having come to their moorings, ravaged the land, and passed the night there.

The next day, having first coasted along to the Epidaurian territory and made a descent upon it, they came to Methone, which stands between Epidaurus and Troezen; and cutting off the isthmus of the peninsula in which Methone is situated, they fortified it, and having made it a post for a garrison, continued afterwards to lay waste the land of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. After cutting off this spot by a wall, they sailed back home with their ships.

At the same time that these things were being done, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after weighing from Pylus for Sicily with an Athenian squadron, came to Corcyra, and with the Corcyraeans in the city carried on war upon those that had established themselves on Mount Istone, and who at that time, after crossing over subsequently to the insurrection, commanded the country, and were doing them much damage.

They attacked their strong-hold and took it, but the men, having escaped in a body to a higher eminence, surrendered on condition of giving up their auxiliaries, and letting the Athenian people decide their own fate, after they had given up their arms. So the generals carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they were sent to Athens;

with an understanding that if any one were caught running away, the treaty would be void in the case of all.

But the leaders of the popular party at Corcyra, fearing. that the Athenians might not put to death those that were sent to them, contrive the following stratagem.

They persuade some few of the men in the island, by secretly sending friends to them, and instructing them to say, as though with a kind motive, that it was best for them to make their escape as quickly as possible, and that they would themselves get a vessel ready, for that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the Corcyraean populace.

So when they had persuaded them, and through their own arrangements about the vessel the men were caught sailing away, the treaty was declared void, and the whole party given up to the Corcyraeans.

And the Athenian generals contributed no small share to such a result—that the pretext seemed strictly true, and its contrivers took it in hand more securely—by showing that they would not wish the men to be conveyed to Athens by another party, (they themselves being bound for Sicily,) and so to confer the honour on those who took them there.

When the Corcyraeans had got possession of them, they shut them up in a large building, and afterwards taking them out by twenties, led them through two rows of heavy-armed soldiers posted on each side; the prisoners being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men ranged in the lines, wherever any of them happened to see a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side, and hastened on the way those that were proceeding too slowly.

As many as sixty men they took out in this manner, and put to death without the knowledge of those in the building; (for they supposed that they were taking them to be removed to some other place); but when they were aware of it, through some one's having pointed it out to them, they called on the Athenians, and desired that they would themselves put them to death, if they wished.

They refused also any longer to leave the building, and said they would not, as far as they could prevent it, permit any one to come in. The Corcyraeans indeed were themselves not disposed to force a passage by the doors; but having gone up to the top of the building, and broken through the roof, they threw the tiles and discharged their arrows down on them.

The prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could, while at the same time the greater part were dispatching themselves, by thrusting into their throats the arrows which their enemies discharged, and hanging themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place, and by making strips from their clothes; and so in every manner during the greater part of the night, (for night came on while the tragedy was acting,) they were destroying themselves, and were dispatched with missiles by those on the roof.

When it was day, the Corcyraeans threw them in layers on waggons, and carried them out of the city;

while all the women that were taken in the building were reduced to slavery. In this way were the Corcyraeans of the mountain cut off by the commons; and the sedition, after raging so violently, came to this termination, at least, as far as the present war is concerned; for of one of the two parties there was nothing left worth mentioning.

The Athenians then sailed away to Sicily, which was their original destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.

At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition, and took Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was betrayed to them. And having turned out the Corinthians, Acarnanian settlers from all parts of the country themselves kept possession of the place. And so the summer ended.

The following winter Aristides son of Archippus, a commander of the Athenian ships which had been sent out to the allies to levy contributions, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the king to Lacedaemon.

On his being conveyed to Athens, they got his despatches translated out of the Assyrian character, and read them: the substance of which, as regarded the Lacedaemonians, (though many other things were mentioned in them,) was, that the king did not understand what they would have; for though many ambassadors had come to him, no one ever made the same statement as another; if then they would but speak plainly, they might send men to him in company with this Persian.

The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and ambassadors with him; but on hearing there that king Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for it was at that time that he died,) they returned home.

The same winter also the Chians dismantled their new fortifications, at the command of the Athenians, and in consequence of their suspecting that they would form some new designs against them: they obtained, however, pledges from the Athenians, and security (as far as they could) for their making no change in their treatment of them. And so the winter ended and the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

At the very commencement of the following summer, there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of a new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake.

Moreover, the exiles of the the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, setting out most of them from the continent, and having taken into their pay an auxiliary force from the Peloponnese, and raised troops from the neighbourhood, took Rhoeteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of 2000 Phocaean staters.

After this they marched against Antandrus, and took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And their design was to liberate both the other

Actaean towns, as they were called—which the Athenians held, though formerly the Mytilenaeans owned them—and, above all, Antandrus; having fortified which, (for there were great facilities for building ships there, as there was a supply of timber, with Ida close at hand,) and sallying from it, as they easily might, with resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravage Lesbos, which lay near, and to subdue the Aeolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant to make.

The Athenians in the same summer made an expedition against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, taking with them also from amongst the allies the Milesians and some others; under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotreplles, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

This Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite to Malea. The inhabitants are Laconians, of the class of the perioeci, and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually. They also sent over regularly a garrison of heavy-armed, and paid great attention to it.

For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; and at the same time privateers were less able to annoy Laconia from the sea, the only side on which it could be injured; for the whole of it runs out toward the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

The Athenians therefore, having made the land with their armament, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy-armed of the Milesians, took the town on the coast called Scandea; while with the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, and at once found all the inhabitants encamped there.

A battle having been fought, the Cytherians stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and fled into the upper town; after which they came to an agreement with Nicias and his colleagues to throw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, only stipulating that they should not be put to death.

Indeed there had been before certain proposals made by Nicias to some of the Cytherians, in consequence of which the terms of the capitulation were settled more quickly and favourably, both for their present and future interests: else the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedaemonians and of the island being so adjacent to Laconia.

After the capitulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scandea, the town near the harbour, and appointed a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea; and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, they continued ravaging the country about seven days.

The Lacedaemonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, no where opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen;

and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters, being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have.

At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them.

And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune.

Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the neighbourhood. of which each descent was made, generally speaking they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And one garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, though it terrified by an attack the scattered crowd of light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained by the heavy-armed; and some few men belonging to it were killed, and some arms were taken; and the Athenians raised a trophy, and. then sailed back to Cythera.

Thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, which forms a part of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia. This district the Lacedaemonians, who owned it, gave to the Aeginetans, when expelled from their island, as a residence, for the service they had done them at the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always stood on their side.

While then the Athenians were yet sailing towards them, the Aeginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the upper town, in which they lived, at the distance of about ten states from the sea.

And one of the garrisons in the country, which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with them within the wall, though the Aeginetans requested them; but thought it dangerous to be shut up within it; and so having retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, as they did not consider themselves a match for the enemy.

In the mean time the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they burnt down, and plundered the property in it, and took the Aeginetans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen in battle, and the Lacedaemonian commander who was amongst them, Tantalus the son of Patrocles; for he was taken prisoner after being wounded.

They also took with them some few individuals from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for security. These the Athenians determined to deposit in the islands; to order the rest of the Cytherians, while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four talents; to put to death all the Aeginetans that had been taken, for their former perpetual hostility; and to throw Tantalus into prison with the other Lacedaemonians taken in the island.

The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with one another; and then all the rest of the Sicilians also assembled at Gela, with embassies from all the cities, and held a conference together on the subject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were expressed on both sides of the question, while they stated their differences and urged their claims, as they severally thought themselves injured; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the man who had the greatest influence with them, addressed the following words to the assembly:

"It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily.

And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, deterred From it fear, should he think that e will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will lace the perils rather than put up with any present loss.

But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful And this would be most serviceable to us too at the present time, if we did but believe it.

For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavouring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again.

"We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us.

For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion: it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavour to bring all these states into subjection to them.

"And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city.

Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion.

For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race:

for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practise this covetousness and forecasting;

and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm;

we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other:

for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success.

"With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice.

And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it amongst ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honours and splendours? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it.

And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had.

For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree; and though the most. deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful: for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another.

"And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians' presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfilment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is amongst us, and ourselves make peace for ever, if possible; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period.

In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill: but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not to speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.

And for myself, although, as I said at the beginning of my speech, I represent a most powerful city, and am more likely to attack another than to defend myself, yet I think it right to provide against these these things, and to make concessions; and not so to injure my enemies as to incur greater damage myself; nor through a foolish animosity to think that I have absolute sway alike over my own plans and over fortune, which I cannot control;

but to give way, as far as is reasonable. And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies.

For there is no disgrace in connexions giving way to connexions, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race; in a word. all of us who are neighbours, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians.

For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again amongst ourselves by means of general conferences: but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered;

and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.

Hermocrates having spoken to this effect, the Sicilians agreed amongst themselves in a determination to have done with the war, retaining their several possessions, but that Morgantina should be ceded to the Camarinaeans on their paying a stipulated sum of money to the Syracusans.

So the allies of the Athenians called those of them who were in command, and said that they should conclude peace, and that the treaty would extend to them also. When the generals had expressed their assent, they concluded peace, and the Athenian ships afterwards sailed away from Sicily.

But on the arrival of the generals, the Athenians at home banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, on the belief of their having been bribed to return, when they might have brought Sicily under their dominion.

Thus in their present success they presumed that they could meet with no impediment, but equally achieve what was possible and impossible, with ample or deficient resources alike. The reason of which was their general success beyond their calculations, which suggested to them an idea of strength resting only on hope.

The same summer, the Megareans in the city, pressed at once by the hostilities of the Athenians, who always invaded their country in full force twice a year, and by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been expelled during the strife of factions by the popular party, and harassed them by their forays, began to discuss amongst themselves the propriety of receiving back their exiles, and not ruining the city in both ways.

The friends of the banished, when aware of such discussion, themselves begged them more openly than before to adopt this proposal.

But the leaders of the commons, knowing that the populace would not be able under the pressure of their sufferings to hold out with them, in their fear entered into communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, wishing to betray the city to them, and thinking that the danger to themselves would be less than from the return of those who had been banished by them. It was agreed then that in the first place the Athenians should take the long walls, (they were about eight stades in length, from the city to Nisaea their port,) that the Peloponnesians might not come to the rescue from Nisaea, where they alone formed the garrison to secure the good faith of Megara; and then that they should endeavour to put the upper town into their hands: and they thought the inhabitants would the more readily surrender when that had been done.

The Athenians therefore, when preparations had been made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the night to Minoa, an island off Megara, with six hundred heavyarmed under the command of Hippocrates, and posted themselves in an excavated piece of ground, from which they used to make their bricks, and which was not far off;

while the troops, with Demosthenes, the other commander, consisting of lightarmed Plataeans, and a second corps composed of peripoli, placed themselves in ambuscade in the ground consecrated to Mars, which was at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this but those who took care to know [what was doing] that night.

When day was about to dawn, the traitors amongst the Megareans did as follows. They had for a long time past used means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the consent of the officer in command, in the guise of privateers, to carry on a cart, during the night, a boat worked by sculls along the trench down to the sea, and so sail out; and before it was day, they brought it again on the cart, and took it within the wall through the gates; that the Athenians, as they pretended, might not know what precautions to take, no boat being visible in the harbour.

And on that occasion the cart was already at the gates, and on their being opened in the usual manner for the skiff, as they thought, the Athenians, (for this had been done by agreement with them,) on seeing it, ran full speed from their ambush, wishing to reach the spot before the gates were shut again, and while the cart was still in the entrance, and prevented their being closed; the Megareans who were in concert with them at the same time dispatching the guard at the gate.

Demosthenes with his Plataeans and peripoli were the first to run in, (at the point where the trophy now stands,) and as soon as they were within the wall, (for now the nearest Peloponnesians were aware of it,) the Plataeans engaged with and defeated those who came to the rescue, and secured the gates for the advancing heavy-armed of the Athenians.

Then each of the Athenians, as he successively entered, proceeded against the wall.

And of the Peloponnesian garrison a few at first resisted, and defended themselves, and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight, being terrified in consequence of the enemy having attacked them by night, and the Megarean traitors fighting against them; and thinking that all the Megareans had betrayed them.

For it happened that the Athenian herald had of his own accord proclaimed, that whoever of the Megareans wished, should go and pile his arms with the Athenians. So when they heard that, they stayed no longer; but thinking that they were certainly the objects of a common attack, fled for refuge to Nisaea.

In the morning, when the walls were now taken, and the Megareans in the city were in confusion, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and others with them, viz. the popular party who were privy to the measure, said that they ought to throw open the gates, and march out to battle. It had been arranged by them, that when the gates were opened, the Athenians should rush in;

and they themselves would be distinguished from the rest, for they said they would anoint themselves with oil, that they might not be hurt. And they felt the greater security in opening the gates, since, according to agreement, the four thousand Athenian heavy-armed from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, and were now there.

But when they were anointed, and were now standing about the gates, one of their associates gave information of the plot to the other party, who consequently united, and came in a body, and urged that they ought neither to march out, (for not even before, when they were stronger, had they ever ventured on this,) nor to bring the city into evident danger; and if any one did not obey them, there, [in Megara itself,] should the battle be fought. But they gave no intimation of their being acquainted with their practices, but positively maintained that they were giving the best advice; and at the same time they kept their post about the gates, so that it was not possible for the conspirators to accomplish what they intended.

The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had arisen, and that they would not be able to take the city by force, immediately proceeded to invest Nisaea; thinking that if they could take it before it was relieved, Megara also would the more quickly surrender.

Now iron, stone-masons. and all other requisites were quickly brought from Athens. So they began from the wall which they occupied, and built a cross-wall on the side of Megara, from the point mentioned down to the sea on each side of Nisaea; the whole army having divided amongst themselves the trench and walls; and they used the stones and bricks from the suburb, and cutting down the fruit trees and timber, strengthened with a palisade whatever point might require it. The houses, too, in the suburb, when provided with battlements, were in themselves a fortification. That whole day they continued working;

and about afternoon of the next day the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, in despair of provisions, (for they used to receive daily rations from the upper city,) not thinking that the Peloponnesians would soon relieve them, and supposing the Megareans to be their enemies, capitulated to the Athenians, on condition that after surrendering their arms they should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; but that the Lacedaemonians, both the commander and all others in the place, should be treated by the Athenians according to their pleasure. On these conditions they surrendered and went out;

and the Athenians, having broken down the long walls at their abutment on Megara, and having taken possession of Nisaea, proceeded with their other preparations.

Now Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, happened at this time to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army for Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing both for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Boeotians with orders to meet him with a body of troops as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, (it is a village in the Megarean territory that has this name, under Mount Gerania,) and went himself with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy-armed, four hundred Phliasian, six hundred Sicyonian, and all his own forces that had been already raised, thinking that he should still find Nisaea untaken.

But when he heard of its capture, (for he happened to have gone out to Tripodiscus by night,) picking out three hundred men from his army, before he was heard of, he advanced to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were about the shore; wishing nominally, and really too, if he could, to make an attempt on Nisaea; but, above all, to effect an entrance into Megara, and secure it. Accordingly he begged them to receive his forces, telling them that he was in hope of recovering Nisaea.

But the Megarean factions were afraid, on the one side, that he might introduce the exiles, and expel them; on the other, that the popular party, through fear of this very thing, might attack them, and so the city be ruined by their fighting with each other, while the Athenians were close at hand in ambush against them; and therefore they did not receive him, but both parties determined to remain quiet, and wait to see the result.

For each side expected that a battle would be fought between the Athenians and those who had come to relieve the place, and that so it would be safer for themselves to go over to the side they favoured, if it were victorious. When therefore Brasidas did not prevail on them, he returned again to the rest of the army.

In the morning the Boeotians joined them, having indeed purposed, even before Brasidas sent to them, to march to the relief of Megara, considering the danger to affect themselves, and being already in full force at Plataea; but when the messenger reached them, they felt much more confidence, and after despatching two thousand two hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred cavalry, they returned again with the main force.

When the whole army was now come, amounting to no less than six thousand heavy-armed, and when the Athenian heavy-armed were formed in line about Nisaea at the shore, but their light-armed were dispersed over the plain; the Boeotian horse fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the sea, while they were not expecting it; for before this no succours had yet come to the Megareans from any quarter.

But the Athenian horse charged in return, and came to close quarters with them; and there was a cavalry action which lasted for a long time, in which both parties claim to have had the better.

For the Athenians, close under the walls of Nisaea, charged, killed, and stripped the Boeotian commander of the horse, and some few others; and having got possession of these bodies, restored them under truce, and elected a trophy: yet, regarding the action as a whole, neither party retired with a decided result, but the Boeotians drew off to their forces, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

After this, Brasidas and the army moved nearer to the sea and to Megara; and having chosen a convenient spot, drew up in order of battle, and remained still, thinking that the Athenians would advance against them, and knowing that the Megareans were waiting to see on which side would be the victory.

And they considered that both results were favourable for them, their not being the first to make the attack, and voluntarily to begin an engagement with all its hazard, (since, at any rate, they had clearly shown that they were ready to defend themselves,) and the victory's being fairly assigned to them, without any struggle, so to speak; and that at the same time it was favourable to their interest at Megara.

For if they had not shown themselves there, they would not have had a chance, but would certainly have lost the city, being considered as good as beaten. But as it was, the Athenians might happen to be not disposed for a contest; so that without fighting they would succeed in the objects of their coming. And this was indeed the case.

For the Athenians came out, and drew up by the long walls, but remained quiet on their side also, as the enemy did not attack them: since their commanders too considered it no equal hazard, on the one hand for them, after succeeding in most of their designs, to commence an engagement against superior numbers, and either, if victorious, only to take Megara, or, if beaten, to sacrifice the flower of their heavy-soldiery; and, on the other hand, for merely a part of their enemies' whole force, nay even of that which was present in each case, to be willing, as they reasonably might, with boldness to risk a battle. So when, after waiting some time and no attack being made on either side, the Athenians first returned to Nisaea, and then the Peloponnesians to the point they had set out from; under these circumstances the friends of the Megarean exiles with greater confidence threw open the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states, (considering that he had proved his superior strength, and that the Athenians had no longer been willing to fight,) and having received them, proceeded to confer with them, while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were now confounded.

Afterwards, when Brasidas had dismissed the allies to their several cities, he himself went back to Corinth, and prepared for his expedition to Thrace, which was his original destination.

When the Athenians also had returned home, such of the Megareans in the city as had been most implicated in the negotiations with them, knowing that they had been marked, immediately stole away; while the rest, having conferred with the friends of the exiles, restored the party at Pegae, after binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past, and to advise what was best for the city.

When, however, they had been put in office, and held a review of the heavy-armed troops, having separated the battalions, they selected a hundred of their enemies, and of those who appeared to have joined most decidedly in the negotiations with the Athenians; and having compelled the commons to pass an open sentence upon them, on their being condemned, they put them to death, and established a thorough oligarchy in the city.

And this change of government lasted a very long time, though effected by a very few men through the triumph of a faction.

The same summer, when Antandrus was going to be strengthened by the Mytilenaeans, as they were planning [when we last mentioned them], Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the ships sent to levy contributions, being about the Hellespont, (for Lamachus, their third colleague, had sailed with ten ships into the Pontus,) became aware of the provisions made for the place, and thinking there was danger of its becoming what Anaea was to Samos—where the Samian exiles had established themselves, and both assisted the Peloponnesians by sending pilates to their squadrons, and threw the Samians in the city into confusion, and received those who deserted them—on these grounds they collected a force from the allies and set sail, and having defeated in a battle those who came out from Antandrus against them, retook the place.

Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, having anchored in the river Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, lost his ships in consequence of a rain in the interior, and the flood coming suddenly down upon them. He himself and his troops went by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who are situated across the strait in Asia, to Chalcedon, the Megarean colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

The same summer Demosthenes, the Athenian general, went to Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid.

For communications respecting the affairs of Boeotia were being carried on with Hippocrates and him by certain men in the cities, who wished to change the constitution, and to bring them under a democracy like that of Athens; it being especially under the direction of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, that these preparations were made by them.

A party was to betray to them Siphae, a seaport town in the Thespian territory, on the Crisaean Bay; while Chaeronea, which was dependent on what was formerly called the Minyan, but now the Boeotian Orchomenus, was to be delivered up by another party in that city; the exiles from it also co-operating most warmly, and raising mercenary troops from the Peloponnese. Chaeronea is the frontier town too of Boeotia, near to Phanotis in Phocis, and a party of Phocians joined in the design. On the other hand, the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, looking towards Euboea;

and these measures were to be simultaneously executed on the same day; that the Boeotians might not oppose them in a body at Delium, but have to attend to their own respective neighbourhoods that were being revolutionized.

And should the attempt succeed, and Delium be fortified, they confidently hoped, that even if no change in their constitution were immediately made by the Boeotians, yet when these posts were occupied by Athenian garrisons, and the land was being plundered, and the several parties had a rallying place close at hand, that things would not remain in their present position, but that, in the course of time, when the Athenians supported the disaffected, and the power of the oligarchs was disunited, they would settle them to their own advantage. Such then was the design in preparation.

Now Hippocrates himself, with a force raised at home, was ready, when the time came, to take the field against the Boeotians; but Demosthenes he sent on before, with the forty ships mentioned, to Naupactus; that after raising in those quarters an army of Acamanians and the other allies, he might sail to Siphae, in expectation of its being betrayed to him: and the day had been fixed between them on which they were simultaneously to carry out these plans.

Accordingly, Demosthenes went to Naupactus, and finding $Aeniadae compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and having himself raised all the allies on that side, and marched first against Salynthius and the Agraeans, and reduced them to subjection, he proceeded to make his other preparations for going at the proper time to Siphae.

About the same part of the summer, when Brasidas, being on his march with one thousand seven hundred heavy-armed to the Thrace-ward countries, had come to Heraclea in Trachinia; and when, on his sending before him a messenger to his partisans in Pharsalus, and requesting them to conduct himself and his army through the country, there came to Melitia, in Achaia, Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was proxenus to the Chalcidians; upon that he proceeded on his march, being conducted both by other Thessalians, and especially by Niconidas of Larissa, who was a friend of Perdiccas.

For on other grounds it was not easy to pass through Thessaly without an escort, and with an armed force, especially, to pass through a neighbour's country without having obtained his consent, was regarded with suspicion by all the Greeks alike. Besides, the great mass of the Thessalians had always been on friendly terms with Athens;

so that, had not Thessaly, by the constitution of their country, been under the dominion of a few individuals, rather than in the enjoyment of civil equality, he would never have made his way; since even as it was, another party, of contrary views to those who have been named, met him on his march on the river Enipeus, and tried to stop him, telling him that he did wrong in advancing without the national consent.

But his conductors said that they would not escort him against their will, and that they were only attending him as friends, on his unexpectedly coming to them. Brasidas himself also told them that he came as a friend both to the country of the Thessalians and to themselves, and was bringing his forces against the Athenians, who were at war with his country, and not against them; nor did he know of any enmity existing between the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians, to prevent their having access to each other's territory:

and now he would not advance against their will (for neither indeed could he); but yet he claimed not to be obstructed After hearing this, they went away; and he, without halting at all, pushed on at a rapid pace, according to the advice of his conductors, before a greater force might be collected to stop him. And so on the day of his setting out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus;

thence to Phacium, and thence to Peraebia. At that point his Thessalian escort returned; but the Peraxbians, who were subject to the Thessalians, brought him to Dium, in the dominions of Perdiccas, a town of Macedonia lying under Mount Olympus, on the side of Thessaly.

In this way Brasidas stole a rapid march through Thessaly, before any one was prepared to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

For what brought the army up out of the Peloponnese, while the affairs of Athens were so prosperous, was the fear of the Thrace-ward cities which had revolted from the Athenians, and that of Perdiccas:

the Chalcidians thinking that the Athenians would in the first place march against them, (and moreover, the cities near to them which had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation,) and Perdiccas, though not an open enemy, yet being afraid, on his part also, because of his old quarrels with the Athenians, and most of all being desirous of reducing to subjection Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians.

And what contributed to their getting the army out of the Peloponnese the more easily, was the misfortune of the Lacedaemonians at that time. For as the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and especially upon their territory, they hoped to divert them from it most effectually, if they annoyed them in return by sending an army to their allies; especially as they were ready to maintain it, and were calling them to their aid, with a view to revolting.

Besides, they were glad to have a pretext for sending away some of the Helots; lest in the present state of affairs, when Pylus was occupied by an enemy, they might attempt some revolution.

Indeed through fear of their youth and great numbers, they even perpetrated the following deed: (for at all times most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were framed particularly with a view to the Helots, to guard against them.) They made proclamation, that as many of them as claimed to have done the state most service against the enemy should be picked out, professing that they would give them their liberty; thus applying a test to them, and thinking that those who severally claimed to be first made free, would also, through their high spirit, be most ready to attack them.

Having thus selected as many as two thousand, the Helots crowned themselves, and went round to the temples, on the strength of having gained their freedom; but the Spartans soon after did away with them, and no one ever knew by what means they were severally dispatched. And on this occasion they eagerly sent away seven hundred of them with Brasidas as heavy-armed troops:

the rest of his army he induced by pay to follow him from the Peloponnese. As for Brasidas himself, it was chiefly at his own desire that the Lacedaemonians sent him out.

But the Chalcidians were also very anxious to have him, as a man who both appeared, while in Sparta, to be active in every thing, and after he had gone from home, proved himself most valuable to the Lacedaemonians.

For at that present time, by showing himself just and moderate towards the cities, he caused their revolt in most instances; while other places he took through their being betrayed to him; so that the Lacedaemonians, if they might wish to conclude peace, (as they did,) had towns to give and receive back, and a respite from the war in the Peloponnese. And at a later period of the war, after what had happened in Sicily, it was the probity and tact of Brasidas at this time, experienced by some and heard of by others, that most raised amongst the allies of Athens a strong inclination towards the Lacedaemonians.

For by going out first, and showing himself to be in all respects a worthy man, he left amongst them an assured hope that the rest also were like him.

On his arrival then at this time in the countries Thrace-ward, the Athenians, when they heard it, declared war against Perdiccas, thinking that he was the cause of his march thither; and kept a closer watch over their allies in that quarter.

Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, and led them with his own forces against Arrhibaeus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whose territory bordered on his own; for he had a quarrel with him, and wished to reduce him to subjection.

But when he had come with his army, accompanied by Brasidas, to the pass into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that he wished to go, before hostilities were commenced, and by means of words bring Arrhibaeus into alliance with the Lacedaemonians, if he could.

Indeed Arrhibaeus sent a herald to make some advances, being willing to refer the matter to Brasidas as an arbitrator between them: and the Chalcidian envoys who were with him, advised him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, that they might be able to command his more hearty assistance in their own affairs also.

Besides, the envoys from Perdiccas had made at Lacedaemon a declaration to this effect, that he would bring many places around him into alliance with them; so that Brasidas, on the strength of this, thought himself entitled to arrange the affairs of Arrhibaeus in common with Perdiccas, rather than leave them to him alone.

But Perdiccas said that he had not taken Brasidas as an arbitrator in their disputes, but rather to destroy the enemies he should point out to him; and, that he would act unjustly. if, while he supported half his army, he should hold a conference with Arrhibaeus.

But Brasidas, against the king's will, and after a quarrel with him, had a meeting with Arrhibaeus, and being persuaded by his arguments, drew off the army before they entered his country. And Perdiccas after this supplied but a third, instead of half, towards the support of the army, considering himself to be aggrieved.

The same summer, Brasidas, accompanied by the Chalcidians, immediately made an expedition against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians, a little before the vintage.

The people there were divided into parties amongst themselves on the subject of receiving him, those who with the Chalcidians joined in inviting him, and the commons [who were opposed to it]. Nevertheless, through fear for their fruit, which was still out, when the commons were urged by Brasidas to admit him alone, and to decide after hearing him, they admitted him. And coming forward to speak to the people, (being, for a Lacedaemonian, not deficient in eloquence,) he addressed them as follows:

"The sending out, Acanthians, of myself and my army by the Lacedaemonians, has been executed to verify the reason we alleged for hostilities at the commencement of them, viz. that to liberate Greece we should go to war with the Athenians.

And if we have been long in coming to you, through being disappointed in our expectation regarding the war in those parts, according to which we hoped quickly by ourselves, and without any risk on your part, to overthrow the Athenians, let no one find fault with us; for now, when we had an opportunity, we are come, and will endeavour, in concert with you, to subdue them. But I am astonished at my being shut out of your gates, and that my arrival should be unwelcome to any of you.

For we Lacedaemonians, as thinking that we should come to men who in feeling, at any rate, were on our side, even before we actually joined them, and that we should be welcome to you, ran the great risk of making a march of many days through the country of strangers, and evinced all possible zeal:

and now, if you have aught else in mind, or if you should stand in the way of your own liberty, and that of the rest of the Greeks, it would be a hard case.

For it is not merely that you oppose me yourselves, but of those also to whom I may apply, each will be less disposed to come over to me, raising a difficulty on the ground that you, to whom I first came, and who are seen in the possession of a considerable city, and are considered to be prudent men, did not admit me.

And I shall not be able to prove the credibility of the reason [alleged by us for the war], but shall be charged with either bringing to them a liberty which has an unjust end in view, or of having come too weak and powerless to assist them against the Athenians, in case of their attacking them. And yet when I went with the army I now have to the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians, though more numerous, were unwilling to engage with me: so that it is not likely, that coming with forces conveyed by sea, they will send against you an army equal in numbers to that at Nisaea.

With regard to myself, too, I have come to you, not for the injury, but for the liberation of the Greeks-having bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that such as I win over shall assuredly be independent confederates-nor, again, that we may have allies whom we have got by violence or deceit, but, on the contrary, prepared to act as allies to you, who are enslaved by the Athenians. I claim, therefore, neither to be suspected myself, since I have given the strongest pledges for my honesty, nor to be considered a powerless avenger; and I call on you to come over to me with confidence.

"And if any one be backward to do so, from being personally afraid of some individual or other, lest I should put the city into the hands of a particular party, let him above all others feel confidence. For I am not come to be a partisan; nor am I minded to bring you a doubtful liberty, as I should do, if, disregarding your hereditary constitution, I should enslave the many to the few, or the few to the many.

For that would be more grievous than foreign dominion;

and towards us Lacedaemonians no obligation would be felt for our exertions, but instead of honour and glory, accusation rather.

And those charges with which we are throwing down the Athenians, we should ourselves seem to incur in a more odious degree than a party which has shown no pretensions to honesty. For to gain advantage by specious trickery is more disgraceful, at any rate for men in high station, than to do it by open violence:

since the one is a case of aggression on the plea of might, which fortune has given; the other, by the insidiousness of a dishonest policy.

So great care do we take for things which most deeply interest us;

and in addition to oaths, you could not receive a greater assurance than in the case of men whose actions, when viewed in the light of their words, convey a necessary conviction that it is even expedient for them to do as they have said.

But if, when I advance these arguments, you say that you have not the power to comply with them, and yet claim, on the strength of your kind wishes, to incur no harm by refusing;

and allege that freedom does not appear to you unaccompanied with danger, and that it is right to offer it to those who have the power to accept it, but to force it on no one against his will: in that case, I will take the gods and heroes of your country to witness, that after coming for your benefit, I cannot prevail upon you to accept it; and will endeavour to compel you by ravaging your country. Nor shall I then think that I am doing wrong, but that reason is on my side, on the ground of two compulsory considerations;

with regard to the Lacedaemonians, that they may not, with all your kind feelings towards them, be injured, in case of your not being won over to them, by means of the money paid by you to the Athenians; and with regard to the Greeks, that they may not be prevented by you from escaping bondage. For otherwise, certainly we should have no right to act thus;

nor are we Lacedaemonians bound to liberate those who do not wish it, except on the plea of some general good. Nor is it dominion that we aim at;

but rather being anxious, as we are, to stop others from acquiring it, we should wrong the majority, if, when bringing independence to all, we should permit you to stand in the way of it.

Wherefore advise well, and strive to be the first to give liberty to the Greeks, and to lay up for yourselves everlasting glory; and both to avoid suffering in your private capacities, and to confer on your whole city the most honourable title.

To this effect spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much previous speaking on both sides of the question, gave their votes upon it in secret; and because Brasidas had urged alluring arguments, and at the same time through fear for their fruit, the majority determined to revolt from the Athenians; and after pledging him to the oaths which the Lacedaemonian authorities swore before they sent him out, that such as he won over should assuredly be independent allies, in this way they admitted the army.

Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, also joined them in revolt. Such then were the events of this summer.

At the very commencement of the following winter, when the towns in Boeotia were to be delivered up to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, and Demosthenes was to repair with his ships to Siphae, Hippocrates to Delium; a mistake having been made in the days on which they were both to take the field, Demosthenes sailed first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many allies from those parts on board, but did not succeed in his undertaking, through information of the design having been given by Nicomachus, a Phocian of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians.

Accordingly, succours being brought by all the Boeotians, (for Hippocrates was not yet in their country to make a diversion,) Siphae and Chaeronea were secured by surprise; and when the conspirators were aware of the mistake, they attempted no movement in the cities.

But Hippocrates, having drawn out the whole population of Athens, citizens, resident aliens, and all the foreigners then in the city, afterwards arrived at Delium, when the Boeotians had now returned from Siphae; and having encamped his army, proceeded to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner.

They dug a trench all round the sacred precinct and the fane, and from the ground thus excavated threw up the earth in a mound, as a substitute for a wall; and fixing stakes on it, cut down the vines that were round the sanctuary and threw them in, taking down also at the same time stones and brick-work from the neighbouring houses; and so they ran up the work in every way. They also erected wooden towers where there was occasion for them, and where there was not already any building belonging to the temple:

for [on one side] the gallery that once existed had fallen down. Having begun the work on the third day after setting out from home, they continued it that day, the fourth, and till dinner-time of the fifth.

Then. as the main part of it was finished, the army went forward from Delium about ten stades on its way home; whence most of the light-armed proceeded straight on, but the heavy-armed halted, and remained stationary; while Hippocrates was still staying behind, and arranging the guards, and how they should complete such parts of the out-works as remained to be finished.

Now during the days thus employed, the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra; and when they were come from all the cities, and found the Athenians on their progress homeward, the rest of the Boeotarchs, (who were eleven in number,) not consenting to an engagement, since the Athenians were no longer in Boeotia, (for they were just within the borders of the Oropian territory when they halted,) Pagondas son of Aeoladas, being Boeotarch of Thebes together with Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas, and having the command at the time, wished to fight the battle, and thought it best to run the risk; and so, calling the men to him separately, in their different battalions, that they might not all at once leave the arms that were piled, he tried to persuade the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and bring on the contest, by speaking to this effect:

Men of Boeotia, it should not have even entered the thoughts of any of us your commanders, that it would not be right to engage with the Athenians, in case we found them no longer in Boeotia. For it is Boeotia that they intend to ravage, after coming from the border territory, and building a fortress in it: and so they are surely our enemies, wherever they may be found, and from whatever country they may have come to act as enemies would.

But now, if any one has thought this the safer course, let him change his mind on the question. For prudence, in the case of men attacked by others, does not admit of such nice calculation as in the case of those who are enjoying their own, and yet wilfully attack others through coveting more. The custom of your country, too, is to repel alike a foreign force that has invaded you, whether in your own or in your neighbour's territory.

But against Athenians, and borderers besides, this is far more necessary than against any others. For, with respect to their neighbours, equality in the case of all men constitutes liberty;

and against these men, most especially, who endeavour to make vassals not only of those who are near them, but of those also who are far away, how can it fail to be our duty to struggle to the very utmost? (for in the Euboeans across the strait, and in the greater part of the rest of Greece, we have an example of the position in which they stand towards them;) and to be convinced, that with others their neighbours fight about the boundaries of their land, but that in our case there will be fixed for the whole of it, if we are conquered, one boundary, not to be controverted; for they will invade it and take by force whatever we have.

So much more dangerous neighbours have we in these men than in any others. It is usual, also, with such as through confidence in their power attack those who are near them, as the Athenians are now doing, to march more fearlessly against those who remain quiet, and only defend themselves in their own territory; but to be less ready to grapple with those who meet them beyond their borders, and strike the first blow, if they have an opportunity. And we have had a proof of this in the case of these very men;

for by conquering them at Coronaea, when they got possession of our country through our own divisions, we won great security for Boeotia, which has lasted up to the present time.

Remembering which, we ought, the older part of us, to come up to our former deeds, and the younger, as sons of fathers who then behaved so bravely, to strive not to disgrace the noble qualities that by birth belong to them; but to trust that the gods will be on our side, whose sanctuary they have lawlessly fortified, and are using, and to rely on the omens, which, after sacrificing, appear favourable to us; and so to meet these men in battle, and show them that what they want they must go and get by attacking such as will not resist them; but that from those who deem it noble ever to secure by their arms the liberty of their own country, and not to enslave unjustly that of other people, they shall not go away without a struggle.

By thus exhorting the Boeotians, Pagondas persuaded them to go against the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp, led the army forward (for it was now late in the day). On approaching near to their forces, he placed his troops in a position where, in consequence of a hill intervening, the armies did not see each other;

and there he drew them up, and made his arrangements for battle. When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received tidings of the advance of the Boeotians, he sent to his troops, with orders to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them soon after, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, both to defend it if any one came against it, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the engagement.

Against these the Boeotians posted a division to resist their charge; and when all was well arranged by them, they appeared over the hill, and halted in the order they intended to fight in, to the number of about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers.

The right wing was held by the Thebans and those of the same division of Boeotia; the cen tre by the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people round the lake; the left by the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians. The cavalry and light-armed were posted on each flank. The Thebans formed their line five-and-twenty deep; the rest, as might happen.

These then were the forces and the dispositions of the Boeotians.

On the side of the Athenians, the heavy-armed formed their whole line eight deep, being equal in numbers to their adversaries, with the cavalry on each flank. As for lightarmed regularly equipped, there were neither any present on that occasion, nor had the state ever raised any. Such as had joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those on the other side, had, for the most part, followed unarmed; inasmuch as there was a levy en masse of foreigners who were present, as well as of citizens; and on their first setting out for home, they did not, with a few exceptions, keep to their standards.

When the armies were formed in line, and now on the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them, by speaking as follows:

Athenians, my advice is given you in a few words, but it is equally availing to brave men, and is intended to remind, rather than exhort you.

Let the thought then be en tertained by none of you, that we are improperly running this hazard in another people's territory. For though in these men's territory, the struggle will be for the good of our own; and if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country, when deprived of the Boeotian horse; but in one battle you will both gain possession of this land, and confirm the liberty of that.

Advance to meet them, then, in a manner worthy of the state in which each of you boasts that he has the first country in Greece; and of your fathers, who, by defeating these men in battle at Aenophyta, under Myronides, once got possession of Boeotia.

While Hippocrates was thus exhorting his men, and when he had reached the centre of the line, but had not had time to go farther, the Boeotians, having also been exhorted in few words by Pagondas, on that occasion as well as the former, raised their paean, and advanced against them from the hill.

The Athenians, on their side, also advanced to meet them, and closed with them at a run. The extremity of neither line came into action, but both were in the same case; for water-courses were in their way:

but the rest met in an obstinate engagement, shield to shield. And the Boeotian left, and as far as the centre, was beaten by the Athenians, who pressed hard both the others posted there, and especially the Thespians. For the troops next to them in the line having given way, and the Thespians being thus surrounded in a narrow space, those of them who were killed were cut down while defending themselves hand to hand:

and some of the Athenians also, being thrown into confusion through surrounding the enemy, failed to recognise their own men, and so killed each other. This part then of the Boeotian line was beaten, and retreated on that which was still fighting;

but their right, where the Thebans were posted, had the advantage over the Athenians, and drove them back, and pursued them, though but gradually at first. It happened also, that Pagondas having secretly sent two squadrons of horse round the hill when his left was distressed, and these suddenly making their appearance, the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming against them, was seized with a panic;

and so now on both parts of the field, owing to this supposition, and to the Thebans' pursuing them and breaking their line, the whole Athenian army took to flight.

Some hurried to Delium and the sea-coast, others towards Oropus, others to Mount Parnes, and others as they severally had hope of saving themselves.

The Boeotians, in the mean time, were pursuing them close, and putting them to the sword, especially the cavalry, both their own and the Locrian, which came to their succour just as the rout took place: but the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they would else have done, in consequence of night coming on before the business was over.

The next day, the troops at Oropus and those at Delium, having left a garrison in it, (for they still continued to hold it notwithstanding,) returned home by sea.

The Boeotians, after erecting a trophy, taking up their own dead, stripping those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them, retired to Tanagra, and formed plans for assaulting Delium.

Meanwhile, a herald from the Athenians, coming to ask back the dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, and told him that he would gain nothing before he himself had come back again. Then he went to the Athenians, and delivered the message of the Boeotians, viz.

that they had not acted right in violating the laws of the Greeks. For it was a principle acknowledged by all, that in an invasion of each other's territory, they should abstain from injuring the temples that were in it.

But the Athenians had fortified Delium, and were living in it, every thing that men do in profane ground being done there; and they drew and used for ordinary purposes the water which was never touched by themselves, except to use in the laver of purification.

In the god's behalf, therefore, as well as their own, the Boeotians appealed to the associated deities and to Apollo, and charged them to retire from the sanctuary, and then take back the dead which belonged to them.

The herald having spoken to this effect, the Athenians sent their own herald to the Boeotians, and said, that as for the sanctuary, they had neither done it any injury, nor would they in future voluntarily damage it; for neither had they originally entered it for that purpose, but to avenge themselves from it on those who were rather injuring them.

Now the law of the Greeks was, that whoever in any case had command of the country, whether more or less extensive, to them the temples always belonged, provided they received such honours as the occupiers had the power to pay, without limiting them to what were usual.

For the Boeotians, and most others who had expelled any people from their country and taken forcible possession of it, had proceeded against temples which originally belonged to others, and now held them as their own. And if the Athenians had been able to make themselves masters of the Boeotian territory to a greater extent, such would have been the case:

but as it was, from the part in which they then were they would not, if they could help it, retire; as they considered that it belonged to them.

The water they had disturbed under the pressure of necessity, which they had not wantonly brought on themselves; but they were compelled to use it while defending themselves against the Boeotians, who had first come against their country.

And every thing, it was natural to suppose, done under pressure of war, or any other danger, would be considered as pardonable even in the eyes of the god. For the altars were a place of refuge in unintentional offences; and transgression was a term applied to those who were wicked through no compulsion, and not to those who had ventured to do any thing in consequence of their misfortunes.

Nay, the Boeotians were much more impious in wishing to give back dead bodies in return for sanctuaries, than they were who would not at the price of sanctuaries recover things not suitable [for such bartering].

They begged, then, that they would simply tell them to take up their dead, not after evacuating the territory of the Boeotians

—for they were no longer in their territory, but in one which they had won with their arms—but, on making a truce according to the custom of their fathers.

The Boeotians replied, that if they were in Boeotia, they might take up their dead after evacuating their country; but if in Athenian territory, then they knew themselves what to do:

considering that the Oropian territory, in which the bodies happened to be lying, (for the battle was fought on the borders,) was indeed subject to Athens, and yet that the Athenians could not get possession of them without their consent. Nor, again, were they disposed, they said, to grant any truce for a country belonging to Athens; but they thought it was a fair answer to give, that when they had evacuated the Boeotian territory, they might then recover what they asked.

So the herald of the Athenians, after hearing their answer, returned without effecting his object.

The Boeotians immediately sent for dartmen and slingers from the Malian gulf, and having been reinforced since the battle by two thousand Corinthian heavy-armed, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and some Megareans with them, they marched against Delium and assaulted the fortress, both attempting it in other ways, and bringing against it an engine of the following description, which was the means of taking it.

Having sawn a great beam in two, they hollowed out the whole of it, and fitted it nicely together again, like a pipe, and hung by chains at the end of it a caldron, into which was placed an iron bellows-pipe, inclining from the beam, the timber also being for a considerable distance covered with iron.

This they brought up from a distance on carts to that part of the wall where it had been chiefly built of the vines and timber; and when it was near, they applied great bellows to the end of the beam next themselves, and blew them.

The blast passing closely confined into the caldron, which held lighted coals, sulphur, and pitch, produced a great flame, and set fire to a part of the wall; so that no one could any longer stand upon it, but they left it and took to flight; and in this way the fortress was taken.

Of the garrison some were killed, and two hundred taken: of the rest the greater part got on board their ships, and returned home.

Delium having thus been taken on the fifteenth day after the battle, and the Athenian herald, without knowing any thing that had happened, having soon after come again respecting the bodies, the Boeotians restored them, and no longer made the same answer as before.

There fell in the engagement, of the Boeotians, not quite five hundred; of the Athenians, not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates the general; but of light-armed and camp-followers a great number.

A short time after this battle, Demosthenes, having had no success with regard to Siphae being betrayed to him, when he sailed thither at that time, and having still on board his ships the Acarnanian and Agraean forces, with four hundred Athenian heavy-armed, made a descent on the territory of

Sicyon. But before all his ships reached the shore, the Sicyonians came against them, and routed those that had landed, and drove them back to their vessels, killing some, and taking others prisoners. Having erected a trophy, they restored the dead under truce. It was also about the same time as the affair at Delium, that Sitalces, king of the Odrysse, died, after making an expedition against the Triballi, and being defeated in battle; and Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded to the kingdom of the Odrysae, and the other parts of Thrace, over which Sitalces had reigned.

The same winter, Brasidas with his allies Thrace-ward marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon.

On the site on which the town now stands a settlement was before attempted by Aristagoras the Milesian, when flying from king Darius; but he was driven away by the Edonians: and then by the Athenians, two-and-thirty years later, who sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else would go; who were cut off by the Thracians at Drabescus.

Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians went again, Hagnon son of Nicias being sent out as leader of the colony, and expelled the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot which before was called

Nineways.

They set out for the purpose from Eion, which they occupied themselves at the mouth of the river, on the coast, at a distance of five-and-twenty stades from the present town, which Hagnon named

Amphipolis, because, as the river Strymon flows round it on both sides, with a view to enclosing it, he ran a long wall across from river to river, and built the town so as to be conspicuous both towards the sea and towards the land.

Against this town then Brasidas marched with his forces, starting from Arnae in Chalcidice. Having arrived about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe empties itself into the sea, and there supped, he proceeded during the night. The weather was stormy, and it was snowing a little;

on which account he hurried or the more, wishing to surprise the people of Amphipolis, except those who were to betray it.

For there were residing in it some Argilians, (this people are a colony from Andros,) and some others, who were carrying on this intrigue together; some at the suggestion of Perdiccas, others at that of the Chalcidians.

But most active of all were the Argilians, who lived close by, and had always been suspected by the Athenians of forming designs upon the place. For when the opportunity now presented itself, and Brasidas had come; as they had for some time past been intriguing with their countrymen who resided there with a view to its being delivered up to him, so at that time they received him into their own town, and revolted from Athens, and took him forward that same night to the bridge over the river.

The town stands further off than the passage of the river, and the walls did not reach down to it as they do now, but there was only a small guard posted there; which Brasidas easily drove in, (partly from there being treason amongst them, and partly from the stormy weather and the suddenness of his attack,) and then crossed the bridge, and was at once master of all the property outside the town belonging to the Amphipolitans, who had houses over the whole quarter.

His passage having thus taken by surprise those who were in the city, while of those who were outside many were made prisoners, and others took refuge within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspected by each other.

Indeed it is said, that if Brasidas would not have set his troops to plunder, but marched straightway to the town, he would probably have taken it.

But as it was, after establishing his army there, he overran the property outside; and when he found no result produced by those within, as he expected, he remained quiet.

In the mean time, the party opposed to the traitors, prevailing by their numbers to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, sent with Eucles the general, who had come to them from Athens to defend the place, to the other commander Thrace-ward, Thucydides son of Olorus, the historian of this war, who was at Thasos, (this island is a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail,) requesting him to come to their relief.

On hearing the news, he set sail with the greatest speed, with seven ships which happened to be there; wishing, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time, before any surrender was made, or, at any rate, to reach Eion.

In the mean time Brasidas, being afraid of the naval succour from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in those parts of Thrace, and by this means had influence amongst the chief persons on the mainland, made haste to get possession of the town beforehand, if possible; lest, if he came, the populace of Amphipolis, hoping that he would raise a confederate force from the sea and from Thrace, and so save them, should not then surrender to him.

Accordingly he was willing to come to moderate terms with them, and made this proclamation; that of the Amphipolitans and Athenians in the town whoever would might remain in possession of his property, sharing in a fair and equal government; and whoever would not, might depart and take out his property with him, within five days.

The mass of the people, on hearing this, rather changed their minds; especially as only a small number of Athenians were citizens of the place, the majority being a mixed multitude. There were also within the walls many relations of those who had been taken without; and they considered the proclamation to be reasonable, when measured by the standard of their fear. The Athenians took this view of it, because they were glad to go out, thinking that the danger was greater for them than the rest, and, besides, not expecting any speedy relief; the rest of the multitude, because they were not to be deprived of their franchise, on an equal footing, and were released from peril beyond their expectation.

When therefore the partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated these proposals, on seeing that the populace had changed their minds, and no longer listened to the Athenian commander, who was present;

the surrender was made, and they admitted him on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they delivered up the city; and Thucydides and his ships landed at Eion late on the same day.

Brasidas had just taken possession of Amphipolis, and was within a night of taking Eion; for if the ships had not quickly come to its aid, in the morning it would have been in his hands.

After this, Thucydides arranged matters in Eion, so that it might be safe, both for the present time, if Brasidas should attack it, and in future; receiving into it those who had chosen to come there from up the country, according to the terms of the treaty.

And Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion, with a great number of boats, on the chance of taking the point of land which runs out from the wall, and so commanding the entrance into the place: and he attempted it by land at the same time; but was beaten off in both instances:

at Amphipolis, however, he was putting every thing in readiness. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, having been killed by the sons of Goaxis, and Brauro his own wife: and not long after, Galepsus and Oesyme, colonies of the Thasians, did the same. Perdiccas also came immediately after the capture of Amphipolis, and took part in these arrangements.

When Amphipolis was in the enemy's hands, the- Athenians were reduced to great fear, especially because the town was of service to them by supplying timber for ship building, and in point of payment of revenue; and because, though as far as the Strymon the Lacedaemonians had a passage open to them for reaching the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to go through their country, yet so long as they were not masters of the bridge, they could have gone no further; as on the inland side a large lake, formed by the river, spread for a great distance, while in the neighbourhood of Eion they were watched by cruisers:

but now the passage was considered to have been rendered easy. They were also afraid that their allies would revolt.

For Brasidas both showed himself moderate in other respects, and in his speeches every where declared that he was sent out to give freedom to Greece. And the cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, and what advantages it enjoyed, and the gentleness of Brasidas, were most strongly encouraged to make innovations, and sent secret messages to him, desiring him to come to them, and each wishing to be the first to revolt.

For they thought they might do it with security; their mistake in the estimate of the Athenian power being as great as power afterwards showed itself, and their judgment resting on blind desire, rather than on safe forethought: since men are accustomed to grant to inconsiderate hope whatever they;

but to thrust aside with despotic reasoning whatever they do not like. Besides, as the Athenians had lately met with a heavy blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas asserted what was attractive, but not true, that the Athenians had been unwilling to fight him at Nisaea with his own force alone, they were full of confidence, and believed that no one would come against them.

Above all, from regard to what was agreeable at the moment, and because they would be likely to find the Lacedaemonians zealous in their behalf at first, they were ready on all accounts to run the risk. The Athenians perceiving this, distributed guards in the different states as well as they could in a short time, and in the winter season; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon, begging them to send him additional forces, and himself prepared for building triremes in the Strymon.

But the Lacedaemonians did not comply with his wishes, partly through envy felt by the principal men, and partly because they were more anxious to recover the men taken in the island, and to bring the war to a conclusion.

The same winter the Megareans took and razed to their foundations the long walls in their country which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the territory called Acte.

This territory runs out from the king's dike on the inner side of the isthmus, Athos, a high mountain which stands in it, being its boundary on the side of the Aegean Sea.

Of the towns it contains, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians close to the dike, facing the sea towards Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium.

These are inhabited by mixed races of men speaking two different languages, a small portion of them being Chalcidians, but the main part Pelasgians—a tribe of those Tyrrhenians who once settled in Lemnos and Athens—Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; and they live in small towns.

The greater part of them surrendered to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out against him; and, accordingly, he stayed with his army in their territory, and laid it waste.

When they did not listen to his proposals, he marched straightway against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians, being invited by a few persons who were prepared to deliver up the town to him. Having arrived while it was yet night, and just about day-break, he sat down with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, distant from the town about three stades.

Now by the rest of the town of the Toronaeans, and by the Athenians who were in garrison in it, he was not observed; but his partisans, knowing that he would come, and some few of them having privately visited him, were watching for his arrival. And when they found that he was come, they took in to them seven light-armed men with daggers; (for such only was the number, out of twenty who were at first appointed to the work, that were not afraid to enter, their commander being Lysistratus, an Olynthian.) These having passed through the sea-ward wall, and escaped observation, went up and put to the sword the garrison in the highest guard-house, (for the town stands on a hill, and broke open the postern towards Canastraeum.

Brasidas, meanwhile, after advancing a short distance, remained quiet with the rest of his army, but sent forward a hundred targeteers, that when any gates were opened, and the signal raised which had been agreed on, they might be the first to rush in.

These, having waited some time, and wondering at the delay, had come by degrees near the town; while those of the Toronaeans within, who were preparing matters with the party that had entered, after the postern had been broken open by them, and the gates leading to the market-place opened by cutting through the bar, in the first place brought a party round to the postern and introduced them, that in their rear, and on both sides of them, they might suddenly strike terror into the townsmen, knowing nothing of what was going on. Next they raised the fire-signal as had been appointed; and then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates leading to the market-place.

And now Brasidas, on seeing the appointed signal, ordered his troops to rise, after giving a shout all together, and causing much consternation to those in the town, and ran at full speed.

Some immediately burst in through the gates, others over some square timbers that happened to be lying by the wall, which had fallen and was being re-built, for the purpose of drawing up stones.

Brasidas, therefore, and the greatest part of the troops turned immediately up to the highest parts of the town, wishing to take it from top to bottom, and securely; the rest of the multitude spread in all directions alike.

While the capture of Torone was being effected, the mass of the people, knowing nothing of the matter, was confounded; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with the proceedings, straightway joined those who had entered the town.

When the Athenians (for there happened to be about fifty heavy-armed sleeping in the market-place) were aware of it, some few of them were killed in close combat; of the rest, some fled by land, others to their ships, (for there were two keeping guard there,) and escaped to Lecythus, the fort which they held themselves, having occupied a corner of the town running out into the sea, and cut off by its position on a narrow isthmus.

As many of the Toronaeans also as were on their side, took refuge with them.

When it was now day, and the town was safely in his possession, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that whoever wished should come out to his own property, and live in the town in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald, and told them to evacuate Lecythus under truce, with their property, as the place belonged to the Chalcidians.

They refused to evacuate it, but begged him to grant them a truce for one day, that they might take up their dead. He granted it for two days; during which he himself fortified the neighbouring houses, and the Athenians their positions. Having convened also an assembly of the Toronaeans, he said nearly the same things as at Acanthus;

that it was not right for them to regard as bad men, or traitors, those who had negotiated with them for the capture of the city; (for they had not done so to bring it into slavery, nor because they had been bribed, but for the advantage and liberty of the town;) nor for those who had taken no part in it to suppose that they would not reap the same benefits; for he had not come to destroy either city or individual. For this reason he had made the proclamation to those who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, as he had none the worse opinion of them for their friendship to them:

and he thought that when they had made trial of the Lacedaemonians, they would not be less kindly disposed towards them, but far more so, inasmuch as they were acting more justly: but as it was, through want of such a trial, they were afraid of them.

And he desired them all to prepare for being stanch allies, and for having to answer in future for whatever they did amiss: but as regarded the past, it was not the Lacedaemonians that were injured, but themselves rather, by others who were too strong for them; and so allowance was to be made for any thing in which they had opposed him.

Having thus addressed and encouraged them, on the expiration of the truce, he made his assault upon Lecythus; while the Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall, and from some houses that had battlements. For one day they beat him off;

but on the next, when an engine was going to be brought up against them by the enemy, from which they intended to throw fire on the wooden defences, and when the army was now advancing where they thought they should best bring up the engine, and where the place was most assailable, the defenders placed a wooden tower on the wall opposite to them, and carried up on to it many jars and casks of water, with large stones, an a large party of men ascended it.

But the building, having had too great a weight put on it, suddenly broke down, and making a loud noise, vexed more than it terrified those of the Athenians who were near and saw it; but those who were at a distance, and most of all those who were at the greatest, thinking that the place was already taken in that quarter, hurried away, and fled to the sea and to their ships.

When Brasidas perceived that they were deserting the battlements, and saw what was going on, he rushed up with his army, d immediately took the fort, and put to the sword as many s he found in it.

The Athenians in this way evacuated the race, and went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. How there is in Lecythus a temple of Minerva; and Brasidas had proclaimed, when he was about to make the assault, that the man who first scaled the wall he would give thirty minae of silver. Thinking, therefore, that the capture had been effected by other means than human, he presented the thirty mine to the goddess, for the use of her temple; and having razed and cleared Lecythus, he devoted the whole, as sacred ground.

During the remainder of the winter, he was settling the affairs of the places in his possession, and forming designs against others; and at the expiration of the winter, the eighth year of this war ended.

At the commencement of the spring of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians immediately concluded an armistice for a year; the Athenians considering that Brasidas would then no longer win any more of their towns to revolt, before they had made their preparations for securing them at their leisure; and at the same time, that if it were for their interest, they might conclude a general peace: while the Lacedaemonians thought that the Athenians feared what they really were afraid of; and that after having a suspension of their miseries and suffering, they would be more desirous, from their taste of it, to effect a reconciliation, and, restoring their men, to make a treaty for a longer time.

For they deemed it of greater importance to recover their men at a time when Brasidas was still prosperous: and, [on the other hand,] if he reached a still greater measure of success, and put matters on an equality, they were likely to lose those men, and while defending themselves with their others, on equal terms, still to run a risk of not gaining the mastery.

An armistice was therefore concluded by them and their allies on the following terms:

"With regard to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we agree that any one who wishes, may have access to it, without deceit, and without fear, according to the laws of our respective countries.

The Lacedaemonians, and such of the allies as are present, agree to this; and declare that they will, to the best of their power, persuade the Boeotians and Phocians to do so, by sending heralds to them on the subject.

"With regard to the treasures of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to find out such as unjustly meddle with them, uprightly and honestly acting in accordance with the laws of our forefathers, both we, and you, and such of the rest as may consent to this article; all acting in accordance with the laws of our respective countries. On these points, then, the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the allies agree, according to the terms mentioned.

"On the following points the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the allies agree, in case the Athenians make a treaty to that effect; that we shall each remain in our own territory, keeping what we now have; the garrison in Coryphasium confining themselves within the Buphras and Tomeus; that in Cythera holding no intercourse with the allied states, neither we with you, nor you with us; and that in Nisaea and Minoa not crossing the road, which runs from the gates leading from the temple of Nisus to that of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune straight to the bridge at Minoa, (the Megareans and the allies being also bound not to cross this road,) and the Athenians retaining the island taken by them, without any communication on either side; and lastly, with regard to Troezen, that each party shall retain what they now possess. and as was arranged with the Athenians.

"With regard to the navigation of the sea, that along their own coast and that of their confederacy, the Lacedaemonians may sail, not in a ship of war, but in any other vessel rowed by oars, and carrying not more than

500 talents tonnage.

"That any herald, ambassadors, and attendants, as many as they may choose, on their way to the Peloponnese or to Athens, for bringing the war to a conclusion, and adjusting all claims, shall have free passage, going and returning, both by land and by sea. That deserters shall not be received in the mean time, neither free nor bond, neither by you nor by us. Further, that we shall give judicial satisfaction, both you to us and we to you, according to the laws of our respective countries, deciding all disputes by law, without recourse to hostilities.

The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles: but if you think any thing else either better or more just, come to Lacedaemon and explain your views; for neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies will object to any thing you may say with justice. But let those who come, come with full powers to treat, as you also desire us. The truce shall continue one year.

The people [of Athens] ratified the truce.

The tribe Acamantis had the prytany; Phoenippus was secretary; Niciades was chairman. Laches moved, 'that they do conclude the armistice, (and may they do it for the good fortune of Athens!) on the terms agreed to by the Lacedaemonians and the allies.' And they agreed in the assembly of the people, 'that the armistice be for a year, commencing this very day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion; that, during that time, ambassadors and heralds shall proceed to each other's country, and discuss on what terms the war shall be brought to a conclusion. That the generals and prytanes having summoned an assembly of the people, the Athenians shall, in the first place, consult on the peace, and on the manner in which the envoys for putting an end to the wars shall be admitted. That the envoys now present in the city shall immediately bind themselves in the presence of the people, that they will assuredly abide by this truce for the space of a year.'

To these articles the Lacedaemonians agreed, (their allies also swearing to them,) with the Athenians and their allies, on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius.

Those who agreed to the articles and ratified them by libations, were the following: Of the Lacedaemonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxidaidas; of the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; of the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates, and Onasimus son of Megacles; of the Megareans, Nicasus son of Cecalus, and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; of the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas;

of the Athenians, the following generals, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus. This then was the armistice which was concluded; and during it they were throughout holding conferences for a more general treaty.

About the time at which they were thus going backwards and forwards to each other, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. Now these Scionaeans say that they are Palleneans from the Peloponnese, and that their first founders, while on their voyage from Troy, were carried to this place by the storm which the Achaeans experienced, and there took up their abode.

On their revolting, Brasidas crossed over to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead of him, and himself following at some distance in a skiff; that in case of his falling in with any vessel larger than the skiff, the trireme might come to his aid; while if another trireme of equal force came against them, he thought that it would not turn upon the smaller vessel, but upon the ship, and in the mean time he should make his escape. Having thus crossed over, and convened an assembly of the Scionaeans, he spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone:

and told them, moreover, that they were most deserving of praise, inasmuch as, though Pallene within the isthmus was cut off from succours by land through the Athenians occupying Potidaea, and they were virtually nothing else but islanders, they had of their own accord joined the banner of liberty, and had not through cowardice waited for compulsion to be applied to them, in the case of what was manifestly for their own advantage. That this was a proof that they would also endure like men any other even of the greatest perils, if [by their so doing] their affairs should be arranged to their satisfaction; in short, that he should consider them as truly the most faithful allies of the Lacedaemonians, and show them all other proofs of his respect.

The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and all alike taking courage, even those who before were not pleased with the business, resolved to carry on the war with spirit; and both received Brasidas with other marks of honour, and publicly crowned him with a crown of gold, as the liberator of Greece; while individually they decked him with garlands, and thronged to him as to a victorious athlete.

At that time, after leaving them some guards, he crossed over again, and not long after sent them over a larger force; as he wished, in conjunction with them, to make an attempt on Mende and Potidaea, thinking that the Athenians would come to their relief, as though it were an island, and desiring to be beforehand with them. He was carrying on also some communications with those towns, with a view to their being betrayed to him. And thus he was meditating an attack on these places.

But in the mean time there came to him in a trireme the commissioners, who were carrying round intelligence of the armistice, Aristonymus on the side of the Athenian s, and Athenians on that of the Lacedaemonians.

So the troops crossed over again to Torone; while they informed Brasidas of the truce, and all the allies of the Lacedaemonians Thrace-ward assented to what had been done. Now Aristonymus allowed all the other cases;

but finding, on a calculation of the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date of the convention, he said that they would not be included in it. But Brasidas earnestly contended, on the other hand, that they had revolted before the truce was made, and refused to give the town up.

So when Aristonymus reported their case at Athens, the people were immediately prepared to send an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedaemonians sent envoys and told them that they would be violating the truce; and laid claim to the town, in reliance on the statement of Brasidas; offering, at the same time, to let the question be decided by arbitration.

The Athenians, however, did not wish to run the risk of arbitration, but to send the expedition as quickly as possible; being enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the power of the Lacedaemonians by land, which could not help them.

And indeed the truth of the question respecting the revolt was rather as the Athenians maintained; for the Scionaeans revolted two days after the truce was signed. Accordingly, at the instigation of Cleon, they at once passed a decree that they should reduce the Scionaeans, and put them to death; and so, while they remained quiet from other undertakings, they were engaged in preparing for this.

In the mean time, Mende revolted from them, a town in Pallene, and a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas received them, not thinking that he was doing wrong, because they had clearly come over to him during the armistice: for in some points he himself also charged the Athenians with infringing the truce.

And for this reason the Mendaeans were the more emboldened, seeing the feelings of Brasidas warmly disposed towards them, and inferring as much from the case of Scione, since he would not give it up; and at the same time because those of them who contrived the revolt were a small party, and since thinking of it on that occasion, had never let it rest afterwards, but were afraid of conviction for themselves, and forced the majority to it against their inclination.

The Athenians, immediately hearing of it, were still far more enraged, and made their preparations against both the towns.

And Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy-armed and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas in command of them all. And so they joined in making their preparations, believing that the Athenians would quickly be with them.

Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile made an expedition together the second time into Lyncus, against Arrhibaeus; taking with them, the latter, the forces of the Macedonians under his dominion, and some heavy-armed troops of the Greeks living amongst them; the former, in addition to those of the Peloponnesians whom he had still left, the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and of the rest according to their respective strength. In all, the heavy-armed Greeks amounted to about three thousand; all the cavalry of the Macedonians with the Chalcidians went with them, amounting to nearly a thousand, and a large multitude of the barbarians besides. Having:

invaded the country of Arrhibaeus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field against them, they also took up a position opposite to them.

The infantry occupying a hill on each side, and the space between being a plain, the horse of both armies, in the first place, galloped down into it, and engaged in a cavalry action. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed having advanced first from their hill with their cavalry, and being ready for action, Brasidas and Perdiccas also, in their turn, led their forces against them, and engaged in battle, and routed the Lyncestians, and killed many of them; but the rest took refuge on the heights, and there remained quiet.

After thin, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, in expectation of the Illyrians, who were to join Perdiccas as mercenaries. Then Perdiccas wished to advance against the villages of Arrhibaeus, and not to sit still; but Brasidas was anxious for Mende, lest if the Athenians should sail against it before his return, it should meet with some disaster; and; as the Illyrians, moreover, had not joined them, he was not eager to advance, but rather to retreat.

In the mean time, while they were thus at variance, news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas, and joined Arrhibaeus: so that now both parties thought it best to retreat through their fear of them, as they were men of a warlike character; but nothing being settled, in consequence of their quarrel, as to when they should march, and night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of the barbarians were immediately terrified, (as great armies are wont to be panic-stricken for no certain cause;) and thinking that many times more than had really come were advancing against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into sudden flight, and proceeded homeward. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of it, was compelled by them, on his learning it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped at a great distance from each other)

In the morning, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeus were on the point of attacking him, he, on his side, drew his heavy-armed together into a square, and taking the light-armed multitude into the centre, intended to retire. And he appointed his youngest men to dash out, on whatever point they might charge them;

while he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the enemy that should fall upon them.

Before the enemy came near, he addressed his men, as well as the short time allowed him, with the following exhortation:

Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that in consequence of your being left alone, and because your assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you were thrown into consternation, I should not have given you, as I do, information at the same time as encouragement. But as it is, with respect to the desertion of our friends, and the superior numbers of our adversaries, I will endeavour, by a brief admonition and advice, to convince you of what is most important for you.

For it is your proper characterr to be brave in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each case, but from your own native valour; and to fear no number of your enemies whatever:

since neither are the governments from which you come of such a character—governments in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the smaller number the greater, having acquired their power by no other means than by being victorious in battle.

But with regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid through inexperience, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from what I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained from hearsay, that they will not prove formidable.

For with regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of strength, while they are in reality weak, when correct information is gained respecting them, it rather gives confidence to those who resist them: whereas in the case of those who have any solid advantage, men would meet them the more boldly from having no previous acquaintance with them.

Now these men present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unacquainted with them: for they are formidable in their numbers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of their shouting; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a look of threatening. But to those who stand their ground against them, they are not what they seemed; for they have no definite order, so as to be ashamed of leaving any particular position, when hard pressed; and their retreat and attack being considered equally honourable puts their courage also beyond the reach of proof; while their independent mode of fighting would most frequently afford a man a pretext for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider the probability of their frightening you without any danger to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; else they would have adopted that method instead of their present one.

And in this way you clearly see, that all that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, though to the eye and to the ear very urgent. If, therefore, you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, you will the sooner reach a place of safety; and will know in future, that to those who sustain their first attack, such rabbles only make a vaunting demonstration, by threatening at a distance; but in the case of those who yield to them, they are quick in displaying their courage in pursuit, when they can do it with security.

In this way did Brasidas exhort them, and began to lead off his forces. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed on him with much shouting and uproar, thinking that he was flying, and being determined to overtake and cut him off.

Then, when the reserve companies met them, at whatever point they charged; and Brasidas himself with his picked men withstood the pressure, and they had, contrary to their expectation, resisted their first rush, and, after that, received and repelled them when they came on, but retired themselves, when the enemy withdrew: then indeed the main body of the barbarians ceased attacking the Greeks with Brasidas in the the open country; and having left a portion of their forces to follow and harass them, the rest advanced at a run against the flying Macedonians, cutting down such as they fell in with; and got in time to preoccupy the narrow pass which runs between two hills, into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And when he was coming to just where the road now became impassable, they proceeded to surround him, with a view to cutting him off.

He, on perceiving it, gave orders to his band of three hundred to advance at a run to that one of the hills which he thought they might take more easily, as quickly as each man could, without observing any order; and to endeavour to dislodge from it the barbarians who were already upon it, before their main force that was surrounding him should join them there.

Accordingly, they charged, and overpowered the party on the hill, and the main force of the Greeks now advanced more easily up to it; for the barbarians were frightened on finding their men on that side dislodged from the height, and no longer followed the main body, considering that they were now on the borders, and had escaped them.

When Brasidas had thus reached the heights, he proceeded with greater safety, and arrived the same day at Arnissa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas.

And as the soldiers were enraged at the Macedonians' having retreated before them, whatever yokes of oxen belonging to them they fell in with on the road, or whatever baggage that had dropped off, (as was likely to happen in case of a retreat by night, and under an alarm,) on their own authority they unyoked and cut down the cattle, and appropriated the baggage.

From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and cherished in future a hatred of the Lacedaemonians, which was not, indeed congenial with his feelings, because of his aversion for the Athenians; but he departed from his natural interests, and was contriving in what way he might soonest come to terms with the Athenians, and be rid of the Peloponnesians.

On his return from Macedonia, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende; and remaining quiet there, though he considered himself unable to cross over into Pallene, and assist it, he kept watch over Torone.

For about the same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sent the expedition against Mende and Scione, as they were preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, and one thousand heavy-armed of their own, six hundred bowmen, one thousand Thracian mercenaries, and others of their allies from that country serving as targeteers, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus son of

Diitrephes. After advancing from Potidaea with their ships, they came to land opposite the temple of Neptune, and proceeded against the Mendaeans. They, both themselves and three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy-armed in all, with Polydamidas their commander, were encamped outside the city on a strong hill. Nicias, with one hundred and twenty Methonaean light-armed, sixty picked men of the Athenian heavy-armed, and all the bowmen, attempted to come at them by a path running up the hill; but being wounded by them, was unable to force their position: while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different approach, and from a more distant point, against the hill, which was difficult of access, was beaten back in utter confusion, and the whole force of the Athenians was within a little of being conquered. For that day, then, as the Mendaeans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians retreated and pitched their camp; and the Mendaeans, when night came on, returned into the town.

The day following, the Athenians sailed round to the side towards Scione, and took the suburb, and ravaged the land the whole day, no one coming out against them. For indeed there was some opposition of parties in the town; and the three hundred of the Scionaeans, on the approach of night, returned home.

The next day Nicias advanced with half the forces to the borders of the Scionaeans, and laid waste the land, while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town, near the upper gates, by the way they go to Potidaea.

There Polydamidas (as the arms of the Mendaeans and their auxiliaries happened to be piled in that quarter) began to draw them up for battle, and exhorted the Mendaeans to march out against the enemy.

One of the popular faction replying to him, in the spirit of party, that they would not go out, and did not want a war, and, when he had thus relied, being dragged to him by the hand, and roughly treated, the commons immediately took up their arms, and advanced in a great rage against the Peloponnesians, and those who had joined them in opposition to themselves. Having thus fallen upon them, they routed them, in consequence both of the suddenness of the charge, and of their alarm at the gates being opened to the Athenians;

for they imagined that the attack had been made in consequence of some agreement with them.

They then, as many as were not immediately killed, took refuge in the citadel, which was before held by themselves; while the Athenians (for by this time Nicias also had returned and was close to the town) rushed with all their forces into Mende, inasmuch as it had not thrown open its gates to them on the ground of any convention, and sacked it as though they had taken it by storm; the generals with difficulty restraining them from even butchering the inhabitants.

Afterwards they told the Mendaeans to retain their civil rights, as usual, after having tried amongst themselves whomever they considered to have been the originators of the revolt: but the party in the citadel they cut off by a wall down to the sea on each side, and stationed troops to keep guard over them. When they had thus got possession of Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

The inhabitants of that town, both themselves and the Peloponnesians, marched out to oppose them, and were posted on a strong hill before the city, without the occupation of which by the enemy there was no possibility of investing them.

So the Athenians attacked it vigorously, and having driven off by their charge those who were upon it, pitched their camp, and after erecting a trophy, prepared for the circumvallation of the place.

Not long after, while they were now engaged in the work, the auxiliaries who were being besieged in the citadel of Mende having, during the night, driven in the guard by the sea-side, arrived at Scione; and most of them escaping through the troops encamped before it, threw themselves into the place.

While Scione was invested, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals, and concluded an arrangement with the Athenians, through his hatred of Brasidas in consequence of the retreat from Lyncus; having begun to negotiate for it from that very time.

And, as Isagoras the Lacedaemonian then happened to be on the point of taking an army by land to join Brasidas, Perdiccas, partly because Nicias advised him, since he had come to terms with the Athenians, to give them some clear proof of his being a firm friend; and partly because he himself wished the Lacedaemonians never again to go to his territories; won over to his views his friends in Thessaly, (for he was always intimate with the principal men,) and stopped the army and its equipments, so that they did not even try the mind of the Thessalians on the subject.

Isagoras, however, Ameinias, and Aristeus, themselves came to Brasidas, being commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the state of affairs; and took from Sparta, in opposition to the spirit of their laws, some of their young men, with a view to appointing them to the command in the cities, instead of intrusting it to any that might happen to be there at present. Accordingly, he appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus to the command in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander in Torone.

The same summer, the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, on a charge of their favouring the Athenians; having always wished to do it, but finding it more easy at that time, since all the flower of their population had fallen in the battle against the Athenians.

The temple of Juno at Argos was also burnt down that same summer, in consequence of Chrysis the priestess having placed a lighted torch near the garlands, and fallen asleep after it; so that they all caught fire, and were in a flame before she perceived it.

Chrysis immediately, the same night, fled to Phlius, in her fear of the Argives; who, according to the law laid down on the subject, appointed another priestess, by name Phaeinis. The priesthood of Chrysis, at the time she fled, embraced eight years of this war, and to the middle of the ninth.

And now, towards the close of the summer, Scione was entirely invested; and the Athenians, having left a garrison to keep watch over it, returned with the rest of their army.

The following winter, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained quiet, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies on both sides, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the district of Oresthis, and the victory was doubtful; for each side having put to flight one of the enemy's wings which was opposed to them, they both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi.

Though, however, many had fallen on each side, and the battle was undecisive, and night interrupted the action, the Tegeans bi vouacked on the field, and erected a trophy immediately; whereas the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and erected their counter-trophy afterwards.

Towards the end of the same winter, and when it was now approaching to spring, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. For he went thither by night, and planted a ladder against the wall, and so far escaped observation; the ladder having been planted just in the interval when the bell had been passed round, before the man who passed it returned to that side. Afterwards, however, on their immediately perceiving it, before his troops came up to the place, he led them back again as quickly as possible, and did not wait for the day to break.

And so the winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.