Book 5

THE following summer, the truce for a year continued till the Pythian games, and then ended. During the suspension of arms, the Athenians expelled the Delians from their island, thinking that they had been consecrated when in a state of impurity from some crime of ancient date; and, moreover, that this had been the deficiency in their former purification of it; in which case I have before explained that they considered themselves to have performed it rightly by taking up the coffins of the dead. The Delians found a residence at Atramyttium in Asia, given to them by Pharnaces, as each of them arrived there.

After the armistice had expired, Cleon, having persuaded the Athenians to the measure, led an expedition against the Thrace-ward towns, with twelve hundred heavy-armed, and three hundred cavalry of the Athenians, a larger force of the allies, and thirty ships.

After landing in the first place at Scione, which was still being besieged, and taking thence some heavy-armed from the garrison, he sailed into the port of the Colophonians, belonging to the Toronaeans, and at no great distance from their city.

Thence, having learned from deserters both that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that those who were in it were not strong enough to give him battle, with his land forces he marched against the city, while he sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour.

First, then, he came to the fortifications which Brasidas had raised anew round the city, from a wish to include the suburb, and so by taking down a part of the original wall had made it one city.

Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonians commander, and the garrison that was there, went to the defence of the fortifications, and tried to resist the assault of the Athenians. When they were being driven in, and the ships that had been sent round were at the same time sailing into the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing that the ships might find the city deserted by its defenders before he could reach it, and that if the fortifications were carried he might be made prisoner in them, left them, and ran into the city.

But the Athenians from the ships had had time to take Torone, and their land forces, rushing after him, on the very first assault burst in with him through the part of the old wall that had been removed.

And thus some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans they slew immediately in close combat, and others they took alive, with Pasitelidas the commander. Now Brasidas was coming to the relief of Torone;

but hearing of its capture while on his way, he went back again, having been but forty stades short of arriving in time. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one by the harbour, the other near the fortifications; and sold into slavery the women and children of the Toronaeans, while the men themselves, with the Peloponnesians, and whatever Chalcidians there were besides, seven hundred in all, they sent off to Athens; whence some of them afterwards were dismissed, on conclusion of peace, while others were recovered by the Olynthians, through an exchange of prisoners.

About the same time, too, the Boeotians took by treachery Panactum, a fortress of the Athenians on the borders.

Cleon. after establishing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor and sailed round Athos on his way to Amphipolis.

About this same time, Phaeax, son of Erasistratus, with two colleagues, being commissioned by the Athenians, sailed with two ships as ambassador to Italy and Sicily.

For on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, the Leontines had enrolled a large number of new citizens, and the commons were thinking of dividing the land.

When the aristocratical party were aware of it, they called in the Syracusans, and expelled the commons; who wandered about as they severally happened; while the nobles entered into an arrangement with the Syracusans, and having abandoned and laid waste their own city, lived at Syracuse with the enjoyment of the franchise.

Afterwards some of them, in consequence of not being pleased, withdrew from Syracuse, and occupied a quarter of the city of Leontini, called Phocaeae, and Bricinniae, which was a stronghold in the Leontine country. There the majority of the popular party who had been expelled, came to them, and having thus established themselves, they carried on the war from the fortifications.

The Athenians, hearing this, despatched Phaeax, to try if by any means they might persuade the allies they had there, and the rest of the Sicilians if they could, to join in attacking the Syracusans, on the strength of their gaining such additional power, and thus might save the commons of'

Leontini. So Phaeax came, and prevailed on the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; but when the question was settled against him at Gela, he did not then proceed to the others, as he found that he should not prevail on them; but having returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, and having on his route also visited Bricinniae, and encouraged its inhabitants, he sailed back again.

On his course to Sicily and return from it, he also communicated with certain cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with the Athenians. He likewise fell in with the Locrian settlers banished from Messana, who, after the pacification effected by the Sicilians, when the Messanians were divided into factions, and one of them had invited the Locrians to their aid, had been sent out for that purpose; and so Messana came into the hands of the Locrians for some time.

Phaeax then, having fallen in with these men on their way home, did them no harm, as proposals had been made to him by the Locrians for coming to terms with the Athenians.

For they were the only people of the allies who, when the Sicilians were reconciled to each other, did not make peace with the Athenians: nor would they have done it then, had they not been pressed by hostilities with the Itonaeans and Melaeans, who lived on their borders, and were a colony from them. So Phaeax returned, and arrived at Athens some time after.

Now when Cleon, at the lime we last mentioned him, sailed round from Torone to go against Amphipolis, making Eion the base of his operations, he assaulted Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, but without reducing it; but Galepsus, the Thasian colony, he took by storm.

And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, that he might join him with an army according to the terms of their alliance, and others into Thrace, to Polles, the king of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could, he himself remained quiet in Eion, awaiting their arrival.

On hearing this, Brasidas, on his side also, took up an opposite position on Cerdylium. This spot is in the Argilian country, being on the high ground on the other side of the river, not far from the city of Amphipolis; and every thing was distinctly seen from it; so that Cleon could not unobserved by him set out with his army; as he expected him to do, and despising the numbers of the Lacedaemonians to march up with the forces he had with him against Amphipolis.

At the same time he was getting ready fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries, and was calling all the Edonians to his aid, both targeteers and cavalry; and he had a thousand targeteers of the Myrcinians and Chalcidians, in addition to those in Amphipolis.

All his heavy-armed force too was mustered, about two thousand in number, and three hundred Grecian horse. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas stationed himself on Cerdylium, whilst the rest were posted with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected.

For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmers; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his camp and led them forward.

And he adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm.

Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace.

He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

Immediately that Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he too went down from Cerdylium, and entered Amphipolis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against the Athenians, he made none;

being afraid of his own resources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so much in numbers, (for they were pretty nearly equal,) but in character; (for it was the flower of the Athenian force that was in the field, and the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians;) but he prepared to attack them by means of a stratagem.

For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the equipment of the troops with him, which was such as necessity alone dictated, he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, and despising them on sufficient grounds.

Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect:

Men of the Peloponnese, with regard to the character of the country from which we are come, namely, that through its bravery it has always been a free country, and that you are Dorians about to engage with Ionians, to whom you are habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice.

But with regard to the present attack, I will explain in what way I purpose making it;

that the fact of your meeting the danger in small divisions, and not in one body, may not cause a want of courage by an appearance of weakness.

For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while, without any order, they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them with regard to his own power, not so much in an open manner and in regular battle-array, as with reference to his present advantage, that man would be most successful.

And those stratagems by which one would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation.

While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are thinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than remaining; while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed on the centre of their forces.

And do you, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me now charging, and in all probability frightening them, take your division, both the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and suddenly opening the gates rush out against them, and make all haste to close with them as quickly as possible. For we may expect that in this way they will be most alarmed;

since the force which follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than that which is already before him and engaged with him.

And do you be a brave man yourself, as it is natural that you should, being a Spartan; and do ye, allies, follow him courageously; and consider that it is the proof of good soldiership to to be willing, and to be alive to shame, and to obey your commanders. Reflect, too, that on this day you either gain your liberty, if you act bravely, and the title of confederates of the Lacedaemonians; or are slaves of the Athenians—if you fare as well as you possibly can, without being reduced to personal bondage, or put to death—and incur a more galling slavery than before, while you oppose the liberation of the rest of the Greeks.

Do not you, then, act as cowards, seeing for how much you are struggling; and I will show you that I am not better able to give advice to others, than to carry it out in action myself.

Having thus spoken, Brasidas himself prepared for marching out, and posted the rest of the troops with Clearidas at what were called the Thracian gates, to sally out after him, as had been arranged.

His descent from Cerdylium having been observed, as also his sacrificing, when he was in the city —of which a view is commanded from the outside—near the temple of Minerva, and his being occupied with these measures, tidings were carried to Cleon (for he had gone forward at the time to look about him) that the enemy's whole force was visible in the city; and that under the gates were observed many feet of horses and men, as though prepared to make a sally.

On receiving this intelligence he came up to the spot; and when he saw that it was so, not wishing to come to a decisive engagement before his reinforcements also had arrived, and thinking that he should have time to retire, he at once gave orders for the signal to march back, and sent word to the troops on the retreat to draw off in the direction of Eion, moving on their left wing;

which indeed was the only way they could.

But when he thought there was a dilatoriness on their part, he himself made the right wing turn round, and presenting their exposed side to the enemy, began to lead off his troops. Upon this, Brasidas, marking his opportunity, and seeing that the Athenian force was on the move, says to his own company and the rest:

The men are not disposed to wait for us, as is evident by the motion of their spears and of their heads; for those who have this going on amongst them do not generally receive the charge of their assailants.

So then let somebody throw open for me the gates I have mentioned, and let us march out against them as quickly as possible, and with good courage.

He, accordingly, sallied out by the gates near the stockade, the first in the long wall which was then standing, and ran full speed along the high road, where the trophy now stands, as you go by the strongest part of the position;

and falling on the Athenians, who were both terrified by their own disorder and confounded by his boldness, in the centre of their forces, he put them to the rout. Clearidas too, as had been arranged, sallied out after him by the Thracian gates, and rushed upon the enemy's troops.

The consequence was, that by this unexpected and sudden charge on both sides, the enemy were thrown into confusion; and their left wing, on the side of Eion, which had already advanced some distance, immediately broke away and fled.

When it was now on its retreat, Brasidas, in advancing along to attack the right wing, received a wound; and while the Athenians did not observe his fall, those who were near him took him up, and carried him off the field. The right of the Athenians, however, stood its ground better; and though Cleon, who from the first had no intention of making a stand, immediately fled, and was overtaken and killed by a Myrcinian targeteer, his heavy-armed retreated in a close body to the hill, and repulsed the charge of Clearidas twine or thrice, and did not give way till the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse, with the targeteers, having surrounded them, and pouring their missiles upon them, put them to the rout.

And so now the whole army of the Athenians, flying with great difficulty, and taking many different roads over the mountains, effected their return to Eion;

excepting such as were killed either in the immediate action, or by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Those who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, carried him still breathing into the city; where he lived to hear that his troops were victorious, but after a short interval expired.

The rest of the army, on returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and erected a trophy.

After this all the allies attended in arms, and interred Brasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of the present market-place. And ever since the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb with a fence, have made offerings to him as to a hero, and have given him the honour of games and annual sacrifices. They also referred the settlement to him as its founder, demolishing the buildings of Hagnon, and obliterating whatever memorial of his founding the place was likely to remain: for they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver; and at the present time too, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedaemonians confederacy; while, on the other hand, they thought that Hagnon, in consequence of their hostility towards the Athenians, would not retain his honours either so beneficially or so agreeably to them.

The dead they restored to the Athenians. There were killed, of the Athenians, about six hundred; of their adversaries, only seven; because the battle was not fought with any regular order, but was rather brought on by such an accidental occurrence and previous alarm as has been described.

After taking up their dead, the Athenians sailed away home; while Clearidas and his party proceeded to settle matters about Amphipolis.

About the same time, towards the close of the summer, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedaemonians, led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed to the Thraceward towns, and on their arrival at Heraclea in Trachinia arranged whatever appeared to them not to be on a good footing.

While they thus prolonged their stay in the place, this battle of Amphipolis happened to be fought; and so the summer ended

The following winter, Ramphias and his companions immediately passed through the country as far as Pierius in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians forbad their advance, and as Brasidas, moreover, was dead, to whom they were leading the force, they turned back home; thinking the time for action had gone by; as both the Athenians had departed in consequence of their defeat, and they were not competent to execute any of his designs.

But, most of all, they returned because they knew that the Lacedaemonians, at the time of their setting out, were more strongly disposed for peace.

It happened too, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither party any longer applied themselves at all to the war, but they were rather inclined for peace. The Athenians were so, as having received a severe blow at Delium, and again shortly after at Amphipolis; and as no longer having that confident hope in their strength, through which they would not before accept the offered treaty, thinking, in consequence of their present success, that they should come off victorious in the struggle.

Besides, they were also afraid of their allies, lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on a larger scale; and they repented not having come to an arrangement, when they had a fine opportunity, after the events at Pylus.

The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, wished for peace, because they found protracted beyond their expectation those hostilities by which they imagined that in a few years they should reduce the power of the Athenians, if they ravaged their land; and because they had met with the disaster on the island—such as had never yet befallen Sparta: and in consequence of their country being plundered from Pylus and Cythera; while their helots also were deserting, and there was a constant apprehension lest even those that remained in the country, trusting in the support of those who were out of it, should, on the strength of the present state of things, adopt some revolutionary designs against them, as on a former occasion.

It happened, too, that their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for them to carry on war at once with the Argives and Athenians. Besides, they suspected that some of the states in the Peloponnese would revolt from them to the Argives; as was really the case.

On these considerations both parties thought it best to conclude the arrangement; and particularly the Lacedaemonians, through the desire of recovering their men taken in the island; for those of them who were Spartans were of the highest rank, and connected with themselves in the same way.

They began therefore to negotiate immediately after their capture; but the Athenians, being so successful, would not yet make peace on fair terms. When, however, they had been defeated at Delium, immediately the Lacedaemonians, finding that they would now be more ready to accept their proposals, concluded the armistice for a year, during which they should meet together, and consult respecting a treaty for a longer period.

And when, moreover, the defeat at Amphipolis had befallen the Athenians, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who on each side were most opposed to the cause of peace-the one, because he was successful and honoured in consequence of the war; the other, because he thought, that if tranquillity were secured, he would be more easily detected in his evil practices, and less believed in his calumniations-then the individuals who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who of all his contemporaries was most generally successful in his military commands, were much more anxious for peace than ever. Nicias was so, because he wished, while he had met with no disaster, and was in high repute, permanently to secure his good fortune; and both at present to obtain a respite from troubles himself and give his countrymen the same, and to hand down to futurity a name for having continued to the end without subjecting the state to any disaster; and he thought that such a result is secured by freedom from danger, and by a man's committing himself as little as possible to fortune, and that such freedom from danger is afforded by peace. Pleistoanax, on the other hand, took the same view, because he was calumniated by his enemies on the subject of his restoration, and was continually being brought forward by them as the object of religious scruple on the part of the Lacedaemonians, whenever they met with any defeat; as though it were owing to his illegal restoration that these things befell them.

For they charged him with having, in concert with Aristocles, his brother, prevailed on the prophetess at Delphi to give the following charge to such Lacedaemonians as went, during a long period, to consult the oracle;

that they should bring back the seed of the demigod son of Jupiter from a foreign land to his own; else they would plough with a silver share.

And so they said that in the course of time, when he had gone as an exile to Lycaeum, (in consequence of his former return from Attica, which was thought to have been effected by bribery,) and had then, through fear of the Lacedaemonians, half his house within the sanctuary of Jupiter, he induced them, in the nineteenth year of his exile, to restore him with the same dances and sacrifices as when they appointed their kings on first settling in Lacedaemonian.

Being annoyed therefore by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no reverse was experienced, and when, moreover, the Lacedaemonians were recovering their men from the island, he too should give his enemies no handle against him; whereas, as long as there was war, the leading men must always be exposed to accusations from the occurrence of disasters; he was ardently desirous of the pacification.

And so during this winter they were meeting in conference; and when it was now close upon spring,

The terrors of an armament, for which orders were sent round to the different states, as though for the purpose of building forts, were held forth by the Lacedaemonians, that the Athenians might the more readily listen to them. And when, after these conferences had been held. and they had urged many claims against each other, it was agreed that they should make peace on restoring what they had respectively taken during the war; but that the Athenians should keep Nisaea; (for on their demanding back Plataea, the Thebans said that it was not by force that they held the place, but in consequence of the inhabitants themselves having surrendered on definite terms, and not betrayed it to them; and the Athenians maintained that in the same way had they got possession of Nisaea;) then the Lacedaemonians convened their allies; and when all the rest, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were displeased with what was being done, had voted for putting an end to the war, they concluded the arrangement, and made a treaty and bound themselves by oaths to the Athenians, and they to them, to the following effect:

1st, "The Athenians and Lacedaemonians, with their allies, made a treaty on the following terms, and swore to observe it, state by state. With regard to the temples common to the nation, that whoever wishes shall sacrifice, and go for that purpose, and consult the oracle, and attend the games, according to the custom of his fathers, whether proceeding by sea or land, without fear.

2nd, "That the temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi, and the Delphians, shall be independent, self-taxed, and self judged, as regards both themselves and their territory, according to their hereditary usage.

3rd, "That the treaty shall be in force fifty years between the Athenians and their allies, and the Lacedaemonians and theirs, without guile or wrong, by land and by sea.

4th, "That it shall not be lawful to take the field for the purpose of inflicting injury, either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by any means whatever. But should any dispute arise between them, they must have recourse to justice and oaths, in whatever way they may arrange.

5th, "That the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. That of all the cities, however, which the Lacedaemonians may restore to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to depart wherever they please, themselves and their property with them; and the cities shall be independent, only paying the tribute that was paid in the time of Aristides. That it shall not be lawful for the Athenians, or their allies, to take the field against them for their injury, after the treaty has been concluded. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. That these shall be considered as allies to neither party, neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians; but if the Athenians gain the consent of the cities, then it shall be lawful for them to make them their allies, with their own free will. That the Mecybernaeans, Samaeans, and Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities, like the Olynthians and Acanthians; but that the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians.

6th, "That the Athenians, also, shall restore to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedaemonians that are in prison at Athens, or any where else in all the Athenian dominions; and shall release those of the Peloponnesians who are being besieged in Scione; and all others in that place who are allies of the Lacedaemonians; and whoever amongst the allies of the Lacedaemonians is in prison at Athens, or any where else in the Athenian dominions.

7th, "That the Lacedaemonians too, and their allies, shall in the same way restore whomever of the Athenians and their allies they may have in their hands.

8th, "That in the case of the Scionaeans, Toronaeans, and Sermylians, and whatever other city the Athenians have possession of, respecting these and the rest they shall adopt such measures as they please.

9th, "That the Athenians shall take the oaths to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, state by state; and that every man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, according to his respective state. That the oath must be to this effect: 'I will abide by these arrangements and articles of the treaty, honestly and without guile.' That in the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedaemonians and their allies to the Athenians;

and that on both sides the oath shall be renewed yearly. That the contracting parties shall erect pillars at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae.

That if they forget any thing, whatever it may be, and on whatever point, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Athenians and Lacedaemonians, by means of fair discussion, to change it in such manner as they please.

The treaty commences from the ephoralty of Pleistolas, on the 27th of the month Artemisium, and from the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, on the 25th of the month Elaphebolion. Those who took the oaths and subscribed the treaty were as follows:

on the side of the Lacedaemonians, [Pleistoanax, Agis,] Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: on the side of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates. Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter, when the spring was commencing, immediately after the city festival of Bacchus, when just ten years had elapsed with the variation of a few days, since the invasion of Attica was first made, and this war commenced.

But let every one regard this with reference to the periods of time, and not, as placing greater confidence in such a view, with respect to the enumeration of the public officers in the several places, or of the titles derived from any honourable appointment which serve to mark past events. For that gives no definite idea, as to who were in the commencement of their office, or in the middle of it, or whatever part it might be, when any event occurred.

But if he reckon by summers and winters, as I have written my history, he will find that while each of these amounts to half a year, there were ten summers and as many winters included in this first war.

Now the Lacedaemonians (for it fell to their lot to be the first to restore what they held) immediately released the men who were prisoners in their country; and sending as ambassadors to the countries Thrace-ward, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, commanded Clearidas to restore Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of the states to accept the treaty, as it had been severally arranged for them.

They, however, would not, as they thought it not favourable to them; nor did Clearidas restore the city, wishing to oblige the Chalcidians, and declaring that he could not give it up in opposition to them.

He, however, went in haste to Lacedaemon with ambassadors from that place, to defend himself, if Ischagoras and his party should bring any charge against him for not obeying; and at the same time from a wish to know whether the arrangement might still be altered: but when he found the treaty secured, being sent back again himself by the Lacedaemonians, and ordered to deliver up the place, if possible, but if not, to bring out all the Peloponnesians that were in it, he set out with all speed.

Now the allies happened themselves to be at Lacedaemon, and those of them who had not accepted the treaty were commanded by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. They, however, on the same grounds as they had at first rejected it, refused to accept it, unless they made a more equitable one than that.

So when they did not listen to them, they sent them away, and themselves proceeded to conclude an alliance with the Athenians; thinking that the Argives ( since they refused, on Ampelidas and Lichas going to them, to make a fresh treaty) would be by no means formidable without the support of the Athenians, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be most disposed to remain quiet; whereas they would have gone over to the Athenians, if they had had the power.

Ambassadors, therefore, having come from the Athenians, and a conference having been held, they came to an agreement, and oaths were taken, and this alliance concluded, on the following terms:

"The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years.

2nd, "That should any come as enemies against the territory of the Lacedaemonians, and do them injury, the Athenians shall assist them in such manner as they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and be punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

3rd, "That, again, should any come as enemies against the country of the Athenians, and injure them, the Lacedaemonians shall assist them in whatever manner they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

4th, "That should the slave population rise up against them, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedaemonians with all their might, according to their ability.

5th,

That these articles shall be sworn to by the same persons as swore to the other treaty, on both sides. That they shall be renewed every year, by the Lacedaemonians going to Athens at the Dionysian festival, and by the Athenians going to

Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthian. That they shall each erect a pillar, that at Lacedaemon near the statue of Apollo in the Amyclaeum, and that at Athens in the citadel, near the statue of Minerva. That should the Lacedaemonians and Athenians choose to add to, or take away from, these terms of alliance, whatever they please so to do shall be consistent with the oaths of both parties.

The oath was sworn by the following on the side of the Lacedaemonians: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: and on the side of the Athenians, by Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes

This alliance was entered into not long after the treaty, and the Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the men taken from the island; and thus began the summer of the eleventh year. During these ten years, then, the first war was carried on continuously, and such is the history of it.

After the treaty, and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of the ten years' war, in the ephoralty of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, those who had acceded to them were at peace; but the Corinthians, and some of the states in the Peloponnese, were trying to alter what had been done; and another disturbance immediately arose on the part of the allies against Lacedaemon.

Moreover, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians also, through not performing in some respects what had been agreed on, according to the treaty.

And though for six years and ten months they abstained from marching against each other's territory, yet out of it, during the existence of a doubtful suspension of arms, they were doing one another the greatest possible damage. Subsequently, however, they were compelled to break the treaty concluded after the ten years' war, and again proceeded to open hostilities.

And the same Thucydides the Athenian has also written the history of these transactions in order, as they severally happened, by summers and winters, until the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the sovereignty of the Athenians, and took the long walls and Piraeus. To the time of that event there were spent in the war seven and twenty years in all. With regard to the intervening arrangement, if any one shall object to consider it as a state of war, he will not estimate it rightly.

For let him regard it as it is characterized by the facts of the case, and he will find that there is no reason for its being deemed a state of peace; since during it they neither gave nor received back all they had arranged to do; and besides this, there were offences committed on both sides, as in the case of the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and other instances; and the Thrace-ward allies were in no respect less at war than before; while the Boeeotians had only a truce from one ten days to another.

Including, therefore, the first war of ten years, the suspicious cessation of hostilities which followed it, and the subsequent war which succeeded to that, any one will find that the number of years was what I have mentioned, (reckoning by the great divisions of time,) with only a few days' difference; and that such as positively asserted any thing on the strength of oracles, found this the only fact which proved true.

At least I, for my own part, remember that all along, both at the beginning of the war, and till it was brought to a conclusion, it was alleged by many that it was to last thrice nine years.

And I lived on through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and paying attention, in order to gain accurate knowledge on each point. It was also my lot to be banished my country twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and thus, by being present at the transactions of either party, and especially of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a more perfect acquaintance with each of them.

The difference, then, which arose after the ten years, and the breaking up of the treaty, and the subsequent course of hostilities, I will now relate.

When, then, the fifty years' treaty had been concluded, and the alliance afterwards, the embassies from the Peloponnese, which had been summoned for that business, returned from Lacedaemon. Accordingly the rest went home;

but the Corinthians repaired to Argos, and in the first place held communications with some of the Argives who were in office, to the effect that, since the Lacedaemonians, not for the good, but for the subjugation of the Peloponnese, had entered into treaty and alliance with the Athenians, who were before their bitterest enemies; the Argives ought to consider how the Peloponnese might be preserved; and to pass a decree, that any city of the Greeks that wished, being independent, and giving judicial satisfaction for wrongs, on fair and equal terms, might enter into alliance with the Argives, on condition of defending each other's country: and that they should appoint a few persons as commissioners with full powers, instead of the discussion of the measure being held before the people; in order that those might not be known who had failed to persuade the multitude. And they asserted that many would come over to them for hatred of the Lacedaemonians.

The Corinthians then, having suggested these things, returned home.

When those of the Argives who heard their proposals had reported them to the government and the people, the Argives passed the decree, and chose twelve men, with whom any one of the Greeks who wished should conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, neither of whom should have liberty to enter into treaty without the consent of the Argive people.

The Argives acceded the more readily to these proposals, because they saw that they should have the war with the Lacedaemonians, (for their treaty with them was on the point of expiring,) and also because they hoped to gain the supremacy of the Peloponnese. For at that time Lacedaemon was in very bad repute, and was despised in consequence of its misfortunes; while the Argives were in an excellent condition in all respects, as they had taken no part in the war against Athens, but had rather reaped the good fruits of having been in treaty with both sides.

Thus, then, the Argives were admitting into alliance such of the Greeks as wished it.

The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For a certain part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on; and they thought that the Lacedaemonians would not allow their sovereignty over it, since they had now leisure to interfere; so that they gladly turned to the Argives, considering them to be a powerful state, and one which was always at variance with the Lacedaemonians, and under a democratical government like themselves.

When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of the Peloponnese also was thrown into commotion, with the idea that they too ought to do the same; as they thought that they had changed sides through knowing more than the rest. At the same time they were angry with the Lacedaemonians, both on other grounds, and because it had been mentioned in the treaty with Athens, that it should be consistent with their oaths to add to it, or take from it, whatever might seem fit to both states, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.

For it was this clause, above all, that caused the excitement in the Peloponnese, and set them on suspecting that the Lacedaemonians, in concert with the Athenians, might wish to reduce them to slavery: for it was only just, they thought, that the alteration should have been referred to all the allies.

The majority therefore, through fear, were eager to conclude the alliance with the Argives on their own part, respectively, as the Mantineans had done.

When the Lacedaemonians perceived this commotion which had arisen in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians were the advisers of it, and were themselves about to enter into treaty with Argos, they sent ambassadors to Corinth, wishing to prevent what was going to happen. They charged them therefore with suggesting the whole business; and said that if they withdrew from them, and became allies of the Argives, they would violate their oaths; and that they were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, when it had been declared, that whatever the majority of the allies decreed, should be binding, unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes.

The Corinthians, in the presence of all the allies who, like themselves, had not acceded to the treaty, (for they had themselves previously invited them thither,) spoke in reply to the Lacedaemonians; not indeed directly stating the injuries they had received, namely, that they had not recovered Sollium from the Athenians, nor Anactorium—with any other point on which they considered themselves to be aggrieved; but urging as a pretext their determination not to betray the Thrace-ward Greeks; for they had taken oaths to them, both by themselves, when in the first instance they revolted, in concert with the Potidaeans, and others afterwards.

They were not then, they said, violating their oaths to the allies by refusing to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; for since they had sworn to their Thrace-ward friends, with appeals to the gods, they should not show a proper regard for their oaths, if they betrayed them. Besides, it had been expressly mentioned, unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes;

this, then, they considered an impediment on the part of the gods. Thus much they said on the subject of their former oaths: with regard to the Argive alliance, they would consult with their friends, and do whatever was right.

So the envoys of the Lacedaemonians returned home. But there happened to be in Corinth at that time some ambassadors from the Argives also, who urged the Corinthians to enter at once into their confederacy, and not delay. They, however, told them to come to the next congress which was to be held in their city.

Immediately after, there came also an embassy from the Eleans, who concluded an alliance with the Corinthians in the first place, and then proceeded thence to Argos, as they had been previously instructed, and became allies of the Argives. For they were at variance with the Lacedaemonians just then about Lepreum.

For a war having before this arisen between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians, and the Eleans having been invited to alliance by the Lepreans, on condition of receiving half their territory, and having brought the war to a conclusion, the Eleans imposed on the Lepreans, who were themselves allowed to occupy the territory, the payment of a talent to the Olympian Jupiter.

This they continued to pay till the Attic war broke out; when, on their ceasing to do so on the pretext of the war, the Eleans proceeded to compel them; on which they had recourse to the Lacedaemonians. When the case was thus submitted to the arbitration of the Lacedaemonians, the Eleans, suspecting that they should not have justice, renounced the reference, and laid waste the Leprean territory.

The Lacedaemonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were independent, and that the Eleans were acting with injustice; and inasmuch as they had not stood by the arbitration, they sent into Lepreum a garrison of heavy-armed troops.

So the Eleans, considering the Lacedaemonians to be receiving a city which had revolted from them, and alleging the agreement in which it had been declared, that whatever each party had when they entered on the Attic war, that they should also have when they retired from it; since they considered that they had not their due, they went over to the Argives; and thus they too, as they had been previously instructed, concluded the alliance.

Immediately after them the Corinthians and Thrace-ward Chalcidians also entered into alliance with the Argives; but the Boeotians and Megareans, holding each the same language as the other, remained quiet; being neglected by the Lacedaemonians, and yet thinking that the democracy of the Argives was less suited to them, with their oligarchical form of government, than the constitution of the Lacedaemonians.

About the same period of this summer, the Athenians, having reduced the Scionaeans to surrender, put the adult males to death; while they sold into slavery the women and children, and gave the territory for the Plataeans to occupy. On the other hand, they brought back the Delians to their country, from scruples arising from their disasters in different battles, and because the god at Delphi had so commanded them.

At this time, too, the Phocians and. Locrians commenced hostilities.

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now in alliance, went to Tegea, to procure its revolt from the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it formed a considerable part of the Peloponnese, and thinking that, if it were added to them, they would command the whole of it.

But when the Tegeans said they would do nothing in opposition to the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, though hitherto very hearty in their measures, relaxed in their vehemence, and were afraid that none of the other parties might now come over to them. They went, however, to the Boeotians, and begged them to enter into alliance with themselves and the Argives, and act in all other respects in concert with them.

With reference to the ten days' truces also, which had been made with each other by the Athenians and Boeotians not long after the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty, the Corinthians desired the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens, and obtain the same for them also, on the same footing as the Boeotians; and in case of the Athenians not acceding to this, then to renounce the suspension of arms, and in future to make no truce without being joined by them. On the Corinthians preferring these requests, the Boeotians desired them to desist on the subject of the Argive alliance:

they went with them, however, to Athens, but did not obtain the ten days' truce; as the Athenians answered, that they were already in treaty with the Corinthians, inasmuch as they were allies of the Lacedaemonians.

The Boeotians, then, did not any the more on that account renounce their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians called on them to do so, and expostulated with them on the ground of their having agreed to do it. Between the Corinthians, however, and the Athenians there was a suspension of arms without any actual truce.

The same summer, the Lacedaemonians made an expedition with all their forces, under the command of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, their king, into the country of the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Mantineans, and who had invited their interference in the spirit of faction: intending also, if they could, to demolish the stronghold at Cypsela, which, being situated in the Parrhasian territory, the Mantineans had fortified and garrisoned with their own troops, for the annoyance of the district of Sciritis in Laconia The Lacedaemonians therefore proceeded to ravage the land of the Parrhasians;

while the Mantineans, having committed their city to the custody of Argive troops, themselves kept guard over their confederates' country. Being unable, however, to save the fort at Cypsela, and the towns in Parrhasia, they retired.

The Lacedaemonians, after making the Parrhasians independent, and demolishing the fortress, returned home.

Moreover, in the course of the same summer, on the arrival of the troops from Thrace who had marched out with Brasidas, and whom Clearidas had brought back after the treaty was made, the Lacedaemonians decreed that the helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free, and live where they pleased; and not long after they settled them, together with the

Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is situated on the borders of Laconia and Elis; for they were now at variance with the Eleans.

But with regard to those of their own body who had been taken in the island, and had surrendered their arms, fearing they might suppose that they would be subjected to some degradation in consequence of their misfortune, and so, if allowed to retain their franchise, might attempt a revolution, they disfranchised them, even while some were holding offices; and with a disfranchisement of such a kind that they could neither take office, nor have power to buy or sell any thing. Subsequently, however, in the course of time, they were again enfranchised.

The same summer also the Dians took Thyssus on the promontory of Athos, a colony of the Athenians.

And during the whole of this summer there was intercourse indeed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, but both parties suspected each other, from immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, on the ground of their not mutually restoring the places specified. For the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell first to restore Amphipolis and the other towns, had not done so:

nor did they make their Thrace-ward allies accede to the treaty, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians; though they were continually saying that, in conjunction with the Athenians, they would compel those states to do so, if they would not of their own accord. They also pleaded in excuse the fact of the time not being specified, at which those who did not accede to it were to be considered as enemies to both sides.

The Athenians therefore, seeing none of these things really performed, suspected that the Lacedaemonians had no upright intentions; so that on their demanding back Pylus, they refused to restore it, (nay, they even repented of having given them back their prisoners taken in the island,) and kept the other places, waiting till they, on their part, performed for them what had been arranged.

The Lacedaemonians said that they had done what was possible; for that they had restored the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had recalled the troops in Thrace; and whatever else they had in their power. With regard to Amphipolis, they were not, they said, masters of it, so as to give it up; but they would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians over to the treaty, and to recover Panactum;

and would restore as many of the Athenians as were prisoners in Boeotia. They required, however, that they should restore Pylus to them; or if not that, should withdraw the Messenians and helots, as they, on their part, had withdrawn their troops from Thrace;

and that the Athenians themselves should garrison it, if they would. So when conferences had been held, many and often, during this summer, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians, and the rest of the helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia; and they settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia.

During this summer, then, there was peace and free intercourse with each other.

But the following winter, (different ephors happening now to be in office, and not those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them being even opposed to it,) when embassies had come from their confederacy, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were there, and they had held many discussions with one another, and come to no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and Xenares—those of the ephors who most wished to break up the treaty—held a private conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to pursue as far as possible the same policy; and that the Boeotians, after first entering into alliance with Argos themselves, should then endeavour to bring the Argives together with themselves into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. For in this way the Boeotians were least likely to be forced to accede to the Attic treaty; since the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives even at the risk of the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians were always desirous that Argos should be their friend on fair terms; thinking that so the war out of the Peloponnese would be more easily conducted by them.

They begged the Boeotians, however, to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedaemonians; that by getting back Pylus, if they could, in exchange for it, they might more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians.

The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus, and such of the Lacedaemonians as were friendly towards them, these instructions to carry to their governments, went each their way.

But two persons of the Argives, who held the highest office in their country, watched for them by the way, as they were returning; and having met them, entered into conversation with them on the possibility of the Boeotians becoming their allies, as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for if that could be well arranged, they thought they might then, on advantageous terms, both carry on war and make peace, both with the Lacedaemonians, if they should wish it—holding the same language all together—and with whomever else it might be necessary.

The Boeotian envoys were pleased at hearing this; for they happened to ask the same things as their friends in Lacedaemon had instructed them to propose. So when the men from Argos perceived that they listened to their suggestions, they said they would send ambassadors to the Boeotians, and went away.

The Boeotians, on their arrival, reported to the Boeotarchs what had been said to them, both at Lacedaemon, and by the Argives who had met them: and the Boeotarchs were pleased, and were much more eager in the business, since it had turned out so luckily for them in both quarters, that their friends amongst the Lacedaemonians requested the same things as the Argives were anxiously wishing.

Not long after, ambassadors came from Argos with the proposals that have been mentioned; whom the Boeotarchs sent back after assenting to their terms, and promising to send envoys to Argos on the question of the alliance.

In the mean time it was determined by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the ambassadors from Thrace, in the first place, to bind themselves by oaths to each other, that assuredly, when occasion offered, they would assist the party which needed it; and that they would carry on war with none, or make peace, without common assent; and that so the Boeotians and Megareans (for they had the same object before them) should then enter into treaty with the Argives.

But before the oaths were taken, the Boeotarchs communicated these resolutions to the four councils of the Boeotians, which have the sole power of ratifying measures; and recommended to them that oaths should be exchanged with such cities as wished to league with them for mutual assistance.

However, the members of the Boeotian councils did not accede to the plan, fearing that they should do what was displeasing to the Lacedaemonians, if they leagued with the Corinthians, who had separated from them. For the Boeotarchs did not tell them of what had taken place at Lacedaemon, namely, that Cleobulus and Xenares, amongst the ephors, and their friends, advised them first to enter into alliance with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to join the Lacedaemonians; as they imagined, that though they should not mention it, the council would decree nothing different from what they had previously determined on, and now recommended to their country.

When the business had met with this check, the ambassadors from Corinth and Thrace departed without concluding any thing; while the Boeotarchs, who before intended, if they carried these measures, to attempt also to effect the alliance with the Argives, did not now bring the question of the Argives before the councils, or send to Argos the ambassadors they had promised; but there arose an indifference and procrastination in the whole business.

In the course of this same summer, the Olynthians assaulted and took Mecyberna, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After these events, conferences being continually held between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians respecting the possessions of each other which they still retained, the Lacedaemonians, hoping that, if the Athenians should receive back Panactum from the Boeotians, they would themselves recover Pylus, went on an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged them to deliver up to them Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they might recover Pylus in exchange for them.

But the Boeotians refused to deliver them up, unless they would make an especial alliance with them, as with the Athenians. Although therefore the Lacedaemonians were aware that they should be acting wrong to the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that they should make neither peace nor war with any but by mutual consent; yet, as they wished to receive Panactum from them, believing that so they should recover Pylus, and as the party which was anxious to break up the treaty earnestly entered into the Boeotian negotiation; they concluded the alliance, when the winter was now closing and the spring at hand; and Panactum was immediately begun to be demolished. And thus ended the eleventh year of this war.

As soon as the spring of the next summer commenced, the Argives, finding that the Boeotian ambassadors, whom they said they would send, did not come, and that Panactum was being demolished, and an especial alliance had been concluded by the Boeotians with the Lacedaemonians, were afraid that they might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to the Lacedaemonians.

For they supposed that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians both to demolish Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; and that the Athenians were privy to these measures; so that they themselves had no longer power even to make alliance with the Athenians: whereas they hoped before, in consequence of the existing dissensions, that if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians should not continue, they would, at any rate, be in alliance with the Athenians.

The Argives, then, were involved in these difficulties, and feared they might be engaged in war at once with the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians: and consequently, though they did not before accept the treaty with the Lacedaemonians, but entertained the proud hope that they should enjoy the supremacy over the Peloponnese; they sent as envoys to Lacedaemon, as quickly as they could, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were considered to be the most acceptable persons to them; thinking to live in quiet by making a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, as they best could under present circumstances, whatever might be the arrangement.

On the arrival of their ambassadors, they made proposals to the Lacedaemonians, as to the terms on which the treaty should be concluded between them.

And at first the Argives claimed that they should have a judicial reference granted them, either to some state or individual, respecting the Cynurian territory; concerning which they have always been debating, as it is border-land: (it contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians.) Afterwards, when the Lacedaemonians begged them not to mention that, but said that if they wished to make a treaty as before, they were ready to do so; the Argive ambassadors nevertheless induced the Lacedaemonians to agree to the following conditions: that at the present time they should make a treaty for fifty years; but that on either party giving a challenge, at a time when there was neither plague nor war in Lacedaemon or Argos, they should be at liberty to decide by battle the question of this territory—as on a former occasion, when each side claimed the victory for themselves—but not to pursue the fugitives beyond the frontiers, whether towards Argos or Lacedaemon.

Now the Lacedaemonians at first considered this as mere folly; but afterwards, (for they were anxious on any terms to have Argos for a friend,) they agreed to the conditions they demanded, and made a treaty with them in writing. Before, however, any thing was definitely arranged, the Lacedaemonians desired them to return first to Argos, and show it to their people; and if it pleased them, then to come at the Hyacinthia, to take the oaths. Accordingly they returned.

In the mean time, while the Argives were negotiating these matters, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas, who were to restore Panactum to the Athenians, and to receive the prisoners from the Boeotians, and bring them back home, found Panactum demolished by the Boeotians themselves, on the pretext of there having been exchanged in former times between the Athenians and Boeotians, in consequence of a dispute about it, an oath that neither party should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in common. The men, however, whom the Boeotians held as prisoners taken from the Athenians, Andromedes and his colleagues received from them, and conveyed to Athens, and restored. They likewise announced to them the demolition of Panactum, thinking that so they restored that too; for no enemy to the Athenians would in future inhabit it. On this announcement, the Athenians expressed great indignation;

thinking themselves wronged by the Lacedaemonians, both with regard to the demolition of Panactum, which they ought to have delivered up to them standing, and the intelligence of their having on their own account made treaty with the Boeotians, though they formerly declared that they would join in compelling those who did not accede to the general treaty. They also looked for any other points in which they had departed from their compact, and considered themselves to have been overreached by them; so that they gave an angry reply to the ambassadors, and sent them away.

When the Lacedaemonians, then, were in such a state of variance with the Athenians, those at Athens, again, who wished to do away with the treaty, were immediately urgent against it.

Amongst others who were so was Alcibiades son of Clinias, a man who in age was still at that time a youth, (as he would have been thought in any other state,) but honoured on account of the nobility of his ancestors. He considered that it was really better to side with the Argives; though he also opposed the treaty in the bitterness of wounded pride, because the Lacedaemonians had negotiated it through the agency of Nicias and Laches, having overlooked him on account of his youth, and not having shown him the respect suitable to the old connexion of his family as their proxeni, which, having been renounced by his grandfather, he himself thought to renew by showing attention to the prisoners taken in the island.

Considering himself therefore to be in every way slighted by them, he both spoke against the treaty in the first instance, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be depended upon, but were only making a treaty in order that by so doing they might deprive Athens of the Argives. and again come against them when left alone; and at that time, when this difference had arisen, he immediately sent to Argos on his own account, urging them to come as quickly as possible with proposals for alliance, in company with the Mantineans and Eleans, since it was a fine opportunity, and he would co-operate with them to the utmost.

When the Argives received this message, and found that the alliance with the Boeotians had not been brought about in concert with the Athenians, but that they were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedaemonians; they thought no more of their ambassadors at Lacedaemon, who were just at that time gone thither on the subject of the treaty, but paid more attention to the Athenians; thinking that so, if they went to war, there would be on their side in it a state which had been their friend from of old, and was under a democratical form of government, like themselves, and wielded a great power in the command of the sea.

They immediately therefore sent ambassadors to the Athenians to treat of the alliance; and were also accompanied by envoys from the Eleans and Mantineans.

There came likewise with all speed, as ambassadors from the Lacedaemonians, persons who were thought to be favourably inclined towards the Athenians, namely, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; through fear that in their anger they might conclude the alliance with the Argives, and at the same time to ask back Pylus in exchange for Panactum, and to plead in excuse for the Boeotian alliance, that it had not been made for the purpose of hurting the Athenians.

By speaking in the council on these points, and declaring that they had come with full powers to effect a settlement of all their disputes, they made Alcibiades afraid that if they were to talk in the same strain to the popular assembly, they would win over the multitude, and the Argive alliance would be rejected. He adopted therefore the following device against them.

He gained the confidence of the Lacedaemonians by giving them a solemn assurance, that if they would not acknowledge in the assembly that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylus to them, (for lie would himself persuade the Athenians to the measure, as he now opposed it,) and would settle all other points of difference.

It was with a wish to withdraw them from the influence of Nicias that he did this; and in order that by accusing them before the people, as having no sincere intentions, and never saying the same thing, he might cause the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, to be taken into alliance. And so it turned out.

For when, on coming before the people and being asked that question, they did not say, as they had said in the council, that they were come with full powers, the Athenians could endure it no longer; but on Alcibiades' exclaiming against the Lacedaemonians much more vehemently than before, they both listened to him, and were ready straightway to bring forward the Argives and those who were with them, and take them into alliance. An earthquake, however, having occurred before any thing was finally settled, that assembly was adjourned.

In the one which was held next day, although the Lacedaemonians had been outwitted, and he himself utterly deceived with regard to their confessing not to have come with full powers, Nicias nevertheless maintained that they ought rather to become friends of the Lacedaemonians, and, deferring their measures with the Argives, to send once more to them, and ascertain their intentions. He represented that it was to their own honour, but to their rivals' discredit, for the war to be put off: for since their own affairs were in so good a condition, it was best to preserve their prosperity as long as possible; whereas to the Lacedaemonians, in their present misfortunes, it would be gain to run all hazards as quickly as possible.

So he prevailed on them to send ambassadors, of whom he was himself one, to bid the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum standing, with Amphipolis, and to give up their alliance with the Boeotians, if they refused to accede to the treaty; as it had been stipulated that they should make peace with none but by mutual consent.

They told them also to say, that they too, if they had wished to act unjustly, might have already taken the Argives for their allies, since they were come to them for that very purpose.

And whatever complaint they had against them, they gave instructions on the subject to Nicias and his colleagues, and then sent them off. When they came there, and, after delivering their other messages, finally declared, that unless they gave up their alliance with the Boeotians, in case of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians also would take as their allies the Argives and those who joined them; the Lacedaemonians refused to renounce the alliance with the Boeotians—the party of Xenares, the ephor, and all the rest who had the same views having sufficient influence to secure that,—but the oaths they renewed at the request of Nicias: for he was afraid of returning with all his objects unaccomplished, and of being exposed to censure, (as indeed was the case,) since he was considered as the author of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

On his return, when the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemonian, immediately they were enraged; and since they considered themselves injured, the Argives and their allies happening to be present, (having been introduced by Alcibiades,) they made a treaty and alliance with them on the following terms:

"The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans made a treaty for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies in their respective dominions, to be observed without guile or injury, both by land and by sea.

That it shall not be allowed to take up arms with a mischievous design, either for the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, against the Athenians, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, by any means whatever.

"That the following are the terms on which the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a hundred years.

"That in case of an enemy marching against the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the succour of Athens, according to whatever message the Athenians may send them, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all these states; and that no one of them shall be at liberty to terminate hostilities with that state, unless they all think fit to do so. That the Athenians likewise shall go to the succour of Argos Mantinea, and Elis, in case of an enemy marching against the Elean, Mantinean, or Argive territory, according to what ever message these states may send, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Athenians, Eleans, Mantineans, and Argives, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all of them; and that it shall not be lawful to terminate hostilities with that state, unless all the states think fit to do so.

"That they shall not allow armed troops to pass for hostile purposes through their own land, or that of the allies in their respective dominions, nor by sea, unless all the states, the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, have decreed that their passage be allowed.

"That to the troops going as succours the state which sends them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their arrival in the state which sent them word to succour it, and on their return in the same way: but that in case of their wishing to avail themselves of their service for a longer time, the state which sent for them shall supply them with provisions, at the rate of three Aeginetan oboli a day for a heavy-armed soldier, a light-armed, or a bowman, and of an aeginetan drachma for a horseman.

"That the state which sent for them shall have the command, while the war is in its own territory; but that in case of the states resolving to make a joint expedition in any quarter, an equal share of the command shall be enjoyed by all the states.

"That the treaty shall be sworn to, by the Athenians on behalf both of themselves and their allies, but on the part of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by each several state. That they shall swear that oath respectively which is the most binding in their country, over full-grown victims; and the oath shall be to this effect; 'I will stand by this alliance according to the stipulations, honestly, without injury, and without guile, and will not violate it by any method or means whatever.' That the persons to take the oath shall be, at Athens, the council and the home magistrates, the prytanes administering it; at Argos, the council, the eighty, and the artynae, the eighty administering it; at Mantinea, the demurgi the council, and the other magistrates, the theori and the polemarchs administering it; at Elis, the demiurgi, the magistrates, and the six hundred, the demiurgi and thesmophulaces administering it. That the oaths shall be renewed by the Athenians, on going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos, thirty days before the Olympic festival; by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, on going to Athens, ten days before the great Panathenaic festival.

That the stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance, shall be inscribed on a stone pillar, by the Athenians, in the citadel; by the Argives, in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo; by the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter in the market-place: and that a brazen pillar shall be erected at their joint expense at Olympia, at the present festival. That should these states think it better to make any addition to the articles agreed on, whatever seems fit to all the states, on holding common deliberation, that shall be binding.

In this way were the treaty and alliances concluded; and yet that between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not renounced on this account by either party.

But though the Corinthians were allies of the Argives, they did not accede to the new treaty. Nay, before this time, when an alliance was formed between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, to be at war and peace with the same states, they did not join the league, but said that they were content with the first alliance which had been made for purposes of defence, on condition of succouring one another, but not joining to attack any party.

The Corinthians, then, thus stood aloof from their allies, and turned their thoughts again towards the Lacedaemonians.

The Olympic festival was held this summer, that at which Androsthenes the Arcadian was victor the first time in the pancratium. The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists, as refusing to pay the fine to which the Eleans, by virtue of the Olympian law, had condemned them, alleging that they had attacked the fortress of Phyrcus, and sent a body of their heavy-armed into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine imposed upon them was two thousand mine, being two for each heavy-armed soldier, as the law ordains. But the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors, and pleaded that it had not been fairly imposed upon them;

declaring that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at Lacedaemon, when they sent their troops into Lepreum.

The Eleans, however, maintained that the cessation of arms in their country had already commenced, (for they proclaim it amongst themselves first,) and that while they were living in quiet, and not expecting any thing, as it was time of truce, the Lacedaemonians had committed an injury upon them by surprise.

The Lacedaemonians replied, that there was no need of the Eleans having still proclaimed the truce at Lacedaemon, if they had thought them already guilty of injustice; but they had done so, as not thinking it; and they themselves had no longer gone any where to attack them.

The Eleans. however, adhered to the same statement, namely, that they could never be persuaded that they were not guilty; but that if they would restore Lepreum to them, they were ready to give up their own share of the money, and would themselves pay for them that which fell to the god.

When they did not comply, they required them again to do as follows: not to give back Lepreum, if they objected to it, but to mount on the altar of the Olympian Jupiter—since they were so anxious to have access to the temple—and swear before the Greeks that assuredly they would discharge the fine at a future period.

But when they would not do this either, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple—from the sacrifice and from the games—and made their offerings at home;

while the rest of the Greeks, except the Lepreans, sent their deputations to the festival. However, the Eleans were afraid of their sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed company of their young men; while there also came to them a body of Argives and Mantineans, each a thousand strong, and some Athenian cavalry, that were at Argos, waiting for the festival.

And a great alarm was produced in the assembly lest the Lacedaemonians should come in arms; especially after Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, was scourged on the course by the lictors, because, on his horses being the winners, and the Boeotian people being proclaimed victor, on account of his having no right to enter the lists, he came forward on to the course, and crowned the charioteer, from a wish to show that the chariot was his. All therefore were now much more afraid, and thought there would be some disturbance.

However, the Lacedaemonians kept quiet, and let the feast thus pass by.—After the Olympic festival, the Argives and their allies repaired to Corinth, to beg that state to come over to them. Some Lacedaemonian ambassadors, too, happened to be there; and after there had been much discussion, nothing was accomplished at last; but an earthquake having occurred, they dispersed to their several homes. And so the summer ended.

The following winter the Heracleans in Trachinia fought a battle with the Aenianians, Dolopians, Maleans, and some of the Thessalians.

For these nations were bordering on, and hostile to, their city; as it was against no other country but theirs that the place was fortified. Accordingly they opposed the city on its first settlement, by annoying it as far as they could; and at this time they defeated the Heracleans in the engagement, Xenares son of Cnidis, a Lacedaemonians, being slain, and others of the Heracleans also cut off. And thus the winter ended, and the twelfth year of the war.

At the very commencement of the following summer, the Boeotians seized on Heraclea, when it was miserably reduced after the battle, and sent away Hegesippidas the Lacedaemonian, on the charge of governing it ill. They occupied the place through fear that, while the Lacedaemonians were distracted with the affairs of the Peloponnese, the Athenians might take it. The Lacedaemonians, however, were offended with them for what they had done.

The same summer, Alcibiades son of Clinias, being one of the generals at Athens, having the co-operation of the Argives and the allies, went into the Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy-armed and bowmen; and taking with him some of the allies in those parts, both proceeded to settle in concert with them other matters connected with the alliance, marching about the Peloponnese with his troops, and persuaded the Patreans to carry their walls down to the sea; intending also himself to build a fort beside the Achaean Rhium. But the Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all to whose injury it would have been built, came against him, and prevented his doing it.

The same summer a war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives; nominally, about the offering to Apollo Pythaeus, which the Epidaurians were bound to make, but did not, for certain lands by the river side; (the Argives had the chief management of the temple;) but even independently of this charge, Alcibiades and the Argives thought it desirable to get possession of Epidaurus, if they could; both to insure the neutrality of Corinth, and thinking that the Athenians would find it a shorter passage for their succours through Aegina, than by sailing round Scyllaeum. The Argives therefore prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, in order to exact the offering.

The Lacedaemonians, too, at the same time marched out with all their forces to Leuctra, on their own borders, opposite Mount Lyaeum, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, their king; but no one knew what was their destination, not even the cities from which contingents were sent.

When, however, the omens from their sacrifices were not favourable for crossing the border, they both returned home themselves, and sent word to their allies to prepare to take the field after the ensuing month; (that being the month Carneus, a holy period amongst the Dorians).

On their retiring, the Argives marched out on the 26th of the month preceding Carneus;

and advancing that day the whole of the time invaded the Epidaurian territory, and proceeded to lay it waste The Epidaurians invoked the aid of their allies;

but some of them pleaded the month as an excuse, while others, even after coming to the borders of Epidaurus, remained inactive.

At the time that the Argives were in Epidaurus, deputations from the states assembled at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. And when the conference began, the Corinthians said that their words did not agree with their deeds; since they were sitting in council on the subject of peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each other under arms. Deputies therefore from each party ought first to go and separate the armies, and then come and speak again on the subject of peace.

In compliance with this sentiment, they went and brought back the Argives out of the Epidaurian territory. They then assembled again, but could not even then come to any agreement; but the Argives again invaded Epidaurus, and laid it waste. The Lacedaemonians, too, marched out to Caryae;

and returned again, when the omens on that occasion also proved unfavourable to them.

The Argives, after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Moreover, a thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians had come to their assistance, with Alcibiades as general; but on learning that the Lacedaemonians had ended their expedition, and that there was no longer any need for them, they returned home. And so the summer passed by.

The following winter, the Lacedaemonians eluded the vigilance of the Athenians in sending by sea to Epidaurus three hundred garrison troops, under command of Agesippidas.

The Argives therefore went to the Athenians, and complained, that though it had been specified in the treaty that they should not allow an enemy to pass through their respective countries, they had allowed them to go there by sea; and therefore they should consider themselves aggrieved, if the Athenians, on their side, did not take the Messenians and helots to Pylus, to annoy the Lacedaemonians.

So the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, inscribed at the bottom of the Laconian pillar, that the Lacedaemonians had not adhered to their oaths; and they conveyed the helots who were at Cranii to Pylus, to plunder the country;

though in other respects they remained quiet. Now in the course of hostilities during this winter between the Argives and Epidaurians, no pitched battle was fought, but there were only ambuscades and skirmishes, in which some were slain on each side, as might happen.

When the winter was closing, and spring was now at hand, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, supposing that it would be left unguarded on account of the war, and intending to take it by storm; but returned unsuccessful. And thus the winter ended, and the thirteenth year of this war.

In the middle of the next summer, when the Lacedaemonians saw that the Epidaurians, who were their allieswere in distress, and that the other states in the Peloponnese had either separated from them, or were unfavourably disposed towards them; thinking that if they did not quickly prevent it, they would proceed to a greater degree of disaffection, they marched with all their forces, themselves and the helots, against Argos, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

They were accompanied by the Tegeans, and as many others of the Arcadians as were in alliance with them. The allies in the rest of the Peloponnese also, and those beyond it, mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with five thousand heavy-armed, the same number of light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and an equal number of hamippi; the Corinthians with two thousand heavy-armed; the rest as might severally happen; but the Phliasians in full force, as the army was posted in their country.

Now the Argives had from the first been aware of the preparations of the Lacedaemonians; and when they were on their march for the purpose of joining the rest at Phlius, then they also took the field. They were reinforced by the Mantineans with their allies, and by three thousand heavy-armed of the Eleans.

And as they advanced, they met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia, and each army occupied a hill. The Argives then prepared to engage the Lacedaemonians, cut off as they were by themselves: but Agis broke up in the night, and eluding them, proceeded to the rest of the allies at Phlius.

The Argives, on finding this, marched, as soon as it was morning, to Argos first, and then to where they expected the Lacedaemonians with their allies would descend into their country, namely, the road running by Nemea.

Agis, however, did not take that road, as they expected him to do; but having given orders to the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he advanced by another and more difficult route, and so came down into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians had been ordered to descend by that leading to Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order that, if the Argives should advance into the plain against his own division, they might hang on their rear, and use their cavalry with effect.

He then, having made these arrangements and entered the plain, proceeded to ravage Saminthus and other places.

The Argives, having discovered it, advanced from Nemea, when it was now day, to their succour; and falling in with the forces of the Phliasians and Corinthians, killed a few of the former, but themselves had rather more killed by the latter.

And now the Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians advanced, as they had been ordered, towards Nemea, and found the Argives no longer there; but they had gone down, on seing their property ravaged, and were forming for battle; while the Lacedaemonians also were preparing to meet them.

Now the Argives were intercepted in the midst of their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and those with them excluded them from their city; above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and in the direction of Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. They had no cavalry with them;

for the Athenians alone of all the allies had not yet joined them.

Now the mass of the Argives and their allies did not consider their present position so formidable; but fancied that the battle would be fought on favourable terms, and that they had intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own country, and close by their city.

But two individuals of the Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, when the armies were now on the very point of engaging, went to Agis, and in a conference urged him not to bring on a battle; since the Argives were prepared to give and accept fair and equal arbitration for whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians had against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace for the future.

Those of the Argives who made these statements did so on their own authority, and not by order of the people; and Agis on his own discretion received their proposals; and without consulting, any more than they had, with the majority, but only communicating them to one of the officers who joined the expedition, granted a truce for four months, during which they were to fulfil their agreement. And so he immediately led back the army, without explaining the matter to any of the other confederates.

The Lacedaemonians and allies followed, indeed, as he led them, out of respect for the law; but amongst each other they blamed him exceedingly, considering that when they had had an opportunity of fighting on favourable terms, and their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by infantry and cavalry, they were returning without having achieved any thing worthy of their preparations.

For indeed this was the finest Grecian army that had ever been brought together up to that time; and it appeared such especially while it was still all united at Nemea. consisting of the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians. Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and those, too, all picked men from their respective populations, and thinking themselves a match, not only for the Argive confederacy, but even for another such added to it.

Thus then the army, finding great fault with Agis, withdrew, and dispersed to their several homes.

But the Argives, on their side, blamed far more severely still those who had concluded the truce without consulting the people; as they too thought that the Lacedaemonians had escaped when they never could have had a finer opportunity of destroying them; since the contest would have been decided near their own city, and in concert with many brave allies.

On their return therefore they began to stone Thrasyllus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all causes that may arise from any expedition, before they enter the city. He escaped by flying for refuge to the altar; his property, however, was confiscated by them.

After this, when the Athenian succours arrived, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred cavalry, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives being loath, notwithstanding their arrival, to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians, commanded them to go back, though they wished to make a communication to them, and did not grant them a public audience, until the Mantineans and Eleans, (for they were still there,) by their entreaties, constrained them to do so.

The Athenians then—Alcibiades being sent as ambassador—spoke before the Argives and their allies to this effect; that it was not right for the truce even to have been made, without the consent of the other allies; and that now, since their force had come so seasonably, they ought to proceed to hostilities.

And having persuaded the allies by their arguments, they immediately marched against Orchomenus, all but the Argives, who, though persuaded to the measure, still stayed behind at first; afterwards, however, they also went.

Thus they all sat down before Orchomenus, and besieged it, and made assaults upon it; being for other reasons desirous to get possession of it, and especially as some hostages from Arcadia were deposited there by the Lacedaemonians.

The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the number of the hostile forces, and fearing, since no succours had arrived, that they might perish before they did, surrendered on condition of joining the confederacy, giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and delivering up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them.

After this, when the allies were now in possession of Orchomenus, they consulted to which of the remaining places they should proceed first. The Eleans urged them to go against Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans.

The Eleans, being angry at their not determining to march against Lepreum, returned home; while the rest of the allies made preparations at Mantinea for proceeding against Tegea; and a party of the Tegeans themselves in the town were ready to give up the government to them.

As for the Lacedaemonians, when they had returned from Argos after concluding the four months' truce, they blamed Agis exceedingly for not having brought Argos into subjection to them, when there was so fine an opportunity as they thought had never before presented itself; for it was no easy thing to find so many and such allies collected together.

But when tidings also came of the capture of Orchomenus, they were far more enraged, and under the influence of anger resolved immediately (contrary to their general habit) that they ought to demolish his house, and fine him ten thousand drachmas.

But he besought them to do none of these things; for he would atone for his faults by good service when he next took the field, or they might then do to him whatever they pleased.

Accordingly, they abstained from the fine and the demolition of his house, but passed a law at that time which had never before existed amongst them; for they chose ten Spartans to act as counsellors with him, without whose consent he should have no power to lead an army out of the city.

Meanwhile intelligence reached them from their friends in Tegea, that unless they came there quickly, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and their allies, and that it had all but done so.

Upon this then succour was given them by the Lacedaemonians and their helots in full force, with vigour, and in such a way as had never been done before.

They advanced to Orestheum, in the Maenalian territory; and commanded those of the Arcadians who were their allies to muster and march close after them to Tegea; while they themselves, after coming all of them as far as Orestheum, from that place sent back home the sixth part of their force, in which were included those who were too old or too young for foreign service, to protect their property at home, and with the remainder of their army arrived at Tegea, where their allies from Arcadia joined them not long after. They also sent to the Corinthians.

Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, with orders to reinforce them as quickly as possible at Mantinea. But to these the notice was short, and it was not easy, except in a body, and after waiting for each other, to cross the enemy's territory; for it closed up the communication, lying just in the way of it: however, they made all haste notwithstanding.

The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, taking with them their Arcadian allies who had joined them, invaded the territory of Mantinea, and having encamped near the temple of Hercules, laid waste the land.

The Argives and their allies, on seeing them, occupied a position that was strong and difficult of access, and drew up their troops for action.

The Lacedaemonians and their allies immediately advanced against them, and proceeded to within stone's throw or arrow-shot; when one of the elders called out to Agis, that he was purposing to cure evil with evil;

meaning that his present unseasonable eagerness was intended to be a reparation of his culpable retreat from Argos.

He then, whether in consequence of this exclamation, or because he was himself suddenly struck by some resolution different from what he had before adopted, led his army back again with all speed, before the engagement had begun;

and going into the Tegean country, diverted over that of the Mantineans the water about which the Tegeans and Mantineans are continually engaged in hostilities, as it causes a general injury to whichever country it falls into. His object was to bring the Argives and their allies down from the hill, on their coming to resist the diversion of the water, when they heard of it, and so to fight the battle on the plain. Accordingly, after staying there in the neighbourhood of the water during that day, he turned it off.

The Argives and their allies, on the other hand, were at first amazed at his sudden retreat, when at so short a distance from them, and did not know what to conjecture. Afterwards, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight, while they themselves remained still, and did not follow them, they then began to blame their generals again; both because, on the former occasion, the Lacedaemonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; and now, when they were running away, no one pursued them; but with perfect quiet the enemy were saving themselves, while they were being betrayed.

The generals, then, were at the moment confounded, but afterwards they led them off from the hill, and having advanced on to the plain, pitched their camp, with the intention of advancing against the enemy.

The next day the Argives and their allies formed their line as they intended to engage, should they fall in with their opponents; and the Lacedaemonians, on going back again from the water to the temple of Hercules, into their old encampment, see the enemy at a short distance from them, all by this time in order of battle, and advanced from the hill.

The Lacedaemonians, then, were on this occasion in the greatest consternation they had ever experienced within their memory. For their preparations had to be made on a short notice; and immediately they fell into their ranks in a hurry, Agis, their king, giving all orders, according to their law.

For when a king is at the head of an army, all commands are given by him; and he communicates to the polemarchs what is to be done, they to the lochagi, those to the penteconters, these again to the enomotarchs, and these to their enomoty;

and thus their orders, whatever they wish to be done, pass in the same manner, and quickly reach the troops; for pretty nearly all the army of the Lacedaemonians, a small portion excepted, are officers over officers; and to attend to what is going on is a duty incumbent on many.

On that occasion the Sciritae formed their left wing; who alone of the Lacedaemonians have always that post by themselves. Next to them were the soldiers who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes with them. Then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, with their lochi posted one after the other; by their side the Arcadians of Heraea; after them the Maenalians; and on the right wing the Tegeans, with a few of the Lacedaemonians holding the extreme position. Their cavalry was posted on each wing.

The Lacedaemonians, then, were drawn up in this way. On the side of their opponents, their right wing was occupied by the Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country; and by their side were the Arcadian allies. Then came the thousand picked men of the Argives, for whom the state had for a long time furnished at the public expense a course of training in military matters; next to them the other Argives; and after these, their allies the Cleonaeans and Orneans; then the Athenians, holding the extreme left, and their own cavalry with them.

Such was the order of battle and the preparation on both sides. The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared the larger of the two;

but as for stating any number, either of the several divisions on each side, or of their collective force, I could not do it with accuracy. For the number of the Lacedaemonians, on account of the secrecy of their government, was not known; and that of the others, in consequence of men's natural tendency to boasting with regard to their own numbers, was regarded with distrust.

From the following mode of calculating, however, one may see the number of Lacedaemonians that was present on that occasion. There were engaged in the battle seven lochi, exclusive of the Sciritae, who amounted to six hundred; and in each lochus there were four pentecpstyes, and in the pentecosty four enomotiae. In the first rank of the enomoty there were four fighting men.

In depth, though they had not all been drawn up alike, but as each lochagus chose, they took their position on the field uniformly eight deep. And thus, along the whole line, the first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, besides the Sciritae.

When they were now on the point of engaging, the following admonitions were then severally addressed to them by their own generals. To the Mantineans, that the battle would be fought for their country, and to decide on the question of empire and slavery-that they might not be deprived of the former after tasting it, and might avoid again tasting the latter. To the Argives, that they would fight for their original supremacy, and not to brook being for ever deprived of their former equal share of the Peloponnese; and at the same time to avenge themselves on men who were their enemies, and near ones too, for many acts of injustice. To the Athenians, that fighting as they were in concert with many brave allies, it was a glorious thing for them to show themselves inferior to none; and that by defeating the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese, they would enjoy their empire more securely, and to a greater extent, while no one else would ever march against their country.

To the Argives and their allies such were the admonitions that were addressed. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, both individually amongst themselves, and with their national war-songs, exhorted one another, as brave men, to remember what they had learned before; knowing that actual training for a long time previous was of more benefit than a brief verbal exhortation, however well expressed.

After this the conflict commenced: the Argives and their allies advancing with haste and impetuosity; the Lacedaemonians slowly, and to the music of many flute-players, placed amongst them according to custom, not with a religious object, but that they might advance evenly, stepping in time, and so that their line might not be broken, a thing which large armies are apt to do in their approaches to an enemy.

While they were yet closing in battle, King Agis resolved to execute a manoeuvre, as follows. All armies, on going into battle, are forced out too much on their right wing; because the men, in their fear, each shelter, as far as possible, their exposed side with the shield of the man who is posted next to them on the right, and think that the closer they are locked together, the more effectually they are protected. The man who primarily gives occasion to this is he who stands first on the right wing, through wishing continually to withdraw from the enemy his own unarmed side; and the rest follow him under the influence of the same fear.

And so, on that occasion, the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans farther still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was larger than theirs.

Agis therefore, being afraid that their left might be surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans were extending too far beyond it, gave orders for the Sciritae and Brasidean soldiers to advance from their position with a part of their number, and equalize their line to that of the Mantineans; while into the void thus created he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs, to move over from the right wing with their lochi, and by throwing themselves into it to fill it up; thinking that their own right would still have an abundance of strength, and that the line opposite the Mantineans would be formed the more firmly.

Now as he gave these orders at the very moment of the charge, and on a sudden, the consequence was, that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move on, (they were for this offence afterwards banished from Sparta, being thought to have shown cowardice,) and that so the enemy closed with them before any thing could be done; and moreover, that when he ordered the Sciritae to rejoin their comrades, since the lochi did not move on to their support, neither could these now fill up the line.

But when the Lacedaemonians were most decidedly and in every respect beaten in point of skill, at that very time they proved themselves no less superior in point of courage.

For when they had come to close quarters with their opponents, though the right wing of the Mantineans broke their Sciritan and Brasidean corps, and the Mantineans and their allies, with the thousand picked men of the Argives, rushing in through the open and unclosed part of the line, cut up the Lacedaemonians, having surrounded and broken them, and drove them to the baggage waggons, and killed some of the veterans who were posted as a guard over them:

though in this part of the field, I say, the Lacedaemonians were worsted, yet with the rest of their forces, and especially the centre, where was King Agis, and around him the three hundred horsemen, as they are called, they fell on the veterans of the Argives, and what are named the five lochi, with the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and those of the Athenians who were posted next to them, and put them to flight; the majority not having even waited to close with them, but having, on the approach of the Lacedaemonians, immediately given way, and some of them having been even trodden under foot, in their hurry to avoid being anticipated and overtaken.

When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way on this side, their line was now broken off both ways; while at the same time the right wing of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans was surrounding the Athenians with the troops which outflanked them, and they were encompassed with danger on both sides, as they were being surrounded on one, and were already beaten on the other. Indeed they would have suffered most severely of all the army, if the presence of their cavalry had not been of service to them.

It happened too, that Agis, on perceiving the Lacedaemonian left wing, which was opposed to the Montineans and the thousand Argives, to be hard pressed, gave orders for the whole army to advance to the support of the division which was being defeated.

And when this was done, the Athenians meanwhile, as the enemy's forces passed on and withdrew from them, escaped at their leisure, and with them the beaten division of the Argives. The Mantineans and their allies, on the other hand, and the picked men of the Argives, were no longer disposed to press on their adversaries; but seeing their own side defeated, and the Lacedaemonians advancing against them, they took to flight.

And of the Mantineans many were slain, but of the picked Argives the great majority escaped. However, the flight and retreat were not hard pressed, nor to any great distance; for though the Lacedaemonians, until they have routed their enemies, fight for a long time, and stubbornly, as regards standing their ground; yet when they have routed them, they pursue but for a short time and for a little distance.

Of such a character then, and answering as nearly as possible to this description, was the battle—the greatest that had occurred for a very long time amongst the Greeks, and fought by the most considerable states.

The Lacedaemonians, after piling their arms in front of the enemy's dead, immediately erected a trophy, and stripped the slain; and taking up their own dead carried them back to Tegea, where they were buried, while they restored the enemy's under truce.

There were killed, of the Argives, Orneans, and Cleonaeans, seven hundred; of the Mantineans, two hundred; and the same number of the Athenians including the Aeginetans, with their generals. On the side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer to such an extent that any number worth mentioning were killed; and of themselves it was difficult to learn the truth, but about three hundred were said to have fallen.

Now when the engagement was about to take place, Pleistoanax also, the other king, set out to their aid with those who were above and below the usual age for service, and reached as far as Tegea, but went back again on hearing of the victory.

The Lacedaemonians sent, too, and turned back the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus; and having themselves returned and dismissed their allies, they kept the festival; (for it happened to be the time of their Carnea).

And the imputations which at that time were urged against them by the Greeks, both on the score of cowardice in consequence of their disaster in the island, and of their bad management and dilatoriness in other respects, they wiped out by this one action; having been, as was now thought, reduced by fortune, but still the same men at heart.

Now the day before this battle it also happened that the Epidaurians with all their forces invaded the Argive territory, and cut off in great numbers, when they came out to give them battle, those of the Argives who were left behind to keep guard. Moreover, when three thousand of the Elean heavy-armed had come after the battle to the succour of the Mantineans, and a thousand Athenians in addition to their former force, all these allies at once marched against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were keeping the Carnea; and dividing the work between them, they began a wall of circumvallation round the city. And though the rest abandoned the work, the Athenians finished it round the promontory called the Heraeum, the part which had been assigned to them. And having all joined in leaving a garrison in this fortress, they returned to their several cities. And so the summer ended.

At the beginning of the following winter, the Lacedaemonians, after they had celebrated the Carnean festival, immediately took the field; and on arriving at Tegea, sent on to Argos proposals for an accommodation.

For there had been there previously a party in their interest, and desirous of putting down the democracy at Argos; and since the battle had been fought, they were much better able to persuade the people at large to the proposed arrangement. Their wish was, after first concluding a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, then, in the second place, to enter into alliance with them; and so at length to attack the democracy.

Accordingly, there came from the Lacedaemonians to Argos, Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, who was proxenus for the Argives, bearing two proposals, one as to the mode in which they should carry on hostilities, if they preferred it; the other, as to the footing on which they should remain at peace, if they preferred that. And after there had been much controversy on the subject, (for Alcibiades also happened to be present,) the party who negotiated for the Lacedaemonians, and who now ventured to do so openly, prevailed on the Argives to accept the proposal for an accommodation; which was to this effect:

It seems good to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians to enter into agreement with the Argives on the following conditions:—That they shall restore their children to the Orchomenians, their men to the Maenalians, and the men deposited at Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians. That they shall evacuate Epidaurus, and demolish their fortification there:

and that if the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared enemies to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, with the allies of both those states.—

That if the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, they shall restore them to all the states.—

That with respect to the offering to the god, the Epidaurians shall be at liberty to take an oath on the subject, and that the Argives shall allow them to do so.—

That the states in the Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be all independent, according to the institutions of their fathers.—

That if any of those beyond the Peloponnese come against the Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, they shall repel the invader by common counsel, on such terms as shall seem most just for the Peloponnesians.—

That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedaemonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the allies of the Lacedaemonians and of the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—

That the contracting parties shall show these conditions to the allies, and enter into agreement with them, if they seem satisfactory to them; but that if any thing else seem good to the allies, they shall send them away home.

This proposal the Argives in the first place accepted, and the army of the Lacedaemonians returned home from Tegea. Afterwards, when intercourse with each other was now held by them, not long subsequently the same party again contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and conclude a treaty and alliance with the Lacedaemonians; which were to this effect:

The following are the terms on which it seemed good to the Lacedaemonians and Argives that a treaty and alliance should be concluded between them for fifty years.—That they shall afford to each other judicial decision of differences, on fair and equal terms, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That the other states in the Peloponnese shall participate in this treaty and alliance, as independent and self-governed, retaining their own possessions, and affording fair and equal judicial decisions, according to the institutions of their fathers.—

That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedaemonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives on the same footing as the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—

That if a common expedition to any quarter should be required, the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it, deciding as may be most just for the allies.—

That if any of the states, either in the Peloponnese or out of it, have any points of dispute, whether concerning their borders or any thing else, they shall be judicially decided.—That if any of the allied states should have a quarrel with another, they shall have recourse to the arbitration of whatever third state may be thought impartial by both.—That the private citizens in each state shall have their causes tried according to the institutions of their fathers.

This then was the treaty and alliance that was concluded; and whatever belonging to each other they had taken in the war, or whatever other ground of difference existed between them, they came to a settlement of all such matters. And as they now arranged their measures in concert, they adopted a resolution not to receive any herald or embassy from the Athenians, unless they withdrew from the Peloponnese, and evacuated their forts;

and neither to make peace nor carry on war with any, except conjointly. And besides conducting their other measures with vehemence, they both of them sent ambassadors to the Thrace-ward towns, and to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join their league. He did not, however, immediately separate from the Athenians, but purposed doing so, because he saw that the Argives had also; for he himself was originally from Argos. They likewise renewed their former oaths with the Chalcidians, and bound themselves by new ones.

Moreover, the Argives sent ambassadors to the Athenians, commanding them to evacuate their fortress in Epidaurus. They therefore, seeing themselves to be but few against many who joined in garrisoning it, sent Demosthenes to lead their men out of it; who having arrived, and instituted, by way of pretext, a gymnastic contest outside the fortress, when the rest of the garrison had gone out, shut the gates upon them. Afterwards, having renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves gave up the fortress.

Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Argives from the confederacy, the Mantineans, after first holding out, and then finding themselves unable to do so without the Argives, came to terms on their part also with the Lacedaemonians, and relinquished their sovereignty over the cities.

And now the Lacedaemonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, took the field together, and the Lacedaemonians by themselves went and put the government of Sicyon into the hands of a smaller num ber than before, and then both of them together also put down the democracy at Argos, an oligarchy being established, in accordance with the interests of the Lacedaemonians. These things occurred at the close of the winter, when spring was now near at hand; and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

The following summer, the inhabitants of Dium on Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedaemonians settled the affairs of Achaia, which before had not been suitable to their views.

And now the commons party at Argos, gradually combining and recovering their spirits, made an attack upon the oligarchical party, having watched their opportunity, when it was just the time of the Lacedaemonian Gymnopaediae. And a battle having been fought in the city, the commons gained the victory, and slew some of them, and banished others.

The Lacedaemonians, while their friends had been sending for them a long time before, did not go; but at length put off the Gymnopaediae, and marched to their aid. On hearing at Tegea that the oligarchical party had been defeated, they would not advance any farther, though entreated by those who had escaped;

but returned home, and kept the Gymnopaediae. Afterwards, when ambassadors had come both from the Argives in the city and from those driven out of it, and when the allies also were present, and much had been said on both sides, they decided that the party in the city were in the wrong, and resolved to march against Argos; but much delay and procrastination ensued.

In the mean time the commons at Argos were afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and as they courted the alliance of Athens again, and thought it would be of the greatest service to them, they built long walls to the sea; that if they should be excluded from the use of the land, the importation of things by sea, through the help of the Athenians, might be of benefit to them.

Some of the cities in the Peloponnese were also privy to their building these walls. The Argives therefore were engaged in the work with all their population, themselves, their wives, and their slaves; while there came to them from Athens carpenters and stone-masons. And so the summer ended.

The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians were aware of their building the walls, they marched against Argos, both themselves and their allies, excepting the Corinthians; communication being also held with them from Argos itself. The leader of the army was Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

With regard, then, to the advantages which they thought they had secured in the city itself, nothing more came of them; but the walls that were being built, they took and demolished. And having taken Hysiae, a town in the Argive territory, and put to the sword all the free-men they got into their hands, they returned, and dispersed to their respective cities.

After this, the Argives, in their turn, marched against the Phliasian country, and laid it waste before they returned, because they harboured their exiles; for the greater part of them had settled there.

The Athenians ravaged, too, during the same winter a part of Macedonia also, charging Perdiccas with the league he had entered into with the Argives and Lacedaemonians; and with the fact, that when they had prepared to lead an army against the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, he had proved false to his allies, and the armament was chiefly broken up in consequence of his having deserted the cause. He was therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war.

The next summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized three hundred men, who were still thought to be suspicious characters, and to favour the cause of the Lacedaemonians; and these the Athenians deposited in the neighbouring islands within their dominions. The Athenians also undertook an expedition against the island of Melos, with thirty ships of their own, six of the Chians, two of the Lesbians, sixteen hundred of their own heavy-armed, three hundred bowmen, twenty mounted archers, and about five thousand five hundred heavy-armed of the allies and the islanders.

Now the Melians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and would not submit to the Athenians, like the rest of the islanders, but at first remained quiet as neutrals, and then, when the Athenians tried to compel them by devastating their land, went openly to war with them.

The generals therefore, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes, and Tisias son of Tisimachus, having gone and encamped in their territory with this armament, before injuring any part of the land, first sent ambassadors to hold a conference with them. These the Melians did not introduce to their popular assembly, but desired them to state the objects of their mission before the magistrates and the few. The ambassadors of the Athenians then spoke as follows:

Ath.

Since our words are not to be addressed to your populace, in order that the many may not be deceived, forsooth, by hearing at once in one continuous oration persuasive and irrefutable arguments, (for we know that this is the meaning of your introducing us to the few,) do ye who are seated here in congress pursue a still more cautious method. For do not ye, either, make one continuous speech on the several topics, but immediately taking us up at whatever does not appear to be advanced in accordance with your interest, decide that question. And first tell us if you are pleased with what we propose.

The commissioners of the Melians made this reply:

Mel.

The fairness of thus calmly instructing each other is open to no objection: but your preparations for war, which are already here, and not merely coming, appear to be at variance with it. For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what will be said; and that the issue of the conference will in all probability bring us war, if we are stronger in the justice of our cause, and therefore refuse to submit; or slavery, if we are convinced by you.

Ath.

If now you have met to argue upon suspicions of the future, or to do any thing else but to consult for your country with a view to its preservation, according to what is present and before your eyes, we will stop; but if for this object, we will speak.

Mel.

It is but natural and pardonable for men so circumstanced to have recourse to many things, both in thinking and speaking. However, this our meeting is held with a view to our preservation; and let the discussion proceed, if you please, in the way which you propose.

Ath.

We then shall not ourselves advance fair pretences, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of having overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you because we are being injured-and so make a long speech which would not be believed; nor do we wish you to think of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the standard of the Lacedaemonians, though you were their colony; or that you have done us no wrong. But we advise you, according to the real sentiments of us both, to think of getting what you can; since you know, and are speaking to those who know, that, in the language of men, what is estimated by equality of power compel; but what is possible is that which the stronger practise, and to which the weak submit.

Mel.

So far then as our opinion goes, it is for our advantage (for we must, since you have so prescribed, speak of what is expedient, to the neglect of what is right) that you should not take away what is a common benefit; but that for every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable should also be considered right; and that if he can gain assent to something which ails short of strict justice, he should have the benefit of it. And this is not less for your interest; in as much, as you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern for inflicting the heaviest vengeance upon you.

Ath.

Nay, for our part, we are not disheartened about the end of our empire, even should it be brought to an end. For it is not those who rule over others, like the Lacedaemonians, that are to be feared by the vanquished. Nor is it with the Lacedaemonians that we have to struggle, but with the possibility of our subjects in any quarter by themselves attacking and overpowering those who have had rule over them.

So on this point let the danger be left to us. But that we are come here for the benefit of our empire, and that we shall also speak on the present occasion for the preservation of your country, on these points we will give you proofs; since we wish to maintain our own sovereignty over you without trouble, and to have you preserved for the advantage of us both.

Mel.

And how then could it prove advantageous for us to serve, as it is for you to govern?

Ath.

Because you would have the benefit of submitting before you suffered the last extremities; while we should be gainers by not destroying you.

Mel.

But would you not accept our proposals, on condition of our remaining quiet, and being friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side?

Ath.

No; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our weakness, but your hatred, of our power.

Mel.

And do your subjects then take such a view of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases your colonists, and in some cases having revolted from you, have been reduced to subjection?

Ath.

Why, for an argument resting on justice they think that neither of us are at a loss; but that on the ground of their power they escape, and we, through fear, abstain from attacking them. So that, besides our ruling over more subjects, you would also through your subjection confer security upon us; especially by the fact that you who are islanders, and weaker too than some others, did not escape our dominion, who have the command of the sea.

Mel.

And do you consider that there is no security in that other case? (For here again, as you have excluded us from appeals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations of your advantage, we too must explain what is expedient for us, and so endeavour to persuade you, if the same happen to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to the present case, they reckon that some time or other you will proceed against them also? And by that course what do you do, but aggrandize your present enemies, and bring those upon you against their will who would never else be likely to become hostile to you?

Ath.

Why, we do not consider those who live any where on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will long delay taking precautions against us, to be so formidable to us as those who are islanders any where without being under our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule are now exasperated against us. For it is these who would most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and us into danger that was evident beforehand.

Mel.

Surely then, if you run such a risk not to be deprived of your empire, and those who are already in subjection, to be released from it; for us who are still free it were great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every thing before we submit to it.

Ath.

No; not at least if you take a sensible view of the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for honour, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating for your preservation, to avoid resisting those who are far stronger than yourselves.

Mel.

But we know that warlike measures sometimes come to more impartial results than might have been expected from the different numbers on each side. And in our case to yield is immediate despair; but by making an effort there is yet hope of our keeping ourselves up.

Ath.

Hope, which is the solace of danger, when entertained by those who have abundant means, though it may injure, yet does not ruin them. But in the case of those who risk all they have on a throw, (for it is naturally an extravagant passion,) it is only found out at the time of their ruin, and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it is found out.

Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging on one single turn of the scale, be desirous of this fate, nor of resembling the greater part of mankind, who, when they might have been saved by human means, after visible hopes have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such as are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting upon them.

Mel.

Difficult indeed even we, be well assured, consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that in point of fortune we shall, by the favour of the gods, not be worsted, because we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and that our deficiency in power will be made up by our Lacedaemonian allies; who are under a necessity of succouring us, if for no other reason, yet on account of our connexion with them, and for very shame.

Ath.

As regards then the favour of heaven, we trust that we too shall not fall short of it: since we are not requiring or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with respect to the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves.

For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that, in obedience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor were the first to carry it out when enacted; but having received it when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force for ever, we only avail ourselves of it; knowing that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would do the same.

And so, with regard to the gods, we are with good reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion respecting the Lacedaemonians, according to which you trust, that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will assist you; though we bless your simplicity, we do not admire your folly.

For with respect to themselves, and the institutions of their country, the Lacedaemonians do indeed to a very great extent practise virtue; but with respect to others, though we might descant at length on their conduct towards them, speaking most concisely we should declare, that of all the men we are acquainted with, most evident consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is exedient to be just. And yet such a view of things is not in favour of your present unreasonable hopes of safety.

Mel.

But it is on this very ground that we now rely on their sense of interest, and believe that they will not be tray us Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the confidence of those Greeks who wish them well, while they help those who are hostile to them.

Ath.

Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honour are practised with danger; a course on which the Lacedaemonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture.

Mel.

Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would regard them as less hazardous than in the case of others; in as much as we he near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be.

Ath.

Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea.

Mel.

But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation.

Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country.

Ath.

On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others.

But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allowing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this.

For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful as the attendant on folly than on fortune.

Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard; and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful.

Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting, which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful.

So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, having been left to themselves, as they still thought pretty nearly the same as they had maintained in the discussion, gave the following answer:

We neither think differently from what we did at first, Athenians, nor will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which has now been inhabited seven hundred years; but trusting to the fortune which, by the favour of heaven, has hitherto preserved it, and to the help of man, especially of the Lacedaemonians, we will endeavour to save ourselves.

But we propose to you that we should be your friends, and the enemies of neither party; and that you should retire from our country after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both sides.

Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said:

Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as appears to us, consider what is future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already occurring, because you wish it; and having staked and relied most on [ such things as] Lacedaemonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will also be most disappointed.

So the Athenian ambassadors returned to their forces: and their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to their proposals, immediately proceeded to apply themselves to war; and having divided the work between the different states, enclosed the Melians with lines on all sides.

Afterwards, the Athenians left a part of their own troops and the allies, to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with the main body of the forces. Those who were left behind remained and besieged the place.

About the same time an Argive force invaded the Phliasian territory, and being intercepted by an ambuscade of the Phliasians and their allies, were cut off to the number of eighty.

And now the Athenians at Pylus took great spoils from the Lacedaemonians; in consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, though even then they did not renounce the treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of their people who pleased might plunder the Athenians.

Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities with the Athenians for some private quarrels of their own;

but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market-place, and slew some of the men; and having carried in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and kept quiet; while the Athenians made better provision for the guard in future. And so the summer ended.

The following winter, the Lacedaemonians intended to march against the Argive territory, but returned on finding, when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not favourable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Argives, suspecting a certain party in their city, seized some of them, while others escaped them.

About the same time, the Melians again took a part of the Athenian lines in another direction, the garrison not being numerous.

A fresh force having afterwards come from Athens in consequence of these occurrences, under the command of Philocrates son of Demeas, and the inhabitants being now vigorously blockaded, after there had also been some treachery practised by their own men, they surrendered at discretion to the Athenians;

who put to death all the Melian adults they took, and made slaves of the children and women. As for the country, they afterwards sent out five hundred colonists, and inhabited it themselves.